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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis aims to provide a detailed historical narrative of Israel’s 
relationship with the Occupied Territories between the years 1967 and 
1977, using the most up-to-date archival material. The central argument 
of the thesis is that successive Israeli governments lacked a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term policy towards the Occupied Territories; it is 
the contention of this thesis that there is no documentary evidence to 
support the common belief that successive Israeli governments had a 
comprehensive long-term territorial policy. It is true that successive 
Israeli governments made decisions based on several long-term plans and 
approaches, such as the Allon Plan and the Functional Solution, but, when 
put into context and viewed as a whole, these decisions were neither 
coherent nor comprehensive and in any case were never formally adopted 
by the government.  
 
In trying to explain why successive governments failed to put forward a 
coherent and comprehensive long-term policy, four major contributing 
factors have been identified: the faction-based politics of the Labour 
Party, the US position vis-à-vis Israel, New Zionism and the intention of 
successive Prime Ministers to avoid formulating a clear long-term policy. 
The need to maintain unity, and avoid a split amongst the factions, 
ensured that the Labour Party was unable and unwilling to take a clear 
and unequivocal stand on the issue of the Occupied Territories; the US 
diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Israel exacerbated existing divisions, while 
strengthening the positions of those who argued in favour of avoiding 
taking clear decisions on the Occupied Territories; the rise of New 
Zionism changed the dynamics and landscape of the Israeli political 
system in a way that weakened Mapai’s, and later the Labour Party’s, 
ability to dictate territorial policy; lastly, successive Prime Ministers 
(Eshkol, Meir and Rabin) made clear choices against the formulation of a 
coherent and comprehensive long-term policy.  
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Note on the Transliteration 
 
 
The thesis uses the transliteration system adopted by the Encyclopaedia Judaica for 
both Hebrew and Arab names and terms.
1 The diacritical signs are written as vowels, 
for example דחואמה ץוביקה is transliterated as Hakibbutz Hameuhad. The consonant א 
is not transliterated; instead its diacritical sign is used. In addition the consonant ע is 
rendered as (‘), this is also used in regards to the Arabic ع. In order to avoid 
confusion, the Hebrew consonant י when at the beginning of a name is transliterated 
as (Y), e.g. Yisrael Galili.  
 
In order to make the vocalisation easier the Hebrew Consonant צ is transliterated as 
(Tz) as opposed to the normal (Z); in addition the Hebrew Consonants ח is (H), ק (K), 
ש (Sh or S). One exception has been the transliteration of the Arabic Consonants خ as 
(Kh) and ح (H).  
 
To make it easier to vocalise, the Hebrew Consonant צ is transliterated as (Tz) as 
opposed to the normal (Z). To provide an example of the approach this thesis uses, the 
Hebrew Name גוצרה בקעי is transliterated as Ya’akov Hertzog. 
 
Finally, in many cases, and where relevant, the English or internationally known term 
has been used, e.g. the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 “Transliteration,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1 (Second Edition, Farmington Hills, 2007), Page 197. 
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  8Introduction 
 
Government and Politics are interesting when problems are difficult. The most 
fascinating problems are likely to be on the agenda for a long time without being 
solved in any final sense. Attention may come and go. Individual episodes may find 
their treatment, but the same underlying problems will return.
2 
 
Following the Six Day War,
3 Opposition member Uri Avneri asked for the 
government’s inclination regarding the Occupied Territories. Avneri was particularly 
interested to know how the Eshkol government saw the future of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. In his view there were four possible scenarios: to exchange the 
territories for peace with Israel’s Arab neighbours, to annex the territories, to 
transform the territories into a Palestinian state, or to create a pseudo colony in the 
territories whereby Israel would informally annex the territories without allowing the 
Palestinians to become Israeli citizens. Avneri proposed that the best long-term option 
for Israel would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
4 The 
discussion that ensued involved not only those territories mentioned by Avneri, but 
also the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the future of East Jerusalem.
5  
 
In the aftermath of the Six Day War Israel faced a new reality. The war left Israel in 
possession of territories three and a half times its own size and a population of over 
one million Arabs. The occupation of Arab lands and people posed numerous 
problems for Israel, particularly with security and the economy, but also with some 
complex demographic and diplomatic challenges. Israel needed to take into account 
the complexity of these problems and define its approach towards them, not only in a 
manner that addressed the challenges but also in a way that corresponded to its 
national objectives. The problem of defining such an approach was further 
complicated by the need to reach a consensus within the confines of the National 
Unity Government. The government’s first objective was to reach a decision 
regarding Israel’s future borders, i.e. which of the territories it wanted to retain and 
from which it was willing to withdraw as part of a negotiated settlement. However, 
                                                 
2 Ira Sharkansky, Ambiguity, Coping, and Governance: Israeli Experiences in Politics, Religion, and 
Policymaking (Westport, Praeger, 1999), Page 1. 
3 The use of the term Six Day War (also known as the June War) throughout this thesis reflects the fact 
that the thesis deals with the Israeli state and government. 
4 Knesset Transcripts/Booklet 32/Meeting 184/Page 2346. 
5 Ronald Ranta, The Seventh Day (MSc, 2005), Page 25. 
  9this decision was, to a certain degree, dependent upon whether the government 
adopted an Instrumental or Normative standpoint in relation to the territories.
6 It was 
a question of whether the territories would be viewed in relation to their perceived 
military-strategic importance (i.e. Instrumental), or their perceived historical and 
religious significance (i.e. Normative). This question was applicable not only to the 
Occupied Territories as a collective notion, but also towards each individual territory. 
Additionally, the government needed to agree on a mechanism of administering the 
Occupied Territories as well as on the required level of economic and social 
interaction. This included making a decision on the viability and necessity of 
settlements.   
 
On the 19
th of June 1967, the Eshkol government managed to reach a consensus 
regarding most of the Occupied Territories. It decided to annex East Jerusalem and 
the Gaza Strip and to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Height in 
exchange for peace agreements. The government failed to reach a consensus in regard 
to the West Bank, as its vote on the matter ended in a stalemate.
7 The government 
failed to decide on the issue of settlements and the matter was dropped from further 
discussions. The failure to decide on the issue of the West Bank is referred to as the 
‘decision not to decide’. 
 
However, in the absence of direct negotiations with its Arab neighbours, Israel 
eventually reversed its decision. The proclamations of the Khartoum Summit 
convinced many Israeli politicians of the lack of credible peace partners. The earlier 
government resolution, agreeing to a land-for-peace approach, was consigned to the 
history books.
8 In this environment of uncertainty, policy makers appeared unable to 
agree on a clear vision for the future of the territories. Instead, they settled for a 
muddled and ad-hoc approach that did not address Israel’s future relationship with the 
Occupied Territories and its population. In a sense, Israel had de-facto decided not to 
make a decision on the long-term future of the territories. 
 
                                                 
6 Ofira Seliktar, New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel (London, Croom Helm, 1986), 
Pages 156-157 
7 Rueven Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment: Israel and the Territories after the Six Day War 
(Tel Aviv, Yad Tabenkin, 1996) (Hebrew), Page 55 
8 Dan Bavly, Dreams and Missed Opportunities 1967-1973 (Jerusalem, Carmel, 2002) (Hebrew), Page 
42. 
  10This thesis examines the period from the aftermath of the Six Day War to the Labour 
Party’s electoral defeat in 1977. The period chosen represents a particular 
chronological timeframe and the first attempt by the Labour Party at defining Israel’s 
relationship with the Occupied Territories. The research contends that during this 
period, successive Israeli governments did not grasp the opportunity to define Israel’s 
long-term relationship with the Occupied Territories. With the exception of East 
Jerusalem, Israel did not take a strategic decision regarding the territories; in fact, no 
coherent long-term policy was formulated, approved or implemented during the entire 
period. It is important to note that  this is not an indictment against a specific 
government, as successive Israeli governments avoided defining Israel’s long-term 
territorial policy. These governments were undermined by individual ministers, and 
hampered by the polarisation of views within the Coalition and the dominant Labour 
Party factions. Additionally, the Eshkol and Rabin governments lacked a consistent 
decision-making process and were troubled by weak leadership and internal fighting.  
 
Internal and external forces played a significant part in the government’s inability to 
conceive and implement such a policy. Internally, the rebirth of Israeli nationalism in 
the form of Religious Zionism or New Zionism,
9 and renewed religious fervour, 
combined with the transitional state of the Israeli society - which underwent 
demographic as well as cultural changes - had the effect of hardening the 
government’s position and causing a shift to the right among the electorate.
10 The 
formation of Gush-Emunim can be seen as the culmination of this shift in public 
attitude. Externally, the lack, at times, of US pressure on Israel, the resumed hostilities 
with the Arab neighbours, the rise in terrorist attacks and the lack of suitable 
negotiation partners, all compounded the government’s indecisions. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is three-fold. First, the thesis provides a detailed historical 
analysis - based on the most up-to-date archival material - of Israel’s relationship with 
the Occupied Territories, between the years 1967 and 1977. This analysis includes a 
detailed account of the specific challenges posed by the occupation of the territories 
and their population, and the approaches and plans that were proposed in order to 
                                                 
9 Seliktar, New Zionism Page X.  
10 Samuel J. Roberts, Party and Policy in Israel: The Battle between Hawks and Doves (London, 
Westview Press, 1990), Page 39. 
  11address them. Through the historical narrative, the thesis charts the evolution of 
policy-makers’ approaches, plans, decisions and views towards the territories. 
Additionally, the thesis situates these issues within the context of Israel’s political 
environment - domestic and international - including its relationship with the US, and 
the role played by the Labour Party and its elites. In short, this thesis provides an 
encompassing analysis of Israel’s relationship with the Occupied Territories within a 
historical narrative, based on newly released primary sources.  
 
Second, this thesis questions whether successive governments, under the leadership of 
the Labour Party, had a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy towards the 
Occupied Territories that addressed Israel’s main concerns and was in accordance 
with its stated objectives. By examining Israel’s decisions regarding the specific 
problems posed by the occupation, this thesis will demonstrate that successive Israeli 
governments had no such policy. This statement is made with regard to specific 
governments as well as successive governments. The research will show that, during 
the period, it was common practice for policies to be formulated and implemented on 
an ad-hoc basis, and for decisions that would only provide short-term solutions to be 
taken by the various bodies (most notably by or at the behest of the Defence Ministry 
and the Ministerial Settlement Committee). It would appear that none of the 
governments that form the subject of this thesis ever tried to define Israel’s position 
vis-à-vis the Occupied Territories. On the contrary, these governments chose, for 
matters of self preservation and political convenience, not to do so. The majority of 
the plans formulated during the period never made it to the government and were 
never approved. The Allon Plan, which is considered to be the blueprint upon which 
the Labour Party’s territorial approach was based, was never voted on or approved of. 
Even though some of the government’s approaches and policies derived from the 
Allon Plan, the plan itself was never implemented as a whole. Moreover, on numerous 
occasions, the Labour Party, the government and even Allon himself took decisions 
that contradicted the Allon Plan.  
 
Lastly, this thesis analyses the reasons behind this lack of long-term policy - a flaw 
that was displayed by each individual government and by successive governments 
during a 10-year period. There has never been substantial research into the reasons 
behind the inability of successive Israeli governments, under the leadership of the 
  12Labour Party, to put forward a clear and comprehensive policy that would define its 
relationship with the Occupied Territories. In this respect this research is an attempt to 
resolve this long-standing question, by providing an explanation for Israel’s lack of 
policy. Why is it that successive governments failed to deal with the problem? There 
has been some indirect research into this question, but the existing literature deals 
with the subject tangentially, either as part of a study into a related subject, or as part 
of a broader study of the Israeli state. In this respect, there has been a great deal of 
research on issues such as: the settlements, the military occupation, domestic factors 
behind Israel’s territorial policies and the relationship between the Labour Party and 
the territories. However, no specific research has ever been conducted into the 
question of Israel’s long-term approach towards the Occupied Territories and their 
population. Therefore, this research breaks new ground and provides a unifying 
framework for previous studies.  
 
The following is a general review of the existing studies of Israel’s approach towards 
the Occupied Territories, which were conducted either as part of a broader study of or 
an examination of a particular aspect. These studies are divided into four general 
categories: the economy, the settlements phenomenon, the military and security, and 
the political and diplomatic spheres. This survey provides important background 
information on the issues and subjects that will be examined in this thesis, and 
examines where gaps exist in our current understanding of the subject.  
 
The Economy 
 
There has been little published research on the subject of Israel’s economic policies 
towards the Occupied Territories; the majority of the research has been carried out by 
Israeli government sources, in particular the Bank of Israel and the Defence Ministry. 
This research analyses the effects of Israel’s economic relationship with the 
‘administered territories’ and the main economic trends. It does not deal with Israel’s 
economic decision-making process regarding the Occupied Territories, nor does it try 
to address the question of whether Israel had a long-term economic policy for the 
territories. This research generally points to the beneficial economic relationship and 
  13highlights the positive effect this had on the Occupied Territories, in areas such as 
living standards, GDP, agricultural output and employment rates.
11  
 
Nevertheless, the non-governmental literature is very clear about Israel’s economic 
plans and policies towards the Occupied Territories: ‘In the absence of a guiding 
policy, reality spun its own policy’.
12 The Israeli economy dictated to a large extent 
the level of integration and interaction. The majority of the decisions taken had less to 
do with government policy and planning and more to do with the ‘inexorable 
economic forces on both sides’.
13 The disparity between the economies was such that 
the territories became a net importer of Israeli produce, while offering in return the 
only commodity they had, i.e. cheap labour.
14 The Open Bridges policy can serve as 
an example of this trend. The policy stemmed from Dayan’s conviction that allowing 
free movement between the West Bank and the Arab world would help raise living 
standards and allow indefinite Israeli rule.
15 However, Teveth claims that this policy 
did not stem from Dayan’s drawing board. Instead, it was a response to Palestinian 
traders smuggling produce into Jordan.
16 The ruling elites could not agree on the level 
of integration between the two economies and the desired economic relations, and this 
was highlighted by the clash between Sapir and Dayan.
17 In ensuring that the interests 
of the home economy were protected, Israel’s economic approach is probably best 
summed up by Larry Fabian: ‘Israel would not allow them [the Occupied Territories] 
to be a net budget burden’.
18 
 
There is a dissenting view that argues that Israel might not have sought a specific 
policy but, over time, it became accustomed to the territories serving as a secondary 
                                                 
11 Arie Bergman, Economic Growth in the Administered Areas 1968-1973 (Jerusalem, Bank of Israel 
Research Department, 1974), Pages 4-8.  
12 Shabtai Teveth, The Cursed Blessing: The Story of Israel’s Occupation of the West Bank (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), Page 336. 
13 Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Territories: A study in Control 1967-1977 (Ramat Gan, Turtledove, 
1978), Page 36. 
14 Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, “The Political Economy of the Administrated Territories”, in 
Daniel J. Elazar (ed), Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future (Washington, 
American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, 1982), Page 133. 
15 Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 
(New York, Times Books, 2006), Page 131. 
16 Teveth, The Cursed Blessing Pages 138-151. 
17 Yael Yishai, Land or Peace, Whither Israel? (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1987), Page 73. 
18 Brain Van Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies 
since 1967 (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International peace, 1977), Page 12. 
  14market for its goods. This view suggests that Israel manipulated the territories’ 
economy to suit its needs by encouraging the transition of cheap labour, regulating 
trade and restricting the flow of competing commodities.
19 In conclusion, and to 
reflect on the prevailing consensus, Van Arkadie states that, while the government 
manipulated the economic interaction to its advantage, it did not ‘conceive or attempt 
to implement any systematic, large-scale plan to alter the economic structure of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip’ and there was no ‘Israeli master-plan’.
20  
  
The Settlements  
 
There is no doubt that Israel established numerous settlements and outposts 
throughout the period in all of the territories it occupied. Moreover, there is no doubt 
that Israel formulated, approved and implemented settlement policies during the 
period. These, however, were driven more by interest groups and the personal 
agendas of Dayan, Allon and Galili, than by clear policies.
21 Yishai argues that 
Israel’s settlement activities can be divided into three periods; the Eshkol, the Meir 
and the Rabin periods. She describes the initial settlement period as ‘semi-private 
initiatives that prompted the government’s consent’ and that during the Meir period, 
settlement activity increased, with the initiative increasingly coming from the 
government. However, she claims, ‘there was a discernible gap between decisions and 
their implementation’. During the third period, she states that, even though settlement 
activity had increased, it was still ‘indecisive’.
  22 Yishai describes the settlement 
policy as an unapproved Allon Plan, but that it was not the state that was in charge of 
the policy’s implementation.
23 Gazit adds that this was a result of the state having a 
special settlement committee which only dealt with the authorisation of projects, but 
not with the fundamental implications of the settlement policy.
24 On the one hand, 
some of these projects did not emanate from the state, but from individuals and 
interest groups. On the other hand, this lack of a clear guiding policy matched the 
government’s settlement approach. The government sought to create ‘facts on the 
                                                 
19 Van Arkadie, Page 14. 
20 Van Arkadie, Pages 37-38. 
21 Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment Pages 162-163. 
22 Yishai, Land or Peace Pages 41, 46 and 53. 
23 Yishai, Page 195. 
24 Shlomo Gazit, “The Steps towards the Yom Kippur War”, in Ram Erez (ed), Civil-Military 
Relationships in Israel in times of Military Conflict (JCSS Memoranda no. 82, Feb 2006), Page 38. 
  15ground’ rather than spell out a particular policy. The old notion of ‘another dunam’ 
was replaced by ‘another installation and another settlement’.
25 
 
Israel’s settlement policies and activities have been the subject of many extensive 
researches and studies, many of which have been utilised by this thesis. There are, 
however, three important and authoritative studies, which ought to be mentioned: 
Admoni, Harris and Demant. The main writings on the subject are based, to a large 
extent, on these three studies, with the exception of Gorenberg, who based his 
research on newly declassified archival material. Admoni, the former head of the 
Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department, worked side-by-side with Israel’s leaders 
and decision makers, and was involved in the establishment of all 76 settlements and 
outposts in the Occupied Territories; he based his book on these experiences. 
According to Admoni, and despite the fact that he provides some examples to the 
contrary, Israel’s settlement activities in the Occupied Territories were not random but 
deliberate. He argues that settlement activities were in direct response to, and dictated 
by, Israel’s security needs, which included the need to define Israel’s future ‘secure 
borders’.
26  
 
In contrast to Admoni, Harris’ research is unique in that it examines the issue from the 
viewpoint of political geography. He provides an analysis of both the political and 
environmental realities and the social and spatial implications of the settlement policy. 
Moreover, Harris underlines the importance of both the logistical and geographical 
considerations on the settlement programme.  He maintains that Israel’s settlement 
policy was primarily dependent on the ‘shifting balance of personalities and attitudes 
within the domestic political system’. He argues that decision makers initially 
favoured a ‘spatially limited policy concentrating on strategic belts’, but shifted 
towards viewing colonisation as a permanent feature.
27 
 
Demant argues that Harris’ research does not fully explain the mechanics behind 
Israel’s settlement decision-making process. Because of the scarcity of primary 
                                                 
25 Yishai, Land or Peace Page 195. 
26 Yehiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories 1967-1977 (Tel Aviv, 
Yad Tabenkin, 1992) (Hebrew), Page 19. 
27  W.W Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza 
Strip 1967-1980 (New York, Research Studies Press, 1980), Pages 164-165. 
  16sources at the time, Demant relied primarily on interviews, which were conducted 
with the leading members of the settler movement, as well as with numerous 
politicians and public officials associated with the settlement programme. Demant 
claims that settlement policies originated amongst a small group of decision makers, 
consisting mainly of Eshkol, Meir, Galili, Dayan, Allon and Peres. This group did not 
put forward a ‘grand plan’, but instead, a number of ‘competing blueprints with 
mutual overlaps and big hiatuses in between them’. However, he states that, despite 
the vagueness of this settlement policy, many decision makers were ‘pleased with the 
results’. He attributes the lack of clear settlement policy to the controversial nature of 
the issue: ‘Domestically, the whole issue was so explosive that any clear-cut decision 
would probably have led to a breach within the government.’
28 
 
The Military/Security Dimension 
 
Hardly any research has been carried out on either the history of the military 
administration or Israel’s national-security imperatives regarding the Occupied 
Territories. Of note are Gazit’s partially autobiographical accounts of the formation 
and history of the military administration and Israel’s occupation, Gordon’s 
examination of the Israeli occupation, and Nisan’s study of Israel’s control of the 
territories, both of which deal with, among other things, the military aspect. 
 
Israel’s military/security approach can be divided into two components. The first 
deals with the security issues and the conduct of the Israeli Defence Force within the 
territories, while the second part deals with Israel’s broader military/security outlook. 
Israel had three main guidelines in the Occupied Territories: non-intervention, open 
borders and invisibility.
29 According to Gazit, these guidelines were doomed to fail 
even if fully implemented. Moreover, he argues that the Israeli elites diverged and 
moved from these initial policies without understanding the greater implications of 
their actions.
30 Gazit takes this line of argument further; he suggests that Israeli 
government ministers never dealt with the strategic questions regarding the 
                                                 
28 Peter Robert Demant, Ploughshares into Swords: Israeli Settlement Policy in the Occupied 
Territories, 1967-1977 (PhD, 1988), Pages 549-567. 
29 Yehuda Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1997), 
Page 27 
30 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped (Tel Aviv, Zmora-Bitan, 1999) (Hebrew), Pages 288-291. 
  17territories.
31 This wait-and-see policy caused the IDF to pursue very limited goals in 
the Occupied Territories, as it was not given political guidance.
32 In addition, it put a 
big strain on the military and commanders in the field and led to Dayan’s retention of 
powers through the Defence Ministry.
33  
 
With regard to the wider question of borders and security, the Israeli elites created 
new terminology: ‘secure and recognised’ borders. This presented a departure from 
the Ben-Gurion doctrine of pre-emption, towards a security doctrine based on 
strategic depth.
34 This new line of thinking was behind successive governments’ 
decision to hold on to Sharm El-Sheikh, the Jordan Valley and the Rafah Plains. 
However, Roberts argues that the secure borders concept ‘possessed an inherent 
elasticity’ and was redefined according to political ‘requirements’.
35 Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that a new understanding developed within the IDF and the Defence 
Ministry regarding the strategic advantages with which the new territories provided 
Israel.
36 On the broader security issues, the IDF concluded that chances for peace 
were very limited and that a Palestinian independent state was against the interests of 
Israel. They advised the government to proclaim the Jordan River as Israel’s eastern 
security border, not to withdraw from the Golan Heights, not to withdraw from Sharm 
El-Sheikh, and to find a ‘special’ status for the West Bank.
37 It created a situation in 
which the government was being advised by an organisation that was feeding it one 
particular view and was dependent on that channel of information.
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  18The Political and Diplomatic Spheres 
 
There has been substantial research into the impact the occupation of Arab territories 
and population had on the Israeli political system. Moreover, there has been a great 
deal of research into Israel’s relationships with the US and the Arab states, including 
the negotiations over the Occupied Territories. However, the main weakness of most 
of these studies, in particular those written in the 1980’s and 90s, is their lack of 
primary sources. Of particular exception is Pedatzur’s study of the Eshkol 
government’s decision-making process in regard to the Occupied Territories. This is 
primarily because Pedatzur was provided with privileged access to primary sources by 
Yisrael Galili. Pedatzur contends that the decision-making process was held captive 
by a small group of politicians, who failed to properly deal with the Palestinian 
question. This group sowed the seeds of future conflicts by being unable to detach 
themselves from the concepts and understandings they acquired in the aftermath of 
the Six Day War; he refers to this phenomenon as the ‘triumph of embarrassment’.
39 
 
At the political party level, there have been several important studies into the 
relationship between Israel’s political parties and the Occupied Territories. These are 
either studies associated with political science, or with ideology and the rise of the 
Right and New Zionism. This research will be discussed below in connection with the 
Labour Party’s relationship with the territories.  
 
The literature points to two main imperatives facing Israeli governments: deciding 
which track to follow regarding the West Bank, i.e. the Palestinian or Jordanian,
 and 
negotiating with Syria and Egypt over the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. The 
first dilemma occupied policy makers for much of the Eshkol period. Israel eventually 
decided on a Jordanian Approach,
40 although it is questionable whether Israel ever 
pursued a Palestinian Approach seriously.
41 Nonetheless, to argue that Israel actively 
pursued a Jordanian option would be something of an overstatement. It is true that 
Israel relinquished the Palestinian Approach quickly, but it is debatable whether any 
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  19of Israel’s policies towards the West Bank were based on true enthusiasm for the 
Jordanian option.  
 
With regard to its negotiations with the Arab states, Israeli elites were willing in 
principle to exchange land for peace but, in practice, their reliance on delaying 
negotiations and arguing over methods led to diplomatic stagnation.
42 Safran adds 
that Israel ‘did not define formally and specifically’ its end-game, but was willing to 
negotiate for a permanent peace. However, until such negotiations materialised Israel 
would retain the territories.
43 Arguably, while Israel did not decide not to seek peace, 
it did not actively pursue a peace policy.
44 Sasson, however, attributes the absence of 
an Israeli peace initiative and meaningful negotiations, in the period leading to the 
Yom Kippur War, to the lack of credible partners; ‘there was no one to talk to’.
45 
Isaac argues that Israel had two policies: one it had approved of, but could not 
implement, and another it was partially implementing, without fully agreeing upon. 
He claims that Israel agreed to the land-for-peace concept, but the lack of Arab 
reciprocity and popular backing meant the state ‘had a map and could not say so’.
46 
The map and concept that Isaac alludes to is based on Israel’s 19
th of June decisions. 
It is true that the Eshkol government made an attempt to define Israel’s approach. 
However, the June decision cannot be understood as the basis for Israel’s diplomatic 
approach: the document did not deal with the West Bank, it was revoked within 
months, Israel’s ambassador to the US was unaware of it and it was never 
implemented.
47  
 
One of the most important contributing factors to Israel’s policies towards the 
Occupied Territories was the role played by the American administration. The US 
was ‘anxious about the consequences’ of instability and increased USSR involvement 
in the Middle East. The fact that Israel was ‘partly unwilling, partly unable’ to define 
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  20its end-game increased instability and forced the US involvement.
48 There is no doubt 
that successive Israeli governments accepted the notion of territorial concessions and 
land for peace, but it was ‘American pressure, rewards and incentives that made peace 
seem acceptable and the inevitable price worth paying’.
49  
 
 
Lack of Policy 
 
Three main views can be deduced from the literature regarding Israel’s territorial 
policies. First, Israel had a clear policy, at least with regards to its settlement activity, 
which it formulated, approved and implemented. In other words, Israel might not have 
had a clear territorial policy (for whatever reasons), but it did have a clear settlement 
policy. Settlements were built according to Israel’s ‘peace map’, i.e. the Allon Plan;
50 
this view is shared by Admoni and Tzur.
51 This view will be shown to be baseless. 
The thesis will demonstrate that, in fact, Israel did not have a clear long-term 
settlement policy based on the Allon Plan.  
 
Second, Israel had decided not to make a decision and that this ‘non-decision’ was its 
policy of choice. Kieval asserts that the decision not to make a decision was a 
conscious one.
52 Israel had implicitly rejected a formal policy in order to create ‘facts 
on the ground’  while claiming not to have taken a firm decision on the matter. 
According to Gorenberg, the avoidance of policy was a ploy that served the purpose 
of maintaining unity within the Labour Party and the Coalition: ‘It was easier to avoid 
decisions or keep them vague’.
53 Shlaim points to the Galili document to argue that 
they are basically policies of creeping annexation.
54 Roberts adds that the creation of 
settlements was part of Israel’s new security understanding.
55 Pedatzur argues that the 
political impasse was acceptable to Israel, because it allowed for policy flexibility and 
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  21political manoeuvres. He does not agree that the government had a clear policy, but 
contends that the lack of clear policy enabled the government to continue with its 
settlement activities.
56  
 
Third, Israel did not have a clear policy and, because of domestic and international 
factors, was unable to produce one. In fact, Brecher contends that Israel, during the 
period, ‘lacked long-ranged planning in foreign policy’ and that its response to the 
Rogers’ proposals was based on ‘improvisation’.
57 According to Van Arkadie, 
Israel’s lack of a long-term economic policy was not deliberate, but its response to the 
economic forces and its security and political requirements.
58 Sasson contends that 
when it came to formulate a long term policy (1967-1977), Israel avoided doing so 
and the result was military occupation without a diplomatic end-game.
59 
 
Two main approaches, or answers, to the question of Israel’s lack of policy, can be 
deduced from the literature, although it is important to note that none of the studies 
conducted was specifically designed to address this question. The two approaches can 
be broadly interpreted as the Labour Party Approach and the Transitional State 
Approach. This terminology does not exist in the literature and is used here for the 
sake of clarity. By explaining these approaches, the thesis provides some background 
information about the Labour Party and the Israeli political scene. 
 
 
The Labour Party Approach 
 
Beilin argues that the structure and the mechanism of operation of the Labour Party 
were the main reasons, among other things, behind Israel’s inability to put forward a 
clear long-term policy. It stems, in his view, from the process of unification the party 
underwent; Beilin refers to this as the ‘price of unity’.
60  
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  22The history of Israel’s Labour Party has been a fractious and fragmented one. The 
party is better understood as a movement which supported diverse groups who 
occasionally split and/or joined forces. This process of splitting and forming new 
parties under the banner of the Labour movement has been endemic to politics in 
Israel. Therefore, it is no surprise that the unified party did not have clear views and 
tended to incorporate the divergence of opinion within it. The diverse views expressed 
within the party’s factions regarding the Arabs, territorial compromise, Socialism, 
questions of security and foreign policy, and the nature of the Israeli state have been a 
feature of the party from its inception.
61 There were three main topics of debate 
within the Labour movement. First was the power of the elites to dictate the agenda, 
suppress issues and dominate the nomination and patronage system; even though this 
arrogant behaviour served them well in the past,
62 it came to represent a growing gap 
between the Labour elites and the public.
63 Second was the role that Socialism should 
play within the state. Third was deciding on the nature of the Israeli state, its attitude 
towards the Arab world, and its future borders. Latter-day Labour factions 
correspond, to a certain degree, to earlier splits along these debating lines.  
 
Two previous episodes provide insight into the issues and problems that shaped the 
Labour Party: the Partition Plan and the Lavon Affair. In both cases, reaching a 
consensus within the party meant sacrificing party unity and, in both cases, a split in 
the party precipitated a crucial decision on a controversial issue. The Partition Plan 
divided the Labour movement into those who were willing to compromise and accept 
a two-state solution, and those who were not, although the initial signs of 
disagreement between the different constituents of the movement arose in the early 
1930s and were connected to the nature of Socialism; at that juncture, Mapam and 
Mapai represented the two competing approaches. David Ben-Gurion, the leading 
figure of Mapai, accepted the Partition Plan out of necessity and as a diplomatic 
compromise. His counterpart in Ahdut-Ha’avoda, Yitzhak Tabenkin, was unwilling to 
accept the plan.
64 Initially, Ahdut-Ha’avoda was a faction within Mapai known as 
Siya Bet. The debate between Mapai and Ahdut-Ha’avoda concerned the nature of the 
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  23party and the state. Ben-Gurion advocated a policy of Statism and a movement away 
from the social policies advocated by Ahdut-Ha’avoda and Mapam.
  Statism 
represented a policy shift that occurred within Mapai as it changed from being a 
narrowly focused entity, into a party associated with the state and considered to be 
more representative of the nation.
65 Ahdut-Ha’avoda’s opposition to the Partition 
Plan, and to Ben-Gurion’s Statism, caused the faction to split and form an 
independent party.  
 
During the Lavon Affair, the party’s central apparatus was pitted against several of 
the party elites, including its leader. The affair revolved around the discovery of an 
Israeli terrorist organisation in Egypt that sought to implicate the Nasser regime in 
anti-British activities. The story became an affair because of one unanswered 
question: who authorised it? The party was unable to resolve the issue one way or the 
other without risking a major split. The affair went through several stages, which 
ended in a battle between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and the party’s apparatus. Ben-
Gurion’s unwillingness to accept the party’s findings resulted in his resignation and 
the formation of an independent party (Rafi).
66 The affair, or more precisely one of its 
key figures Binyamin Gibli, is referred to as the banana skin that caused Ben-Gurion 
to slip.
67 
 
The Lavon Affair, in particular its last stage, brought about realignment within the 
Labour movement.
68 The Mapai old guard appeared weak and out of touch when 
compared with the young technocrats and former army commanders of Rafi and 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda. The solution to the party’s problems, which were proposed by the 
elites, was unification with Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda. The process was seen as a way 
of preserving the status quo from the Mapai point of view;
69 Rafi and Ahdut-
Ha’avoda viewed it differently. For Rafi it represented an opportunity, as Dayan put 
it, to take back the Labour Party from within.
70 Ahdut-Ha’avoda considered the 
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  24unification a political necessity in order to preserve and expand its own political 
strength and as a way to block or constrain Rafi, as it feared the political power of 
Dayan.
71 The unification process also exposed the generational shift that was taking 
place. The younger generation of leaders, coming mainly from Rafi and Ahdut-
Ha’avoda, stated that they were bent on using the process to reshape the party. They 
felt that they and not the older, more hesitant and moderate leadership represented the 
views of Israelis.  
 
The Labour factions’ strife in the aftermath of the Six Day War shared similarities 
with both the Lavon Affair and the partition debate. ‘Within Mapai, the conflict over 
the succession and the split between Rafi and Mapai became entangled with the 
territorial issue.’
72 The Mapai elites were unwilling to plunge the party into a renewed 
ideological crisis, as occurred during the debate on the Partition Plan, nor risk a 
further split, as happened with Rafi. Lochery cites the importance of maintaining 
unity, and thus the difficulty in achieving a consensus, as one of the factors 
contributing to the decline of the party.
73 Beilin, Kieval, and others argue that it was 
the infighting which hampered the ability of the Mapai elites to conduct foreign 
policy as they did before the war. In a sense, the relationships between elites - 
especially Dayan and the Mapai leadership - eroded the authority and ability of the 
Labour elites to conduct and maintain their previous decision-making mechanisms. 
Kieval suggests that the reasons for this are engraved in the inter-party factionalism 
and the structural characteristics of the Israeli political system as a whole, as well as 
the Labour Party’s, which allows small parties and factions to have disproportionate 
leverage on the decision-making process. These factions proved to be more adept at 
averting actions than promoting them.
74  
 
The view that the problems within the Labour Party affected the decision-making 
process to such a degree that the government was unable to reach a consensus is not 
without merit. There have been several previous incidents in which the party’s failure 
also represented the state’s failure. Such was Mapai’s political supremacy, that when 
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  25it internally decided over a policy, it was as if Israel decided.
75 However, to argue that 
the internal strife within the Labour Party was the main reason behind the policy 
failure is to ignore the impact of other domestic factors. Although faction-based 
politics hindered policy making, they had caused considerable problems to various 
governments well before 1967. In fact, it can be argued that this factionalism is an 
essential characteristic of Israeli politics. Furthermore, this approach fails to take into 
account the factionalism and polarisation to which the Israeli society as a whole was 
subjected. Finally, it is interesting to note that the factions did not play an important 
part in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war.
76  
 
 
Transitional State Approach  
 
Brecher, Sharkansky and Arian have suggested that, beyond the Labour Party, the 
Israeli state as a whole went through a transitional phase, which included 
demographic, political and cultural changes. These changes resulted in a shift in the 
views and the political power to the Right, which contributed to a deeper 
fragmentation of Israel’s polity. Medding suggests that the history of Israel should be 
divided into two periods, i.e. before and after 1967.
77 The transition between the 
periods involved rapid changes to the Israeli state and society. Shapiro refers to the 
post-1967 period as the transition from the founding generation to the 1948 
generation.
78 The founding generation had neither served as active fighters in the IDF 
nor in the resistance movements during the British mandate period.
79 An examination 
of the age differences among the leading politicians in Israel illustrates this. Eshkol 
and the leading politicians of Mapai were mostly in their late sixties and early 
seventies and had served most of their lives as politicians.
80 The younger generation, 
in their early forties or fifties, were native Israelis and had served as IDF 
commanders, or in the resistance movements.
81  
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The changes affecting the state were not limited to demographics. The manner of the 
Israeli victory in the Six Day War had a detrimental effect on the state.
82 The 
Occupied Territories were referred to as the liberated ones and this ‘Liberation’ of 
biblical Israel assumed messianic and prophetic proportions. An increase in 
immigration and investment followed a wave of nationalistic and religious fervour 
that swept through the state, signalling the revival of a new form of Zionism, i.e. 
Religious Zionism or New Zionism.
83 In Seliktar’s view the occupation brought to the 
fore a territorial discussion not touched upon since the partition era. This discussion 
revealed a ‘growing dissonance’ between the Labour Party’s foreign policy and the 
public’s perception of the Occupied Territories.
84 Lustick refers to this dissonance as 
the ‘breakdown of the Green Line as a Hegemonic Conception’.
85 The public was 
overwhelmingly in favour of retaining most if not all of the territories.
86 The shift in 
the public’s perception and the inability of the Labour Party to respond meant that 
interest groups took it upon themselves to influence the state’s foreign policy. Israel’s 
settlement policy and approach to the territories cannot be understood fully without 
taking into account the role of these groups, in particular the role of Gush-Emunim.
87 
Aronoff states that before the Six Day War the public accepted Mapai’s national 
agenda. However, in the aftermath of the war, the gulf between the party and the 
public grew, and the party elites were no longer seen as representing the state.
88  
 
This situation was starkly different from the one prevailing before the Six Day War. 
The government decision in 1965 to slow down an overheating economy led directly 
to a serious economic recession.
89 Immigration, one of the most important social 
indicators in Israel, reached unheard-of lows, while the numbers of emigrants were at 
record highs.
90 As a result of this economic hardship, declining immigration and 
increased emigration, the state of Israel did not resemble the epitome of the Zionist 
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  27dreams; the nationalistic parties, Gahal in particular, were seen as losing their way.
91 
A famous joke at the time asked for the last person leaving the country to switch off 
the lights.
92 
 
It all changed on the 15
th of May 1967. Israel stood in the middle of an unfolding 
crisis following Nasser’s decision to move Egyptian troops into the previously 
demilitarised area of the Sinai Peninsula. The period between the 15th of May and the 
5th of June is known in Israel as the ‘Hamtana’ (Waiting Period). During this period 
the leadership of Eshkol was publicly challenged by members of his own party, as 
well as by members of the Coalition, the Opposition, Israeli Defence Forces, the 
press, and the public.
93 The ‘Waiting Period’ can be seen as a period in which the 
younger leadership was pushing for war, while the older leadership was trying to find 
a political way out.  
 
Before the Six Day War, Eshkol used a number of decision-making committees, 
which included his closest political allies and senior members of the Mapai party, to 
formulate and examine potential policies. The inclusion of Gahal and Rafi within a 
National Unity Government and the distrust of Eshkol for the members of his party, 
who tried to depose him during the Hamtana period, diminished the capacity of those 
structures. The government resorted to an ad-hoc decision-making process in which 
various ministers, in particular Dayan, Allon and Eshkol, each appeared to operate on 
his own accord, either through their ministries, or in Dayan’s case, through the IDF. 
This occurred because of Eshkol’s increasingly difficult position in the government, 
and with the inclusion of his political enemies, leading to the system being threatened 
with paralysis. The government was not formulating policies nor was it in charge of 
an increasingly ad-hoc process. Instead, the responsibility was taken on by individuals 
and interest groups with personal agendas.  
 
Bavly argues that, during the 1967-1973 period, Israel operated within a limited 
perspective and relied on the wrong axioms.
94 Prominent officials and politicians 
within the administration described the decision-making process during the period as 
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  28‘non-existent’, ‘lacking definitions and targets’ and ‘unprofessional’. Eban described 
it as ‘amateurish’ and being ‘based on improvisation’.
95 Important decisions were 
taken by Israeli leaders ‘on a spontaneous basis … relying on personal intuition’. 
Coalition governments in Israel lacked the scope and political clout to offer a clear 
approach on the territorial problem. There was a lack of transparency in the decision-
making process, which was dominated by a small group of elites, free of supervision 
by the government and the Knesset.
96 Furthermore, the division within the 
government and the state froze all new ideas, resulting in a wait-and-see policy.
97 
Bavly compares Israel’s policies towards the Occupied Territories to Barbara 
Tuchman’s notion of the ‘March of folly’: an event in which a state or an actor 
behaves in a way that goes against his best interests, and while knowing or being 
aware of the folly of his actions, he nevertheless  continues.
98 
 
There are two important problems with this approach. First, this approach examines 
the impact structural changes had on the Israeli state and its territorial policy without 
examining the role played by the elites and their images. Second, while explaining the 
importance of domestic factors this approach fails to mention the significance of the 
international ones. In this respect, both approaches fail to recognise an important 
aspect of Israeli policy making, namely the US involvement and the occasional 
pressure it put on Israel.
99 With policy makers unable to reach a consensus, the role of 
the broker fell increasingly on the US. The more Israeli elites disagreed amongst 
themselves, the more the US got involved.
100  
 
 
Examination 
 
The literature is biased in its handling of the subject. In other words, the literature 
portrays the bias that is inherent in its scope and context. The literature does not set 
out to explain Israel’s lack of clear long-term territorial policies. The ideas and 
approaches that have been raised by researchers were done within the confines of 
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their own research into a related subject, with an emphasis on their own subject 
matter. None of them researched or discussed all the elements influencing Israel’s 
territorial policies, but that is not to say that they did not raise valid points. Those that 
have written on the subject concede that there is more to what they have provided. 
Pedatzur has limited his research into the internal workings of the Eshkol 
government.
101 Yishai admits that what goes on in Israeli politics ‘only partly shapes 
Israeli perceptions of the territorial issue’. She says that her book is only an 
explanation of Israeli domestic factors influencing Israeli territorial policy.
102 Nissan 
argues that he is merely presenting the problem not explaining it.
103 Kieval explains 
that he is only focusing on structural problems associated with Israel’s political 
fragmentation.
104 In short, despite the fact that the literature mainly agrees with the 
assertion that Israel lacked a long-term policy towards the Occupied Territories during 
the period in question, it is remarkable that no systematic research has ever been 
conducted on the reasons behind this. 
 
With the exception of Gorenberg and Pedatzur, the main weakness inherent in the 
existing literature is the lack of primary sources. Therefore, in order to build upon and 
expand the previous knowledge, this thesis is based on recently declassified archival 
material, the majority of which was only made public in 2007. Consequently, the 
research fills existing gaps in our knowledge and understanding, which will help 
further research on the subject and advance our understanding of Israeli history and 
politics. This research, while providing new information, is only a part of an ongoing 
pursuit to further the understanding of Israel’s relationship with the Occupied 
Territories. It provides a few more pieces to the puzzle, so that one may be able to get 
a clearer picture of what has happened and why. In a way, this links to the choices 
Israel’s present leaders face. The current situation is a continuation of their inability to 
decide over the future of the territories. It is the same debate, using the same lines of 
argument.
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Introduction 
 
The dowry pleases you but the bride does not.
1 
 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s eloquent metaphor summed up Israel’s and the Labour 
Party’s attitudes towards the Occupied Territories. Israel did not plan to take over the 
territories.
2 It had made no plans for the aftermath of such an event and had only 
started to formulate plans for the territories during the war,
3 a fact that explains the 
chaotic nature of the early stages of the occupation. While not wishing to take over 
‘Arab’ land before the Six-Day War, and being very mindful of the implications of 
such action, the government became increasingly zealous to achieve just that during 
the war.
4 The war resulted in Israel conquering an area three and a half times its size, 
with one and a half million Arabs under Israeli control.  
 
Several attempts were made during and immediately after the war to look into the 
future of the Occupied Territories.
5 The various committees and individuals that 
analysed the situation - either at the behest of the government, particular ministers or 
the IDF’s Intelligence unit (AMAN) - reached several but similar conclusions. Two of 
these were that Israel must formulate a long-term policy for dealing with the 
territories and that any delay in finding a long-lasting solution would undermine 
national security and put Israel in a difficult position vis-à-vis the international 
community. In contrast, these individuals and committees did not reach similar 
conclusions regarding the policies Israel must adopt. 
 
On the 19
th of June 1967, the government under Eshkol had taken a historic decision 
to annex East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and to agree, in principle, to return the 
Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights to Egypt and Syria respectively, as part of 
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  31peace agreements.
6 These decisions, however, for reasons that will be discussed later, 
were overturned. In regard to the West Bank, the government failed to reach a 
consensus and, therefore, decided to postpone any decision on the future of the 
region.
7 This inability of the government to reach a decision on the future of the West 
Bank would be a hallmark of the period.  
 
The Eshkol period will be discussed over the next three chapters. The first chapter 
will examine the domestic and international environments in which the Israeli 
government operated as well as provide a detailed account of the main concepts and 
considerations which formed the basis for its territorial approach. Additionally, the 
chapter will analyse the various plans and policies proposed in relation to the 
Occupied Territories and the government’s response to them. The second chapter will 
chart the evolution of Israel’s territorial policies, from the erosion of the 19
th of June 
decisions and the breakdown of political consensus to the adoption of an uncommitted 
approach. This chapter will demonstrate that, due to the government’s inability, and 
Eshkol’s unwillingness, to put forward a clear long-term policy, Israel’s territorial 
policy was taken over by individual ministers, in particular Dayan and Allon, and 
interest groups. The final chapter will examine how these developments affected 
Israel’s territorial policies. Through the use of specific examples (e.g. the Hebron 
settlement, Israel’s economic policies and the debate over the government’s preferred 
West Bank approach) this chapter will show that the Israeli government, under the 
leadership of Eshkol, did not have a coherent and comprehensive long-term territorial 
policy.  
 
The following chapters will also demonstrate that, due to the lack of suitable peace 
partners, the absence of American pressure, weak leadership, the unification of the 
Labour party, the rise of New Zionism, the activities of individual ministers and the 
fragmentation of its decision-making process, the Eshkol government was unable to 
reach a consensus regarding the long-term future of the Occupied Territories during 
its entire time in power. 
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  32Chapter one  
 
The War 
 
Several days after the end of the Six-Day War, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan 
expressed his views on the conduct of the government and the army in the period 
leading up to and during the war. Dayan did not spare any criticism from either the 
government or the army. He accused Prime Minister Eshkol of being over-reliant on 
the US administration, as well as mismanaging the country in the period leading up to 
the war. In regard to the war, he claimed that the government had not complemented 
the army’s operational plans with clear diplomatic and territorial objectives.
8 
According to Dayan, it was the least planned and worst prepared war in Israel’s 
history. Reactions to the day-to-day events determined the direction of the war, even 
though the army was successful at exploiting the chances that came its way.
9  
 
On the 1
st of June 1967, Dayan took his place as Israel’s new Defence Minister, 
replacing Eshkol.
10 This followed a week of intense political manoeuvring within 
both the Coalition and the Opposition parties. It came about as a result of Eshkol’s 
perceived paralysis in the face of an unfolding crisis; one that started with Gamal 
‘Abd El-Nasser’s decision to move troops into the demilitarised Sinai Peninsula and 
his decision to close the Straits of Tiran. After a particularly embarrassing incident, in 
which Eshkol seemed to stutter and stumble during a live radio broadcast to the 
nation, public confidence in him evaporated. Demands for his removal from office 
were made by members of the Opposition, the press, the army and even amongst his 
own Mapai party members.
11 Threats to dissolve the ruling coalition were made by 
several parties, in particular the National Religious Party.
12 They demanded the 
formation of a National Unity Government that would include Rafi and Gahal (Herut-
Liberal Bloc), and the removal of Eshkol from the Defence Ministry, which 
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  33incidentally was also one of the pre-conditions set by both Rafi and Gahal.
13 Former 
Chief of Staff Dayan was the Opposition’s preferred candidate. 
 
Contrary to popular perception, Dayan’s addition to the government did not hasten the 
decision to go to war. This decision came as a result of the inability of the US 
administration, headed by President Lyndon Johnson, to put forward a constructive 
solution to the diplomatic impasse that had been reached. Despite the army’s top brass 
clamouring for action, and deep held fears for the country’s existence expressed by 
the press and the public, Eshkol tried to avoid war. He, as well as most of the 
ministers, believed in the army’s capability, but feared an international backlash if 
Israel went ahead without America’s approval. The final decision came on the 3
rd of 
June 1967, during the Head of Mossad Meir Amit’s mission to Washington, where he 
received what was understood to be a ‘yellow light’ for operations against Egypt.
14 
 
Israel’s war plan was clear from the outset. It called for an early air strike to neutralise 
the Egyptian air force, which was to be followed by a three-pronged armoured thrust 
into Sinai, sweeping through the Egyptian stationary defensive set-up, and advancing 
towards the Suez Canal.
15 The Israeli war planners had their sights focused on the 
Egyptian front. IDF units on the Jordanian and Syrian borders were ordered to remain 
in defensive positions. This was done despite warnings from AMAN (IDF’s 
Intelligence unit) that King Hussein might be tempted to ‘bite the bullet’ and join the 
war.
16 As a precaution, the Israeli government sent a message to King Hussein not to 
interfere with the war, promising in return to honour Jordan’s territorial integrity.
17  
 
Having examined the plans, Dayan requested that two important changes should be 
included. He wanted the IDF to surround the Gaza Strip but not enter it. Dayan felt, 
(and Eshkol backed him), that conquering the Gaza Strip would be unwise and that 
encircling it would eventually lead to its capitulation without fighting. Dayan referred 
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  34to the Gaza Strip as a ‘nest of wasps’ bristling with problems.
18 Dayan also felt that 
not instructing the army to take Sharm El-Sheikh and securing the Straits of Tiran was 
a mistake, arguing that the war was fought over the right of passage through the 
Straits. Furthermore, he warned the army generals not to get Israel entangled in a war 
over the West Bank or Jerusalem. Fearing a war on several fronts, he insisted the 
fighting should be concentrated against the Egyptian army and be fought in Sinai.
19 
The first digression from the plan occurred early on the first day of fighting (the 5
th of 
June 1967). General Gavish, Head of Israel’s Southern Command, sent an urgent 
request to Chief-of-Staff Yitzhak Rabin for permission to send troops to occupy the 
Gaza Strip. Gavish complained that Israeli troops were coming under fire from 
Egyptian and Palestinian forces in the Strip.
20 Knowing Dayan’s predisposition 
towards Gaza, Rabin decided to approve Gavish’s request without consulting him.
21  
 
Encouraged by misleading early reports of Egypt’s success, Syria and Jordan decide 
to join the war. By the time their forces entered the war the Egyptian army was ‘on 
the ropes’; its air force had been eliminated in a series of coordinated air strikes, while 
its ground forces were rolled back by the rapidly advancing Israeli armoured thrust. 
Jordanian air force and artillery units began attacking Israeli targets in and around 
West Jerusalem, reaching as far as the outskirts of Tel Aviv.
22 Dayan’s fears of a 
multiple-front war became a reality. Yet despite the attacks, he called for restraint and 
warned against diverting troops to the new fronts before the army was allowed to 
conclude its operations on the Egyptian one. Israeli forces were ordered to remain in 
defensive mode. The Israeli government tried to invalidate one of the newly-created 
fronts by offering Hussein a way out. Eshkol sent him a message, imploring him to 
cease all hostilities; by his own admission, Hussein refused.
23  
 
As the situation on the Egyptian front and the scale of Egypt’s impeding defeat 
became clearer, the voices calling on the IDF to divert attention to the Jordanian front 
grew. Around midday, Employment Minister Yigal Allon and Minister-without-
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  35Portfolio Menahem Begin (leader of the Gahal party) declared that this was a historic 
opportunity for Israel.
 In a meeting that day they urged the government to order the 
conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
24 Eshkol appeared to be siding with 
the duo, but demanded time to consider the diplomatic repercussions of such an act.
25 
Several ministers were against the conquest of East Jerusalem, including Foreign 
Minister Abba Eban and the religious NRP Ministers Haim-Moshe Shapira and 
Zerach Warhaftig. Shapira and Education Minister Zalman Aran suggested that the 
government consider handing over the city, once it had been occupied, to international 
jurisdiction.
26 Shapira would later claim he meant for international jurisdiction to be 
applied only in the holy places.
27 In reply, Eshkol commented that even if Israel took 
over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, it would have to withdraw from these areas 
in the end.
28 Rabin argued along similar lines, remarking that, while the IDF was 
destroying the Jordanian air force, talk of taking over the West Bank was 
unnecessary.
29 In a meeting later that day to discuss the future of the West Bank, 
Dayan proposed to take control over the Samaria mountain ranges, stretching from 
Jerusalem to Jenin (these included the cities of Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus). 
Dayan was against taking over the whole of the West Bank or East Jerusalem (at that 
stage), fearing an international backlash.  
 
During the second day of the fighting, the government convened to discuss its 
options, with ministers voting for the conquest of the mountain ranges (as advocated 
by Dayan), and for the army to seize the city of Hebron, as well as to surround the old 
city of Jerusalem. A government vote on whether to storm the old city ended in a 
draw.
30 During the meeting, Meir Amit inquired whether Israel would seek to annex 
the West Bank and wanted to know more about the diplomatic state of affairs the 
government would have to face should the worse come to worst.
31 According to Amit, 
this lack of long-term strategic planning was characteristic of the Eshkol government, 
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  36during and after the war.
32 At the same time across the border in Jordan, realising the 
extent to which the situation has deteriorated, King Hussein implored the US and 
British governments to intervene on his behalf and impose a ceasefire, citing his fear 
for the survival of his Hashemite kingdom.
33 Eshkol offered Hussein a way out, but 
demanded that the king agree to immediate peace talks; a generous proposition, but 
one to which Hussein could not agree.
34 
 
After agreeing to postpone the conquest of the old city, the ministers deliberated over 
the Syrian front. Dayan argued against opening another front; he warned against 
antagonising the Soviets. According to Dayan, the Syrian army had not advanced into 
Israel, and its artillery attacks on northern Israel were manageable and did not pose an 
imminent danger. On this issue, Rabin and Dayan did not see eye to eye, which 
cannot be said about Rabin and David ‘Daddo’ El’azar, Head of the Northern 
Command, who were particularly adamant.
35 On the Syrian question Dayan became 
increasingly isolated; the majority of ministers were in favour of dealing with the 
Syrians ‘once and for all’, but agreed to leave the final decision to Dayan and 
Eshkol.
36  
 
One of the main concerns expressed by ministers was of a possible international 
condemnation - a fear which increased with every new territory the army had 
conquered, but one which eventually turned out to be totally misplaced. The US 
administration was starting to accept that some territories would remain in Israel’s 
possession. During the first days of fighting, Walt Rostow (the National Security 
Advisor) wrote to President Johnson suggesting that the US should act, upon the 
cessation of violence, to find a permanent solution to the Middle East problem, adding 
that the US should not allow for a return to the pre-war borders.
37 The US position 
was further clarified when Walworth Barbour (US ambassador to Israel), while 
conveying King Hussein’s urgent request for a ceasefire to Eshkol, did not seek an 
Israeli commitment on the West Bank. In Barbour’s view it was too late.
38  
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In the early hours of the morning, on the 7
th of June, Eshkol was informed that the UN 
Security Council had agreed to a general ceasefire that would come into effect at 22-
00 later that night. Eshkol immediately called Dayan, ordering him to send the army 
into the old city. At a ministerial-level meeting later that morning, Dayan announced 
that orders had been given to storm the old city.
39 Despite a Jordanian acceptance of 
the UN-brokered ceasefire, fighting in and around the city continued throughout the 
morning. Israeli officials claimed that as long as the ceasefire was not agreed to by 
Egypt and Syria, the fighting would go on. By night time the majority of the West 
Bank was in Israeli hands. Eshkol explained that there were now new opportunities to 
bring about peace in the area, declaring his wish to establish a committee that would 
advise him on possible avenues he could pursue. Eshkol commented that ‘these were 
historic days for Israel and for the Jewish people’.
40 He expressed his views regarding 
the territories several times that day, professing a deep desire to keep the Gaza Strip 
as part of Israel, referring to it as ‘a lily with many thorns’, while examining the 
possibility of relocating its population.
41  
 
Around late afternoon on June the 7
th, news that the IDF had managed to seize the old 
city of Jerusalem prompted a mad rush of government ministers to the site. Dayan, 
initially sceptical about the need to conquer the old city, and wanting to avoid what he 
called ‘all that Vatican’, was the first on the scene. In full military attire and 
accompanied by Head of the Central Command General Uzi Narkiss and Rabin, he 
was the first minister photographed entering the old city, stealing the limelight from 
Eshkol in the process. On that day, Dayan declared, ‘We have returned to our most 
holy places, returned in order never to be separated from them again’.
42  
 
On June the 8
th, the daily broadsheet Ha’aretz asked the government, in its editorial, 
to complete the task and conquer the Golan Heights.
43 Goaded on by the press, the 
entire leadership appeared to be in frenzy for further conquests. Allon claimed that, 
when it came to seizing the territories, he did not understand why occupying the Sinai 
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  38Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was acceptable, while the Golan Heights 
were ‘off the table’.
44 Allon’s opinion was echoed by the IDF’s high command and 
most of the ministers, including Eshkol. However, not all shared this view. Warhaftig 
and Aran expressed concern about a possible Soviet intervention, in response to an 
Israeli assault on the Golan Heights.
45 Dayan, admonishing the ministers for their 
enthusiasm, refused to consider any attack on the Golan Heights.
46  
 
In the early hours of June the 9
th, and not for the first time, Dayan changed his mind 
and ordered the northern command to advance up the Golan.
47 When ministers found 
out about the order they were exasperated. They supported his decision but not the 
manner in which it was carried out.
48 However, this would not be the last time (during 
and after the war) that Dayan exhibited fickle behaviour.
49 By June the 10
th, with the 
fighting in the Golan Heights going Israel’s way, Ambassador Barbour strongly 
advised Israel to agree and adhere to the UN’s unconditional call for a ceasefire, if it 
did not want to jeopardise its gains.
50 Fearing that the UN would force Israel to halt 
before the conquest of the Golan had been completed, Eshkol urged El’azar to finish 
the job, promising him that the government would do its best to stall.
51 The UN-
proposed ceasefire came into effect on the 11
th, but Israeli forces continued to fight 
until the 13
th, at which point the entire area was under Israeli control. The immediate 
result of these actions was a break-up of relations with the Soviet Union.
52  
 
The war brought about numerous changes, one of which saw Israel occupying 
territories three and a half times its size; but the transformation also occurred on other 
levels such as political, diplomatic and ideological. Politically, the war had elevated 
Dayan to the status of a national hero, which created great tension with Eshkol. 
Furthermore, it had brought to the fore a territorial question that was thought to have 
been settled with the acceptance of the Baltimore Plan. This territorial pre-
independence debate threatened to challenge Mapai’s long-held view of accepting the 
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  39temporary 1949 ceasefire borders, which put the party at odds with several of its 
Coalition allies, most notably Ahdut-Ha’avoda.
53 The war had also left the country 
with a National Unity Government, which incorporated a ‘wall to wall’ Coalition of 
the Right, the Left and the religious parties. Thus, the task of maintaining unity within 
the Coalition was made very difficult by the controversial and polarising issues on the 
agenda. 
 
On the diplomatic front, the war had provided Israeli decision makers, for the first 
time, with the necessary bargaining chips to achieve a long-lasting peaceful resolution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Eshkol expressed hope that the government would have 
the sufficient wisdom and intellect to deal with ‘this property and I do not only refer 
to the real estate’.
54 In addition, the war instigated a change in the involvement of the 
super powers in the region, in particular the increasing Israeli dependency, 
diplomatically and militarily, on the US. 
 
Ideologically, the war brought about a Zionist revival, albeit in a new form. New 
Zionism fused together religious and nationalist elements, which resulted in a change 
in the way most decision makers viewed the conflict. In Seliktar’s view, it brought 
about a gradual shift from an Instrumental to a Normative approach, in particular with 
regards to the West Bank.
55 The war was talked about in biblical and even messianic 
terms, and not only in the religious circles. Eshkol remarked that, for the first time, 
Jews could pray at the Wailing Wall, at the Grave of Rachel and the Machpela 
Cave.
56 The Ma’ariv daily newspaper described the conquest of East Jerusalem as 
though ‘the messiah had arrived to Jerusalem when he was tired, grey, and riding a 
tank’.
57  
 
As far as the military was concerned, the two main threats to Israel’s security prior to 
the war were now a distant memory, as Syria was no longer able to pose a risk to 
Israel’s northern settlements and water supplies, and the threat posed by Egypt to 
Israel’s right to a free passage through the Straits of Tiran had also been eliminated. 
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  40The new territories also changed the strategic balance in the region. Israel had 
acquired strategic depth allowing it to change its long-held pre-emptive strike 
doctrine. However, beyond the strategic gains and achievements, and with the 
obligation to govern the population now under occupation, the war also brought 
changes to the army’s traditional role.
58  
 
 
The Military Administration 
 
The occupation of the territories raised some urgent issues with which the Israeli 
government had to contend, such as the restoration of public and social services and 
the resumption of day-to-day life. These entailed setting up an Israeli administrative 
body to govern the territories. In 1961, Meir Shamgar, the army’s Judge Advocate 
General, following a study into the army’s previous experience in governing the Gaza 
Strip and the Sinai Peninsula,
59 set up regional administrative commands. These 
would handle civilian matters in accordance with international law regarding occupied 
land. Shamgar also set out clear guidelines and procedures regarding behaviour 
towards the population under occupation. These were later integrated into the army’s 
officer training programme. In addition, regional commanders and their personnel 
were appointed, with former General Haim Hertzog taking responsibility over the 
West Bank.
60 The Military administration and regional commands were set up in the 
belief that they would soon be required. But as time went on, and no apparent need for 
a military administration arose, the resources allocated for it understandably 
decreased.
61 Therefore, it is no surprise that, despite the original contingency plan by 
the army, the appointment of officials and the preparatory work done by Shamgar and 
others, the early conduct of the military administration left much to be desired.  
 
During the Waiting period General Hertzog attempted to staff his command and 
organise his men in anticipation for the possible occupation of the West Bank. This 
proved a difficult thing to do.  Neither Dayan nor Narkiss had time for him, as they 
were preoccupied by ongoing events. On the first day of fighting, Shamgar sent a 
                                                 
58 Nadel, Between the Two Wars Page 21. 
59 In the aftermath of the Suez War in 1957. 
60 Teveth, The Cursed Blessing Pages 10-11. 
61 Teveth, Page 11. 
  41memo to the army’s heads of command, reminding them of the principles of 
international law regarding military procedures in Occupied Territories and the 
conduct of its forces when in contact with the local population.
62 On the same day, 
requests were made by regional commanders for clear guidelines regarding setting up 
military administrations in the areas occupied. Many of the officers had no prior 
knowledge of the previous appointments and arrangements. On the 7
th of June, Dayan 
and Narkiss appointed General Moshe Goran as Governor of the Gaza Strip, and 
placed the West Bank under the jurisdiction of Narkiss. There was no mention of 
Hertzog or his unit.
63  
 
Hertzog’s first week in command was described as an ‘absolute confusion’.
64 His 
administrative units suffered from lack of manpower and adequate resources. They 
had insufficient communication lines, which harmed their ability to coordinate their 
activities. Orders given by Hertzog were not carried out. Combat units were either 
unaware of the role of the administrative units, or simply disregarded them. 
Furthermore, in each of the West Bank regions, local commanders - facing chaotic 
circumstances in the absence of clear instructions - were asked to use their own 
initiatives.
65 This was not the case in the Gaza Strip where unused combat units were 
sent to the Sinai front, leaving behind only logistic and support units, which were 
assigned to operate under appointed Governor General Goran.
66 When asked by 
Narkiss how he planned to restore the basic services to the Arab population, Hertzog 
proposed using the existing workforce of the Palestinian public sector. The army 
wanted to avoid using Israeli professionals, who were already in short supply due to 
the national conscription. Narkiss agreed and gave his blessing to the plan. Dayan 
would later use it as one of the cornerstones of his ‘enlightened occupation’ 
approach.
67  
 
Before the war broke out, Dayan had nominated General Yehuda Nitzan to coordinate 
the army’s activity with regard to civilian matters. Within the first few days of the 
fighting Nitzan was able to conclude that the army and the Ministry of Defence were 
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  42lacking the capacity to govern the territories. The scale of the task meant that 
additional resources and expertise were required, especially in the West Bank. In the 
aftermath of the war, Nitzan recommended that responsibilities over civilian affairs in 
the territories should be shared by all relevant government ministries. This led to a 
reorganisation of the army’s administrative units, and to the establishment of a special 
committee, to coordinate the government’s activities. The committee comprised the 
government ministries’ Directors-General, under Ya’akov Arnon, Director-General of 
the Treasury.
68 It also marked the end of Hertzog’s tenure; on the 15
th of June, his 
command was annulled and the West Bank was placed under the command of 
Narkiss.  
 
 
First Proposals 
 
On the 6
th of June, while the outcome of the war had not yet been determined, Eshkol 
summarised the problems Israel’s decision makers were facing:  
 
In front of us are the problems of our relationship with Egypt: the status of Sinai and 
Gaza, the question of free passage through the Gulf of Eilat and the Suez Canal, the 
status of the West Bank, the status of the old city of Jerusalem, the question of the 
demilitarised areas in the north, the issue of control over water, finding a solution to 
the refugee problem and the problems with the Arab population in the Occupied 
Territories.
69  
 
The need to formulate comprehensive long-term policies with regard to the newly-
occupied territories inspired many within the army and the government to put forward 
their ideas. During those early days, three interesting and thought-provoking 
proposals were handed to Israeli decision makers. These plans were designed to deal 
principally with the West Bank and its Palestinian population. The first of these 
proposals was submitted to the Chief-of-Staff and the Ministry of Defence on the 9
th 
of June. It was the brainchild of the AMAN research department, headed by General 
Shlomo Gazit, the would-be coordinator of IDF activities in the Occupied Territories. 
Senior officers in AMAN felt that Israel had to dictate the proceedings in the early 
diplomatic activity. On the one hand, this would act to nullify any Arab proposal that 
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  43might come up, while on the other hand, it would show the world that Israel was 
sincere in its desire to resolve the conflict.
70 The AMAN proposal called for the 
abrogation of the 1949 ceasefire agreements and for minor border modifications as 
part of new agreements which would be based on peace negotiations. In regard to the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, AMAN recommended the establishment of an 
independent, though demilitarised, Palestinian state. Furthermore, they argued that the 
old city of Jerusalem should become an open city, modelled on the Vatican. The plan 
was never officially discussed and no comments were made by the Ministry of 
Defence and the General Staff.
71  
 
Another thought-provoking proposal was handed to the Ministry of Defence and 
General Staff on the 14
th of June, with Eshkol reportedly receiving a copy as well.
72 
Its authors had been members of Israel’s Intelligence community. They held talks 
during the war and immediately after with many Palestinian notables in the West 
Bank. This was done with the approval and support of both the head of AMAN 
General Aharon Yariv, and Narkiss. The authors identified the Palestinian issue as the 
most crucial element in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In their view, Israel had an 
opportunity to resolve this conflict once and for all by adopting what would become 
known as a Palestinian Approach. From their discussions with Palestinian notables, 
the authors sensed that there was a desire to reach a separate peace agreement with 
Israel, a move which would effectively bypass King Hussein. In their remarks the 
authors called on the Israeli leadership to seize this unique and historic opportunity.
73 
They urged the government to work without delay towards the establishment of an 
independent, though demilitarised, Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Israel, they advised, should annex East Jerusalem, the Latrun Pass, and the 
Gilbo’a Mountain. In order to allow for an honourable accord, they proposed 
transferring some Arab lands in Israel to the newly-created state and assigning a 
special status to the Christian and Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. 
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  44For the proposed solution to succeed, a step-by-step plan was drafted, with several 
goals being mentioned as points of reference. These included resolving the issue of 
the Palestinian refugees (re-settlement, repatriation, international support, monetary 
compensation), convening a gathering of all Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and 
producing a declaration of intent, ensuring the economic viability of the Palestinian 
state, free passage between the West Bank and Gaza as well as free port services in 
Israel.
74 The authors warned that a non-resolution of the issue would ‘sow the seed of 
future violence’,
75 but even this did not bring the proposal to the fore, and it was 
subsequently dropped. Examining the current political approaches which are regularly 
discussed around the subject of the Middle East, the similarities with the above-
mentioned proposals are simply remarkable. 
 
Another proposal, which called for a Palestinian Approach, was handed to AMAN 
and the Defence Ministry on the 11
th of June. It was written by Professor Yuval 
Neeman, the Dean of the Tel Aviv University and a special assistant to Yariv during 
the war. Neeman called for the creation of a Palestinian state, but argued that it should 
be done as part of an Israeli-Palestinian Federation, with Israel being in charge of 
foreign and defence issues. He proposed that the ceasefire lines should be declared 
Israel’s future borders, while acknowledging the possibility of future land trades as a 
result of international pressure.
76 Similarly to the previous proposals, the Ne’eman 
document was never officially discussed.
 77 
 
During those first days, many additional proposals were submitted, although these did 
not deal with the long-term future of the Occupied Territories, e.g. the Yekotiali-
Danin document. Of all the proposals, only one made a significant contribution to 
Israel’s initial policy-formulation process. General Arie Shalev and Foreign Ministry 
representative Hanan Bar-On worked alongside Dayan during the war. They 
suggested that the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula should be returned to Syria 
and Egypt respectively in exchange for peace treaties. Furthermore, they proposed 
that the West Bank should either form the basis of a Palestinian autonomous region or 
be returned to Jordan, in exchange for peace. In both scenarios, the authors suggested 
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  45some border modifications in the Jerusalem area, the Latrun Pass and around the city 
of Qalqilya.
78 The Shalev-Bar-On plan appealed to Dayan and he adopted some of its 
recommendations, in particular the parts referring to Sinai and the Golan.
79  
 
In a meeting with his staff on the 12
th of June, Dayan expressed, for the first time, his 
views on the future of the territories. He believed Israel did not need an additional 1.2 
million Arabs. He made it clear that there were only two viable options with regards 
to the West Bank, i.e. the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian entity with 
Israel in charge of its security and foreign affairs, or withdrawing from the West Bank 
and handing over the responsibility for the area to Jordan. On the subject of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Golan Heights Dayan felt that Israel should not rush to offer 
anything, but instead wait and see what Egypt and Syria offered. He was willing to 
consider an Israeli withdrawal in return for peace treaties and the demilitarisation of 
these areas, with some minor border adjustments. In addition, he decided to establish 
a special exploratory committee, headed by Hertzog, which would examine the main 
issues and report back to him.
80  
 
 
The 11
th and the 13
th of June 
 
Dayan’s apparent desire to dictate Israel’s territorial policy concerned Eshkol. When 
Eshkol heard of Dayan’s exploratory committee he immediately dismissed it, fearing 
that Dayan was trying to establish in the territories his own fiefdom.
81 In response, he 
ordered Dayan to refrain from acting independently, and to leave the territorial policy 
matters to the government.
82 Over the following days, Eshkol used two ministerial 
meetings to establish a new committee under his control that would advise him on the 
territorial problems, effectively bypassing Dayan and the Defence Ministry. The 
ministerial committee for the territories was headed by Sapir, who wanted no part in 
it; the committee convened once on the 15
th of June and was disbanded on the 18
th.
83  
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  46Eshkol wanted to find a forum in which he could nullify Dayan’s contribution, while 
continuing to operate as he did before the war. In the pre-war period, policy 
formulation regarding security and foreign affairs was dominated by a special 
informal committee headed by Eshkol, which included Golda Meir (the former 
Foreign Minister and Secretary general of Mapai), Pinhas Sapir (the Finance 
Minister), Ya’akov-Shimshon Shapira (the Justice Minister) and, on occasions, Eban. 
In addition, Eshkol made use of several other forums, depending on the issue. These 
included the Ma’arach Political Committee (comprising the senior Mapai and Ahdut-
Ha’avoda members), the Ministerial Defence Committee, and the ‘Sarinu’ forum, 
headed by him, and comprising ministers close to him.
84 The challenge facing Eshkol 
was to find a useful mechanism of reaching a consensus and dictating policies, while 
preserving the National Unity Government, which included two of his fiercest 
political antagonists before the war (Dayan and Begin). Eshkol was unable to find an 
appropriate forum and had to go through several different ones, changing his mind 
according to the political reality. Not only was it a question of preserving his 
hegemony on the decision-making process, but it was also the need to navigate 
through the process while having to manage with reduced influence. He was no longer 
serving as Defence Minister, and his political allies had failed to stand by him during 
the Waiting period.
85  
 
The two ministerial meetings on the 11
th and the 13
th of June illustrated Eshkol’s 
method of operation. The first meeting dealt primarily with the question of Jerusalem, 
and was attended by all ministers. It was an attempt to reach a unanimous decision on 
a matter that enjoyed broad consensus among ministers. Eshkol, favouring the 
unification of Jerusalem, felt the ministers should differentiate between Jerusalem and 
other territories when voting over the city’s future.
86 Eshkol stated that Jerusalem had 
been ‘liberated and united’, arguing that the government ‘should do what it needs to 
do quickly’, i.e. formally unify the city.
87 The ministers did not need convincing and 
all agreed to the need to unite the city, with the exception of Aran, who raised several 
concerns regarding the possible repercussions the act would have on future Israeli-
Arab relations and the political damage that could be caused by the need to do an 
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  47abrupt u-turn in the face of international pressure.
88 Haim-Moshe Shapira convinced 
the rest of the ministers that the government should unify the city quietly, and without 
much fanfare. He proposed to extend the municipal borders of West Jerusalem, so to 
include East Jerusalem, without having to vote on unification or annexation. Police 
Minister Eliyahu Sasson added that this is how things were done in 1949.
89  The 
proposal was accepted unanimously and a special committee was established to look 
into the future boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality.
90  
 
In contrast, the meeting on the 13
th was an attempt by Eshkol to marginalise Dayan, 
and clarify to him that Israel’s future foreign and security policies would remain in the 
hands of the Prime Minister. The meeting on the 13
th dealt with the need to define 
Israel’s long-term policies and was attended only by Eshkol, Eban, Dayan, Allon, 
Minister-without-portfolio Yisrael Galili and Yigal Yadin.
91 The meeting established 
the basis for the conduct of the military administration, and led to the establishment of 
the Directors-General Committee to oversee the activities of the government 
ministries in the territories. It was the first time that Israel’s long-term territorial 
policy was deliberated, with ministers hinting they would be willing to offer Egypt 
and Syria peace treaties, on the basis of Israeli withdrawal to international borders. 
This meeting was an example of the prevailing mood among ministers, with most 
believing that the bulk of the territories would be returned as a result of international 
pressure. In an interview given on the 11
th, Eshkol echoed those very sentiments, 
conceding that Israel would probably have to withdraw from the Golan Heights in 
order to appease US and international pressure.
92 Eshkol had previously informed the 
US ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg that Israel would return all the territories 
it conquered in return for peace.
93  
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  48Jerusalem 
 
The attempt to limit Dayan’s contribution to the decision-making process had 
succeeded only in part. Dayan did leave the territorial policy formulation in the hands 
of Eshkol, the government and the various special committees but, with the military 
administration coming under the Defence Ministry’s jurisdiction, Dayan had an 
alternative avenue to influence policy. He believed neither Eshkol nor Sapir had 
sufficient understanding of the Arab mentality, meaning that they were both incapable 
of governing the territories.
94 Furthermore, when it came to the core issues, the 
indecisiveness exercised by ministers prompted Dayan to ‘relieve’ them from their 
day-to-day duties in the territories. As a result, his relations with Eshkol and the 
Mapai old guard deteriorated, even though most ministers appeared to be content with 
his running of the territories.
95 Dayan’s decisions with regards to Jerusalem are a case 
in study. 
 
On the 10
th of June, and before the government managed to discuss the small matter 
of Jerusalem, events had already been shaping a new reality. In the courtyard of the 
Wailing Wall stood the Moors Quarter with its decrepit houses - a product of 
Jordanian rule. On the 8
th of June, and accompanied by the mayor of Jerusalem Teddy 
Kollek, David Ben-Gurion arrived at the site and was horrified. He became furious 
when he realised that public toilets were situated directly in front of the Wailing Wall, 
and demanded that Kollek do something about it. On the same day, during a meeting 
between Dayan and the proposed military governor of East Jerusalem General 
Shlomo Lahat, Dayan asked Lahat to find ‘a way’ for hundreds of thousands of Jews 
to visit the wall through the narrow alleys and the small courtyard.
96 In coordination 
with civilian engineers, and supported by Kollek, the army started demolishing the 
Moors Quarters, expelling dozens of local families in the process. When, on the 11
th, 
Eshkol called Narkiss to enquire about rumours of the demolishing of buildings, 
Narkiss claimed he did not know anything about it. Dayan and Kollek urged the 
contractors to finish the job quickly before the government succumbed to 
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  49international pressure and had to cease the work.
97 It is alleged that when Kollek 
asked Justice Minister Shapira about the legality of the demolitions, the latter replied, 
‘Do it fast, and god will help’.
98  
 
The government needed to decide on the fate of the Temple Mount with regards to the 
control over the site, and whether to allow Jews to pray there. While ministers argued, 
Dayan decided to bar Jews from praying at the Temple Mount, placing it under the 
control of the WAKF. Furthermore, against the wishes of the army, Dayan decided to 
remove all the barriers between the two parts of the city, using army engineers for the 
job. He also relinquished the need for permits, against the advice of Narkiss, and 
decided to allow Muslims to pray at the Temple Mount, with immediate effect.
99 
According to Gorenberg, this was a pattern: ‘Actions of great importance, taken by 
Dayan or those beneath him, without authorization, improvised to fit the moment’s 
demands as they saw it, borne on euphoria.’ This set a precedent for state officials, the 
army, or private individuals to act ‘not in line with government policy, but in order to 
set it’.
100 
 
 
The Ministerial Defence Committee 
 
On the 14
th and 15
th of June the Ministerial Defence Committee held discussions 
about the territories, where it produced the first official recommendations to the 
government. These bore resemblance to the suggestions made in the Shalev-Bar-On 
plan. On the matter of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights the committee 
advised the government to accept the notion of an Israeli withdrawal, while warning 
that it should only do so if several conditions were met. These conditions included the 
abrogation of the 1949 ceasefire lines and the signing of peace treaties. The 
committee also insisted that Israel demand the right to pass through the Tiran Straits, 
the demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, a guarantee for the 
continuation of the flow of water from the Jordan tributaries, as well as the removal of 
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  50the Arab economic embargo. The committee suggested that, as long as there was no 
peace, Israel would continue to hold these territories.
101  
 
The committee was unable to reach a decision on the future of the West Bank, though 
it did look into several proposals regarding its governance, i.e. making it an 
autonomous region or semi-autonomous region, or the formation of cantons and 
military rule without any citizenship.
102 It suggested that the West Bank remain under 
Israeli control until a long-lasting constructive solution was found. The committee 
went on to suggest that Israel negotiate with Hussein in an attempt to promote good 
relations and achieve economic integration between the two states, while declaring the 
Jordan River as Israel’s eastern border. It also recommended that East Jerusalem 
should be annexed, with special arrangements to be made for the Christian and 
Muslim holy sites. The committee deliberated over the Gaza Strip, but could not reach 
a decision. Dayan disagreed with the committee over several issues and submitted his 
own proposals to the government. He suggested that Israel annex the Gaza Strip, and 
that any long-term solution for the West Bank should be based on a Palestinian 
Approach. He envisioned a semi-autonomous Palestinian entity, with Israel in charge 
over its foreign and security policies.
103 
 
 
The 19
th of June 
 
On the 18
th and 19
th of June, the government convened to discuss its position with 
regards to the Occupied Territories. These meetings were held in response to a US 
request that Israel reveal its position prior to discussions in the UN on the 19
th;
104 
Allon stated that ‘what has been decided here is not meant for the assembly [the UN 
General Assembly], but for talks with the Americans’.
105 Eshkol remarked that Israel 
was forced to tell the US what it had planned. He advised the ministers not to shy 
away from setting clear policies, explaining that Israel could not operate in a vacuum 
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  51and would need to consider the views of the international community.
106 These 
meetings were the government’s first attempt at defining Israel’s territorial policy; it 
would be the first and last time the government clearly laid out its position on the 
matter. Despite dissenting views, the government, taking their cue from the 
recommendations of the Defence Committee, was able to reach a consensus on the 
Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and East Jerusalem.  
 
The government decided to annex East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, although Eshkol 
remarked that while they were willing to die over Jerusalem, the thought of 
incorporating an additional four-hundred-thousand Arabs left a bad taste in the 
mouth.
107 The decision was in accordance with the understanding reached on the 13
th 
on the issue of East Jerusalem. With regards to Egypt, the government agreed to 
withdraw to the international border in return for a peace treaty, excluding the Gaza 
Strip. The government based its decision on the international border between Egypt 
and Mandatory Palestine which included the Gaza Strip as part of the British 
mandate.
108 Furthermore, they decided to look into the idea of relocating the Gaza 
Strip’s population before annexing it. Begin questioned how the government would 
transfer hundreds of thousands of Arabs from Gaza, and suggested that it might be 
possible to do so, but only if they were transferred to Northern Sinai.
109 It is important 
to note that, at that time, the Gaza Strip was regarded by even the dovish Mapam 
ministers as essential to Israel’s national security.
110 It was further decided that the 
peace treaty with Egypt would be conditional on Israel’s right to pass through the 
Tiran Straits and the Suez Canal, and on the demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula.
111  
 
With regards to Syria, the government proposed a peace treaty based on an Israeli 
withdrawal to the international borders and in accordance with Israel’s security 
needs.
112 Eshkol acknowledged, later that day, that this meant an Israeli retention of 
the 1949 disputed demilitarised areas.
113 In addition, the government conditioned its 
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  52withdrawal on the demilitarisation of the Golan and an agreement not to sever Israel’s 
water supplies from the Jordan River’s tributaries. Until such an agreement was 
signed the government agreed to continue holding and administering the territory.
114 
Several ministers remarked that Israel would probably end up holding most of the 
territories for a long time, believing there would be no willingness from the Arab side 
to negotiate.
115 Despite this, Eshkol remarked that he did not believe the world will 
allow Israel to retain possession of the Golan Heights.
116 The decisions regarding the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are known as 
‘the decisions of the 19
th of June’. These decisions were kept secret from the IDF and 
the Knesset. Rabin only learned of these decisions from the US administration when 
he became Israel’s ambassador to Washington.
117  
 
One of the few dissenting views was expressed by Sasson. He advised his colleagues 
to ‘be realistic and demand only the feasible and the possible’.
118 He proposed that 
Israel withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights without a formal 
peace treaty.
119 According to Sasson, because the Arab states would not agree to 
formal peace treaties, Israel should present them with a proposal to withdraw to the 
international border in return for essential security arrangements (Israel’s water 
sources, naval passage and full demilitarisation).
120 Since .the Syrians will not sign a 
peace agreement with Israel’ Israel must say ‘we have no interest in sitting there [the 
Golan Heights] other than to guarantee our security’.
121  
 
The apparent consensus reached regarding the Occupied Territories did not apply to 
the West Bank, this despite the fact that the area stood at the centre of the discussions. 
A motion, proposed by the Health Minister Israel Barzilai, to decide on the issue of 
the West Bank was rejected.
122 The discussion revolved around whether to adopt a 
Palestinian or Jordanian-based approach, with only five ministers (Barzilai, Sapir, 
Aran, Shimshon Shapira and Haim Shapira) supporting a Jordanian Approach. The 
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  53rest adopted some form of a Palestinian Approach, while only Begin differed, 
advocating an outright annexation. Begin argued that Israel ‘did not sacrifice its sons 
in order to create an additional Arab state’, or indeed, to return the area back to 
Jordan.
123 Furthermore, Begin feared that the establishment of Arab cantons or 
ghettoes, in an age of decolonisation, would be a mistake. Begin questioned how 
‘seasoned and intellectual politicians’ could even raise the idea of cantons which he 
described as an ‘Arab ghetto’.
124 Therefore, Begin proposed that Israel declare its 
sovereignty over the West Bank.
125  
 
Justice Minister Shapira, in agreement with Begin, asked how in an age of de-
colonisation Israel could think it could control the lives of the Palestinians. He did not 
think anyone would accept it, suggesting Israel either annex the West Bank and deal 
with the demographic repercussions (echoing Begin’s proposal), or negotiate with 
Hussein over it. He warned that the world would accuse Israel of being the bearer of 
colonisation and imperialism, effectively trying to create an Israeli colony in the West 
Bank. Shapira claimed that any decision made by Israel, other than withdrawal, would 
be regarded as annexation by international standards. Shapira, however, 
acknowledged that some territorial modifications were essential (e.g. East Jerusalem, 
and some areas near Qalqilya).
126   
 
Sapir warned the government that, by annexing the West Bank, Israel would find it 
difficult to maintain a Jewish majority.
127 Aran added another note of caution, 
warning that, by annexing the West Bank, ‘Israel might manage to snatch defeat from 
the claws of victory’. He suggested that Israel instead negotiate with Hussein, stating 
‘a great deed did God do by giving us this thing called Hussein, on whom we can drop 
this burden [the West Bank]’.
128  
 
Dayan also advocated a Jordanian Approach, but a slightly different version of it. 
Dayan proposed a joint Israeli-Jordanian control over the West Bank. Jordan’s role 
would be restricted to administrative matters, while Israel would control the territory 
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  54militarily. He suggested declaring the Jordan River as Israel’s security border, beyond 
which no Arab army will be allowed to advance. Additionally, Dayan proposed the 
establishment of army bases on the West Bank’s mountain ranges.
129 
 
The idea of negotiating with Hussein was rejected by the Ahdut-Ha’avoda ministers 
Allon, Galili and Transport Minister Moshe Carmel, who viewed the problem mainly 
from a strategic-military perspective - that is to say an Instrumental Approach. For 
them, the best way to achieve long-term security was to retain either part, or the 
whole, of the West Bank. In this respect their ideas were closest to Begin’s. However, 
while accepting the demographic considerations, they were unwilling to grant 
citizenship to the population in those territories Israel chose to retain. Galili declared 
that he was willing to accept the social and political problems that could arise from 
Israel maintaining its control over the West Bank. Acknowledging Shapira’s 
‘colonial’ warning, Galili proposed solving the demographic problem through some 
form of a Palestinian-administered autonomy.
130 
 
Allon, echoing Galili, proposed a territorial-strategic solution that took into account 
Israel’s national security needs, stating that ‘peace agreements are the weakest form 
of guarantees regarding future peace and security’.
131 Allon acknowledged the 
demographic problems associated with controlling the West Bank. He admitted that, 
if he was forced to choose between adding the Palestinian population of the West 
Bank to Israel and withdrawing from the West Bank, he would choose the latter. He, 
therefore, proposed establishing an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank 
that would be surrounded by Israel.
132 Allon argued against a return to the pre-war 
situation, proposing instead to unilaterally annex several strategically important areas. 
In those areas, Allon proposed creating facts on the ground that would emphasise 
Israel’s refusal to return to the pre-war border.
133 Allon asserted that the government 
must decide soon on the future of the West Bank.  He went on to argue that Israel 
would not be able to retain areas in which it did not settle; Allon suggested settling in 
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  55the Jordan Valley, the Jerusalem area and the Hebron mountain ranges.
134 Allon’s 
comments prompted Eshkol to remark that every minister was deciding for himself 
what is good for Israel, ‘We are playing chess with ourselves’.
135  
 
Trade Minister Zeev Sherf argued that there was no need to decide, as there were no 
peace partners and no real chance of reaching peace at the moment. He, therefore, 
proposed to leave the matter of the West Bank for the time being and to re-examine it 
in a few weeks’ time, once Israel was able to assess the ‘international mood’.
136 
Sherf’s proposal was accepted and the debate regarding the West Bank was 
postponed.
137 In other words, ministers decided not to decide. However, the 
government did not take a strategic decision to prevaricate in order to increase its 
‘margins for manoeuvre’ or in order to leave open its diplomatic options; it was 
genuinely unable to reach a decision. The differences amongst ministers were so great 
that they were unable to reach a consensus, or even a majority view, on the matter. 
The failure to produce a policy for the West Bank is referred to as ‘the decision not to 
decide’.
138 
 
 
Johnson’s Five Principles 
 
On the 19
th of June, President Johnson laid out the US administration’s position 
regarding the situation in the Middle East. In his speech Johnson proposed ‘five great 
principles of peace in the region’. First, ‘that every nation in the area has a 
fundamental right to live and to have this right respected by its neighbours’. Second, 
‘justice for the refugees … There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East 
unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all’. Third, ‘the right of innocent 
maritime passage must be preserved for all nations’. Fourth, ‘limits on the wasteful 
and destructive arms race’. Fifth, ‘respect for political independence and territorial 
integrity of all the states of the area’.
139 Johnson put the onus on the sides, arguing 
that only direct negotiations between the sides could lead to a peaceful resolution. 
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  56According to Johnson ‘an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4’ was 
‘not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities’. But Johnson steered clear of 
describing the final borders, preferring instead the term ‘territorial integrity’. In 
addition, Johnson did not mention the Palestinian element, other than when stressing 
the importance of resolving the refugee problem.
140 Arguably, the US did not foresee 
a viable long-term solution based on a Palestinian Approach for either the West Bank 
or the Gaza Strip.  
 
From the perspective of the Israeli government, Johnson’s argument (‘no return to the 
pre-war situation’) was a de-facto American acceptance of Israel’s right to hold on to 
parts of the territories. Israeli decision makers did not expect Johnson to argue along 
those lines. It is conceivable that the Israeli government would have modified its 19
th 
of June decisions had it known Johnson’s position in advance. The government would 
have argued for an Israeli withdrawal to ‘recognised and secure borders’ (Dayan’s 
suggestion) as opposed to withdrawing to the international border. 
 
Encouraged by the US position, Eban presented Dean Rusk (the US Secretary of 
State) with Israel’s position, as stated in its 19
th of June decisions. Eban claimed to 
have been surprised when he first learned of these ‘moderate’ decisions. From Eban’s 
perspective, these decisions signalled Israel’s desire for peace.
141 Eban commented 
later that the US administration viewed these decisions as being far-reaching.
142 Rusk 
was overall pleased with Israel’s position, but the ‘non-decision’ regarding the West 
Bank, and the unresolved status of East Jerusalem troubled him (Israel did not inform 
him of the decision to annex the city). Rusk cautioned against unifying the city, 
advising Eban to seek accommodation with Hussein instead.
143 The US conveyed 
Israel’s willingness to negotiate on the basis of its 19
th of June decisions to Syria and 
Egypt. Both states did not reciprocate, which helped to justify the feeling in Israel that 
these were not adequate partners for negotiations. This reinforced the view (expressed 
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  57by Dayan, Allon, Galili, Sherf and Begin) that Israel should be allowed to hold on to 
the territories indefinitely, or until suitable peace partners emerged.
144  
 
In recent years there has been some controversy over Israel’s willingness to negotiate 
at the time. According to Shlaim, Eban did not actually ask Rusk to convey Israel’s 
intentions to Egypt or Syria, and so no offers were ever really made to those states.
145 
In fact, Allon acknowledged that Israel’s statement of intent was meant merely for 
American ears.
146 Bavly argues that because of its own interests in the region, the US 
decided not to convey Israel's position to Egypt and Syria, informing Israel that both 
states refused to reciprocate.
147 If true, this would place a great deal of the 
responsibility for the failure of the Israeli initiative on the American administration. 
Nevertheless, it is known that Israel did convey its position to the US. Regardless of 
what happened next, there is no doubt that the lack of reciprocation, whether it was 
intentional or not, played into the hands of Israeli hardliners.
148 The lack of a 
diplomatic breakthrough provided ammunition to those ministers, i.e. Allon, Galili 
and Dayan, who argued in favour of retaining areas Israel deemed essential for its 
national security.
149 
 
Israel’s 19
th of June decisions were not intended solely for the American 
administration; they were also motivated by the desire to clarify Israel’s position in 
the Middle East, prior to a debate on the matter at the UN. The Soviet delegation, 
supported by the Arab states, demanded that Israel withdraw unconditionally to the 
pre-war borders.
150 The USSR and the Arab delegations believed that, when ‘push 
came to shove’, the US would support a resolution condemning Israel and calling for 
unilateral Israeli withdrawal. This assumption was based on the Suez Crisis 
precedent.
151 However, the US refused to accept the Soviets’ demand, claiming that 
an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war lines would only serve as a precursor to the 
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  58resumption of hostilities.
152 Among the permanent members of the Security Council, 
the American position was supported by France and Britain, i.e. the two former 
Middle East colonial powers. The French delegation suggested that peace could only 
be achieved through dialogue between the sides, even though De-Gaulle blamed Israel 
for the outbreak of the war and imposed a military embargo on it. The British 
concurred, with Foreign Secretary George Brown calling for an Israeli withdrawal in 
conjunction with peace negotiations.  
 
In contrast to the Americans, Brown discussed the intricate details of the problem, 
arguing that the UN should not recognise an Israeli move to unify Jerusalem. The 
move, according to Brown, would ‘isolate them not only from world opinion, but will 
also lose them the support which they have’. This remark, as well as a similar 
statement made by Britain regarding the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by 
means of war, were seen in Israel as an attempt by Britain to appease the Arab side.
153 
Brown’s remarks further increased the pressure on the Israeli government to speed up 
its plans to annex East Jerusalem. 
 
 
Unification 
 
The British comments on a unified Jerusalem provided the subtext for the Israeli 
government’s vote on annexation and were used by Eshkol to open a government 
debate on the subject.
154 The government had previously decided to annex the city, as 
part of its 19
th of June decisions. Only the municipal boundaries of the proposed 
unified city were left undecided. For advice on the issue of municipal boundaries, the 
government established a special ministerial-level committee, headed by the Justice 
Minister. The committee adopted a ‘moderate map’ that excluded Bethlehem and 
several outlying villages in order not to ‘cut’ the West Bank in two.
155 Nevertheless, 
the proposed map tripled the size of Jerusalem, and added many Arab villages and 
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  59open spaces (e.g. surrounding hills) which were never part of Jordanian Jerusalem.
156 
The committee claimed to have increased the municipal boundaries in order to 
provide ‘room’ for future city growth if necessary. The main considerations expressed 
by the committee were of political and military nature, as opposed to urban planning. 
Areas were linked to, or cut from, Jerusalem according to their perceived strategic 
importance. The main idea behind the proposed map was to surround the unified city 
with populated ‘strategic ridges’,
157 with these urban changes being presented as 
reversible (which arguably they were anything but).
158  
 
Between the 20
th and 27
th of June the government deliberated over the map presented 
to it by the committee. Despite Eban’s insistence that a vote to change the status of 
the city prior to the conclusion of UN discussions on the matter would harm the 
Israeli cause, the government proceeded to vote on the special committee’s 
recommendations. The map was approved unanimously.
159 Following the 
recommendations of the Justice Minister, the government decided to annex the city by 
‘adjusting’ the judicial system. A new section was added to a 1948 regulatory law, 
stating that the judicial and administrative law of the state would apply to any part of 
the land of Israel the government saw fit.
160 The government - wanting to avoid 
publicity - proposed to extend the municipal boundaries of West Jerusalem to include 
East Jerusalem, as opposed to formally unifying or annexing the city, hoping a clever 
use of Semantics would ‘do the trick’.  
 
The following day, the Knesset was convened for a special session.
161 With the 
exception of the Communist party and the Arab MKs, the Knesset voted unanimously 
in favour of the new law.
162 The vote was followed by a government decree, stating 
that the new lands (the extended boundaries of Jerusalem) were part of Israel, and 
therefore Israel’s law and sovereignty applied in them.
163 In order to disguise the real 
purpose of the new law, the extended municipal boundaries were only ever mentioned 
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  60as coordinates (i.e. point 1678613520 north towards point 1673613678).
164 The 
Foreign Ministry was required to explain the move as a bureaucratic procedure to help 
operate public services in the territories; Begin called it urban integration.
165 
 
The decision to annex East Jerusalem was taken without a serious discussion on the 
long-term implications of such an act. Despite Eshkol’s initial remarks and the 
remarks made by the special ministerial committee, the decision was taken in full 
knowledge that it was not reversible. The decision was spurred on by overwhelming 
public support and was made possible by a rare consensus among the major political 
parties. Israeli leaders, fearing an international backlash, decided to act before 
international pressure forced Israel to withdraw from the territories.
166 The decision 
clearly paid dividends, as the UN Security Council waited until May 1968 to officially 
condemn Israel’s decision; much of the delay was due to American diplomatic 
obstructions. The American administration ‘strongly deplored’ Israel’s unilateral 
action, but did not put any pressure on Israel to reverse its decision.
167  
 
The UN debate dragged on for nearly two months as the American and Soviet 
delegations were unable to reach a compromise. Finally, this lack of a consensus 
seemed to disappear during the last few days when, on the 20
th of July, the US and the 
USSR proposed a joint draft resolution. Presented by Arthur Goldberg (US 
Ambassador to the UN) and Andrei Gromyko (Soviet Foreign Secretary), the 
Goldberg-Gromyko draft-resolution called on all states to withdraw immediately from 
all territories acquired during the war. The withdrawal would be accompanied by a 
statement calling on all states to recognise each other’s right to live in peace and 
security, ensuring the rights of maritime passage, finding a just solution for the 
refugee problem and allowing for UN peace-keeping deployment in the region.
168  
 
To the Israeli government the Goldberg-Gromyko draft resolution was unacceptable. 
Eban complained vociferously to Goldberg, with Israel objecting on the grounds that 
the sides were not required to negotiate a settlement. Israel did not believe the UN 
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  61was an honest broker and refused to allow UN peace-keepers to be stationed in the 
territories. In addition, Israel refused to accept a return to the pre-war borders, 
distancing itself from its 19
th of June decisions.
169 In order to alleviate Israeli fears, 
Johnson promised Israel that a withdrawal would not precede the other conditions 
mentioned in the resolution and would occur only at the final stage.
170 To the surprise 
of all sides concerned the Arab delegations refused to accept the compromise.
171 This 
refusal played into the hands of those in the Israeli government, who refused to see 
the Arabs as peace partners. 
 
The debates in the UN, coupled with requests made by some hawkish ministers, by 
the press, as well as the general public opinion, all strengthened the demand in Israel 
to keep the territories indefinitely. The claim ‘there is no one to talk to’ became 
prevalent as the Arab refusal to compromise helped foster a climate of denial in Israel. 
This, in turn, helped to erode the perception, among policy makers, of the Occupied 
Territories as diplomatic bargaining chips. The failure of the expected international 
demand for an Israeli withdrawal to materialise proved to Israelis that the world 
would not, or could not, force them to withdraw. Finally, the US acceptance of the ‘no 
return to pre-war boundaries’ concept proved Israel could distance itself from the 19
th 
of June decisions and keep at least some parts of the territories without suffering any 
repercussions. In the cacophony of the hectic diplomatic activity, Israel’s refusal to 
accept the Goldberg-Gromyko compromise became a distant echo. In fact, ministers 
in Israel doubted whether an additional American diplomatic initiative, in the UN, 
was either desirable or necessary. They believed the ‘existing stalemate … is 
exercising a positive influence’ on the Arab sides.
172 
 
On the 2
nd of July, in the midst of the UN diplomatic activity, Ya’akov Hertzog met 
with King Hussein. The talks, which were held in London, were part of a secret 
channel of communication that had existed between the states for years (as a matter of 
fact, Hertzog had already met the King several times before the Six-Day War). Due to 
its inability to formulate a clear policy towards the West Bank and the general unease 
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  62felt by some of the ministers towards Hussein, the government hoped to learn more by 
listening to the King’s position first, and therefore instructed Hertzog not to propose 
anything on its behalf. The King arrived in London from Washington, where he was 
advised by the Americans to pursue peace with Israel, informing him that they would 
not impose a diplomatic settlement on Israel. The King explained to Hertzog that the 
Arab world was at a crossroads, but agreed that achieving peace was the preferred 
destination. Hussein did not put forward any proposals; instead he asked for time. The 
King was hoping that he would be able to convene an Arab summit, one in which the 
moderate sides would set the tone for peace negotiations with Israel, before he would 
proceed to present his views.
173 
 
 
The West Bank  
 
In its 19
th of June decisions the government avoided defining its preferred approach or 
making any decisions regarding the West Bank. The meeting with Hussein did not 
resolve these issues either, but in order to at least overcome the obstacles presented by 
the West Bank, the government commissioned two reports, the first of which came 
from the Foreign Ministry and was presented on the 13
th of July. The report outlined 
and analysed seven possible solutions, as far as the Foreign Ministry was concerned.  
  
1.  Annexation - the report advised against annexation. The option was listed as 
unrealistic because of the demographic problem. 
2.  Withdrawal or returning the West Bank to Hussein - The report suggested that 
this option was unrealistic. It would not solve Israel’s security problems.  
3.  Returning part of the West Bank to Hussein provided it was demilitarised and 
provided he accepts Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip - The 
report concluded that this would be a favourable solution from an Israeli 
perspective, but Hussein would probably consider it unacceptable. 
4.  Leaving the problem without a clear solution, i.e. continuing the ‘non-
decision’ - This option would allow Israel greater flexibility but would pose 
many social and political problems. It would also raise the suspicion that Israel 
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  635.  The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank - The report added 
that the establishment of a Palestinian state would create a breakthrough in 
Israeli-Arab relations. However, it warned that the newly-created Palestinian 
state might appear illegitimate to the Arab world, being an Israeli creation. 
The report concluded that this was the most favourable option, but it did not 
go as far as to recommend it. The report suggested that in order for this 
solution to be feasible Israel would need to annex the Gaza Strip and transfer 
its population to the West Bank. 
6.  A Palestinian state linked to Jordan - This option was listed as a possibility 
only as long as Jordan accepted an Israeli army presence in the West Bank, the 
annexation of Jerusalem, and the relocation of the Gaza Strip population to the 
West Bank. The report did not clarify whether the Palestinians or Hussein 
would agree to this solution, and warned of the implications to Israel’s 
security if the Hashemite rule collapsed.   
7.  An Israeli/Palestinian confederation - This option would solve Israel’s security 
problems but would pose the same political and social problems as 
annexation.
174 
  
The second report was handed to Eshkol on the 20
th of July. It was written by a 
special committee Eshkol had established to advise him on the territorial issue, and 
which included Haim Hertzog and Moshe Sasson. In contrast to the Foreign 
Ministry’s report, this committee concluded that Israel should negotiate with King 
Hussein. In the Hebrew literature this committee is referred to as ‘the committee of 
the four’ (literally). The authors argued for an intensive diplomatic effort to reach a 
peace settlement with Hussein. The report suggested that Israel did not have time on 
its side as it risked losing a historic opportunity. The committee ruled out the idea of 
creating a Palestinian entity as being undesirable for Israel. After conducting 
extensive discussions with Palestinian notables, they concluded that only a minority 
of which were willing to ‘go it alone’ (without the support of the Arab world) and 
establish an independent Palestinian state. The report suggested that Israel conduct an 
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  64intensive diplomatic effort in order to reach a peace settlement with Hussein and that 
such a settlement should be conditional on: an Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip; 
the resettlement of the Gaza population in the West and East Banks; demilitarisation 
of the West Bank: minor border modifications; and the establishment of a joint 
Israeli/Jordanian control over the West Bank. The authors concluded that until such a 
settlement was achieved, the West Bank should be administered as a separate entity 
and be placed under the jurisdiction of a separate government department headed by a 
minister, and that most of the junior administrative positions should be manned by 
Arabs.
 175  
 
The most remarkable aspect about these two reports is that they contradicted each 
another. The committee of the four dismissed the Palestinian Approach while the 
Foreign Ministry report referred to the Jordanian Approach as unfeasible. The reports’ 
conclusions - dismissing both approaches - must have confused ministers and there is 
no doubt that the lack of consensus among the committees further inhibited the 
government’s ability to formulate a clear long-term policy for the West Bank.  
 
 
The Allon Plan 
  
Allon’s involvement in the territorial debate was not limited to the Golan Heights. On 
the 26
th of July Allon presented the government with a plan to resolve the political 
impasse that had been reached with regards to the West Bank. The plan, later to be 
known as the Allon Plan, was the first attempt by a minister to propose a coherent 
long-term territorial policy. In the introduction to his plan, Allon explained the 
importance of establishing clear policies with regards to the territories. He advised the 
government to act quickly, before the US and the USSR managed to find a 
compromise resolution on Israel’s behalf. Allon’s plan did not deal with the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Golan Heights; he explained that these would be dealt with 
separately. The main features of the Allon Plan are summarised below. 
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  65The Allon Plan: 
 
1.  The establishment of the Jordan River as Israel’s eastern border. 
2.  In order to guarantee Israel’s security, the following territories would be 
annexed. 
  A 10-15km-wide strip along the Jordan Valley from Beit-She’an 
Valley to the north part of the Dead Sea. 
  A several-km-wide strip from the northern-most part of the Dead Sea 
to northern Jerusalem. 
  The Hebron Mountain or at least the area from the Judean Desert to the 
Negev. 
  Minor modifications in the Hebron Mountain and the Latrun regions. 
3.  In the annexed areas Israel would establish settlements and permanent military 
bases according to its security needs. 
4.  In East Jerusalem, new Jewish neighbourhoods would be built in addition to 
the repopulation of the Old City’s Jewish quarters. 
5.  In the areas not annexed by Israel, negotiations would start with local notables 
for the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian region, which would be 
linked to Israel by security and economic pacts. 
6.  Israel would work with the international community to resolve the refugee 
problem and would allow their resettlement in the West Bank and/or Sinai. 
7.  The Gaza Strip would be annexed by Israel once its population has been 
resettled. 
8.  An administrative office would be established to deal with the territories and 
the resettlement of refugees. 
9.  The new borders would be delineated by the Ministerial Defence Committee 
and the IDF’s general staff.
176  
 
Allon viewed the territories from an Instrumental point of view. As such, he defined 
West Bank areas according to their perceived military-strategic value, and called for 
the annexation of those deemed essential for national security; the rest of the West 
Bank was assigned for the establishment of a Palestinian autonomy. The Allon Plan 
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  66was based on the notion that Israel had no interest in controlling the Palestinian 
population. According to Yadlin, it was about securing ‘greater Israel’s demographic 
integrity rather than its geographic integrity’.
177 Furthermore, the plan, with its 
emphasis on agricultural settlements and their added value in terms of security, 
represented a return to the way of thinking prevalent during the mandate period. Allon 
understood well that Israel would not withdraw from the areas it wished to settle. 
 
The Allon Plan, however, was not received well and, when the government met to 
discuss its merits, ministers dismissed it as unsuitable on strategic grounds. The plan 
was dismissed by the Right (Gahal), the Centre (Mapai) and the Left (Mapam).
178 
According to Allon, ministers, influenced by Eshkol, refused to take a stand on the 
territorial issue before the Arab world expressed its willingness to negotiate with 
Israel. In short, the government preferred to maintain its ‘non decision’.
179 The plan 
did not fare better when presented to Ahdut-Ha’avoda members. The party base, led 
by Tabenkin, and Hakibbutz Hameuhad were in favour of the Greater Israel ideal. 
Tabenkin warned against the establishment of a Palestinian autonomous region and 
accused Allon of giving away the West Bank.  
 
 
Other Plans 
 
Despite the reluctance shown by the government and Ahdut-Ha’avoda towards 
accepting it, the Allon Plan did not disappear from the political scene. Moreover, the 
plan slowly took on a life of its own and was discussed at great length during a special 
meeting of the Ma’arach political committee on the 18
th of August. This committee 
was composed of the Mapai and Ahdut-Ha’avoda ministers and the purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss Israel’s territorial policy. The committee was presented with 
three alternative plans, i.e. the Allon Plan, a settlement plan by Ra’anan Weitz (Head 
of the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department), and an additional plan created by 
Dayan.
180  
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  67The Weitz Plan bore a stark resemblance to the Allon Plan. When asked to comment 
on it, Allon endorsed it as a ‘settlement interpretation’ of his plan. Weitz proposed the 
establishment of 30-50 settlements in the West Bank, with the bulk of which to be 
situated along the Jordan Valley from Beit-She’an to the northern Dead Sea, and 
recommended that they be established in unpopulated areas. This would allow for the 
creation of a Palestinian entity in the areas not settled by Israel, including the Gaza 
Strip. However, according to Weitz, Israel would still maintain its military control 
over the territories.
181 Weitz and Allon professed not to have known about each 
other’s plans, but this would appear highly unlikely. On the 27
th of July, the date the 
Allon Plan was submitted to the government, Allon outlined in his diary two 
settlement plans. The second settlement plan included the establishment of 24 
settlements: four in the Golan, one near Tirat-Tzvi, two near Qalqilya, three in Gush 
Etzion, two in the Latrun Area, three in the Gaza Strip and nine in the Jordan Valley.
 
The page in Allon’s diary is titled R. Weitz, and is dated 27/06/67.
182 Furthermore, 
Allon’s close collaboration with Weitz on the Eliqa settlement would suggest that 
they had at least some knowledge of each other’s ideas and aims.
183 Whether they 
were working together to influence territorial policy is unclear. 
 
The Dayan plan presented the committee with a different approach to the West Bank; 
the plan in its later incarnations was known as the Functional Solution.  It was first 
presented to the Ministerial Defence Committee on the 14
th of August and was further 
elaborated upon, on the 3
rd of September, at a Rafi meeting.
184 Dayan also approached 
the issue of the West Bank from a strategic-military perspective; the West Bank 
provided Israel, for the first time, with strategic depth. This convinced Dayan that 
there was no need for a static defence (army bases along the Jordan Valley, which was 
one of Allon’s suggestions), proposing instead a plan based on a ‘mobile defence’. 
According to Dayan, this would be achieved by creating five permanent army bases 
on the mountain ranges of the West Bank. In order to support Israel’s position in the 
West Bank, and alongside the army bases, Dayan proposed the establishment of large 
urban settlements. These, in addition to the army bases, would break the territorial 
integrity of the West Bank and ensure Israel’s control over the region. Furthermore, 
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  68Dayan dismissed Allon’s settlement philosophy, arguing that agricultural settlements 
had little security value. Additionally, Dayan envisioned that the administrative 
responsibilities of the West Bank would be shared between Israel and Jordan; the 
population would continue to hold Jordanian citizenship, i.e. a Functional Solution.
185 
Allon acknowledged that Dayan’s plan provided better security for Israel, but at a 
demographic cost.
 186 
 
The committee did not actually agree on either of these plans, but its members 
responded favourably to Weitz’s. There was a broad consensus about the fact that the 
Dayan plan did not provide an answer to Israel’s demographic problem. Eshkol 
commented that the Dayan plan would add more Arabs to Israel’s population, while 
the government was trying to avoid exactly that. Nevertheless, the committee was 
receptive to the security elements in the Dayan plan and recommended it to the 
government. Two days later, the government voted for the creation of military bases 
across the mountain ranges, evidently acknowledging the importance of the military 
elements in the plan.
187  
 
Mapam made public its peace plan on the 18
th of August. Mapam was the only party 
to present a concrete peace plan, which resembled the government’s 19
th of June 
decisions, but whether that was deliberate, remains unclear. Mapam, whilst 
acknowledging that the status of Jerusalem had already been decided, proposed: 
 
1.  The Golan Heights should be returned to Syria with some border 
modifications. 
2.  The Gaza Strip should be annexed to Israel. 
3.  The Sinai Peninsula should be returned to Egypt and be demilitarised. 
4.  The West Bank should be returned to Jordan with some minor border 
modifications. 
5.  Israel should strive to solve the refugee problem.
188 
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  69It was apparent that the main disagreement among Coalition members was about the 
West Bank. While the Israeli government’s position with regards to the West Bank 
remained unclear, four schools of thoughts emerged: the Reconciliationist, the 
Functionalist, the Territorialist and the Annexationist.
189 The first three approaches 
dominated the Israeli way of thinking on the West Bank, without any gaining 
ascendance among decision makers.  
 
1.  The ‘Reconciliationist Approach’ - as expressed by Mapam - called for the 
return of the West Bank to Jordan with some minor border modifications. 
2.  The ‘Functionalist Approach’ - as expressed by Dayan - envisioned an Israeli 
military control over the West Bank with a joint Israeli/Palestinian or 
Israeli/Jordanian administrative rule.  
3.  The ‘Territorialist Approach’ - as expressed by Allon - proposed to annex 
parts of the West Bank for security reasons and, in the territories not annexed, 
either to create a Palestinian entity or to return them to Jordan altogether.  
4.  The ‘Annexationist Approach’ - as expressed by Begin - called for the 
annexation of the West Bank, with some form of transitional period in which 
its residents’ civil rights would be assessed, after which they might be able to 
acquire citizenship.  
 
 
Dayan  
 
While the government and its various committees debated over Israel’s long-term 
policy approach without reaching any clear decisions, the Defence Ministry and the 
IDF dealt with the reality of the occupation. Dayan, while briefing the Knesset’s 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, explained that the Defence Ministry and the 
IDF administered the territories according to government policies. He was, however, 
unable to elaborate on these policies, and whether or not the government had 
formulated any.
190 The main reason Dayan did not detail the government’s economic 
or political long-term policies was that there were none. In reality, most of the 
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  70economic and political policies for the territories originated in the Defence Ministry. 
The lack of clear policies created a culture of ‘wait-and-see’ which put a strain on the 
Ministry of Defence and the IDF, and led to the retention of administrative powers by 
the ministry.
191 This fitted well with Dayan’s general perception of his fellow 
ministers who, he believed, unlike him, did not understand the Arab mentality and 
lacked long-term vision.  
 
Dayan believed Israel would have to keep the territories for an extended period of 
time; a successful solution, or any solution for that matter, was not forthcoming. This 
left Israel with a reality of having to manage the territories and their population 
without creating a ‘pressure cooker’. Israel had to do so while improving the living 
standards of the local population and without allowing the territories to become an 
economic burden on its own economy. For Dayan, the way to manage the territories 
was through Arab self-rule (Minhal A’tzmi) and economic integration with Israel. 
Dayan did not accept the proposition that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should 
remain separate economic entities in order to preserve their status as bargaining 
chips.
192 
 
As for the IDF and the military administration’s conduct in the Occupied Territories, 
Dayan established his guidelines, which were based on three principals, i.e. non-
intervention, open borders and non-visibility.
193 Dayan felt it was essential that Israeli 
officials had minimum contact with the local population and ordered the IDF to 
remain as far as possible from large population centres in order to allow day-to-day 
life to proceed uninterrupted (the ‘Invisible Occupation’). Dayan made it clear to the 
Palestinians that all matters concerning the military administration or the conduct of 
the army would be dealt with exclusively by the Ministry of Defence. Dayan did not 
expect the population to love Israel or accept its rule, but asked that they refrain from 
anti-Israel activities and cooperate with the administration.
194 He remarked that if he 
had to choose to be occupied, he would have preferred being occupied by Israel over 
any other nation.
195 Despite Dayan’s apparent omnipotence, the important polices did 
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re of it.
198 
                                                
not originate with him, or with the government. Israel’s inability to put forward a 
clear territorial policy meant it had to adapt to the existing reality. Arguably, the 
defining policy of the military administration was the Open Bridges policy. Dayan 
claimed in his memoirs that this policy was his brainchild; in reality it had very little 
to do with him. 
 
During the early weeks of the occupation, IDF officers uncovered attempts by West 
Bank traders to smuggle their produce across the Jordan River. After the matter was 
brought to his attention and because of lack of resources to stop the trend, Narkiss 
decided to turn a blind eye. Dayan, however, was quick to spot the inherent 
advantages when informed of the incidents a few weeks later. Dayan was allegedly 
against the Open Bridges at first, but eventually changed his mind after spotting an 
opportunity - an ability for which Dayan was renowned.
196 The exportation of excess 
agricultural produce to Jordan increased Palestinian living standards while protecting 
the Israeli market from cheap imports. The Open Bridges policy came into effect on 
the 21
st of August and, from Dayan’s perspective, it served as a ‘pressure release 
valve’ for the Palestinians and ensured the West Bank would not become an economic 
burden.
197 Dayan may not have conceived the policy, but he understood its 
advantages and therefore authorised it, long before the government was awa
 
In short, Dayan’s vision was self-contradictory. On the one hand, Dayan pushed for 
economic integration and the establishment of army bases and Jewish settlements in 
the West Bank. On the other hand, he genuinely wanted to improve the living 
standards of the Palestinian population, to provide them with the opportunity to 
resume normal lives without Israeli intervention, to allow them to exercise self-rule 
and even maintain their ties with the Arab World, i.e. a ‘Benevolent Occupation’.
199  
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Merom-Golan 
 
The erosion of the 19
th of June consensus as a result of the activity of individual 
ministers, the acceptance by the American administration of Israel’s right to hold on 
to parts of the territories and the perceived lack of suitable peace partners, were all 
elements that combined to create a territorial policy vacuum. Faced with the 
impossible task of reaching a new consensus regarding the Occupied Territories, 
within the confines of the National Unity Coalition, Eshkol chose to maintain political 
stability by leaving the matter unresolved. In other words, the government did not 
pursue a clear long-term policy. The policy vacuum was exploited by individual 
ministers, most notably Dayan and Allon, and interest groups - associated with either 
New Zionism or the pre-state anti-partition Zionist Left. On the 23
rd of June, 
Hakibbutz Hameuhad (the united kibbutz) movement convened to discuss the post-
war situation. Originally a non-political grass root movement, it considered itself to be 
a vehicle for the realisation of Zionist aspirations. This movement was first and 
foremost a settler movement, which had contributed to the creation of numerous 
settlements in the state’s pre-independence era. In the post-independence era the 
movement became the main electoral base for Ahdut-Ha’avoda, enabling the 
movement to express its political aspirations.  
 
The meeting was dominated by the founder of Ahdut-Ha’avoda Yitzhak Tabenkin. 
For him, the war represented a historical opportunity for the fulfilment of the Zionist 
dream; an opportunity to correct Mapai’s mistake of accepting the partition plan. 
Tabenkin called for the annexation of the territories and the immediate establishment 
of settlements in order to increase Israel’s security. According to Tabenkin, 
settlements represented the natural way for the development and strengthening of the 
economic, social and military spheres of Jewish life.
1 Hakibbutz Hameuhad followed 
in Tabenkin’s steps by calling on the government to: abrogate the 1949 ceasefire 
agreements: unify Jerusalem: continue to hold the territories: make no differentiation 
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  73between the territories held: establish settlements: and refuse to conduct peace 
negotiations on the basis of the pre-war borders.
2  
 
Several of Tabenkin’s followers took his words literally. During the meeting they 
discussed the possibility of establishing a settlement on the Golan Heights. It is 
unclear whether they informed Tabenkin, but it is safe to assume that he would have 
supported them. After organising themselves as a group, they announced their 
intentions to harvest the fields and tend to the cattle abandoned by the Syrians in the 
Golan. On the 14
th of July, the group established Eliqa (later to be known as Merom 
Golan) - the first settlement in the territories.
3 The establishment of Eliqa created a 
precedent in that the Israeli government had allowed a semi-private initiative, backed 
by high ranking officials, to create ‘facts on the ground’ and influence policy. In its 
19
th of June decisions, the government had decided to withdraw from the Golan 
Heights in return for peace. During the discussions leading to this decision, the only 
areas mentioned in conjunction with settlements were Hebron, East Jerusalem and the 
Jordan Valley.
4  
 
For the idea of the Eliqa settlement to materialise, the group enlisted the help of the 
Upper Galilee Regional Council, General David El’azar, Allon and Weitz. On the 9
th 
of July, the group met with the Upper Galilee Regional Council, which agreed to 
allocate funds and assist the group with their agricultural undertakings in the Golan. 
Although there was no mention at that point of complicity, it is hard to imagine that 
they were unaware of the implications their actions would have. After the war, the 
IDF declared the Golan Heights a military zone, accessible only with permits.
5 
Through Dan Lerner (Commander of the IDF’s forces in the Golan and a member of 
Hakibbutz Hameuhad), the Eliqa group enlisted the support of El’azar. The head of 
the Northern Command provided the group with permits, food supplies and tractors. 
Later on, El’azar authorised IDF soldiers to stand guard the settlement.
6 On the 30
th of 
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  74July the army moved the settlers to a disused Syrian army base and authorised their 
stay. The order was signed by Akiva Finkelstein, military governor of the Golan.
7  
 
The most important contribution to the group’s effort came from Allon and Weitz, 
who were both privy to the group’s plans; Allon would later claim that it was he who 
organised the group. Allon operated on the basis that Israel would never withdraw 
from the Golan Heights.
8 On the 3
rd of July, a few days after the Eliqa group found a 
suitable area to settle, Allon submitted a proposal to the government for the 
establishment of 2-3 agricultural work camps in the Golan Heights.
9 Allon did not 
mention the Eliqa group to the government. He knew the government would rule out 
any request to settle the Golan and decided to circumvent any obstacles that might 
have arisen from treating these camps as settlements, by proposing the establishment 
of agricultural work camps.
10 In addition, Allon provided the group with funds, which 
were diverted from the Employment Ministry without the knowledge or authorisation 
of the government.
11 
 
Weitz understood from the onset that the principal motive behind the establishment of 
agricultural work camps was to settle the Golan.
12 Nevertheless, Weitz and his deputy 
Yehiel Admoni agreed to provide substantial funds to the group, through the Upper 
Galilee Regional Council, for the purpose of establishing Eliqa. It is important to note 
that the Agency had conducted surveys in the Golan and looked into establishing 
settlements before meeting with the Eliqa group. Arguably, the Agency was acting on 
its own accord, even though it would not normally act independently.
13 Therefore, it 
is plausible that the Settlement Department provided funds to the settlers with the tacit 
authorisation of government officials. According to Pedatzur, Agricultural Minister 
Haim Gvati and Eshkol both knew of and approved these money transfers.
14 During 
the war, Weitz discussed with Eshkol the need to conduct surveys in the territories in 
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  75order to determine land ownerships, water supplies and evaluate development plans. 
Eshkol thought Weitz was crazy, but gave him his authorisation nevertheless.
15 
 
 
Committees 
 
On the 27
th of August, six weeks after the Eliqa group established the first outpost, the 
government convened to discuss its policy regarding to the Golan Heights. On the 
agenda was the creation of agricultural work camps. Eshkol made it clear these camps 
were necessary for the purpose of working the land: ‘It’s clear that you neither destroy 
orchards nor start permanent settlements … but if orchards exist, you have to maintain 
them.’
16 The government decided to approve the establishment of these agricultural 
work camps, which meant that an ad-hoc committee had to be set up and be 
responsible for defining the size and locations of these camps. Gvati claimed ‘the 
government’s decision is sufficient … in consultation with the Agriculture Ministry 
[Gvati], the Defence Ministry [Dayan], and the Employment Ministry [Allon], we will 
decide how to do it [establish agricultural work camps].’
17 Furthermore, the 
government authorised the establishment of an additional agricultural camp in El-
Arish (Sinai).
18  
 
With Allon and Dayan at its helm, the new ad-hoc committee deviated from the task 
given to it by the government. Its first briefing paper was titled ‘Discussion on 
outposts in the Held Territories’. The committee decided to establish two Nahal 
outposts in the Golan Heights,
19 in the Banias area and in El-al, and agreed to provide 
official authorisation for the existing outpost of Eliqa. Furthermore, it authorised the 
creation of a Nahal outpost in El-Arish, and looked into the possibility of establishing 
a fourth outpost in El-Hama (Golan). In its briefing, the committee stated that the 
government had empowered it to decide on settlement matters.
20  
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On the 1
st of September, the leaders of the Arab world, with the exception of Algeria 
and Syria, gathered in Khartoum to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Arab 
leaders agreed to coordinate their activities to ensure Israel withdrew to the pre-war 
boundaries. The summit’s concluding resolution called for ‘no peace with Israel, no 
recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel’ (known as the three no’s). There 
has been a lot of controversy as to what the resolution ‘really’ meant. Gorenberg 
argues that the resolution was a genuine attempt at a two-state solution through third 
party mediations. However, the only problem was that ‘the leaders at Khartoum 
negotiated for a formula for what Israel should accept, then encoded it in bellicose 
rhetoric’.
21 
  
In Israel, the resolution’s three no’s were interpreted as a rejection of Israel’s peace 
initiative.
22 For the government, the Khartoum resolutions served as a reality check. 
After the Six-Day War there were expectations among Israeli politicians that the Arab 
states would stand in line for a just peace, and would accept any condition Israel 
might have.
23 The resolution had the unwanted effect of swaying the debate within 
the Israeli government in favour of those who saw no credible negotiation partners. 
Galili remarked that it was unfair to expect Israel to assume a passive grip on the 
territories while the Arab world refused to negotiate with it.
24 On the 3
rd of 
September, and in the shadows of the Khartoum Summit, the ad-hoc committee 
briefed the government on the conclusions it had reached, with Dayan reminding the 
ministers that the committee was actually authorised by the government to make 
decisions about settlements in the Golan Heights. Eshkol, who earlier criticised 
Dayan’s independent activities in the territories, did not object to the committee’s 
‘new range of activities’. Tourism Minister Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal Party) 
was the only one to state the obvious, remarking that the government had not 
authorised the committee to look into the matter of settlements.  
                                                
 
The government meeting ended without a decision. By failing to reach a decision, the 
government all but decided to leave the matter in the hands of Gvati, Allon and 
 
21 Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire Page 109. 
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  77Dayan; showing, not for the first time, an unwillingness to deal with the complexity of 
the territorial issue. In leaving the future of the existing settlement in Eliqa undecided, 
the government effectively authorised it. There were direct implications to this non-
decision, i.e. by not reprimanding the committee, the government provided it with the 
authority to formulate and implement territorial policies on its behalf. The ad-hoc 
committee proceeded to include in its territorial planning the Settlement Department 
and private organisations.
25  
 
By failing to decide, the government allowed for a decision of great significance, i.e. 
the establishment of settlements in the Occupied Territories, to be taken by an ad-hoc 
committee, without ever discussing its long-term implications. In fact, by leaving the 
matter in the hands of the ad-hoc committee, the Eshkol government effectively 
retracted its 19
th of June decisions without proposing an alternative long-term 
solution. Arguably, the consensus behind the 19
th of June decisions evaporated due to 
several international factors, i.e. the position of the American administration, the lack 
of suitable peace partners and international pressure.  
 
The urgency of reaching a clear policy stance regarding the territories captured, 
particularly the complex and multilayered question of the West Bank, began to recede 
as the prospect of imminent negotiations grew dimmer.
26  
 
The ensuing policy vacuum was exploited by Allon and Dayan, as well as interest 
groups with specific territorial agendas. The actions taken by Allon and Dayan 
(through the ad-hoc settlement committee) resulted in Israel adopting an incoherent 
territorial policy.  
 
On the 10
th of September, Allon presented the government with a proposal to allow 
the ad-hoc committee to establish settlements in Gush-Etzion and the Jordan Valley. 
According to the proposal, Israel would annex both areas. Allon argued that the 
government had already authorised the committee to establish agricultural work 
camps in the Golan Heights, and it should therefore provide it with the same authority 
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  78with regards to the Gush-Etzion and Jordan Valley areas.
27 Eshkol supported the idea 
of settling in Gush-Etzion. He explained to the government that Weitz had informed 
him of a large group of people that were willing to settle there if the government 
approved it.
28 Eshkol did not mention that he had been contacted by former Gush-
Etzion members, who wanted to resettle there.
29 Gvati objected to the idea of 
resettling Gush-Etzion, stating that the government had not yet decided on the future 
of the West Bank and that a decision to settle Gush-Etzion would entail appropriating 
land. Gvati believed it would be prudent to decide over the future of the West Bank 
prior to agreeing on settlements.
30 While the issue of settling Gush-Etzion and the 
Jordan Valley clearly troubled him, Gvati did not object to settling the Golan Heights. 
Justice Minister Shapira explained that Gush-Etzion had a different status to the other 
areas, as the land was legally owned by Jews before the War of Independence.
31 
Additionally, Gush-Etzion was one of the sites suggested by Dayan as suitable for the 
construction of a military base. 
 
There was some confusion among ministers regarding what exactly the government 
was asked to approve. Justice Minister Shapira reminded the government that, despite 
the approval of the work camps, no firm decision had been taken regarding the long-
term future of the territories, while Galili replied that no firm decision had been taken 
‘yet’.
32 Galili went on to say that the government needed to keep the Golan and was 
certain that ministers had recanted their earlier approval of the 19
th of June 
decisions.
33 The ministers in general and Eshkol in particular were confused about the 
legality of establishing outposts, settlements and military bases in the territories. This 
was apparent in the language they used when referring to the territories. The 
territories were described by ministers as 'Freed Territories' (Meshuhrarim),
34 Eban 
talked about ‘Held Territories’,
35 the ‘Committee of the Four’ discussed the future of 
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  79the ‘Occupied Territories’,
36 and several government documents referred to them as 
‘territories held by the IDF’.
37 
 
In order to clarify this uncertainty, the government requested the advice of Theodor 
Meron (the Foreign Office Attorney General). In his opinion, Meron argued, there 
was in fact legal precedent for settling in the Gush-Etzion area. This area had 
previously been owned and occupied by Jews, and Israel could claim the settlers were 
simply returning to their homes. With regards to the Jordan valley, Meron claimed 
that the situation was more complicated, as similar claims would not have legal 
justification. With regards to the Golan Heights, Meron informed the government that, 
in legal terms, the area was an occupied territory, and therefore according to the 
Geneva Convention (which Israel had signed), Israel was categorically prohibited 
from establishing civilian settlement there. Israel’s claim for legal ambiguity 
regarding its control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was not totally 
unjustified, keeping in line with the previous rule by Egypt and Jordan. However, 
Meron added that the international community would not accept an Israeli counter-
claim. According to the Geneva Convention, international law prohibits states from 
annexing occupied territories or settling their populations in them. The Attorney 
General explained that international law indeed applied to civilian settlements, but not 
to military outposts. Therefore, the establishment of temporary army bases on what 
had previously been public lands would be legally permissible. Meron accepted the 
government’s claim for establishing Nahal outposts in the territories in order to carry 
out agricultural work.
38 Meron’s legal advice opened the way for the establishment of 
temporary Nahal outposts.  
 
On the 22
nd of September, Eshkol met representatives of former Gush-Etzion 
residents. Eshkol explained that no firm decision had been taken regarding the future 
of the West Bank, but promised to look into their request and give them an answer 
within a few days.
39 Allegedly, the Gush-Etzion group told Eshkol they were ready to 
establish an outpost in the area with or without the government’s consent, to which 
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  80Eshkol replied with ‘go on!’.
40 It is interesting to note that the settlers, which included 
several of the would-be founders of the Gush-Emunim movement, were politically 
supported by The Land of Israel Movement (known in Hebrew as the Movement for 
Greater Israel). This movement was founded by disillusioned members of the Labour 
Party and included members of every political orientation associated with New 
Zionism and committed to the idea of establishing ‘the land of Israel as a unified 
national entity’.
41 The land of Israel was defined as the territories ‘now in the hands 
of the Jewish people’, i.e. Israel and the Occupied Territories.
42  
                                                
 
Two days later Eshkol received a settlement plan for Gush-Etzion from the Settlement 
Department, which had worked on the plan for some time in the knowledge that the 
Gush-Etzion area would be resettled.
43 Eshkol informed the government that he had 
approved the settlement in Gush-Etzion, which would be established in accordance 
with Dayan’s plan, i.e. the same plan the government, the Ministerial Defence 
Committee and the Ma’arach political committee had previously rejected. For the 
majority of the ministers this was the first time they had heard of this decision. 
Barzilai complained that they (the ministers) only agreed to vote on the issue of 
agricultural work camps and Nahal outposts, but not on civilian settlements.
44 
 
Ministers, the majority of whom were purposely or voluntarily excluded from the 
territorial decision-making process, became upset with the conduct of the government. 
They complained to Eshkol that it was not a question of whether Gush-Etzion was to 
be a civilian or military outpost, but whether the decision-making process had been 
taken out of the hands of the government.
45 Ministers were frustrated at not being 
informed about all settlement activities, and complained that the work done by the ad-
hoc committee was not sufficiently transparent. Eshkol explained that they did not 
need to know everything and that no formal decision had been made, even though it 
was apparent that some policies had been already formulated and implemented.
46 
According to Allon, Eshkol agreed that the ad-hoc committee, and later the 
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  81Ministerial Settlement Committee (MSC), would establish settlements where they saw 
fit, as long as it was done within the parameters of the Allon Plan.
47 Furthermore, 
Eshkol acknowledged that the important decisions should be taken by the MSC 
because ‘the government was of minor importance’.
48 Allon himself admitted that the 
government only acted as a rubber stamp; fulfilling its role by agreeing with the 
motions put before it.
49 
 
The activity of the ad-hoc committee (Gvati, Allon and Dayan) represented a clear 
change in the dynamics of the government’s decision-making process. Several 
prominent ministers, among them the Prime Minister, were able to participate in the 
decision-making process, while most were excluded. The government was 
undermined by private enterprises (The Eliqa and Gush-Etzion groups), individual 
ministerial activity (Allon and Dayan), the work of ad-hoc committees (dominated by 
Eshkol, Allon, Dayan and Gvati, and supported by Galili) and the Settlement 
Department (operating with or without the consent of ministers). This created a 
situation in which - while the government did not have a clear long-term policy of its 
own - Allon and Dayan were implementing decisions according to their own 
interpretation and long-term plans, i.e. the Allon Plan and the Functional Solution. It 
did not help that Eshkol was unable to control the activities of his increasingly 
independent ministers.
50  
 
It is evident that Eshkol supported the efforts of Allon and Dayan; Allon himself 
remarked on several occasions that Eshkol supported the Allon Plan. However, 
because of the unlikelihood of reaching a decision regarding the Allon Plan, or for 
that matter any long-term plan, within the confines of the National Unity Government, 
Eshkol approved the ad-hoc committee’s incremental approach. Eshkol, for reasons of 
political convenience, avoided putting forward clear long-term territorial policies. In 
other words, any attempt by Eshkol to force a clear decision on the matter of the 
Occupied Territories would have been politically complicated and against his own 
inclinations. This last point needs to be emphasised. The lack of a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term territorial policy suited Eshkol and his main Coalition 
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  82partners. Additionally, (and this will be covered in depth later in the chapter), Mapai 
was engaged in negotiations regarding the formation of a united Labour Party with 
Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda. Any clear decision regarding the Occupied Territories 
would have had the potential to derail these negotiations. 
 
 
The 30
th of October Decision 
 
Following the breakdown of the 19
th of June consensus and the ensuing territorial 
policy vacuum, the government debate was no longer on whether to establish 
outposts, but rather on where and of which nature. This debate exposed the 
problematic nature of decision-making within the National Unity Government, with a 
vote on whether to allow civilian settlements to be established in the Golan Heights 
ending in a stalemate.
51 This debate was particularly apparent during the debate over 
Gush-Etzion; ministers appeared confused and unsure as to whether Gush-Etzion 
would be a Nahal settlement or a civilian one. The confusion arose over the fact that 
most settlers were over the official army age. Eshkol - side-stepping the issue - 
commented that ‘even Nahal soldiers grow old’.
52 Eshkol himself expressed 
confusion over which settlements were Nahal, which should be appropriated as Nahal 
and what should be the overall standard when establishing settlements. In order to 
avoid further confusion over this matter, Galili suggested paraphrasing all settlement 
activity as of transitory nature (Nahal).
53 
 
In response to a New York Times article, accusing Israel of establishing settlements in 
the territories, the Foreign Ministry asked Israeli embassies to explain that these were 
transitory Nahal outposts, established in accordance with international law and 
Israel’s security needs, and did not change the future status of the territories.
54 Israel’s 
Ambassador to the US Avraham Herman urged the government to suppress reports of 
this nature, as they were having a ‘catastrophic’ effect on Israel’s position vis-à-vis 
the UN and the US.
55 In its reply, the Foreign Ministry accepted Herman’s stance and 
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  83asked him to stress that the settlements in the Golan Heights and Gush-Etzion were of 
military and not civilian nature.
56 The government contacted the US administration to 
clarify that all these settlements were being established according to security 
requirements and that Israel had not changed its flexible policy regarding the 
territories.
57 The US administration made clear its discontent with such activities, 
informing Israel that its illegal settling of occupied land harmed US foreign policies.
58 
At the same time, the administration refrained from publicly admonishing Israel or 
putting any pressure on it to stop; a fact that was acknowledged by Israel.
59 Arguably, 
by sending out mixed messages, the US administration complicated the on-going 
debate within Israel regarding the long-term future of the territories. 
 
On the 30
th of October the government decided to review its 19
th of June decisions. 
The government had originally agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Golan Heights to the international borders in return for peace treaties. The decision 
was rephrased, and now referred to Israel’s willingness to negotiate with Syria and 
Egypt on the basis of ‘secure and recognised borders’, while the government left open 
the exact definition of ‘secure and recognised borders’. In essence, the government 
had decided to formally retract its 19
th of June decisions, but did not relay the new 
decision to the American administration.
60 The 30
th of October decision should not be 
understood as the adoption of a new long-term territorial policy, but rather as a 
deliberate attempt to revise its original commitments by making these vaguer and less 
binding. In fact, the retraction of the 19
th of June decisions on the 30
th of October left 
Israel without a coherent long-term territorial policy. The government, in its 30
th of 
October decision, chose not to deal with the complex issue of the West Bank and left 
the decision over the long-term status of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights 
for future negotiations.  
 
The evolution of Israel’s territorial policy was directly related to the passivity of most 
ministers. While some ministers took an active role in reshaping the territorial policy 
(e.g. Eshkol, Galili, Allon, Gvati and Dayan), others - despite being excluded from the 
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  84decision-making process - simply supported their actions. One of the explanations for 
this behaviour was the selective information ministers were being fed. For instance, 
when referring to their plans, Allon and Dayan focused on the military’s needs but, 
with most ministers not having any military experience, ministers relied on the IDF to 
explain and brief them on military and security matters. It created a situation in which 
ministers were dependent on an organisation that only exposed them to one particular 
view.
61 To complicate matters further, most army generals argued in favour of 
remaining and maintaining the status-quo in the Occupied Territories. 
 
The army’s top brass chose to express their personal views in a closed meeting with 
Eshkol and Dayan on the 5
th of December. Rabin broke down into three the choices 
that Israel had regarding the West Bank, i.e. annexation, negotiations with Hussein 
and the creation of a Palestinian entity bound to Israel. Rabin dismissed the first two 
options while presenting the third as Israel’s only valid choice.
62 General Yariv 
stressed the need for a long-term strategic plan, although he agreed with Rabin that 
Hussein was not a viable partner for peace and that the Arab states as a whole were 
not ready to negotiate with Israel. He concluded that Israel did not need to find an 
immediate solution to the territories, as time was on its side.
63 General Gavish 
asserted that what Israel gained during the war was exactly what it had wanted, i.e. 
strategic depth, and was therefore happy with the status quo.
64 Former Chief-of-Staff 
Tzvi Tzur stated that Israel needed to find a way of remaining on the current cease-
fire lines while solving the demographic problem that arose as a result. He suggested 
(in line with Rabin) the creation of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip.
65 This line of thought was supported by Haim Bar-Lev (who would later 
replace Rabin as Chief-of-Staff). Bar-Lev claimed that the status-quo was not a bad 
solution for the time being: ‘I am against a Palestinian state, but we must continue to 
control the West Bank militarily and remain on the Jordan River.’
66 
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  85Hussein 
 
Despite the reluctance of the army’s top brass and most ministers to consider him as a 
reliable partner, talks with Hussein continued. The new round of UN discussions on 
the Middle East and the resumption of hostilities in the region persuaded Israel to 
resume its talks with Hussein. These talks took place in part because of the expressed 
support given to Hussein by the American administration.
67 Israel - represented by 
Hertzog - held its second post-war meeting with Hussein in London on the 19
th of 
November. Hertzog inquired whether Hussein would consider holding direct 
negotiations with Israel. In reply, Hussein explained that direct negotiations between 
Jordan and Israel could only proceed if they were part of a wider Israeli-Arab 
settlement. Hussein wanted to know whether Israel would return the West Bank to 
him. Hertzog claimed to have come at the behest of the government to listen rather 
than to talk, which further illustrates the fact that the government did not have, and 
could not agree on, a clear long-term policy regarding the West Bank. Hertzog 
proceeded to explain the different views held within the government and the fact that 
no firm decision had been taken yet regarding the West Bank. The King explained 
that he was willing to entertain ‘harmonising’ Israel’s security requirements with his 
own vision, while taking into account Israel’s historical association with the West 
Bank.
68 Moreover, Hussein was willing to make an offer to Israel, which he claimed 
had Nasser’s support. This offer included an end to all forms of hostility, recognition 
of Israel’s existence, evacuation of Israeli forces from all the Occupied Territories, 
free passage through the Straits of Tiran and Suez and a just solution to the refugee 
problem.
69  
 
Hertzog, with Hussein’s consent, summarised their meeting: 
 
1.  The King favours a package deal to end the conflict. 
2.  He understands Israel’s demand for direct negotiations and a peace accord. 
3.  He understands Israel would not make any moves without direct negotiations 
and a peace accord. 
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  864.  He will work to persuade other Arab states to agree to direct negotiations. 
5.  He asks Israel to clarify its position with regards to the West Bank. 
6.  Hussein urges Israel ‘not to recognise a Palestinian entity’.
70 
 
Several weeks later a secret paper outlining Israel’s position regarding a separate 
settlement with Hussein was handed to Eshkol. The paper - written by Eshkol’s close 
advisers, with input from Hertzog and Yariv (head of AMAN) - questioned Hussein’s 
ability to hold separate talks with Israel. The paper proposed: 
 
1.  Retaining a narrow strip from Ein-Gedi (Dead Sea area) to the Allenby Bridge 
(connecting Jericho with the East Bank), in which settlements would be 
established.  
2.  Retaining a narrow strip from Tirat-Tzvi (near Beit-She’an) to the Damia 
Bridge (30km north of Jericho), in which settlements would be established.  
3.  Extending Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, to make the Latrun Pass part of 
Israel. 
4.  Israel would require minor border modifications in the Jenin and Jerusalem 
areas. 
5.  The remaining West Bank territories would be returned to Jordan. 
6.  These areas would remain demilitarised and Israel would keep five army bases 
on the West Bank mountain ranges. 
7.  The King would be recognised as the protector of the Islamic holy sites in 
Jerusalem. 
8.  Israel would allow free transport of Jordanian goods to and from Israeli ports. 
9.  Finally, Israel would support plans to resolve the refugee problem and 
cooperate with Jordan on joint development plans.
 71  
 
The Israeli proposal, as outlined by the paper, consisted of the Allon Plan with the 
military elements of the Dayan plan, neither of which were agreed to (or voted on) by 
the government. The same proposal was discussed and analysed by the Foreign 
Ministry in its 13
th of July report, where it concluded there was no chance Hussein 
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  87would accept it. Needless to say, the government never got to vote on or to discuss 
this proposal. 
 
 
Resolution 242 
 
The second meeting between Hertzog and Hussein was held in the midst of a new 
round of UN discussions on the situation in the Middle East. The new international 
drive to solve the Middle East problems was prompted, in part, by the resumption of 
hostilities between Israel and Egypt. On the 21
st of October Egyptian forces sunk the 
Israeli battleship Eilat, with Israel retaliating by bombing Egyptian oil refineries near 
the city of Suez.
72 
 
The new round of discussions in the UN provided further proof that Israel did not 
have a coherent long-term territorial policy. As a result of the government’s inability 
to agree on the future status of the Occupied Territories, it worked to stifle any 
international decision on the matter. While publicly arguing in favour of a political 
compromise based on direct negotiations, the Eshkol government had meanwhile 
taken steps to create facts on the ground, such as the establishment of settlements in 
the Jordan Valley, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. However, the actions 
taken by the government did not follow a particular policy or long-term approach.  
 
The US delegation proposed a draft resolution based on the Goldberg-Gromyko 
version. The American drive to resolve the conflict did not sit well with the Israeli 
government. Eban complained to Goldberg that ‘endorsing the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the territories occupied in recent hostilities would jeopardise the prospect 
of creating a new security system in the area.’
73 The Israeli government claimed that 
only a resolution that would put the emphasis on direct talks and would not require it 
to withdraw until agreements were reached would suffice. However, Eshkol admitted 
this claim was disingenuous, as Israel had decided against returning to the pre-war 
borders on all fronts, ‘I am afraid of the moment they [the Arab states] will say: with 
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  88pleasure’ (i.e. agree to direct negotiations).
74 Eshkol acknowledged that the US was 
trying to resolve the situation, but admitted his relief at Egypt’s refusal to accept 
Goldberg’s compromise.
75  
 
On the 9
th of November the Security Council met to discuss the US draft. The Israeli 
delegation had reasons to fear this meeting, as a report by Israel’s Foreign Ministry 
suggested the US managed to get the support of Jordan and Egypt for its draft.
76 
Under intense diplomatic pressure from Israel, the Americans agreed not to introduce 
their draft without Israel’s approval. Israel’s refusal to accept the American draft 
resulted in the Security Council having to debate competing drafts, which contained 
less favourable terms for Israel.
77 To the US delegate’s and Israel’s relief, the Security 
Council did not consider other draft proposals and voted on a British compromise 
draft instead. This draft resolution, tabled by Lord Caradon (the British Ambassador 
to the UN), gained the support of the US, the USSR and the Arab bloc, with the 
exception of Syria and Algeria. This resolution was not accepted by Israel, which 
resorted to a last-minute attempt by Eshkol to convince the Americans to vote against 
it.
78 Nevertheless, this draft resolution, which became known as Resolution 242, was 
adopted unanimously. The Resolution called for: ‘The inadmissibility of acquiring 
territories by war’, ‘The withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict’, ‘Respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in 
peace within secure and recognised boundaries’, ‘Guaranteeing freedom of navigation 
through international waterways in the area’, ‘The Secretary-General to designate a 
special representative … to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned 
in order to promote … efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.’
79  
 
The Security Council appointed Gunnar Jarring - a veteran Swedish diplomat who had 
previously served as the Swedish ambassador to the USSR - as its designated 
representative to the region.  
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  89The White House 
 
The debates in the Security Council confirmed Israel’s growing dependence on the 
US. Israel was in a problematic situation vis-à-vis the American administration since 
it could not pursue policies which contradicted the American position, as it was 
dependent on the US for diplomatic support. To compound the problem Israel was 
under a French arms embargo, while Egypt and Syria were being rearmed at an 
increasing pace by the USSR. France had been, up to that point, Israel’s biggest 
supplier of military hardware.
80 This forced the Israeli government to seek American 
military support, further demonstrating Israel’s growing dependence on the US. 
Eshkol’s visit to Washington at the beginning of January 1968 - the first official visit 
by a serving Prime Minister to the US - provided the opportunity to cement Israeli-
American relations. Israeli politicians and generals were unsure as to which policies 
should be presented to the US administration and, in particular, whether Israel should 
inform the US of its rejection of its 19
th of June decisions. The problem was urgent 
due to Israel’s immediate need for aeroplanes and military equipment - a fact which 
significantly reduced Israel’s diplomatic manoeuvring ability.
81 
 
In preparation for Eshkol’s visit, a memo was sent from Aviad Jaffe (Director of the 
Prime Minister’s office) to Avraham Herman (Israel’s ambassador to the US), 
instructing him to avoid mentioning the territorial issue due to its complicated nature. 
Jaffe went on to write that the government had not authorised anyone to discuss it, as 
most of the ministers no longer agreed with the previous 19
th of June decisions. Jaffe 
added that, among ministers, the thought of holding on to a maximum amount of 
territory acquired a historical and strategic semblance.
82  
 
In Washington Eshkol encountered two US approaches towards Israel. On the one 
hand, Secretary of State Rusk appeared unconvinced by Israel’s military needs and 
was troubled by Israel’s inflexible diplomatic stance. Rusk believed Israel should be 
willing to undertake trust-building measures in the region, and that US supply of 
military equipment should be conditional upon Israel’s diplomatic posturing and the 
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  90situation in the region.
83 Rusk was supported by many in the administration who felt 
that Israel should agree to withdraw from all the territories - in principle - in exchange 
for military hardware.
84 Moreover, according to General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Israeli military needs were not as urgent; he predicted 
continued Israeli air superiority for the next 18 months.
85 On the other hand, Johnson 
accepted Israel’s immediate need for military wares and promised Eshkol to do 
something about it (i.e. deliver through a third country). Furthermore, he assured 
Eshkol that he would not take any steps regarding the territories without discussing it 
with Israel first.
86 Nevertheless, Johnson stressed that the US would work with the 
Soviets to prevent a possible arms race and to promote peace in the region.
87  
 
At one point during these discussions Rusk and Johnson wanted to know from Eshkol 
what kind of Israel he envisioned; in other words, to what extent was Israel willing to 
negotiate and how much was it willing to give up? Eshkol explained his dilemma. He 
had a ‘wall to wall’ Coalition of the Right and Left, there were no Arab states with 
which to negotiate, and Israel was a small country surrounded by enemies. Therefore, 
Eshkol informed them, Israel had decided - until it had other viable options - ‘not to 
decide’.
88  
 
 
Jarring 
 
In December 1967 Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban met with King Hussein of 
Jordan in London. Eban was informed by members of the Jordanian negotiation team 
that Hussein was willing to make concessions in any part of the West Bank, with the 
exception of Jerusalem. The maximum he could offer Israel was control over the 
Wailing Wall, but that was as far as he would go, and that if Israel persisted with its 
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  91attitude towards Jerusalem, the talks would not progress.
89 While it appeared that 
there was some progress in the talks with Jordan, there were still no equivalent talks 
with Egypt. Back in December 1967 Dayan suggested withdrawing from the Suez 
Canal as a gesture of good will. Although the suggestion came from Dayan, it was 
originally put forward by the Meir Amit;
90 Dayan, it turns out, was initially against 
the idea.
91 Once convinced, however, Dayan believed an Israeli withdrawal from the 
canal would promote better understanding between the two states, eliminate friction 
and legitimise Israel’s demand for a military presence in Sharm El-Sheikh. Galili 
claimed that this would be a dangerous precedent and that Israel should instead 
prepare for a lengthy stay in the area. The government eventually decided not to 
decide and to leave the option open.
92 
 
In January 1968 Jarring requested that each state, with the exception of Syria who 
refused to negotiate with Israel, publicly accept Resolution 242 and declare their 
willingness to implement it. While Jordan and Egypt made their stance known, 
Israel’s response fell short of accepting the resolution. Israel stated it would comply 
fully with Jarring but, despite pressure from the US and the UN, it would not publicly 
accept this resolution.
93 One of the main problems was that both Israel and Egypt 
interpreted the resolution differently. Egyptian officials informed Jarring that their 
precondition for implementing the resolution was that Israel withdrew from all the 
territories it occupied, while Israel demanded that peace negotiations proceed before 
any withdrawal, the exact reversal of Egypt’s terms.
94 Furthermore, Jarring’s 
insistence on the acceptance of Resolution 242 created a problem for Israel which, in 
commenting on the document, needed to tread carefully. On the one hand, Israel 
needed to maintain the integrity of its National Unity Government while, on the other 
hand, it had to be seen as being sensitive to the demands made by the American 
administration and the international community. It is, therefore, not a surprise to learn 
that the Eshkol government made a habit of avoiding making controversial decisions 
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  92regarding the Occupied Territories in order to maintain the unity of the Coalition and 
avoid antagonising the US.
95 
 
While the government stated its desire to hold direct negotiations with Egypt in order 
to achieve peace, it concluded that this was not feasible.
96 Dayan proclaimed that 
‘what is being offered [by the international community] to us [Israel] is withdrawal 
from the territories without peace’.
97 He went on to say that peace between Israel and 
the Arab states was ‘something that cannot be attained’.
98 In a joint meeting, the 
heads of the Foreign Ministry and AMAN’s research department reached a similar 
conclusion.
99 Nasser, according to AMAN, was working diplomatically to bring about 
an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories without having to make any 
diplomatic concessions towards Israel. Furthermore, it predicted that Nasser would 
initiate a limited war across the canal if he did not get his way diplomatically.
100  
 
Israel had several opportunities to negotiate with Nasser; these, however, were never 
fully explored.
101 The Eshkol government reached the conclusion that Nasser was not 
a reliable peace partner and opted to maintain the status-quo, a situation that was 
possible because the government was under no pressure from the US;
102 even though 
there were calls within the US administration to put pressure on Israel.
103 In other 
words, the perceived lack of suitable peace partners provided Eshkol with a 
diplomatic and political ‘fig leaf’. There was no reason for him to pursue a long-term 
territorial policy which would entail making controversial decisions and risking 
political instability. Additionally, the adoption of a non-committing approach, i.e. the 
lack of a clear territorial policy, facilitated one of Mapai’s most important endeavours 
during this period, the unification of the Labour parties. 
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  93The Labour Party  
 
One of the most important reasons behind Israel’s lack of a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term territorial policy was the formation of the Labour Party. On 
the 21
st of January 1968, the political parties associated with the Labour movement, 
with the exception of Mapam, united under the banner of the Israeli Labour Party. 
This was preceded by protracted negotiations between the constituents: Mapai, Rafi 
and Ahdut-Ha’avoda. The process of unifying the Labour movement started on the 
13
th of June 1967 when Rafi’s Central Committee decided to adopt a resolution by 
Shimon Peres, and called for re-unification talks with Mapai. These were held against 
the wish of party leader Ben-Gurion, who, as a result of Dayan’s popularity in the 
aftermath of the war, became marginalised.
104 Peres had earlier written to Mapai 
stating Rafi’s intention to return ‘without any pre-conditions’;
105 this signalled the 
start of a new period in the history of the Labour movement. During the following 
months, the unification talks and the territorial debate dominated Israel’s political 
scene. During this time, the government needed to avoid controversial decisions in 
order to maintain consensus and promote unity. Arguably, the unification process was 
one of the major reasons why the government could not formulate a long-term 
territorial policy.
106 For Eshkol and many in Mapai the unification of the Labour 
movement was a long-held dream;
107 it presented an opportunity to ‘welcome the 
unruly sons back to the bosom of the founding party’.
108 In addition, the call for 
unification resonated well among Mapai’s young guard (‘tze’irim’), and many of the 
local political branches, as they did not share the historical resentment towards 
Rafi.
109  
 
According to Mapam Leader Ya’akov Hazan, the unification process represented an 
opportunity for Rafi to replace Eshkol with Dayan and to take over the Labour party 
from within.
110 Dayan appeared to be the natural successor to Eshkol, as long as he 
remained the Defence Minister. The choice facing Rafi was clear; either wait for an 
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  94opportunity to capture the leadership through elections in two years’ time (a political 
long-shot), or capture the leadership from within the unified party.
111 Arguably, 
Dayan’s position was dependent on the success of the unification process:
  112 there 
was a growing fear among Rafi members that the Mapai elites would not allow them 
to remain in the government for long if they did not agree to the unification 
process.
113  
 
Rafi’s calls for re-unification proved a divisive issue for Ahdut-Ha’avoda. On the one 
hand, they opposed the move fearing an attempt by Rafi to gain control over Mapai 
from within. On the other hand, many of the security-minded hawks in Ahdut-
Ha’avoda (among them the party’s ideological leader Tabenkin) thought it was an 
opportunity to nullify the dovish elements in Mapai, regarding Rafi as a natural ally 
on national-security matters. Rafi’s manifesto, as far as the territorial debate was 
concerned, was closer to Tabenkin’s ideology than to Mapai’s. Rafi - through its 
manifesto - called for ‘the new nature of Israel to be designed by a policy of building 
settlements and outposts’.
114  
 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda considered the unification a political necessity, as this would help 
preserve and increase its political strength while limiting Rafi’s and Dayan’s 
influence.
115 Ahdut-Ha’avoda’s main concern was of a merger between Rafi and 
Mapai which would effectively leave it out and eliminate the possibility of assuming 
power through its young leaders (Allon and Galili,). In other words, the party felt it 
had no other choice but to agree. Additionally, Ahdut-Ha’avoda called for the 
inclusion of Mapam, whom they viewed as a more suitable candidate for unification 
on political and ideological reasons - an idea supported by Mapai’s elites. Mapam was 
seen as a socialist ally against the ‘revisionist economic thought’ of Rafi.
116 Mapam, 
however, decided not to join the unification talks, preferring to continue its political 
independence. 
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  95The unification process highlighted the demographic changes that were taking place 
in Israeli society, i.e. a transition from the ‘founding generation’ to the ‘1948 
generation’.
117 Mapai’s elites appeared old, weak and out of touch when compared to 
the young charismatic technocrats and former IDF generals of Rafi and Ahdut-
Ha’avoda.
118 They were not native Israelis: they had immigrated to Israel during the 
second, third and fourth aliyas and had not served in the IDF, or the resistance 
movements during the British mandate. They were mostly in their late sixties and 
early seventies and had been politicians for most of their lives. The younger 
generation of leaders, mainly from Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda, were bent on using the 
process to reshape the Labour movement. They assumed that they - and not the older, 
more hesitant leadership - represented the views of the new generation.
119  
 
The unification was ‘formal rather than thoroughgoing’.
120 The unified party suffered 
from lack of a well-defined national-security agenda and a territorial policy, as 
Mapai’s elites were unwilling to plunge the party into a renewed ideological debate. 
The party became increasingly unable to contain the diverse views within it without 
risking a split.
121 The perverse nature of the unification proved to be one of the main 
difficulties. The agreement they reached dictated that representation within the unified 
party’s institutions would be according to electoral strength (Mapai 57%, Rafi and 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda 21% each), with each faction choosing its own list of 
representatives, thus turning the new party into a ‘façade behind which the three 
parties continued to compete and coexist … as factions’.
122 The characteristics of 
inter-party factionalism allowed small factions to have disproportional leverage on the 
decision-making process, with the factions proving more adept at averting action than 
promoting it.
123  
 
In its first convention, in January 1968, the Labour Party tried to formulate a 
territorial policy, but was unable due to the divisions within the party. Instead, a 
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decision not to decide put forward by Golda Meir was agreed upon. For Meir there 
was no point in making a decision and risking a renewed split before the party 
reached the moment where it absolutely had to decide, i.e. when a credible Arab 
partner with which to negotiate was found. Israel - according to the Labour Party - 
would continue to hold on to the territories until a long-lasting peace agreement was 
reached. In order to maintain a common ground among the factions, the party 
unanimously decided not to decide.
124  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 LPA/2-021-1977-133/Labour Party’s Manifesto/21.1.1968. Chapter Three 
 
The Settlements  
 
The lack of international pressure and suitable peace partners, as well as the political 
complexity of maintaining the national unity government and preserving the unity of 
the Labour Party, inhibited any meaningful debate on the long-term future of the 
Occupied Territories. This policy-making vacuum provided Allon with an opportunity 
to influence Israel’s territorial policy. The government, for a lack of alternative, and 
without scrutinising the activities of its ad-hoc committees, was incrementally 
implementing the Allon Plan. Although the plan was never approved or agreed upon, 
new outposts and settlements were being established according to it. Whether by 
design or by default, the government’s incremental policy of ‘another settlement’ 
started to resemble the pre-state Zionist policy of ‘another dunam’.
1 This was the 
result of having to deal with the authorisation of projects, instead of focusing on the 
fundamental implications inherent in the settlement policy.
2  
 
Settlement activity became routine, and by the end of January 1968 there were 24 
proposed settlements and outposts, 12 were either fully established or were otherwise 
in the process.
3 Of these, there were seven outposts in the Golan Heights, even though 
Israeli citizens were prohibited to enter the area without army authorisation.
4 This is 
because, by its own admission, the army was involved in all aspects of the settlement 
endeavour. The need to use the façade of Nahal outposts for the creation of 
settlements meant that the army was involved even in areas with little or no military 
purpose.
5 On the 31
st of December 1967, the ad-hoc settlement committee approved 
the establishment of two additional Nahal outposts in the north of the Jordan Valley.
6 
A few weeks later, Allon proposed the establishment of three additional settlements: 
one in the vicinity of Jericho (Ma’ale Adumim) that would ‘strengthen Israel’s grip on 
Jerusalem’; another in the vicinity of Hebron (Kiryat Arba) and a Nahal outpost in 
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  98Sharm El-Sheikh, citing the Ministerial Defence Committee’s recommendation to 
maintain a military presence in the area.
7  
 
The claims, made by Admoni, Tzur and others, that Israel’s settlement policy was 
based on the Allon Plan, appear to be inaccurate. According to the Allon Plan, 
settlements were established in order to enable Israel to control territories it deemed 
essential for its security. The fact that early settlements were largely based on the 
Nahal concept helped emphasise their pseudo-military strategic purpose.
8 However, 
early settlement activities only loosely followed the Allon Plan and did not 
necessarily relate to Israel’s security needs. This fact was corroborated by none other 
than Colonel Moshe Netzer (head of the Nahal unit) who claimed that the settlement 
policy was not directly related to Israel’s strategic needs.
9 Netzer went even further 
and stated that, in the period immediately after the war (1967-1968), there was no 
comprehensive long-term settlement policy.
10 The only area in which, according to 
Netzer, settlement activities were based on Israel’s strategic needs was the Jordan 
Valley.
11  
 
One of the main concerns expressed by decision makers was a possible rebuke by the 
American administration over the settlement activity. Eshkol, in a briefing to MKs, 
explained the need to be careful in settling East Jerusalem since it involved seizure of 
land, which would be difficult to justify to the US administration.
12 Furthermore, the 
government decided on the 28
th of January that, having agreed to establish settlements 
in the Jordan Valley, the existence of these settlements should remain secret.
13 This 
did not stop the US from expressing its concern that these settlements were ‘taking on 
aspects of permanent, civilian, kibbutz-like operations and some are, in fact, civilian 
kibbutzim with Nahal cover’.
14 However, while constraining Israel’s ability to expand 
its settlement activities, the US did not apply any substantial pressure on it to desist.  
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  99For Allon, the progress made in the establishment of settlements was not sufficient. 
He proposed that the government authorise the creation of additional settlements 
along the Jordan Valley. He claimed that these settlements could be established in a 
way that left ‘all diplomatic options open’. Allon explained that the fact that the 
government had not decided over the future of the West Bank should not stop it from 
creating ‘facts on the ground’ which would promote Israel’s vital national-security 
needs. According to Allon, the matter of establishing these settlements should be left 
to the settlement committee (Allon, Gvati, Dayan and Eshkol).
15 Within weeks of 
Allon’s proposal the Settlement Department submitted plans for the settlement and 
development of the Jordan Valley, based on the establishment of up to 16 outposts 
with 1800 houses.
16 This was preceded by an Allon proposal to construct a road along 
the Jordan Valley, which would serve the settlements; this road would be later named 
the Allon Road.
17 
 
Allon’s demand for a decision to be taken on his plan (or at least on parts of it) was 
echoed by Mapam’s leader Ya’akov Hazan, who admonished the government for 
failing to decide. He argued that the government could not intentionally decide not to 
decide, while it created facts on the ground. Israel, he added, should settle only in 
areas it intended to keep, and this required making a decision. Hazan asked why the 
government did not make a decision over the future of Sinai and why it established 
outposts in the absence of such a decision.
18 This point of view was shared by the 
Health Minister Israel Barzilai of Mapam. Barzilai wrote that the government, by not 
having a clear policy and by establishing settlements, was de-facto annexing parts of 
the territories and narrowing its diplomatic options.
19  
 
Although the government was unofficially already in the process of implementing his 
plan, Allon was continuously expanding its scope. This was possible precisely 
because the parameters of the plan were never agreed upon. On the 14
th of April, he 
proposed to transform all the Nahal outposts in the Golan Heights into civilian ones,
20 
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  100which eventually led to an explicit request to annex the Golan Heights.
21 Allon 
argued that there were already nine established outposts, as well as several more in 
different stages of development, and that the local Druze community had accepted 
Israel’s presence (Allon had previously submitted a request to have Israeli law applied 
to them).
22 For Allon, Israel made a de-facto decision to remain in the Golan Heights 
and all that was left was for the process to be formalised, i.e. annexation. However, 
the government decided against annexing the Golan. According to Eban, annexing the 
Golan would not only invite a UN counter-resolution and affect Israel’s relations with 
the US, but it would also generate more attacks from El-Fatah and encourage Syria 
and the USSR to take a more active approach in the diplomatic arena.
23 However, 
despite agreeing not to annex the Golan Heights, the government was actively 
integrating it. This occurred despite the concerns raised by Theodor Meron (the 
Foreign Office Attorney General) who called on the government to halt the social and 
economic integration of the Golan Heights.
24 In fact, on the 21
st of January 1968, 
Israel removed all economic and political restrictions regarding the Golan Heights, 
this applied to both the Druze population and Israeli citizens;
25 this action was taken 
without a government decision over the future status of the Golan Heights.  
 
 
The Gaza Strip 
 
In its 19
th of June decisions the government articulated a clear long-term vision with 
regards to the territories, with the exception of the West Bank. While the 
government’s position regarding the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula had 
changed (the decision of the 30
th of October 1967), it had remained steadfast in its 
resolve to annex the Gaza Strip and relocate its population (or at least a substantial 
part of it).
26 The idea had broad political support, to the extent that it was included in 
Mapam’s peace plan.
27 Furthermore, most of the plans and proposals drafted at the 
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  101behest of the government reached similar conclusions. However, despite enjoying 
broad consensus on the subject, the government was unable to implement its policy. It 
was unable to clarify how, in the age of decolonisation, it would transfer around a 
quarter of a million people without drawing the international community’s ire. In 
addition, the government was unable to find a suitable area to which it could transfer 
the population. In his frustration Eshkol made it clear he was ‘in favour that they all 
go, even if to the moon’.
28 
 
The government employed four mechanisms to facilitate the transfer of population out 
of the Gaza Strip: financial incentives, investment in education, employment 
opportunities and a tough security stance. A special task force was formed, whose aim 
was to encourage Palestinians to emigrate by providing generous financial support.
29 
The military administration, with the support of various governmental departments, 
invested in technical schools and further education in the belief that educated and 
skilled Palestinians would have a better chance to emigrate successfully.
30 The 
military administration also created wide-scale infrastructure projects in the West 
Bank in order to entice unemployed Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to move to the 
West Bank.
31 In addition, the military in the Gaza Strip encouraged emigration by 
using a tougher security stance (than that employed in the West Bank).
32 
 
The question of where to transfer the population was never truly answered. A team of 
professors assembled by Eshkol advocated the use of the West Bank and were 
supported by Weitz and several ministers.
33 But not all ministers were in favour; 
Allon was against transferring them to the West Bank as it did not fit well with his 
plan. Attempts to solicit the help of the West Bank mayors to accept Gaza’s refugees 
by promising to invest in local projects and industries failed, with these mayors flatly 
rejecting the idea.
34 Allon suggested El-Arish (northern Sinai) as an alternative;
35 
however, this proved costly and impractical.
36 A year after the war, the number of 
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  102people who had left the Strip was estimated at 50,000, with most being young men 
looking for jobs and families with relatives in Jordan.
37 Arguably, most of those who 
left would have done so even without Israel’s intervention. The government’s failure 
to implement its policies was due to several factors. First, Eshkol was unwilling to 
make available the substantial sums of money requested by the special task force.
38 
Second, the operation was undertaken half-heartedly and without real conviction.
39 
Third, there was no detailed plan of how to implement this policy. Dayan remarked 
that if the government provided a detailed plan of how this could be done he would 
have supported it.
40 Fourth, Arab states and the local population were aware of 
Israel’s desire to annex the Gaza Strip and transfer its population, and would not 
actively support such an effort.
41 Finally, the resumption of hostilities across the 
Jordan River led to the tightening of Jordanian border controls and subsequently to a 
reduction in the numbers of Palestinians emigrating to Jordan.  
 
Israel’s Gaza Strip policy was not practical. The government had made it clear it 
would not annex the territory before relocating a substantial part of its population. Its 
inability to implement this policy was evident from the start.
42 Israel’s reluctance to 
annex a populated Gaza Strip and its unwillingness to return it to Egypt left the area in 
a political limbo.
43 Israel did not have a viable policy with regards to the Gaza Strip 
and at no time did it seriously contemplate the long-term implications of holding 
Gaza, an area to which it referred before the war as ‘a hornets nest’. In a sense, 
Israel’s dealings with the Gaza Strip were a classic example of ‘muddling through’. 
The government’s actions clearly support this thesis’ assertion that, as far as the Gaza 
Strip is concerned, the government did not have a coherent and comprehensive long-
term policy.  
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  103Hebron 
 
One of the greatest contributing factors to Israel’s lack of a clear territorial policy was 
the revival of Religious Zionism, or New Zionism, and its emphasis on a Normative 
standpoint in relation to the Occupied Territories. New Zionism’s influence on the 
government’s long-term territorial policy (or rather the lack of one) can be 
demonstrated using the case study of Hebron, although it is important to note that its 
impact on the policy-making process was by and large indirect. Interest groups 
associated with New Zionism challenged the government’s territorial policy and 
offered an alternative to the Labour Party’s Instrumental standpoint. The National 
Unity Government proved unable to meet these challenges precisely because certain 
factions and individuals within it were supportive of the motives and goals of these 
interest groups.  
 
The conquest of the territories and the subsequent occupation revealed a ‘growing 
dissonance’ between the Labour Party’s official position and the public’s perception 
of the Occupied Territories, i.e. ‘the breakdown of the Green Line as a Hegemonic 
Conception’.
44 The Labour Party elites were no longer seen to be representing the 
public, which was overwhelmingly in favour of retaining most of the territories.
45 In 
addition, the conquest of the West Bank, in particular East Jerusalem and Hebron with 
its religious symbolism ‘challenged the consensus that had been arrived at through the 
first nineteen years of the Jewish state’s existence’.
46 It rekindled the ideological 
debate regarding some of Zionism’s main tenets:  the state’s boundaries, the nature of 
the state, the right to settle and the state’s demographic composition - questions to 
which the government did not have answers. The government’s lack of a clear long-
term policy left a vacuum in which interest groups with a strong ideological agenda 
(i.e. New Zionism) could operate.
47  
 
Israel had hitherto established settlements in the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Golan Heights; this was done (unofficially) according to the Allon Plan. The 
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  104addition of the Golan Heights, parts of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip to the 
Allon Plan was done in part in order to placate fellow Ahdut-Ha’avoda members who 
had doubts regarding the plan. Allon’s broad concept was based on what he perceived 
to be Israel’s national-security needs. The first departure from this method occurred 
when a group of young religious students, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, asked the 
military governor of Hebron for permission to hold a Passover feast in the city. 
Hebron differed from the previous areas settled by Israel in that it was not included in 
the Allon Plan and was of no military or security importance. Furthermore, 
establishing a settlement within the heavily populated city stood in contrast to the 
government’s professed position.  
 
The first to raise the issue of settling in Hebron was none other than Ben-Gurion. 
During the war he told Rafi members that Jews must resettle East Jerusalem and 
Hebron.
48 In the following months Hebron was mentioned several times by ministers 
and Knesset members.
49 The first indication of outsiders expressing their wish to 
resettle Hebron came from KM Shmuel Tamir (Gahal), who appealed to Eshkol on 
behalf of the Hebron Yeshiva.
50 The Yeshiva was originally situated in Hebron but 
was relocated to Jerusalem after the 1929 massacre. In March, Allon proposed the 
creation of a Jewish settlement in Hebron; in his proposal Allon listed several groups, 
among them the Levinger one, which he claimed were willing to settle in the city.
51  
 
It is important to note that Levinger did not act alone as, not only did his actions 
receive public support, but they also appeared to be in accordance with the ‘legitimate 
norms and values’.
52 In addition, he was supported by The Land of Israel movement, 
emboldened by the success of the Gush-Etzion initiative, which provided financial 
assistance and extensive political connections;
53 members of the movement petitioned 
Eshkol for the resettlement of Hebron.
54 This movement was founded by disillusioned 
members of the Labour Party and included members of every political orientation 
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  105committed to the idea of establishing ‘the land of Israel as a unified national entity’.
55 
The land of Israel was defined as the territories ‘now in the hands of the Jewish 
people’, i.e. Israel and the occupied territories.
56 The movement brought about a 
gradual re-alignment of Israeli politics around a Normative viewpoint of the territories 
and New Zionist ideology. 
 
Levinger’s group, which included many of the would-be founders of the Gush-
Emunim movement, was driven not only by a belief that their actions would have a 
direct contribution to Israel’s security, but also by a religious zeal. The conquest of 
the West Bank was described by some religious scholars as the ‘advent of 
redemption’ i.e. the period before the coming of the messiah.
57 The renewal of the 
Jewish presence in Hebron was a divine mission; the city was the second holiest after 
Jerusalem and held the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Moreover, the group sought to ‘return 
to a place perceived as belonging to the collectivity in terms of both the recent past 
and Jewish mythology’;
58 the disappearance of Jewish presence in the city (1929) was 
a traumatic event in the recent history of both Judaism and Zionism. 
 
On the 12
th of April 1968 the Levinger group rented several rooms in the Park Hotel 
in Hebron, allegedly for the sole purpose of conducting the Passover feast. They had 
earlier received the army’s permission to stay overnight, with the permission being 
granted despite advertisements in the national press calling for the renewal of the 
Jewish settlement in the city.
59 Levinger claimed the army and the government were 
aware of his plans, indeed, Allon would later attest to have known of the move to 
resettle Hebron. Allon revealed that he expressed his willingness to help them, but on 
the condition that if the government decided not to establish a settlement in Hebron 
they would accept its decision.
60 The following morning, the settlers - true to their 
cause - refused to leave. Despite acting illegally and against the government’s 
position of not settling in and around heavily populated areas, the government proved 
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  106reluctant to order their forcible removal. In several rounds of discussions the ministers 
were unable to reach a decision regarding the settlers, with Gahal and the NRP 
ministers supporting the settlers. Additionally, and because of the unique place 
Hebron inhabited in the Jewish psyche, most leading Labour ministers, (but not Eban 
and Sapir, who opposed the resettlement of Hebron), appeared unable to make up 
their minds; this was particularly true for Eshkol and Dayan.
61 The settlers’ refusal to 
leave the city did not dissuade Allon from coming to show his support, promising to 
help them find jobs in the area. This was followed by visits from both Begin and 
Warhaftig and a resolution congratulating the endeavour by Hakibbutz Hameuhad. 
Eshkol claimed ministers were making a mockery of the government, being eager to 
show their support in spite of the government’s position.
62  
 
Dayan suggested moving the settlers to the army base in Hebron until a decision was 
reached; the government approved. Levinger accepted the move, in the knowledge 
that the government’s ‘non-decision’ was a de-facto authorisation. The government’s 
non-decision was taken despite a plea from Hebron’s mayor Ali Al-Ja’abri not to 
create a Jewish settlement in the city.
63 Several months later, the government decided 
to authorise the establishment of a Jewish neighbourhood in Hebron and another in 
the outskirts of the city (Kiryat Arba). Admoni admits that this decision deviated from 
the ‘Allon Plan’.
64 Furthermore, this decision was taken despite concerns raised by a 
preparatory committee, which was tasked with finding suitable alternative solutions 
for the Hebron settlement. The committee raised concerns regarding the large number 
of private lands that would need to be appropriated in the case of Kiryat Arba and the 
logistical problems, such as the limited availability of suitable housing, associated 
with the establishment of a Jewish settlement in Hebron.
65 It appears as though the 
government’s decision was based solely on Normative reasons and did not relate to 
Israel’s security needs.
66  
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  107Meetings with Palestinians 
 
In the aftermath of the ‘Six Day War’, the Israeli government decided not to decide on 
the long-term future of the West Bank. Nevertheless, the government made it clear 
that it was against any solution that would leave Israel in control of the heavily 
populated areas; this was exemplified by the government’s rejection of the Dayan 
Plan. Israel’s long-term policy options towards the West Bank were therefore 
narrowed down to either a Palestinian or a Jordanian-based approach. The following 
three sections will provide a detailed account of the government’s attempts to 
ascertain its preferred approach, including an extensive narrative of Israel’s 
negotiations with Jordan and the Palestinians. Through this account, the thesis will 
highlight the factors that circumscribed Israel’s ability to formulate a clear long-term 
policy towards the West Bank.  
 
The idea of using a Palestinian Approach was first raised by the AMAN research 
department and was subsequently adopted by both Allon and Dayan. At the heart of 
this approach was the idea of establishing a demilitarised Palestinian entity (either 
independent or autonomous) in the West Bank (there were some suggestions for 
including the Gaza Strip), bound by security arrangements to Israel. Eshkol decided to 
pursue both approaches simultaneously; he nominated Moshe Sasson as his official 
representative in the territories and asked him to examine the possibility of 
establishing a Palestinian entity in the West Bank while, at the same time, he sent 
Hertzog and Eban to negotiate with Hussein. Sasson was to conduct talks with 
Palestinian notables and liaise with a special steering committee which included 
Eshkol, Dayan, Eban, Hertzog and Gazit.
67 It is interesting to note that Eshkol 
authorised Sasson to suggest several different options to the Palestinian notables, 
including an autonomous region and even a Functional Solution.
68 
 
In his first report, Sasson informed the committee that the Palestinians were waiting to 
hear what Israel had to offer; Palestinian notables told Sasson that Israel - being the 
occupying power - should set the tone for these talks and declare its intentions. Sasson 
explained that most Palestinians were apprehensive of the motives of the Arab states 
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  108and were frustrated by the efforts of these states to rescue them from the Israeli 
occupation. Nevertheless, while they were willing to talk to Israel, they were at the 
same time suspicious of its motives.
69 Nonetheless, Sasson concluded that there was a 
willingness among some Palestinians to pursue a separate deal with Israel,
70 but made 
it clear that there were several major obstacles in the way of an Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement. In his personal opinion, most of the Palestinians were unwilling to accept 
Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and were adamant that any deal would have to 
include the Gaza Strip and a solution to the refugee problem.
71 
 
At the same time - and with the approval of Eshkol - Dayan conducted his own talks 
with Palestinian notables. The most productive of these were with Hamdi Cana’an 
(Mayor of Nablus), and ‘Aziz Shahada (a Ramallah-based lawyer and former minister 
in the Jordanian government). Both complained to Dayan that Israel was not 
forthcoming in its negotiations, claiming to have received no constructive proposals 
from Israel.
72 Dayan informed the duo that he was not authorised to negotiate on the 
government’s behalf. He was, however, willing to define the main guidelines that they 
would be expected to accept, before any meaningful negations could take place:  
 
1.  The solution would have to be agreeable to the American administration. 
2.  There could be no change to the status of Jerusalem (which would stay under 
Israeli control). 
3.  There could be no return to the pre-war situation. 
4.  The solution would be based on the signing of peace agreements.
73  
 
Dayan did not mention the issue of border modifications but that was apparently clear 
to them. Cana’an and Shahada were unhappy with Israel’s position on Jerusalem and 
its unwillingness to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip. They also made it clear that 
any understanding that may be reached between the sides must be part of a wider 
settlement with the Arab world and not a separate one.
74 Cana’an and Shahada 
expressed their willingness to reach a separate deal with Israel, even if other Arab 
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  109states would not. Nonetheless, they demanded that at least an agreement on joint 
sovereignty over Jerusalem be reached (agreeing not to divide the city again) and that 
any border modifications will only be carried out on the basis of reciprocity.
75 Dayan 
informed Eshkol that he thought these talks should continue at a higher level, sensing 
that there was a possible chance for success. Eshkol, however, was lukewarm to the 
idea and decided not to pursue the matter.
76 
 
In May, Sasson informed the committee that most Palestinian notables had publicly 
expressed their loyalty to King Hussein and had made it clear they now favoured a 
Jordanian solution. They had publicly denounced the idea of a Palestinian state and 
had described themselves as Jordanian nationals.
77 Sasson claimed that the change of 
heart came as a result of a Palestinian belief that Israel was about to conclude a deal 
with Jordan behind their backs, and had therefore used the talks with them to put 
pressure on Hussein. Sasson expressed his belief that Israel should continue these 
talks and could still change the minds of most Palestinians, but only if the government 
was fully committed to the Palestinian approach.
78 Dayan supported the continuation 
of talks with the Palestinians regardless, claiming to have always favoured the 
Palestinian Approach. He acknowledged that there were some problems, such as the 
Fatah’s terrorist attacks and the Hebron settlement, and that he did not foresee a final 
peace settlement anytime soon. Nonetheless, he stressed his belief in finding a long-
lasting solution based on a functional compromise, either with the Palestinians (which 
he favoured) or with Jordan.
79  
 
Eshkol believed Israel had nothing to lose from pursuing both the Jordanian and 
Palestinian options simultaneously, ‘We need to hold the iron in two ovens, even if 
nothing comes out of either.’
80 He therefore supported the continuation of the talks, 
even though he had come to the conclusion that the talks were leading nowhere; in the 
preceding months, Eshkol, in conjunction with Sasson and Dayan, held numerous 
talks with the Palestinians. While Eshkol tried to convince them of the merits of a 
Palestinian demilitarised autonomy, he felt they were not committed to signing a 
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  110separate deal with Israel. Eshkol found the Palestinians to be divided amongst 
themselves, with some claiming Israel was not making sincere offers, while others 
argued that Israel should be talking instead to Hussein.
81  
 
 
Al-Ja’abri 
 
In July, Sasson raised the possibility of appointing Hebron Mayor Ali Al-Ja’abri as 
the governor of the West Bank and granting Palestinians the option of self-rule under 
him; the idea of appointing the Hebron mayor as governor of the West Bank came 
from Al-Ja’abri himself.
82 The idea of a Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank was a 
feature of the Dayan’s Functional Solution, and it included limited Palestinian 
autonomy in municipal and social areas, while Israel would continue to have military 
presence and control over the area. Sasson described the reaction of many Palestinians 
towards the idea of self-rule as positive, although many insisted that East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza Strip should be included in the deal.
  Eshkol notified Sasson that 
appointing Al-Ja’abri as the governor of the West Bank was unacceptable and wanted 
to know if there were alternative avenues through which to pursue Palestinian self-
rule.
83 Dayan remarked that ‘it was absurd to think’ that cities such as Bethlehem and 
Nablus would agree to be governed by Al-Ja’abri.
84  
  
A few days later, Sasson presented the special steering committee with four 
alternative options for pursuing a Palestinian self-rule:  
 
1.  Appointing Al-Ja’abri as the governor of the West Bank.  
2.  Adopting a counter-proposal (from the city of Bethlehem) for granting self-
rule to the regions of Bethlehem, Ramallah and Jericho, as these cities enjoyed 
a Christian majority and did not want to be governed by Al-Ja’abri. 
3.  Granting self-rule to all of the West Bank regions, starting from Hebron and 
Bethlehem. 
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  1114.  Granting self-rule only to Hebron and appointing Al-Ja’abri governor of the 
region.
85 
 
After some deliberations the committee decided to pursue the fourth option.
86 Al-
Ja’abri accepted the decision and proceeded to put in writing a formal request to be 
appointed as governor of the Hebron region. In his letter he asked for the creation of 
an Arab civil administration with the same responsibilities as the current military 
administration. He wanted this done in such a way as not to compromise the current 
political status of the West Bank, i.e. Al-Ja’abri appointment was not to be understood 
as recognition of Israel’s occupation.
87 Sasson urged the government to act 
immediately; he was worried that Jordan and some Palestinian elements (PLO and El-
Fatah) would try to derail the agreement.
88 The day before the government convened 
to discuss the matter, Al-Ja’abri professed to have had a change of heart, and was now 
demanding to be appointed governor of the West Bank or not to be appointed at all. 
This was followed by a radio announcement in Jordan that the Israeli plans which, 
they claimed, contravened international law, would not find local backing among the 
‘Jordanians’ of the West Bank. The real reasons behind Al-Ja’abri decision never 
became known; Jordan had most likely made him an offer he could not refuse.
89  
 
It is important to note that Al-Ja’abri continued to negotiate with Israel over the 
possibility of becoming the governor of the West Bank.
90 Nonetheless, nothing 
constructive came out of these talks. The following month, a PLO affiliate Walid Al-
Shaha proposed to organise a Palestinian delegation for negotiations with Israel. This 
was rejected by the PLO, who refused to engage diplomatically with Israel. It became 
clear that Jordan and the exiled Palestinian leadership (PLO and Fatah) were working 
behind the scenes to nullify Israeli attempts to create a Palestinian entity in the West 
Bank.
91  
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  112The failure of Israel’s Palestinian Approach to generate a satisfactory long-term 
solution was due to several factors. First, Israel did not view the Palestinians as 
suitable peace partners, which might explain why Israel did not appear to pursue the 
Palestinian approach seriously. The Palestinians did not have a united leadership and 
were represented by a myriad of groups and individuals who had different aims and 
objectives. In addition, the Palestinians were locked in an internal political battle 
between pro-Jordanian, pro-PLO, and independent parties. For this reason it is highly 
likely that the Al-Ja’abri initiative would have failed in the long run, even if it had 
been implemented.  Second, Israel, despite professing at times to follow a Palestinian 
Approach, was reluctant to put forward any serious offers. The government’s 
reluctance to pursue this approach more vigorously was partly due to the lack of 
ministerial consensus regarding the West Bank. Third, Israel’s refusal to include the 
Gaza Strip and Jerusalem in the negotiations would have made it unlikely for any 
Palestinian leader or group to agree to a separate deal with Israel. Finally, the 
establishment of a Palestinian entity was not high on the agenda for any state, bar 
Israel; the idea lacked international support and was fiercely opposed to by Jordan.  
 
 
Jordan 
 
After proposing to pursue both, the failure of the Palestinian Approach convinced 
Eshkol that the Jordanian Approach was more feasible. He explained to Allon that he 
preferred the Jordanian Approach because it meant that the million-or-so Arabs would 
become the King’s citizens and not Israel’s, and this was more palatable to the US.
92 
It is important to note that Israel had kept its diplomatic channels with Jordan open 
and had held several meetings with Hussein since December 1967. In order to 
continue to have all the options available, Dayan proposed a five-point plan (based on 
a Functional Solution) that would apply to either Jordan or to the Palestinians.  
 
1.  The IDF would remain present on the mountain ranges.  
2.  The Green Line (with some minor border modifications) would become 
Israel’s administrative border, while the Jordan River would be declared 
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  113Israel’s security border. Palestinians in the West Bank would be either part of 
an autonomous Palestinian entity or retain their Jordanian citizenship.  
3.  Israeli citizens would be allowed to reside in the West Bank and Israel’s 
historic attachment to the area would be recognised. 
4.  The Palestinian refugee problem would be resolved. They would be absorbed 
either by Jordan or by the Palestinian entity. 
5.  Jerusalem was, and would remain, Israel’s undivided capital. Israel would 
accord special status to the Christian and Muslim holy sites.
93 
 
Dayan explained that he would be willing to sign a peace agreement with either side 
based on this plan. Nevertheless, he did not consider a Palestinian solution to be 
viable, despite confessing a few weeks earlier to have ‘always’ supported the 
Palestinian Approach. Eshkol agreed to bring the matter of the Jordanian negotiations 
before the Ma’arach Political Committee for a decision.
94  
 
Eshkol informed Labour’s Political Committee of his decision to concentrate on the 
Jordanian Approach. He described how the Americans had asked him to negotiate 
more vigorously with Jarring and to start making ‘concrete offers’.
95 As a result, he 
had decided to elevate the talks with Hussein to a higher level and to push for a final 
agreement, which he believed was possible.
96 Nevertheless, Eshkol called for a 
discussion on what should be offered to Hussein and on the next course of action in 
case these talks proved fruitless. Eshkol did not hold a specific position and 
mentioned several different options that could be discussed with Hussein. He did, 
however, mention that negotiations with Hussein were the only available option for 
Israel, as he did not see any possibility of advancing negations with Egypt as long as 
Nasser was in power.
97 It is important to note that this was also the general sentiment 
in the Foreign Ministry.
98  
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  114Aran asked cynically, ‘How is tonight different from all other nights?’ (referring to 
one of the questions asked during the Passover feast). Aran did not see why they 
should hold further discussions if nothing meaningful ever came out of them, stating 
that that day’s discussions would be no different. He challenged the committee to 
agree on something and to put it to a vote.
99 Aran’s comments alluded to the fact that 
the Labour Party, in an attempt to preserve unity and ensure political stability, 
avoided making controversial decisions.  
  
Eban proposed several points that would serve as Israel’s starting position for 
negotiations; Aran was quick to point out that these points were basically a different 
version of the Allon Plan. Eban conceded, but added that the plan had been slightly 
modified and it now included some input from Dayan.
100 Golda Meir admitted she 
had little faith in these negotiations altogether, since Israel would not agree to divide 
Jerusalem while Hussein would not agree to sign a treaty without it and, therefore, 
there was little chance for peace.
101 Meir added that the Allon Plan was not a suitable 
solution as it conceded too much, to which Eliyahu Sasson replied, ‘What are we 
conceding, 800,000 Arabs?’
102 
 
Sapir remarked that he did not normally deal with ‘these issues’ but he understood the 
need to make decisions, telling ministers that adding more Arabs to Israel was a 
recipe for a disaster and that Israel should negotiate with Hussein over the West Bank. 
Additionally, he claimed that Israel did not need military bases on the mountain 
ranges (these would prove to be an economic liability and would increase military 
expenditure) nor did it need an economic integration with the West Bank; both 
remarks were intended for Dayan.
103 
 
Allon explained that, because Hussein would not act without Nasser’s blessing, the 
negotiations might go on for years. Therefore, he suggested creating facts on the 
ground in those areas Israel intended to keep: ‘These would be established as Nahal 
outposts in order not to upset the Americans’, in order to strengthen Israel’s 
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  115negotiating position and apply pressure on Hussein.
104 In conclusion, Eshkol 
expressed his gratitude for the candid discussion and the meeting ended, like most 
meetings did, without any decisions being taken.
105 
 
In a follow-up meeting Eshkol agreed to send Eban to meet up with Hussein, but 
confessed to be still unsure as to whether the Allon Plan should serve as the basis for 
these talks, claiming that the plan left Hussein with only two thirds of the West Bank. 
Eshkol admitted that he had recently seen the map of the Allon Plan in the press and 
was shocked. He questioned whether settlements in the Jordan Valley provided any 
security and whether they were necessary at all. Allon replied that most of the land 
that would eventually be taken according to his plan would be desert and had no real 
value. In reply, Eshkol made it clear that Israel could afford to make some alterations 
to the plan and wondered whether it would be beneficial to show Dayan’s plan to 
Hussein.
106  
 
The wrangling among ministers over whether or not to offer Hussein the Allon Plan 
continued for several months. On the 20
th of September, Eshkol briefed the committee 
on Eban’s forthcoming meeting with Hussein and explained that the King wanted to 
sit face-to-face with Israel and that he proposed to offer Hussein the Allon Plan.
107 
Dayan was quick to speak out against this idea; he claimed that the plan did not 
represent Israel’s territorial policy, it was never adopted by the government, and that 
Hussein had already informed Israel that he would reject it.
108 Dayan’s remarks 
caught Eshkol off guard. Eshkol retorted that Dayan was being fickle: ‘You [Dayan] 
said you were against the Allon Plan and in favour of your own, but that if the Allon 
Plan was accepted you would accept it too.’
109 Shapira remarked that Israel did not 
need to decide over the Allon Plan, but merely to use it as a basis for negotiations 
with Hussein.
110 Eshkol summarised the debate and informed the committee that 
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  116Eban and Allon would meet up with Hussein and offer him the Allon and/or the 
Dayan Plan.
111  
                                                
 
On the 27
th of September Allon and Eban met with Hussein. Allon pulled out a map 
and presented his plan to the King. Eban explained to Hussein that ‘we have no 
interest in major frontier changes in the western part of the West Bank’ and that the 
changes proposed in the Jordan Valley were based solely on Israel’s security needs.
112 
Hussein rejected the plan categorically, as well as the idea of absorbing Palestinian 
refugees from the Gaza Strip.
113 The most he would have been willing to accept was 
some minor border modifications, as long as these were based on reciprocity. With 
regard to Jerusalem Hussein offered to discuss a ‘new status for the city which will 
guarantee free access and movement to all in the city’ as well as recognise Israel’s 
rights to the Jewish holy places. Hussein refused to accept a plan that took no notice 
of Jordan’s security needs and left the West Bank demilitarised but with Israeli army 
bases and settlements.
114  
 
Several months later, in a briefing to the government, Eban said that although the 
King found the Allon Plan ‘insulting’, he was still willing to continue discussions 
with Israel. Eban raised the possibility of finding a compromise with Hussein, 
suggesting the inclusion of the Gaza Strip in the deal. Hussein had earlier expressed 
an interest in accommodating Palestinian refugees only if he was given the Gaza 
Strip.
115 Eshkol, who had earlier been against any deal that would include Gaza, 
appeared content with Eban’s suggestion. He remarked to Allon that if he (Allon) 
could sell the Gaza Strip for the Jordan Valley he would be ‘blessed’.
116 According to 
Allon, Hussein appeared to favour the idea of receiving the Gaza Strip, but not in 
exchange for parts of the West Bank.
117 
 
Although they did promote better relations the talks with Hussein failed to produce 
any results. In contrast to the Palestinian Approach, there was a sense that these talks 
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  117could actually prove fruitful,
118 as Hussein had made his views clear by expressing 
his willingness to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, while enjoying widespread 
international support (allegedly even from Nasser). The negotiations failed because 
the views of both sides were too far apart to allow for a compromise. Israeli ministers 
found it hard to accept that Israel would have to compromise, as they believed that the 
Allon Plan was a generous offer. Furthermore, Hussein was viewed with suspicion, 
not least by Hertzog, who is alleged to have used his influence to hamper the talks.
119  
 
One of the most remarkable aspects of Israel’s negotiations with Jordan was that it 
had taken the government over a year before it was ready to make an offer to Hussein. 
This offer was based on the Allon Plan, but at no time was it considered as Israel’s 
official policy, or even its final position on the matter. Indeed, Eshkol found some 
elements of the plan unacceptable, and would later request to make changes to it. In 
fact, Sapir commented, in December 1968, that the government needed to decide what 
it was offering and he professed to be ignorant of its official policies.
120 Arguably, 
Israel’s actions were clouded by vague security considerations and misconceptions. In 
the end, the government and the Labour Party placed greater importance on 
preserving the status-quo in the West Bank and maintaining unity and political 
stability, than on finding a viable long-term solution to the West Bank. 
 
 
Economic Integration 
 
One of the clearest indications for Israel’s lack of a coherent and comprehensive long-
term policy was its economic relationship with the Occupied Territories. In the period 
after the war, Israel’s economy grew rapidly, resulting in severe labour shortages.
121 
The annexation of East Jerusalem and the ending of restrictions on Palestinian 
movement within the West Bank meant there was nothing stopping Palestinians from 
finding employment in Israel. The wages were higher and the skills sought by Israeli 
employers (e.g. construction, agriculture, textile industry, etc.) were readily available 
in the West Bank. Attempts by the government, and in particular Sapir, to limit the 
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  118numbers of Palestinian labourers in Israel, did not have any effect. Israeli firms, 
unable to attract labour, started to subcontract firms in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip.
122 The economy of the territories grew rapidly in the first years under the Israeli 
administration. For Dayan this was a positive development, and he sought to promote 
further the Palestinian economy by deepening the economic integration and 
encouraging investment. In cooperation with Trade Minister Zeev Sherf, he gave 
incentives to Israeli firms to set up enterprises in the territories, which were rapidly 
becoming a second market for Israeli goods.
123 Dayan’s actions were taken despite a 
clear warning, given to the government by a committee of Economy experts, against 
lifting the restrictions on investment and the free movement of labour in order to 
protect Israel’s economy. The committee stated that the economic justifications for 
such an act were secondary to the political implications of an economic integration.
124 
 
Hussein’s refusal to accept the Allon Plan prompted Dayan to offer an alternative 
based on a Functional Solution. According to Dayan, Israel would be required to 
control the West Bank indefinitely, which would be achieved by utilising three 
methods: economic integration, Palestinian self-rule and military presence.
125 On the 
6
th of November, Dayan gave a speech in the city of Beersheba, and used the 
opportunity to call for an economic integration between Israel and the territories. 
When asked to clarify his position in the Knesset, Dayan reiterated his call for 
economic integration and added that this was in accordance with the decisions taken 
by the relevant government committees.
126 His words sent shockwaves across the 
political system. The following day Eshkol sent a strongly worded memo to Dayan, 
demanding to know his intentions. Eshkol appeared to be baffled by Dayan’s 
accusation that the government was somehow advocating economic integration; 
Eshkol claimed that this was not the case.
127 Following Dayan’s speech, Sapir gave 
several interviews to the press in which he spelled out that neither he nor the 
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  119government agreed with Dayan’s ideas, ‘I don’t believe in this policy; I don’t want it. 
I am against the integration.’
128  
 
The idea of economic integration was central to Dayan’s plan, with the government’s 
lack of an economic policy with regards to the territories playing into his hands. The 
government, despite being against the idea, was not playing an active part in defining 
its economic policies towards the territories.
129 The government had early-on left the 
running of the territories to Dayan and chose not to deal with the economic problems 
of the territories, not least because Sapir was reluctant to get involved.
130 Arguably, 
the main tenets of Israel’s de-facto economic policy in the territories (Open Bridges, 
economic integration and limited internal autonomy) were a by-product of the 
‘inexorable economic forces on both sides’.
131 Israel’s economic needs dictated to a 
large extent its involvement and the level of integration. But it was Dayan who used 
the economic inertia and internal political debate to promote and deepen the 
integration.
132 In fact, Dayan confirmed that, because of the economic reality, it was 
not possible to stop the process other than by legislating against the free movement of 
labour as well as against the development and investment in the territories.
133 
 
The economic policies towards the territories became a battleground between Sapir 
and Dayan. The government, encouraged by Sapir’s approach, decided to try and 
restrict the flow of labourers. Sapir’s fears of producing a nation of water carriers and 
woodcutters were being realised, as economic needs dictated the opening of 
Palestinian vocational centres intended to address Israel’s labour shortages; Israel was 
now producing a nation of metal-workers and carpenters.
134 The fight against ‘Arab 
Labour’ was taken on by many ministers, chief among them Allon.
135 In addition, 
Sapir decided - against the wishes of Dayan - to place restrictions on the flow of 
Palestinian goods into Israel in order to protect Israel’s economy. Dayan had asked for 
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  120additional resources to be invested in the territories’ infrastructure, but Sapir’s 
interests lay solely with the Israeli economy. Nevertheless, Sapir’s refusal to invest in 
infrastructure and public services could not stop the economic tide. Within months, 
and despite the resistance of Israeli politicians and Palestinian mayors, the territories 
were connected to Israel’s electricity grid.
136 Furthermore, while government 
ministers were bickering and appearing to be in disagreement, Dayan, through the 
Defence Ministry, continued to promote the employment of Arab labour, increased 
Israeli investment in the territories, cooperation on tourism and ongoing support for 
Palestinian entrepreneurs.
137 
 
The fight over the economic integration came to a head during the first week of 
December. The government convened to discuss the Dayan Plan, i.e. the Functional 
Solution, with a rejection by ministers of both a foregone conclusion. Sapir started by 
criticising Dayan’s plan, arguing that it would prove impossible in the long-run to 
administer the territories without granting their populations full civic rights. Eban 
claimed that the plan would lead to annexation, something the government was 
against because of the demographic problem. Shapira said that if the government 
wanted to keep the West Bank, then Dayan’s plan was a good idea, but the 
government did not want to keep the West Bank. He therefore confirmed that the only 
real option Israel had was the Allon Plan, for the simple reason that it left most of the 
West Bank either with Hussein or with the Palestinians. In addition, both Eshkol and 
Sapir were in favour of putting a stop to the integration between the two 
economies.
138 The government decided to limit the Israeli economy’s exposure to the 
territories and to restrict Israeli investments in the territories.
139 However, this had 
little effect due to the economic needs of the Israeli market. It is important to note that 
the government, in formulating its economic policies was not preoccupied by the 
long-term effect its policies would have on the territories.
140 In conclusion, the 
government did not formulate a coherent and comprehensive long-term economic 
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  121policy; instead, it followed a de-facto policy, which was not only shaped by the 
economic forces of both sides and Dayan actions, but one which also stood against the 
it’s official position.  
 
On the 26 of February 1969 Levi Eshkol died of a heart attack. The last important 
decision the government had taken was to accept an operational plan based on the 
‘Allon Plan’.
141 In a meeting on the 26
th of January 1969, Gvati introduced a 
settlement plan that had been put together by the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Settlement Department. The plan proposed the creation of settlements in the Jordan 
Valley, the Golan Heights and the Rafah Plains.
142 The government, while not 
officially approving it, laid the foundation for the Allon Plan to become Israel’s de-
facto territorial and settlement policy while, at the same time, it provided Dayan with 
the opportunity to enact his Functional Solution. In short, the government adopted 
segments of both plans without officially approving either of them. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The National Unity Government under the leadership of Prime Minster Levi Eshkol 
was unable to put forward a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy with 
regards to the Occupied Territories, and at no time did it implement, approve, or 
formulate such a policy. In a sense, decision makers appeared incapable of reaching a 
decision on the future of the territories and instead settled on a ‘muddling-through’ 
approach.
143 In the aftermath of the Six Day War Israel had the problem of what to do 
with the Occupied Territories. The government had stipulated right from the start that 
at no time would it be willing to absorb an influx of one and a half million Arabs (the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank). The solution it sought was based on an Instrumental 
view, meaning that Israel required some minor modifications to the 1948 ceasefire 
lines in order to fulfil its long-term national-security needs. Israel had taken a historic 
decision during the first weeks following the war to annex East Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it had agreed, in principle, to withdraw from the Sinai 
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  122Peninsula and the Golan Heights to the ‘internationally recognised borders’ in return 
for peace agreements. This decision was annulled on the 30
th of October 1967, when 
the government decided to rephrase the wording of its earlier decision. The new 
decision referred to an Israeli withdrawal to ‘secure and recognised borders’, without 
stipulating what this meant. Additionally, Israel’s preferred borders were constantly 
modified; by the time of Eshkol’s death they included parts of the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Gaza Strip, a third of the West Bank (the Allon Plan) and the whole of the Golan 
Heights.  
 
Throughout the period this government was unable to ascertain its preferred approach 
to the West Bank and instead, it dithered over the Palestinian and Jordanian 
approaches. Such was the indecisiveness that most of the submitted plans included 
separate Palestinian and Jordanian options. Initially, the government pursued a 
Palestinian Approach which was based on either an autonomous area or an 
independent state, with Israel annexing the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank 
according to its security needs. With time the government drifted towards a Jordanian 
Approach that tied the future of the West Bank and the majority of its population with 
Jordan’s. However, at no time was a formal decision taken on the preferred 
approach.
144 Israel’s failure to ascertain its preferred approach can be related to a 
certain extent to the perceived lack of suitable negotiation partners; this was also true 
in the case of Egypt and Syria. 
 
On the issue of the settlements, it would appear that the government had a clear 
policy, loosely fashioned on the Allon Plan. Nevertheless, the first time a settlement 
plan based on the Allon Plan was put to a government vote was on the 26
th of January 
1969. Up to that point, settlements were established on an ad-hoc basis by ad-hoc 
committees, without clear government overview.
145 Most of these decisions were 
taken by a small group of ministers, without consulting the government. These 
decisions, in particular with regards to Sinai and the Golan, were taken without 
considering their long-term implications and in a non-transparent manner. Moreover, 
Eshkol’s reluctance to hold to account ministers that acted independently - in 
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  123particularly Dayan and Allon - meant, not only that the government’s authority was 
undermined, but that it was also no longer responsible for the majority of decisions. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that neither the Allon nor the Dayan plans were 
approved, elements of both were used in planning and establishing settlements, 
resulting in an incoherent policy. 
 
Israel’s muddled approach was brought to light in the case of Hebron. The 
establishment of a settlement in the city, which was not included in any of the 
settlement plans, was against the government’s prescribed position of avoiding the 
heavily populated areas. This case exposed the national-unity government’s paralysis 
in terms of its decision-making process, and demonstrated how a small and 
determined group, associated with New Zionism, was able to exploit the system. 
Moreover, the resettlement of Hebron had opened ‘Pandora’s Box’ and introduced 
religious and ideological imagery, i.e. a Normative view, which did not formally exist 
within the secular Zionist movement.
146  
 
Arguably, one of the most important factors that influenced Israel’s territorial policy 
was the position of the American administration. The 19
th of June decisions cannot be 
understood without taking into account Israel’s desire to placate the US. In addition, 
Johnson’s position of ‘no return to pre-war situation’ was instrumental in legitimising 
both the Allon Plan and Israel’s diplomatic stance. The lack of US pressure on the 
issues of Jerusalem and the establishment of settlements, while at the same time 
diplomatically supporting Israel and providing it with much needed military 
hardware, allowed the Israeli government to act with impunity. It had, in effect, given 
Israel a ‘green light’ to continue holding certain territories, those that Israel would 
retain in any future settlement.
147 At the same time, Israel’s territorial policy was also 
circumscribed by the American administration; this was reflected in Israel’s decisions 
in regards to the Palestinian Approach and the Golan Heights. 
 
In addition to the position of the American administration, the need to reach a 
consensus within the wall-to-wall Coalition and within the faction-based Labour Party 
proved to be another factor that limited Israel’s ability to formulate a clear long-term 
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policy towards the Occupied Territories. The inclusion of his fiercest critics, i.e. 
Begin and Dayan, in the National Unity Government severely diminished Eshkol’s, 
and the Mapai elites’, capacity to dominate the decision-making process. Eshkol’s 
position was further weakened by the need to maintain political stability and unity 
within the Labour Party and the Coalition. The resulting paralysis and policy vacuum 
provided individual ministers and interest groups with personal agendas with an 
opportunity to operate on their own accord and influence Israel’s territorial policy. 
 
In short, the government’s approach towards the territories could be described as 
incoherent, muddled or even disjointed. The lack of sustained foreign pressure, 
especially from the US, coupled with the resumption of hostilities and increased 
domestic pressure, created a vacuum in which decisions were either postponed or 
decided upon on an ad-hoc basis. This was exemplified by the government’s non-
policy towards the West Bank, its inability to find a suitable solution to the Gaza 
Strip, its unclear economic and settlement policies, its insistence on ‘secure borders’ 
without defining what they meant and its reluctance to consider the long-term 
economic and social consequences of the occupation. Israel had two basic policies 
towards the territories, i.e. one that it had approved, but did not implement (19
th of 
June decisions) and another which it partially implemented (the Allon Plan) but which 
was not approved. In other words, the Eshkol government had decided not to decide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Meir Period 
 
Introduction 
 
Better Sharm El-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm El-Sheikh.
1 
 
On the 26
th of October 1968, Egypt initiated a massive eight-hour artillery barrage 
across the Suez Canal; the attack was preceded by several smaller artillery 
engagements in the previous months. Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad 
warned visiting American diplomats that more was to come.
2 According to Israeli 
estimates, Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd El-Nasser was gearing up for war, using 
diplomacy as a pretext for gaining time.
3 On the 31
st of October, in response to the 
increasingly volatile situation along the canal, and in order to provide a solution to 
Israel’s long-term security needs in the Sinai Peninsula, the Eshkol government 
decided that there would be no peace with Egypt unless Israel enjoyed territorial 
contiguity with Sharm El-Sheikh. The area was within the parameters of the 
government’s defined ‘secure and recognised borders’ alongside the Gaza Strip.
4 
Israel’s decision was conveyed to the UN special envoy Gunner Jarring, and, in order 
to please the Americans, Israel expressed its willingness to negotiate with Egypt 
without any preconditions.
5  
 
Against the backdrop of increased volatility along the Suez Canal and the impasse 
reached in the diplomatic arena, changes of leadership occurred in Israel and in the 
US. In January 1969 Richard Nixon, who was perceived by many Israeli politicians to 
be more ‘pro-Israel’ than his predecessor, took office in the White House. Nixon, 
together with his Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger, introduced a new era of American involvement in the region.
  6 In 
the following chapters, an emphasis will be placed, on the role played by the new 
American administration and its impact on Israel’s territorial policies.  
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Just as importantly, the death of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol changed the dynamics of 
Israel’s political scene, thrusting previously retired party chairman Golda Meir into 
the limelight. Her nomination was presumed to be temporary; it would turn out to be 
one of the most defining moments in Israeli history. Meir dominated the political 
scene and the decision-making process. Her stranglehold on the decision-making 
process ensured that no serious discussion on Israel’s territorial policy took place. The 
following chapters will demonstrate that, unlike her predecessor, Meir was in no rush 
to find a comprehensive long-term solution to the Occupied Territories; she ‘repressed 
dissent and criticism as creating unnecessary conflict, and insisted decisions could be 
made later’.
7 Meir propagated the myth that time was on Israel’s side and that the 
Arab states would eventually accept Israel’s new concept of ‘secure’ borders.  
 
The Meir period will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will provide a 
detailed account of Israel’s international and domestic environments and examine the 
impact the Labour Party’s faction-based politics and the American diplomatic position 
had on Israel’s territorial policy. Additionally, using the case studies of the Oral Law 
and the Rogers Plan, the chapter will examine the evolution of Israel’s territorial 
policy and the continuing intransigence of the government, its shift to the Right and 
its desire to hold on to areas deemed strategically important. The chapter will 
demonstrate that the Meir government placed greater importance on maintaining unity 
by avoiding taking controversial decisions than on having a clear long-term territorial 
policy.  
 
The second chapter will discuss the changes that occurred in Israel’s domestic and 
international environments as a result of the break-up of the National-Unity Coalition 
and the coming to power of Sadat. The chapter will demonstrate that, unlike during 
the Eshkol period, neither Israel’s perceived lack of peace partners nor the 
composition of its ruling Coalition were major factors behind its lack of policy. 
Additionally, this chapter will examine Israel’s policies towards the Sinai Peninsula, 
the Rafah Plains, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  
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  127The final chapter will re-examine the impact the Labour Party’s faction-based politics 
had on Israel’s territorial policy through the examples of the party’s Grand Debate 
and the discussions that took place over the Galili and the Fourteen-point Documents. 
The chapter will detail the breakdown of national consensus regarding the Occupied 
Territories, as a result of the Yom Kippur War, and the renewed search for clear long-
term territorial policies. Additionally, the chapter will discuss the impact the increased 
American involvement and the new political situation (i.e. the rise of the NRP and the 
Right) had on Israel’s territorial policies. In short, the following chapters will show 
that the government under the leadership of Meir postponed controversial decisions, 
avoided putting forward a coherent and comprehensive territorial policy, and engaged 
in creating a new and irreversible political and demographic reality in the Occupied 
Territories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  128Chapter One 
 
The ‘War of Attrition’ 
 
On the 1
st of February 1969 President Nixon was presented with a NSC (National 
Security Council) briefing-paper outlining America’s Middle East options:  
 
1.  ‘Leave the search for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the parties 
and Ambassador Jarring.’ 
2.  ‘Pursue a more active US policy, involving US-USSR talks.’ 
3.  ‘Assume that no settlement is possible and concentrate efforts on objectives 
short of a settlement.’
8 
 
In its brief, the NSC proposed pursuing the second option and presented Nixon with a 
new policy blueprint:  
 
1.  The administration’s long-term objective is to reach a binding agreement - 
not necessarily a peace treaty. 
2.  Israel should withdraw to the international border with minor adjustments, 
while special arrangements should be made for the Gaza Strip.  
3.  Critical areas should be demilitarised. 
4.  Jerusalem should remain unified but, Jordan should be allowed to assume 
religious and municipal roles within it. 
5.  The parties ‘must’ participate in the negotiations at some point.  
6.  A final solution must be reached with Israel’s consent and participation.  
7.  Any agreement must include a final and comprehensive solution to the 
refugee problem.
9 
 
On the 8
th of March 1969, after several ‘calm’ months, Egyptian artillery resumed its 
bombardment of Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. The Egyptian attack was part of 
a new long-term four-stage campaign by Nasser to regain control over the Sinai 
Peninsula. Nasser planned for an initial period comprising massive artillery 
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  129bombardment of Israel’s positions along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, followed 
by limited cross-border raids by commando units. The third and fourth stages 
comprised of canal crossings by multiple forces culminating in a full-scale attack with 
the intent of seizing the eastern bank of the canal.
10 Egyptian war-planners believed 
Israel would face severe difficulties sustaining a long-term war of attrition; they 
therefore planned for a ‘long battle to exhaust the enemy’.
11 The ensuing war - 
referred to as the ‘War of Attrition’ - never progressed further than the first two stages 
and was characterised by artillery bombardments and limited cross-canal excursions.   
 
The increased instability in the region, as a result of the War of Attrition, provided the 
context for the unveiling of the US’s new initiative, which was based on the NSC 
paper.
12 During the months of March and April 1969, Nixon and Rogers held a series 
of meetings with the leaders of the Arab world, through which they became convinced 
that the only way out of the diplomatic deadlock was to bring Nasser to the 
negotiation table. Although they were sympathetic towards Jordan, they came to the 
conclusion that King Hussein would be unable to reach a separate peace agreement 
with Israel without the support of Nasser.
13 The new American diplomatic initiative 
was therefore based on the belief that there could be no solution to the conflict 
without Nasser’s participation and that this could only be achieved by employing 
direct Soviet political pressure on him. Rogers’ working assumption was that any 
solution would have to be negotiated with the assistance of the USSR and resemble 
Israel’s 19
th of June decisions. In fact, in a meeting several months later, Joseph Sisco 
(Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs) informed 
Yitzhak Rabin (Israel’s ambassador to the US) that the US was working towards a 
settlement based on the 19
th of June decisions.
14 However, while Rogers accepted 
Israel’s demands that the final borders should be in line with Israel’s security 
requirements, he stated that the final agreement would not be based on the Allon Plan 
or on major modifications to the 1967 borders.
15 Nevertheless, neither Rogers nor the 
US administration spelt out what were the future borders they envisioned while doing 
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  130little to force Israel to define its territorial policy, thus contributing to the continuation 
of Israel’s vague approach.  
 
 
Golda Meir 
 
Newly-appointed Prime Minister Golda Meir clarified the government’s position with 
regards to the US initiative. She expressed her reservations about Nixon’s decision to 
find a solution to the conflict through talks with the USSR.
16 According to Meir, the 
US initiative called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories to the 
international borders (allowing for some minor border modifications) and for special 
arrangements to be made for East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. She informed the 
Americans that their initiative did not represent Israel’s position and that Israel did not 
see eye-to-eye with them on this matter. Furthermore, while reiterating the importance 
of its relationship with the US, Meir added that Israel would have no reservations in 
rejecting a US-USSR plan if it was not in line with its own policies.
17 Meir’s position 
was backed by the government, which agreed not to participate in the American 
initiative.
18  
 
After the death of Eshkol, Meir had been unexpectedly nominated for the Prime 
Minister’s position. Finance Minister and acting Labour Party Chairman Pinhas Sapir 
proposed nominating Meir in order to avoid a succession battle between the two 
leading candidates: Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon.
19 Sapir might have been able to 
promote his own candidacy but claimed not to be interested in the job.
20 Sapir 
explained the decision to nominate Meir as an attempt to secure Mapai’s dominant 
position within the Labour Party, so that a suitable candidate from Mapai could 
emerge; it was reported that Meir was sick and rumours were circulating that she 
would not last the year.
21 Moreover, it was well known that Sapir held a historic 
animosity towards Dayan relating to Ben-Gurion’s favouritism of Dayan and Shimon 
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22 Meir’s nomination was surprisingly supported by Dayan and Allon, who 
agreed to her candidacy, both ensuring in the process that the other would not be 
nominated. In addition, Meir’s political views were in line with both Rafi’s and 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda’s; Yitzhak Tabenkin commented that Meir would save Israel from 
the threat of giving back the territories.
23 Indeed, during her premiership, Meir’s 
preferred decision-making unit, infamously called ‘Golda’s Kitchenette’, comprised 
mainly Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda ministers: Dayan, Information Minister Galili and 
to a lesser degree Allon.  
 
According to Meir there would be no return to the pre-war borders and Israel would 
retain control over Sharm El-Sheikh, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. However, 
Meir did rule out annexing parts of the West Bank, citing the demographic problem.
24 
Meir claimed that, in view of the fact that the Arabs refused to make peace, the 
ceasefire lines were Israel’s best security guarantee. For Meir, the need to maintain 
the integrity of the national-unity government and that of the Labour Party superseded 
the need for a clear territorial policy. Therefore, she advocated a policy of ‘non-
decision’ on Israel’s territorial policy, arguing that any decision taken would risk 
alienating parts of the Coalition and the Labour Party; Meir’s stance enabled the 
various elements within the Coalition - from Mapam to Gahal - to coexist. 
 
 
The Electoral Platform 
 
The period following the outbreak of the War of Attrition and leading to the general 
elections (October 1969) saw an intense debate within the Labour Party on the future 
of Israel’s territorial policy. In contrast, the territorial question was not an important 
pre-election issue amongst the electorate and there was scant public debate on the 
subject.
25 The government called for the continuation of the flexible and vague 
understanding reached by the Eshkol administration, i.e. calling for direct negotiations 
between the parties on the basis of ‘secure and recognised borders’ while continuing 
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  132de-facto implementation of the Allon Plan. The government, like its predecessor, left 
the exact definition of those boundaries open for interpretation, opting instead for an 
ambiguous alternative that did not challenge the unity of the Labour Party or the 
National-Unity Coalition.  
 
This practice of leaving the main issues undecided was not acceptable to all ministers. 
Indeed, several ministers, most notably Dayan and Allon, rejected this approach and 
called for the adoption of clear policies. The debate between the two approaches came 
to a head during the Labour Party’s electoral-platform negotiations. It pitted Rafi and 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda on one side and Mapai and Mapam (as part of the Alignment) on the 
other. It is important to note that because of the Labour Party’s dominance within the 
Coalition the outcome of the debate had a direct impact on Israel’s future policies. 
Dayan used his popularity - a movement for the instalment of Dayan as prime 
minister had collected more than 100,000 signatures - and the threat he would leave 
the Labour Party to call for the acceptance of his ideas, i.e. to push for the adoption of 
clear and transparent policies towards the territories based on his Functional 
Solution.
26 On the 27
th of May, during debates on Labour’s electoral platform, Dayan 
proposed several points he believed should serve as the basis for the party’s future 
policy (and as a result that of the next government):
27  
 
1.  Israel should abandon the ceasefire agreements and the ceasefire lines. Any 
changes to the current situation would occur only as part of peace 
agreements. 
2.  Any future peace agreement must provide Israel with ‘strategically-secured 
borders’.  
3.  Within the defined ‘strategically-secured borders’ Israel should use the time 
it had to create facts on the ground. It should not leave the exact borders 
open for negotiations, and should define their parameters instead. This 
would be done through the creation of settlements and the establishment of 
security arrangements in the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula and the 
West Bank. 
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  1334.  Israel’s policies with regards to the occupied population should be guided by 
the would-be-final-status arrangements. The inhabitants of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip should not be allowed to become Israeli citizens. In the 
case of the West Bank, they should be allowed to maintain their Jordanian 
citizenship and the Open Bridges policy should be continued.  
5.  Israel, being the sole government and jurisdiction in the territories, should 
strive to raise the living standards of the population. In addition, the 
population should be allowed to exercise ‘self-rule’ - as opposed to self-
determination - under the auspices of the Israeli military administration and 
the overall control of the government of Israel. The main issues on which 
Israel should focus in the territories were ‘progress and development’.
28  
 
Dayan’s ideas stood against the perceived position of the Labour Party. These ideas 
had been discussed during a series of meetings in December 1968 and subsequently 
rejected by the Eshkol government, with ministers advocating the adoption of the 
Allon Plan instead. At the time, the Eshkol government chose to leave the decision 
over the final status of the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula unresolved. By 
adopting Dayan’s ideas the party risked jeopardising its flexible approach and 
alienating its ‘dovish’ members (most notably Mapam). In addition, ministers 
expressed reservations with regards to Dayan’s ideas of economic integration and 
‘self-rule’ (i.e. the Functional Solution). It was feared that these ideas would lead to a 
demographic problem and would prove to be an economic burden. Consequently, 
both Mapam and Mapai rejected Dayan’s plans. 
 
Dayan did, however, find a receptive audience among Ahdut-Ha’avoda members.
29 
Both factions agreed on most settlement and security matters and believed that Israel 
should define its future relationship with the territories by creating facts on the 
ground. Although the factions clashed on several issues, most notably the role of 
Mapam in the Alignment and the nomination of Allon as Deputy Prime Minister, they 
shared a common vision in regard to Israel’s territorial and security policies which 
allowed them to collaborate. In fact, the factions chose to present a united front on 
diplomatic and security issues during the electoral-platform negotiations. On the issue 
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  134of the settlements, the factions presented a joint position - the Tsur-Ya’akobi 
Amendment - which called for the adoption of an encompassing settlement plan to 
expand and strengthen the existing settlements in the Golan Heights, the West Bank, 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Jordan Valley.
30 In contrast, Mapai called for the fast-
tracking of Israel’s settlement initiatives in order to create facts on the ground as a 
response to future needs.
31 Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda were pushing for immediate 
action and clear policies while Mapai and Mapam were opting for vague definitions 
that would leave room for political manoeuvring.  
 
The collaboration between Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda was more intricate and complex 
than merely a mutual desire to bring about changes to the party’s electoral-platform. 
On the one hand the factions were rivals - fighting for power and influence within the 
Labour Party - while on the other hand, they were natural allies in that both were 
opposing Mapai’s and Mapam’s ‘dovish’ positions. While Ahdut-Ha’avoda members 
were weary of Dayan’s threats to leave the party at any given moment and join 
Gahal,
32 they also viewed him and Rafi as natural political allies with ‘hawkish’ 
credentials.
33 Evidently, Israel’s territorial policy (or the absence of one), during the 
Meir period, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the actions of 
Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda. 
 
 
Dayan and Allon 
 
The cooperation between Rafi and Ahdut-Ha’avoda was not limited to inter-factional 
or party matters. The extensive cooperation by the two factions on the territorial issue 
arose from their near-agreement on the long-term policies Israel should adopt and 
implement: the retention of the Golan Heights and the expansion of settlement activity 
there, the creation of a Jewish presence in the Gaza Strip, the expansion of the 
settlement activity in and around East Jerusalem and Gush-Etzion, strengthening and 
expanding the Jewish presence in and around Hebron (Kiryat Arba) and the 
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  135continuation of the settlement activity along the Jordan Valley - all in accordance with 
the Allon Plan. The apparent near agreement on the territorial issue, in particular on 
the importance of creating facts on the ground, demonstrated good understanding and 
visible cooperation between the leaders of both factions. Despite being bitter political 
rivals, Dayan and Allon collaborated extensively on the territorial issue. This stems 
from the fact that, while both were pursuing different long-term solutions, their short-
term objectives were similar. 
 
Dayan and Allon were amongst the only ministers to be involved in all aspects of 
Israel’s territorial policy. While it is true that other ministers were involved in the 
approval of decisions relating to territorial policies, only Dayan, Allon, Trade 
Minister Zeev Sherf and Agriculture Minister Haim Gvati took part in the formulation 
and the implementation of those decisions. As a result, Dayan and Allon were able to 
manipulate the decision-making process and dictate their agenda; with the exception 
of Golda Meir, Galili, Sherf and Gvati, ministers were kept in the dark until voting 
time. In fact, at times ministers were not even required to approve policies, as the 
relevant ministerial committee’s decisions sufficed.
34 This state of affairs clearly 
indicates that, while Allon and Dayan were implementing (with Meir’s acquiescence) 
their own policies in the Occupied Territories, the government did not have a clear 
long-term territorial policy.  
 
It is important to note that Allon was more proactive on the matter of creating 
settlements. In some cases he collaborated with others e.g. with Gvati and Weitz (the 
head of the Settlement Department) when proposing the settlement of the Rafah 
Plains,
35 while in other cases e.g. the expansion of Jerusalem’s municipal 
boundaries,
36 strengthening the Jewish presence in and around Gush-Etzion
37 and 
Hebron,
38 he appeared to be the driving force. Nevertheless, the vast majority of these 
cases were discussed and decided-upon in committees of which Dayan, Gvati and/or 
Sherf were members.  
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During their time in office, Dayan and Allon dictated and influenced Israel’s 
territorial policies through their ministries as well as the various ministerial 
committees of which they were members.
39 In some cases the relevant ministerial 
committees were exempt from reporting back to the government and were authorised 
to approve and implement policies independently. Moreover, on many occasions 
Allon would request that matters be referred to committees of which both were 
members, or to some newly-established ad-hoc committees (usually comprising 
himself, Dayan, Sherf and/or Gvati). Additionally, both provided ministerial support 
(and in Dayan’s case military support) for each other’s proposals, such as in the case 
of the creation of four outposts in the Petza’el region of the Jordan Valley (which was 
done in accordance with the Allon Plan),
40 and the appropriation of lands in the Gush-
Etzion area for the creation of new settlements.
41 Additional evidence for their 
method of collaboration, and the fact that they were not acting in accordance with any 
particular territorial policy, can be seen in their early attempts to establish settlements 
in the Gaza Strip.  
 
On the 9
th of June 1969, Allon proposed the establishment of civilian settlements 
between the cities of Rafah and Gaza. The proposal was submitted to the Ministerial 
Committee for the Held Territories (MCHT). In his proposal, Allon emphasised the 
importance of creating a Jewish presence in the Gaza Strip and explained the added 
value these settlements would have to the future of the area in that they would split 
the strip south of the city of Gaza.
42 The following week, General Shlomo Gazit, (the 
IDF’s coordinator of activities in the territories), in a memo to Dayan and Gvati, 
explained that Mordehai Gur (the IDF commander of the Gaza Strip) suggested 
looking into the creation of several settlements in the centre of the strip. Gazit went on 
to say that an order had been given on the 13
th of April for the relevant army 
departments to examine this suggestion and to contact the Settlement Department and 
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  137the Ministry of Agriculture, and clarified that the IDF had yet to make a formal 
approach to the Ministry of Agriculture on the subject.
43 
 
On the 17
th of June, Allon wrote to Weitz to inform him that a proposal for the 
creation of two settlements in the Gaza Strip - one north of the city of Rafah and 
another south of Gaza City - had been submitted to the government. Allon requests a 
comprehensive settlement analysis of the area from Weitz and attached a detailed map 
to his letter.
44 The following month, during a meeting dedicated to the settlements, 
Allon informed the government that the decision regarding the creation of settlements 
in the Gaza Strip should await the expert opinion of Gvati.
45 On the 11
th of August, 
Gazit wrote to Allon and Gvati explaining that Dayan would put-forward a proposal 
for the creation of two Nahal outposts in the Gaza Strip - one south of Gaza City 
(Abu-Midan area) and another north of Khan Yunis (Samiri area) - to the MCHT. He 
explained that the decision taken by the Agriculture Ministry, not to propose civilian 
settlements in the area, had prompted the army and the Defence Ministry (which 
viewed the settlements as being vital to Israel’s security) to come up with their own 
proposal. In addition, Gazit stated that the army will have no problem in providing 
appropriate Nahal personnel.
46 On the 24
th of November, Allon proposed to the 
government, (presumably after a decision was taken by the MCHT), to create two 
Nahal outposts in the Gaza Strip: one south of Gaza City (Abu-Midan area) and 
another north of Khan Yunis (Samiri area) - these would later be known as Netzarim 
and Morag. To his proposal Allon attached a detailed survey carried out by the 
Settlement Department.
47  
 
In early 1970, Allon’s free reign as Israel’s settlement Tsar came to an end with the 
appointment of Galili - Meir’s close confidant and political advisor -
48 as the head of 
the Ministerial Settlement Committee (replacing Allon). Under Galili, the process of 
creating facts on the ground was performed in a more ‘organised and transparent 
manner’ and corresponded to the Allon Plan and the Oral Law. This included the 
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  138expansion of Jerusalem’s municipal area, and, for the first time, the establishment of 
settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Rafah Plains.  
 
There was, however, one significant exception to Israel’s settlement activities, during 
the Meir period, one that did not correspond with the Allon Plan. The case of Kiryat 
Arba exposed the fact that the government did not have a clear settlement policy, or 
definitive settlement map, and did not act in accordance with the Allon Plan. The lack 
of clear settlement policies enabled Allon to incorporate Kiryat Arba into his plan 
while claiming that it left all diplomatic options open and served Israel’s security 
needs.
 49 Meir admitted that Kiryat Arba was established because of the problematic 
nature of settling Jews in Hebron. However, she acknowledged that there were some 
causes for concern regarding the technical and geographical aspects of the project,
50 
and regarding the legal and diplomatic issues that might arise from the need for land 
appropriation.
51 The settlement was built on the strategic hills overlooking the city of 
Hebron, on lands appropriated by the IDF for ‘army purposes’. The inclusion of 
Kiryat Arba into the Allon Plan contradicted Allon’s principal objective of avoiding 
the heavily populated areas. Additionally, it is important to mention that, despite the 
fact that its establishment was not in accordance with the government’s professed 
settlement plans, Kiryat Arba was one of the few settlements to be established in a 
transparent manner; it was approved by the government and then, on the 25
th of 
March 1970, by the Knesset. The government initially planned for 900 residential 
units, but later included infrastructure for a commercial and an industrial site.
52  
 
 
The Oral Law 
 
One of the main reasons behind Israel’s inability to formulate a clear long-term 
territorial policy was the state of paralysis of the government’s decision-making 
process, caused by the Labour Party’s faction-based politics. At the beginning of 
August 1969 the Labour Party convened to discuss its electoral platform, while a 
political storm was brewing behind the scenes. The conference came after several 
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  139months of negotiations on the platform chapters by a special steering committee. 
Dayan, despite being a member of this committee, was unhappy with the phrasing of 
the electoral platform and chose the occasion to assert his will on the party’s decision-
making process or, in other words, Mapai’s dominance of the process.
53 In his diary, 
Allon provides a breakdown of the main points of disagreement between Dayan and 
Mapai (in particular with Sapir) in the days leading to the conference. Sapir rejected 
Dayan’s idea of economic integration and his proposals for encouraging Arab labour 
in Israel, Palestinian ‘self-rule’ and increased investment in the territories. These, he 
feared, would lead to the installation of Israeli law in the territories and subsequently 
to their annexation.
54 In fact, Sapir’s fears were not without merit: several weeks 
earlier the MCHT decided to regulate the employment of Palestinians in Israel,
55 and 
the idea of establishing Israeli law in the territories was discussed in the Interior 
Ministry.
56  
 
The Labour Party was more receptive to Dayan’s ideas, arguably because of the fact 
that, over time, and under the hawkish leadership of Meir - who sided with Dayan on 
matters of national security, it had shifted to the right and had become more dogmatic 
and less flexible on the territorial issue. A clear indication of this change can be seen 
in the views and remarks made by the ‘dovish’ ministers. In a meeting on the 20
th of 
August 1967, Police Minister Eliyahu Sasson urged the government to withdraw from 
the West Bank, with the exception of East Jerusalem, in exchange for a peace 
agreement with Jordan.
57 During the conference, Sasson argued that there should not 
be a return to the 1948 ceasefire lines and that any peace treaty must provide Israel 
with ‘secure and recognised borders’ -
58 Dayan’s terminology had become common 
jargon.  
 
Eban - speaking for the Mapai elite - was adamant that the party should not split over 
the territorial issue, arguing that the party was big enough to accommodate different 
points of view. In the negotiation period, Eban tried to persuade Dayan to use the 
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  140more flexible term ‘economic coordination’ as opposed to ‘economic integration’ or 
‘merging’, to describe Israel’s economic relations with the territories.
59 Eban added 
that no firm decision had been taken on the future of the territories and that the current 
situation should be preserved until a suitable peace partner emerged; in other words, 
Eban preferred propagating the ‘decision not to decide’. Eban, repeating the 
government’s mantra, explained that Israel would insist on direct negotiations, which 
would lead to an agreement based on ‘secure and recognised borders’.
60  
 
In response, Dayan argued that Israel needed to dictate the diplomatic proceedings, 
which would ensure that its preferred diplomatic outcome would be achieved, refuting 
the premise that creating facts on the ground was detrimental to peace. For Dayan 
there were only two possible future scenarios for the West Bank - either as part of 
Jordan or as an Israeli controlled area. According to Dayan, one could not divide 
Bethlehem from Jerusalem or Jerusalem from Ramallah, as those areas had historic 
and socio-economic ties; he compared this to the ties between Holon, Tel-Aviv and 
Ramat-Gan.
61 Furthermore, he stated that Israel should not impose its nationalism and 
identity on the local population. According to Dayan, Israel needed to encourage 
investment and economic development in the territories, while allowing the 
population to retain their ties with the Arab world, in order to promote coexistence.
62  
 
Dayan rejected the vague terminology offered by Eban and insisted that he did not 
accept the ‘decision not to decide’.
63 Instead Dayan demanded a clear position on the 
territorial issue while advocating increased economic integration with the territories 
and the eventual establishment of Palestinian ‘self-rule’. Dayan was not alone in 
demanding unequivocal decisions, in this respect he enjoyed the support of Ahdut-
Ha’avoda; Allon claimed that ‘the decision not to decide on Israel’s future map was a 
mistake’.
64 Allon argued that the fact that the government had acted, ‘conceptually’, 
in an incremental way, along the lines of his plan, was not sufficient. He called on the 
party and the government to act in a clear and transparent manner and legislate on the 
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  141matter.
65 Nevertheless, with regards to Israel’s economic objectives, Ahdut-Ha’avoda 
was adamantly against Dayan’s idea of economic integration. 
66  
 
Dayan’s popularity eclipsed that of any other Israeli politician and the threat he made 
to leave the party had an effect on the Mapai elites. A Rafi split appeared an imminent 
reality, as neither Mapai nor Dayan would back down. Yet the need to maintain unity 
and find a compromise was not lost on either side.
67 Dayan needed to remain Defence 
Minister to have a realistic chance to become the next Prime Minister, while Meir 
feared being outflanked by the ‘doves’ in Mapai.
68 Additionally, there was a genuine 
fear, among Mapai members, that Rafi would split from the party and collaborate with 
Gahal, in a move that would pose a direct threat to Mapai’s hegemonic status. In the 
end, the Mapai elites were afraid to ‘call Dayan’s bluff’ and settled on a 
compromise.
69 Sapir was deeply unhappy by the capitulation to Dayan, having 
previously threatened to resign if Rafi’s and Ahdut-Ha’avoda’s amendments were 
accepted.
70 But, as always, Sapir accepted Meir’s decision regardless of his own 
position on the matter. Sapir was rumoured to have had three prerogatives in life: ‘not 
to fight with Golda, to serve the party and to serve the state, and that what was good 
for the party was good for the state.’
71  
 
The agreed compromise became known as the Oral Law, i.e. a non-binding ‘optional-
unwritten understanding’ that would serve as a guideline for future negotiations.
72 
This created a situation where the party had two distinct policies: one policy it had 
agreed upon and which was presented as its formal policy, and another ‘informal’ 
policy which included agreements on specific issues and which would accompany the 
party’s electoral-platform.
73 As if to affirm the importance of Meir’s Kitchenette, the 
Oral Law was written by Galili and Dayan, with some input by Meir.
74 The main 
reasoning behind the Oral Law, other than to satisfy Dayan’s demands, was to provide 
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  142answers to several important questions, regarding the Occupied Territories, which the 
government and the party had been avoiding for years: what was Israel’s long-term 
vision, what were its strategic imperatives and what were its settlement policies?
75 
The Oral Law was as follows:  
 
The government’s decisions regarding the issue of secure borders include: Israel 
views the Jordan River as its eastern border, a secure border fit for the purpose of 
providing protection from possible invasions. The Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip 
will remain under Israeli control, while maritime movement through the Gulf of Eilat 
will remain free and secure by Israeli forces controlling the straits. The latter area will 
be an Israeli territory, allowing for continuity that would suit its security 
requirements.
76  
 
The Oral law and Dayan’s interpretation of it were similar to the Allon Plan,
77 in fact, 
there is nothing in the Oral Law that contradicts the Allon Plan, or for that matter 
previous government or party decisions.
78 With the exception of the demand for 
territorial continuity from Sharm El-Sheikh to Eilat, both the Oral Law and the Allon 
Plan share the same geographical parameters - a fact acknowledged by Allon.
79 Allon, 
however, stated that, while the Oral Law became part of the party’s electoral platform, 
in reality it was the Allon Plan that was implemented.
80 In order not to alienate 
Mapam, and under pressure from elements within Mapai, an additional statement was 
added to the Oral Law reiterating that if a suitable peace partner emerged Israel would 
be willing to enter into negotiations without any pre-conditions.
81 
 
 
Labour Party Convention 
  
On the 11
th of September 1969, the Labour Party’s Central Committee members 
convened to vote on the party’s electoral platform. According to the platform, Israel 
was ready to hold direct negotiations without preconditions, aimed at achieving peace 
agreements. These would be based on ‘strategically-secure borders’ as to ensure 
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  143Israel’s national interests and until such agreements were reached, the current status 
quo would be maintained.
82 According to Torgovnik, the electoral manifesto needed 
to be presented to party members or to potential voters as ‘broad, general and even 
grey … to represent collective views’.
83 On the ‘Held Territories’ chapter, the party 
preferred not to define Israel’s relationship with the territories. The party chose not to 
specify the exact nature of Israel’s economic relationship with the territories and left 
the matter in the hands of the government which,
84 in turn, left the matter in the hands 
of Dayan. This last point needs to be emphasised. By default, because of the Labour 
Party’s political dominance (the party held an outright majority in the Knesset) the 
decision not to define Israel’s economic and political relationship with the Occupied 
Territories effectively represented the government’s territorial policy. Despite the 
party’s disagreement with Dayan’s de-facto implementation of the economic 
integration programme, it chose not to challenge him. The platform recognised the 
government as the highest authority in the territories and, as such, the sole provider of 
services to the population. Additionally, it called for the retention of the Open Bridges 
policy (against the wishes of Sapir) and for the raising of the populations’ living 
standards.
85  
 
For the first time, the party made clear its support for the continuation and expansion 
of the settlement programme. This, in effect, stood against the party’s earlier promise 
to engage in negotiations without preconditions. The party’s agreed position was a 
step towards the acceptance of the Allon Plan and it reinforced the idea that Israel 
must define its own borders and security arrangements by creating facts on the 
ground. The agreed position read:  
 
Since the cease-fire agreement came into effect, new settlements and outposts have 
arisen on the Golan Heights, in the Jordan valley and in Sinai, while the settlement 
movement saw a renewal of its activity in Gush-Etzion, Kalia and Hebron. Two years 
after the Six Day War, security outposts and civilian settlements should be established 
with more urgency and vigour. Whenever debating over the issue of the settlements, 
be it urban or rural, the government will take into account the country’s security needs 
and the current state of affairs. Special consideration will be given to the areas 
essential to Israel’s national security. The Labour Party will call upon the nation, in 
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  144particular the young generation, to help turn the vision of settlement activity into 
reality, as part of the national cause.
86 
 
After reading the first chapters concerning the settlements and the issue of security, 
Reuven Barkatt (chairman of the special steering committee responsible for drafting 
the platform) informed party members that another additional chapter ‘that is not part 
of the platform but is related to it’ would also be put to a vote.
 Barkatt explained that, 
due to ‘the lack of time’, he had no copies to circulate among the members and would 
therefore read it out loud.
87 The additional chapter Barkatt was referring to was the 
Oral Law. Dayan - angered by reports in the media about the ‘dovish’ attitudes among 
Mapai’s elite - demanded the inclusion of the Oral Law as part of the party’s 
electoral-platform. The move was in stark contrast to the understanding reached with 
Mapai that it would serve only as a non-binding guideline. Dayan made it clear that 
the platform’s vague phrasing was unacceptable to him and threatened - yet again - to 
leave the party.
88 Despite being against the move, Sapir agreed to put the matter to a 
vote. The Oral Law was put to a vote even though most members were previously 
unaware of its contents, or even of its existence. Nevertheless, it was approved 
unanimously,
89 with the exception of Mapam members, who abstained from the vote. 
What was supposed to be a secret guideline, became the corner-stone of the party’s 
position on the territories; a move which was arguably promoted and supported by 
Dayan.
90  
 
The inclusion of the Oral Law alongside the chapters on security and settlements 
clearly signalled a change from the previous position of the Labour Party; the 
‘decision not to decide’ had clearly been eroded. This can also be viewed as the first 
attempt by the party to define the political future of the occupied population and its 
relationship with Israel. With regards to Israel’s borders, the vague phrasing of 
‘secure and recognised borders’ had been replaced by a clear indication of the 
territories Israel intended to hold i.e. the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the Jordan 
Valley and a strip of land stretching from Sharm El-Sheikh to Eilat. Nevertheless, the 
agreed position did not define the status of those territories. With regards to the 
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  145population, the party de-facto adopted Dayan’s vision of economic integration and 
‘self-rule’ and, as a result, ruled out returning the West Bank to Jordan. This is despite 
the fact that, with the exception of Rafi, the party was against a Functional Solution.  
 
In short, the Labour Party, in order to maintain unity and appease Dayan, adopted 
several conflicting ideas for the Occupied Territories. The party had effectively 
agreed on a policy that blended elements from the Allon Plan and Dayan’s Functional 
Solution while vowing to leave open all the diplomatic options. In fact, Meir claimed 
that, despite the adoption of the Oral Law and the settlement chapter, Israel was still 
committed to negotiations without preconditions, adding that the government was 
doing all it could to promote peace.
91 However, by seemingly adopting multiple 
positions, and preferring unity over clear policies, the party leadership created a 
situation where no meaningful decision could take place regarding the Occupied 
Territories.
92 In other words, while there was a clear shift to the Right on the 
territorial issue, the Labour Party (and, by default, the government) adopted an 
incoherent policy that blended several conflicting plans, while leaving the long-term 
future of the Occupied Territories unresolved.  
 
The adoption of the Oral Law and the electoral platform helped defuse an ideological 
struggle within the Labour Party, but at the same time it also alienated elements 
within the party, most notably the members of Mapam, who chose to abstain from the 
vote on the Oral Law. Mapam enjoyed a unique situation in the alignment in that its 
members were allowed to have their own opinions and not accept the majority 
decision as members of other factions did.
93 Moreover, the Mapam secretariat 
expressed concern with the party’s settlement chapter and emphasised the faction’s 
support for negotiations without preconditions.
94  
 
Despite the ongoing war, and the intense political wrangling within the Labour Party, 
the period leading up to the elections was devoid of any substantial debate amongst 
the political parties regarding Israel’s foreign or territorial policy.
95 Gahal leader 
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  146Menahem Begin had made it clear that he continued to support the National-Unity 
Government, and promised not to challenge the leadership of Meir and Dayan. 
Instead, Begin concentrated on brandishing his newly acquired statesman credentials, 
by publicly demonstrating his support for the government. Begin vowed to support 
the government against what he referred to as the ‘dovish’ elements within the Labour 
Party.
96 These, according to Begin, would rather withdraw from the territories than 
achieve secure borders for Israel and therefore could not be trusted with Israel’s 
security.
97 The results of the elections were never in doubt, with the only question left 
to be answered being whether the Labour Party would manage to win an outright 
majority; in the end, the party lost several seats (from 63 to 56), but kept its position 
as the dominant party. There were no major changes to the political scene and it was 
expected that the National-Unity Coalition would continue to govern. This situation 
was favoured by Meir, who feared being outflanked by the ‘doves’ in Mapai and 
Mapam, despite the unease with which Ahdut-Ha’avoda viewed Gahal, and the 
reluctance of Mapam.
98 However, even after offering Gahal four ministerial positions, 
Begin - citing differences over employment rights - refused to join the Coalition. 
Begin’s refusal, however, was about to change with the unveiling of the new 
American peace initiative. 
 
 
The Rogers Plan  
 
On the 25
th of September, Meir met with President Nixon in Washington. Meir 
requested that the US put a stop to the ongoing Sisco-Dobrynin talks.
99 Meir was 
concerned about the direction in which the US-USSR talks were heading, in particular 
the solutions proposed by Rogers. The Israeli government believed that Rogers was 
suggesting an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories. However, Meir was 
unsuccessful as Nixon refused to concede the Soviet channel and appeared reluctant 
to distance himself from Rogers’ ideas. The only concession Meir had managed to 
elicit was a tacit US acknowledgement of Israel’s right to develop nuclear weapons - 
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  147in itself a major diplomatic achievement.
100 In addition, Meir’s request for additional 
military hardware was met with a US counter-proposal to exchange ‘hardware for 
software’, i.e. tying the supply of American military hardware to Israel’s diplomatic 
concessions regarding the territories.
101 The assurances the Johnson administration 
had previously provided, regarding the supply of military hardware, were increasingly 
dangled as carrots in front of the Israeli government.  
 
On the 28
th of October, and without Israel’s knowledge, the US handed the USSR a 
proposed joint paper, based on the understandings reached by Sisco and Dobrynin, 
which contained an implicit agreement for an Israeli withdrawal from all the 
territories.
102 This joint paper was presented to Egypt several days later. Nasser found 
‘some positive elements’ in the document but agreed to accept it only as part of an 
‘integrated formula’ for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other 
words, Nasser was not willing to consider a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. 
The apparent Egyptian reluctance prompted Rogers to make public the joint paper, in 
the form of a comprehensive peace plan.  
 
On the 9
th of December 1969, Rogers unveiled America’s new Middle-East initiative - 
referred to as the Rogers Plan or Rogers A.  Rogers announced that the US had 
decided to ‘play a direct role’ in promoting a solution to the Middle-East conflict, 
based on Resolution 242 and the Jarring Mission. The ideas put forward by Rogers 
were based on the understandings that had been reached with the USSR, and referred 
specifically to Israel’s negotiations with Jordan and Egypt.
103 In his speech, Rogers 
called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank, with 
only minor border modifications, insisting that the US did not believe in 
‘expansionism’. However, Rogers made it clear that special provisions would have to 
be made with regards to Sharm El-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. Elements that were 
missing from previous initiatives were introduced for the first time, i.e. the future 
status of Jerusalem and the issue of the Palestinian refugees.
104   
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  148Rogers’ speech had an immediate impact on Israeli politics. Within hours of the 
speech, Begin devised a ploy for settling the main disagreements, between the 
government and Gahal, and joined the Coalition. For Gahal, the perceived threat, 
inherent in the speech, was enough to galvanise the party into action; it made no 
secret that its decision to join the government was so that it could work against any 
initiative that would require Israel to withdraw from the territories.
105 On the 15
th of 
December the new National-Unity Government came out with a foreign policy 
dossier, which stated its main principles:  
 
Israel will continue to be willing to negotiate - without prior conditions on either side 
- with any of the neighbouring States for the conclusion of a peace treaty. Without a 
peace treaty, Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation as established by the 
cease-fire and will consolidate its position in accordance with the vital requirements 
of its security and development. 
106 
 
The government’s immediate response to the Roger’s speech - that is after the 
inclusion of Gahal - was to dispatch Eban to Washington to express Israel’s 
disappointment in it, and to make sure it did not reflect the US’ official policy.
107 
Eban demanded to know what the US’s next steps were and whether it planned to turn 
the speech into its official policy, but he did not receive a clear answer. On the 18
th of 
December, while Eban was awaiting an answer, Rogers circulated a document in the 
UN (known as the Yost Document), which was a new American plan for settling the 
Israeli-Jordanian conflict.
108 The move was a clear departure by the US from the 
diplomatic understanding Rogers had reached with Eban, i.e. consulting it before 
launching new initiatives.
109 
 
The Yost Document (named after Charles Yost, the US ambassador to the UN) called 
for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to the international 
border, with some minor modifications - the document described the extent of Israel’s 
withdrawal as ‘substantially all of the West Bank’. Furthermore, according to the 
document, the West Bank would be demilitarised and the final status of the Gaza Strip 
would be negotiated between Israel, Jordan and Egypt. The final status of East 
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  149Jerusalem was left to be determined by the parties at a later stage; the American idea 
was not to divide the city but to allow for some form of Jordanian religious and 
municipal jurisdiction.
110  
 
The Yost Document surprised and alarmed many in Israel. For the first time the US 
administration had raised the prospects of Israeli concessions, in East Jerusalem and 
the West Bank. Despite the professed shock, at the prospect of having to make 
concessions in East Jerusalem, and unbeknown to the US administration, the Israeli 
government had previously examined possible solutions concerning the city, through 
a special committee headed by Mordehai Gazit (Director-General of the Foreign 
Ministry). This special committee made several recommendations, among them a 
joint Arab-Israeli municipal-administration in Jerusalem.
111 An additional report was 
presented to the Meir government in April 1974, analysing various options regarding 
the future status of Jerusalem and the holy sites in the Occupied Territories.
112 The 
fact that the government was willing to examine different scenarios concerning 
Jerusalem, in the context of final peace agreements, does not indicate whether any of 
those would have been approved. It does, however, demonstrate that the sensitive 
nature of Jerusalem’s future status was well known to the government and that, 
despite publicly refusing to compromise on the matter, it actually examined different 
possibilities at a ministerial level. 
 
On the 22
nd of December, the Israeli government officially rejected both the Rogers 
Plan and the Yost Document. The government issued a statement that it ‘would not be 
sacrificed by any power-policy and will reject any attempt to impose a forced solution 
on it’.
113 The Israeli government was astonished by the perceived pro-Arab stance 
taken by the US administration;
114 the plan was seen as an attempt to appease the 
Arabs at Israel’s expense.
115 Furthermore, Israel did not agree with the main tenets of 
the plan, i.e. the fate of Jerusalem, the West Bank, its borders and the refugees.
116 
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  150Meir described the plan as a ‘disaster for Israel’ and the possible adoption of it by the 
US as ‘an act of betrayal’; she claimed Israel was fortunate that Egypt had rejected the 
plan.
117  
 
In order to understand Israel’s position, regarding the Rogers Plan, it is important to 
bear in mind the balance of power within the government. Meir used her political 
capital to avoid and deter any meaningful discussions and adoption of decisions 
regarding the territories. On most territorial issues, Meir sided with the hawks, i.e. 
Dayan, Galili and Gahal,
118 believing that Israel would have to retain control over the 
territories until suitable partners emerged. Ministers not towing the official line, i.e. 
Meir’s line, were labelled internally as ‘defeatists’ or ‘soft weak doves’ and were 
excluded from the territorial decision-making process.
119 Under the pretext of 
Nasser’s actions and statements, the government gradually abandoned the notion of 
the territories as bargaining chips, in favour of viewing them as strategically 
important to Israel. Additionally, the Meir government would have been placed in a 
precarious position of having to choose between appeasing the Americans and 
maintaining political stability, had Egypt accepted the Rogers Plan. In this respect, the 
rejection of the plan by Egypt, and the lack of US pressure, convinced Meir, who saw 
no point in risking the unity of the Government and the Labour Party, that Israel did 
not have viable negotiation partners. According to Israeli assessments Jordan would 
not be able to sign an agreement with Israel without Nasser’s approval, and Nasser 
would not approve any plan unless it included a solution to the refugee problem and a 
full return to the pre-war borders.
120 
 
Yitzhak Rabin (Israel’s ambassador to the US), in a meeting with Sisco and Rogers, 
accused the US of changing its stance.
121 In response, Sisco informed Rabin that the 
US had not changed its stance and that in fact it was Israel that had changed its stance 
‘since November 1967’. Arguably, Sisco was referring to Israel’s decision from the 
30
th of October 1967, which was never officially conveyed to the US. Even so, Sisco 
added that the US shared Israel’s assessment that the Arab states were ‘not interested 
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  151in peace’ and implored Israel not to obstruct the international diplomatic efforts, as 
doing so would put a strain on American relations with the Soviets and the moderate 
Arab states.
122 
 
In the end, the Rogers Plan was rejected by both Israel and Egypt. Egypt’s insistence 
on a comprehensive solution, coupled with the reluctance of the USSR (which 
initially backed the American initiative) to put pressure on Nasser, doomed the plan. 
The inability, or unwillingness, of the Soviets to force the Egyptians to make ‘specific 
obligations to peace’ meant that the US was not able to do its bit, i.e. force Israel to 
make territorial concessions.
123 Nasser’s stance allowed the Israeli government to 
push forward with its strategic objectives in the Sinai Peninsula, i.e. the creation of 
settlements in the Gaza Strip, the Rafah plains and Sharm El-Sheikh, while claiming 
all along there was no partner on the other side with which to negotiate. Whether the 
US would have put substantial pressure on Israel, had Nasser accepted the Rogers 
Plan, is debatable.  
 
The American administration was speaking in two voices and sending out mixed 
messages which contributed directly to Israel’s lack of clear policy. On the one hand, 
Rogers asserted that the US was ready to use financial aid and the supply of military 
hardware as leverage if necessary.
124 On the other hand, Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
(the President’s National Security Advisor) agreed to accommodate some of Israel’s 
military and financial requests, in spite of Rogers’ threats.
125 It is, therefore, not a 
surprise that Israel did not acquiesce to the US demand regarding the Rogers Plan, as 
it knew the administration was not fully behind it. The lack of either an imposed 
American solution or direct US pressure on Israel allowed the Israeli government to 
avoid taking controversial decisions and continue its non-policy regarding the 
Occupied Territories.  
 
There are many reasons why the Rogers Plan was never accepted by Israel, e.g. the 
desire to avoid taking controversial decisions and the need to maintain the National-
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  152Unity Coalition, the lack of sustained US pressure, the rejection of the plan by Nasser, 
the rejection of an imposed solution, the lack of direct negotiations and the ongoing 
War of Attrition. But perhaps the most important was Israel’s unwillingness to accept 
Rogers’s solution for the West Bank and Jerusalem.
126 It is clear that any decision by 
the government regarding the West Bank, including the formal adoption of the Allon 
Plan, would have brought down the government. It is important to note that Gahal had 
joined the National-Unity Government precisely to ensure that the Rogers Plan was 
not accepted. It was, therefore, imperative for the government to avoid having any 
discussion on the future status of the West Bank. Additionally, Israel was creating 
facts on the ground in the Jerusalem area that would have irreversibly altered its 
status.
127 Israel made it clear that it would not accept any solution that would change 
Jerusalem’s status. Israel’s territorial policy had clearly changed since the 19
th of June 
1967. Arguably, the Eshkol government would have accepted the Rogers Plan and the 
Yost Document as they both provided Israel with more than it initially bargained for. 
Israel’s rejection of the plans was, more than anything else, an indicator of the change 
that occurred within the ruling Coalition since the Six Day War. The Meir 
government did not place any emphasis on finding a long-term solution for the 
Occupied Territories. Its diplomatic stance reflected a growing perception among 
policy-makers that Israel did not have adequate partners for peace and that any clear 
decision would bring down the National-Unity Government.  
 
 
The Rogers B 
 
At the basis of the Meir government’s territorial position was a perverse dichotomy. 
On the one hand, the government refused to put forward any comprehensive long-
term policies regarding the Occupied Territories. On the other hand, it was creating 
facts on the ground that corresponded mainly with the Allon Plan and Dayan’s 
Functional Solution. However, while the government was, unofficially, implementing 
the Allon Plan, it was also constructing army bases in accordance with Dayan’s plan 
and building settlements that matched neither of these plans, such as the settlement of 
Kiryat Arba. Furthermore, despite agreeing to keep all the diplomatic options open 
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  153and negotiate without preconditions, the government was implementing several 
conflicting plans and ad-hoc decisions. The government publicly justified its 
territorial position by linking it to Nasser’s bellicose rhetoric and the continuing 
hostilities. Nevertheless, Israel’s territorial stance was also directly linked to the 
Labour Party’s internal political situation and the lack of direct American pressure.  
 
The government’s inability to bring an end to the war with Egypt raised questions 
regarding its foreign policy approach and tested the patience of the electorate. The 
general sense of frustration was deepened by the resumption of low-scale clashes with 
Syrian forces in the Golan Heights and the increasing number of attacks perpetrated 
against Israeli targets around the world by Palestinian groups.
128 In order to regain the 
initiative and end the war, Israel decided to adopt a tactic of deep-penetration 
bombing raids against Egypt’s main military bases. While the initial raids proved to 
be highly successful, they failed to achieve the desired effect. Instead of backing 
down, Nasser, unable to match Israel’s fire power, requested additional Soviet 
military aid.
129 The ensuing military aid was without precedent in Soviet history. Not 
only were massive amounts of military hardware shipped to Egypt, but Soviet 
advisors, military instructors and even pilots were also provided. By April 1970, 
Israeli pilots were reporting enemy aircraft being flown by Russian pilots as well as 
on being attacked by Russian-operated surface-to-air missile batteries.
130  
 
The deepening Soviet involvement and the fear of a possible new American initiative, 
prompted Meir to announce on the 26
th of May, in a speech to the Knesset, that there 
was no change in Israel’s territorial policies. Meir reaffirmed Israel’s acceptance of 
Resolution 242 and its desire for peace, refuting claims that the creation of facts on 
the ground had irrevocably damaged the chances for peace.
131 When the Knesset 
voted on Meir’s statement, Gahal, which had been against the adoption of 242, chose 
to engage in political brinkmanship by voicing its criticism and abstaining.
132 In a 
speech to the Labour Party members, Meir asked what had changed since they had 
agreed on the party’s manifesto and why was it necessary for the government to make 
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  154far-reaching decisions when there was no credible partner. Meir was aware that any 
decision taken risked splitting up the party and the government and was against any 
change to the status quo.
133 Following Meir’s speech, the Labour Party’s secretariat 
came out with a statement supporting the government’s current policies in the 
territories.
134 In short, the lack of a coherent and comprehensive long-term territorial 
policy was a reflection of Meir’s political approach, which was based on maintaining 
the political stability of the Labour Party and Israel’s wall-to-wall Coalition. 
 
On the 19
th of June 1969, Rogers publicly called on Israel and Egypt to accept a short-
term three-month ceasefire. This was followed by the unveiling of a new US initiative 
i.e. a scaled-down version of the Rogers Plan, referred to as Rogers B. The initiative 
called upon the parties (Jordan, Egypt and Israel) to publicly restate their acceptance 
of Resolution 242 and their willingness to work towards its implementation. 
Furthermore, it invited the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of 
Jarring, with the hope that they could reach a peace agreement which would be based 
on an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war, and recognition by 
all parties of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence.
135 In addition, Israel was informed by the US that future supplies of 
military hardware were conditional to its diplomatic stance on the matter.
136 
 
The Israeli government immediately rejected Rogers B, but Rabin, who objected to 
the ‘tone of the message’ on his own initiative decided not to relay the government’s 
response to Nixon. Instead, Rabin advised the government to wait and see how Egypt 
would respond, before issuing further statements.
137 In order to alleviate Israel’s 
concerns, Nixon assured Israel that any withdrawal would only be to ‘secure borders’- 
this was the first time the Americans had used the Israeli term. Moreover, Kissinger 
stated publicly that it was necessary to maintain Israel’s military superiority in face of 
the growing Soviet intervention. Israeli security concerns prompted the US 
administration to put its full weight behind Rogers B. The US decided to speed-up the 
delivery of military hardware to Israel, and issued a statement reassuring Israel that 
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  155the final boundaries would not be imposed on it, but would be left for the parties to 
negotiate.
138  
 
On the 22
nd of July, and after pressure from the Soviets, Egypt announced its 
unconditional acceptance of Rogers B;
139 Jordan followed suit. The Egyptian 
response put the onus of the success of the American initiative solely on Israel.
140 In 
order to persuade Israel to make the right decision, and in response to Israeli 
inquiries,
141 Nixon sent an additional letter to Meir. In it he promised Meir that the 
final borders would have to be acceptable to Israel and that it would not be forced to 
withdraw from the Occupied Territories before acceptable peace agreements were 
signed. In addition, Nixon assured Meir that the US would not press Israel to accept a 
solution to the Palestinian refugee problem that would change the demographic nature 
of the Jewish state.
142 
                                                
 
Nixon’s letter was a turning point; it altered the mood within the Government and 
brought about a week of intense political wrangling amongst the Coalition 
members.
143 On the 25
th of July, Meir convened her Kitchenette to discuss Israel’s 
viable options i.e. the acceptance of Rogers B (and the dissolution of the National-
Unity Government), or the rejection of the plan with the knowledge it would affect 
Israel’s relationship with the US. All members of the Kitchenette - with the exception 
of Dayan who did not express an opinion - agreed to go ahead with Rogers B.
144 The 
decision to accept Rogers B proved to be the final act of the National-Unity 
Government, as Gahal members voted in favour of leaving the Coalition. Meir tried to 
convince Begin to stay, arguing that accepting Rogers B did not mean the acceptance 
of the territorial demands made in Rogers A, but these claims were not sufficient to 
convince Begin, and the most he was willing to accept was a US call for a limited 
ceasefire.
145 Arguably, Meir feared the resignation of Gahal would strengthen the 
dovish elements in the government and thus weaken her position. 
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On the 31
st of July the Israeli government informed the US that it was willing to 
accept Rogers B, based on the assurances given to it by Nixon.
146 When asked, in a 
meeting with Rabin, whether the US was willing to forgo Rogers A, in return for an 
Israeli acceptance of Rogers B, Sisco responded that the US could not promise that.
147 
In its reply to the US, the government confirmed that it was ready to enter 
negotiations based on Resolution 242 under the auspices of Jarring without any 
preconditions, in order to reach an ‘agreed and binding contractual peace agreement 
between the parties’. It added that Israel’s forces would withdraw from the territories 
held only after secure, recognised and agreed borders were defined by peace 
treaties.
148 The following week, in a speech to the Knesset, Meir explained that the 
acceptance of Rogers B did not indicate a change in the government’s territorial 
policies which, according to her, had been the same since 1967. Moreover, she 
reiterated the government’s willingness to negotiate on the basis of an Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories to secure and recognised borders.  
 
The acceptance of Rogers B by Israel demonstrated the American administration’s 
capability to put pressure on Israel, even though, in this instance, it chose to apply it 
more ‘with a carrot than with a stick’.
149 In the first instance of sustained and direct 
pressure from the Americans, who threatened to withdraw financial and military 
support, Israel was willing to forgo its principles and straighten the line with the US. 
Israel’s decision to accept Rogers B was in fact a testament to its commitment to 
Resolution 242 and to withdrawing from most of the territories, in exchange for peace 
and American security and financial assurances. Israel refused to be bullied into 
making concessions regarding the territories, but it is clear that once the Arab states 
(Egypt and Jordan) accepted the US proposals, Israel was left with no room for 
diplomatic manoeuvring. Arguably, had Egypt accepted Rogers A, Israel would have 
been left with no other option but to comply.  
 
In short, the government engaged in a diplomatic process which was based on 
Resolution 242 and the concept of land for peace. However, at no time during this 
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process did the government put forward clear territorial demands or policies. 
Furthermore, internally, within the Coalition and the Labour Party, no clear decisions 
were taken regarding the future status of the territories. The Israeli insistence on direct 
negotiations without any preconditions, on the basis of secure and recognised borders, 
was clearly a statement directed at domestic audiences, with the hope that it would 
contribute to political stability. The government had already stipulated that it would 
not withdraw from several territories it deemed essential for its national security, but 
it nevertheless refused to decide on their status. On the one hand, the government 
claimed that the issue of the Occupied Territories would be dealt with through direct 
negotiations while, on the other hand, it engaged in creating facts on the ground 
intended to undermine the diplomatic efforts. The Meir government proposed and 
advocated territorial policies it knew others would not accept, while relying on the 
‘good will’ of the US to turn these into reality. According to Brecher, one of this 
government’s short-comings had been the lack of long-term (‘or any’) planning with 
regard to foreign policy, and with its main method of operation being 
‘improvisation’.
150 It is evident that, because of her perceived lack of suitable 
negotiation partners, her personal inclinations and her determination to maintain 
political stability, Meir chose not to pursue a clear long-term territorial policy. 
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Israel’s Secret Peace Plan 
 
On the 7
th of September 1970, and in response to American diplomatic pressure, Israel 
decided to renew its participation in the Jarring talks.
1 Israel’s decision to participate 
in the Jarring talks and its acceptance of Rogers B signalled a change in the 
government’s diplomatic stance regarding the Occupied Territories.
2 Begin, in a 
speech to the Knesset, interpreted this decision as a de-facto acceptance of Resolution 
242, which would ultimately mean the withdrawal of Israel from the majority of the 
territories.
3 As if to affirm Begin’s assessment, Meir and Allon had prepared a secret 
peace plan, as an alternative to Rogers A, that advocated an Israeli withdrawal from 
most of the territories. This plan, which could be seen as Meir’s first attempt at 
formulating a long-term territorial policy, defined the territories according to their 
perceived strategic importance, in accordance with the Oral Law and the Allon Plan. 
The plan - highlighting Israel’s diplomatic and territorial ‘redlines’
4 - was to be 
presented to Nixon, during Meir’s visit to Washington. The government was not privy 
to the details of the peace plan as Meir decided not to confer with the ministers.
  5 
Arguably, Meir based her decision to keep the plan secret on the assumption that, now 
that Gahal had resigned, she would have had little difficulty convincing the 
government to accept the plan, if it was approved by the US. In the introduction to the 
plan, Allon wrote that it would be an accomplishment if the US were to accept the 
plan, although he doubted that that would happen; Allon’s honest assessment 
illustrated how important the position of the American administration was for Israel’s 
territorial policy. According to the plan: 
  
1.  Israel would withdraw from the majority of the West Bank, according to 
the outlines proposed in the Allon Plan, with some additional minor border 
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  159modifications (in the Jerusalem region): Gush-Etzion, Latrun and Beit-
Huron Passage. 
2.  Jerusalem would remain undivided and under Israeli control. 
3.  Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip but would retain the Rafah 
Plains. 
4.  The Gaza Strip would become a demilitarised area, to be used as a free-
port by an Arab state (presumably this referred to Jordan). 
5.  Israel would retain a strip of land stretching from Sharm El-Sheikh to 
Eilat. 
6.  The rest of the Sinai Peninsula would be returned to Egypt on the 
condition that it would remain demilitarised. 
7.  Israel would withdraw from up to a third of the Golan Heights in exchange 
for a peace agreement. The rest of the Golan Heights would be retained by 
Israel in order to protect its water sources and the Upper Galilee area.
 6  
 
The inclusion of the Golan Heights in the plan, despite Israel’s insistence that it would 
not withdraw from the area, can be understood as an attempt to pre-empt a possible 
Syrian acceptance of Resolution 242. It might also be connected to Israeli Intelligence 
reports that indicated a US willingness to discuss the future of the Golan Heights on 
the condition that Syria changed its diplomatic stance.
7 According to Allon, the 
proposed withdrawal would not include the strategically important topographic areas 
in the Golan Heights and would not, therefore, endanger Israel’s long-term security.
8 
Moreover, it is important to note that the areas from which Israel was proposing to 
withdraw did not contain any settlements.  
 
The plan, however, was neither brought to the attention of the American 
administration nor was it presented to Nixon. Because of unfolding events in the 
region such as the outbreak of clashes between the Jordanian army and Palestinian 
groups, and repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement by Egypt, discussions on 
the resumption of negotiations between Israel and its neighbours were postponed.
9 
Nevertheless, the fact that Meir prepared the plan attests to the importance Israeli 
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  160leaders put in gaining American acceptance to their policies and the fear they had of 
an American imposed solution to the Occupied Territories.   
 
 
Black September 
 
On the 16
th of September 1970, as a result of a failed attempt to assassinate him, as 
well as a humiliating episode of multiple plane hijackings which directly challenged 
his authority,
10 King Hussein decided to confront the Palestinian armed groups in 
Jordan (an event later referred to as ‘Black September’). Hussein’s decision was 
welcomed by Israel, which viewed the activity of the Palestinians groups, in Jordan, 
as a security concern. Incidentally, in the months before his decision, Hussein reached 
an agreement with Israel that in the event that he decided to act against the Palestinian 
armed groups, Israel would not take advantage of the situation.
11 In the ensuing 
episode, the Palestinian groups were no match for Hussein’s professional army. 
However, in an attempt to assist the Palestinian groups, Syrian forces crossed into 
Jordan; an action that put the whole region on alert. Acting Israeli Prime Minister 
Allon (Meir was in Washington at the time) informed Hussein that Israel would come 
to his aid, if needed, and would not take advantage of his situation.
12 In consultation 
with the US, the Israeli government ordered a redeployment of its forces on the Syrian 
front, sending a clear message to Syria that Israel was willing to intervene militarily if 
necessary. Arguably, Israel’s show of support thwarted the Syrian attack and paved 
the road for Hussein’s victory.
13  
  
After the event, Hussein and Allon met, in what was described as a meeting between 
friends; Hussein thanked Allon for the support shown by Israel.
14 Allon chose the 
opportunity to present Hussein with an idea of establishing a Jordanian civil 
administration, or a Palestinian civil administration linked to Jordan,
15 in parts of the 
West Bank (based on the Allon Plan) as an interim agreement. This would include an 
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  161Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in order for the area to be used as a deep-water 
port by Jordan. It is unclear whether the status of Jerusalem was discussed, although 
Israel had previously agreed to some form of limited religious and municipal roles for 
Jordan in the city, which included special status for Islam’s holy places.
16 Hussein, 
reportedly, reacted positively to Allon’s idea but was unwilling to commit to it; 
Hussein wanted to ‘hear more about it’. It is important to note that Hussein was 
willing to consider the idea only as part of an interim agreement.
17 Possibly, Hussein 
was unwilling to commit because it was Allon’s private idea and had not yet been 
approved by the Israeli government.
18  
 
On his return to Israel, Allon raised the idea with Meir, who convened an informal 
ministerial meeting to discuss it; according to Allon those present included Meir, 
Dayan, Galili, Ya’akov Shapira and Shlomo Hillel (Police Minister).
19 Despite 
Hussein’s positive reaction to the plan, the ministers present unanimously rejected it; 
a move considered by Allon to be a mistake.
20 According to Allon, ‘everyone was 
against the idea’; the only reasonable objection came from Dayan, who confessed that 
he did not ‘believe in it’.
21  In a somewhat ironic turn of events, after the Yom Kippur 
War, Meir and Dayan offered Hussein the exact same plan.
22 
 
For the first time ministers were presented with an opportunity to vote for the Allon 
Plan, albeit as an interim agreement. The government had previously voted for the 
creation of settlements and for the establishment of security arrangements based on 
the Allon Plan; despite never officially endorsing the Allon Plan, Meir supported the 
creation of settlements within its parameters.
23 With the departure of Gahal from the 
government, one would have expected ministers to vote in favour of Allon’s idea; 
instead, they rejected it. Arguably, Meir feared that the adoption of the plan would 
alienate Dayan and the hawkish members of the Labour Party (i.e. Rafi and 
Tabenkin’s followers in Ahdut-Ha’avoda). It is unclear why the idea was discussed in 
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  162an informal ministerial meeting and was not brought to the attention of the 
government. The idea was consistent with both the Allon Plan and the Oral Law and 
as such, it would have presented the government with an opportunity to vote on these 
issues. According to Shem-Tov, the majority of ministers were not privy to the 
ongoing secret negotiations with Hussein; a situation that prevailed throughout the 
Meir period,
24 when important foreign policy decisions relating to Israel’s territorial 
policies were being taken by a limited number of ministers associated with the 
Kitchenette.
25 This episode clearly indicates that Israel did not have a territorial policy 
based on the Allon Plan. Furthermore, it demonstrates that, even after the break-up of 
the National-Unity Coalition, the government still did not have a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term policy.  
 
 
Sadat 
 
One of the main reasons stated by Meir for not pursuing a comprehensive territorial 
policy was the lack of suitable peace partners. Time and again, Meir explained that, if 
faced with suitable peace partners, the Labour Party and the Government would 
formulate a long-term territorial policy. However, this statement is incorrect: it will be 
demonstrated that, even when faced with suitable peace partners, the Meir 
government chose not to formulate clear policies towards the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Gaza Strip, the Rafah Plains and the West Bank.  
 
On the 29
th of September 1970, Nasser passed away and was replaced by Vice 
President Anwar El-Sadat. Sadat’s first important diplomatic decision came in 
November when he extended the cease-fire agreement with Israel by three months. 
Sadat claimed that a further extension would be conditional on a precise Israeli time-
table for withdrawal,
26 adding that Egypt would not consider itself bound by the 
cease-fire if this was not produced. On the 5
th of January 1971, Sadat proclaimed his 
willingness to sign a peace agreement on the basis of a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from the territories; Sadat threatened that if Israel did not withdraw he would be left 
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  163with no alternative but to go to war.
27 Despite these warlike threats, Sadat’s 
proclamation should be seen as a breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations; this was the 
first time an Arab state had publicly agreed not only to recognise Israel but to sign a 
peace agreement with it.  
 
On the 15
th of January 1971, Sadat informed the US of his willingness to consider an 
interim agreement with Israel, borrowing the concept from Dayan.
28 The idea of 
pursuing an interim agreement was raised by Dayan on several occasions the last of 
which was with Rogers on the 11
th of December 1970.
29 Dayan called for the 
redeployment of forces on both sides to allow for the reopening of the Suez Canal - 
which had remained closed since the Six Day War. Dayan believed that an interim 
agreement would promote better understanding between the sides and help avoid 
future conflicts. However, the idea was rejected by the government, with Meir 
particularly, not supportive of it. 
 
The interim agreement proposed by Sadat was slightly different from the one 
advocated by Dayan. Sadat called for an Israeli withdrawal to the Mitle and Gidi 
passes (40 km from the canal) and for the ‘thinning’ of Egyptian forces, up to 40 km 
from the canal on its western bank. This would create a semi-demilitarised area to 
allow for construction work to reopen the canal. After a period of six months the canal 
would reopen for shipping, and this, according to Sadat, would include free passage 
for Israeli vessels. Sadat saw the interim agreement as part of a comprehensive 
agreement, which would be based on the full implementation of Resolution 242.
30 
Sadat claimed that his suggestion was not a tactical ploy but a sincere attempt to 
reduce tensions between the sides and avoid a future war.
31  
 
On the 8
th of February, Jarring presented Egypt and Israel with a step-by-step 
approach - the Jarring Document - for resolving the conflict. Working outside the 
narrow remit of his mandate, and with the consent of the US, Jarring proposed a 
framework for a comprehensive settlement ‘in accordance with the provisions and 
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  164principles of Resolution 242’. Jarring called for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
Egyptian territories to the international border. He proposed practical security 
arrangements for the Sharm El-Sheikh area and for the imposition of satisfactory 
demilitarised zones. In return, Egypt was required to sign a peace agreement with 
Israel based on: the termination of all claims of belligerency; maritime freedom and 
mutual respect for each side’s sovereignty; territorial integrity; and political 
independence.
32   
 
In Israel, the Jarring Document caused a great deal of confusion. In a meeting with 
Jarring, Gazit and Simha Dinitz (Director-General of the Prime Minister's office) 
claimed Jarring’s approach was not constructive and would only create more 
obstacles. They pointed out that Israel had agreed to enter into negotiations without 
preconditions, in order to reach a peace agreement based on secure and recognised 
borders. These, they insisted, should not have been dictated by him but left for the 
parties to negotiate.
33 In its official response to Jarring, the Israeli government 
rejected his document, reminding him that Israel ‘will not return to the cease-fire 
lines’.
34 In contrast, Egypt, by and large, accepted the Jarring Document. 
Nevertheless, Egypt refused to accept the presence of any forces, other than those of 
the UN, in Sharm El-Sheikh and demanded that Israel withdraw from the Gaza 
Strip.
35 
 
Dayan, while welcoming the Egyptian response, argued that Israel should emphasise 
the differences between the sides’ positions, in particular its refusal to withdraw to the 
international border. He argued that Israel should not make any unnecessary territorial 
concessions unless forced to do so by the Americans and Russians.
36 Dayan accepted 
neither the security arrangements nor the demilitarisation mechanism proposed by 
Egypt. According to Dayan, the presence of the IDF in Sharm El-Sheikh was the only 
security arrangement he would be willing to accept. Dayan argued that, until an 
acceptable agreement was reached, the IDF would consolidate its position there: ‘At 
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  165the moment we are sitting there and building’.
37 Dayan questioned the government’s 
acceptance of Resolution 242, stating that Israel must define its own secure borders, 
which, he argued, should include the Jordan River and the Golan Heights.
38 It is 
important to understand what was meant by Dayan’s comment ‘we are sitting there 
and building’. While Israel appeared to be viewing the Sinai Peninsula as a bargaining 
chip and publicly stating its desire to negotiate with Egypt without preconditions, it 
was continuing to consolidate its presence there. This was done through increased 
investment in the extraction of oil and other natural resources,
39 as well as through the 
establishment of Nahal outposts and civilian settlement.  
 
Israel’s policies towards the Sinai Peninsula seemed to be in accordance with its 
security needs as well as with the Allon Plan and the Oral Law, i.e. Israel, in order to 
secure maritime freedom and ensure strategic depth, intended to remain in the Rafah 
Plains and along the Sharm El-Sheikh-Eilat line. In practice, and with the exception of 
the Rafah Plains (which will be discussed later in the chapter), Israel’s actions in the 
Sinai Peninsula followed a different route. The first Israeli settlements in the Sinai 
Peninsula (Nahal Yam and Nahal Sinai) clearly did not correspond to Israel’s long-
term security needs or the parameters of the Oral Law. General Netzer (the head of 
the Nahal) acknowledged the problematic location of these settlements and the fact 
that they were not part of any particular long-term plan.
40 It is true that the majority of 
settlements were established by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Development 
of the Shlomo Region (Sharm El-Sheikh)
41 in accordance with the Oral Law. 
However, despite Israel’s stated desire to remain in Sharm El-Sheikh, the 
development of the region did not match the diplomatic rhetoric; in 1972 there were 
only 300 settlers in the Sharm El-Sheikh-Eilat region.
42 Moreover, Israel continued to 
invest in the establishment and development of settlements outside the remits of the 
Oral Law. In fact, in his diary, Weitz (the head of the Settlement Department) listed 
several concerns regarding Israel’s long-term policy in the Sinai Peninsula, such as 
the future status of El-Arish, water resources and the need for comprehensive long-
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  166term planning.
43 It is important to note that one of the main problems facing Israel in 
the establishment of settlements in the Sinai Peninsula was the lack of adequate water 
resources.
44 
 
The main reason behind Israel’s lack of a clear long-term policy towards the Sinai 
Peninsula was that Israel was following two separate and contradictory plans. On the 
one hand, Galili and the Settlement Department were adamant about the need to 
invest in projects and establish settlements in the Rafah Plains and along the Sharm 
El-Sheikh-Eilat region, i.e. the Government’s stated parameters. On the other hand, 
Dayan and the IDF were pushing for the establishment of Nahal and civilian 
settlements in northern (near El-Arish) and south-western Sinai (At-Tur and Santa 
Katarina). According to Dayan, Israel’s strategic line in the Sinai Peninsula needed to 
be drawn from El-Arish to Sharm El-Sheikh, and not, as envisioned by the 
Government, from the Rafah Plains. Additionally, Dayan believed that the 
establishment of Nahal outposts in south-western Sinai strengthened Israel’s grip on 
Sharm El-Sheikh. Despite attempts by Galili to restrict the establishment of 
settlements outside the Government’s stated parameters,
45 Israel - not surprisingly - 
proceeded to establish settlements according to both Galili’s and Dayan’s maps. Thus, 
in 1973, Israel transformed the Nahal Sinai outpost into a civilian settlement and 
established a second settlement near the city of El-Arish - the only heavily populated 
area in Sinai (population of around 30,000). This came despite concerns raised by 
Tourism Minister Kol that this decision went against the ‘current policy’.
46 
Additionally, Israel established a Nahal outpost in At-Tur, which Netzer admitted was 
controversial and not in accordance with Israel’s long-term plans.
47 In conclusion, 
Israel’s settlement and development activities in the Sinai Peninsula were neither 
directly related to the government’s stated objectives nor to Sadat’s diplomatic stance. 
In fact, even those officials entrusted with the implementation of Israel’s settlement 
policy (Galili, Netzer and Weitz) were unable to articulate the reasons behind some of 
the decisions. 
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  167Arguably, because of Israel’s lack of clear long-term policy towards the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Foreign Ministry, in particular Eban, proposed that Israel use a ‘non-
committal formulation’ in its reply to Jarring and Egypt. This, they argued, would 
include welcoming Egypt’s response and agreeing to withdraw to secure, recognised 
and agreed borders, which would be determined during the negotiations. The 
government agreed to use the Foreign Ministry’s formula, but under pressure from 
Dayan, Galili and Rabin, it added a ‘decisive qualification’. It stated that, in 
accordance with the Knesset’s decision, Israel would not withdraw to the international 
border.
48 In addition to its reply to Jarring, Israel sent a message to the US stressing 
that it would not accept minor border changes, and reiterating that it rejected the 
territorial component of the Rogers Plan.
49 The foreign ministry advised its embassy 
in Washington to emphasise Israel’s need for a suitable security arrangement in 
Sharm El-Sheikh.
50 
 
Israel’s reply to Jarring put it at a difficult position vis-à-vis the American 
administration. Sisco informed Rabin that the American administration was 
disappointed with Israel’s actions; he went as far as to state that the US might re-
examine its relationship with Israel. According to Sisco, the US had always accepted 
the idea of a territorial compromise, by which Israel would be required to withdraw 
from most of the territories. He called on Israel not to miss this opportunity and to 
offer to withdraw from the canal, as part of an interim agreement.
51 In a later meeting 
with Kissinger, Rabin was asked whether Israel would ‘stick by her position’ if the 
US ‘were to exert pressure upon you by cutting off military aid’.
52  
 
On the 16
th of March 1971, possibly in response to US queries, Meir, in a speech to 
the Knesset, outlined Israel’s territorial position. According to her, the final borders 
between Israel and its neighbours would be determined by peace negotiations and that 
Israel will not return to the cease-fire lines. Meir claimed that the government had not 
adopted any particular plan regarding the territories and was considering several 
different options, among them the Allon Plan. She reiterated that the Gaza Strip 
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  168would not be returned to Egypt, that the Sinai Peninsula must be demilitarised and 
that Sharm El-Sheikh would remain under Israeli control, enabling territorial 
contiguity with Eilat.
53 As noted by Raphael, the ‘map’ presented by Meir during her 
speech ‘neither appealed to Sadat nor comforted the state department’.
54 Additionally, 
Israel’s settlement activities in the Sinai Peninsula did not correspond to Meir’s 
‘map’. 
 
The gap between Meir’s stated and actual positions regarding the Sinai Peninsula was 
amply demonstrated by her response to Dayan’s new initiative. Her response made it 
clear that she was reluctant to consider any withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. 
Dayan, in a meeting with Sisco, suggested that Israel withdraw to the Sinai passes, 
while destroying the Bar-Lev line fortifications, which would demonstrate Israel’s 
peaceful intentions and show Egypt that it did not intend to return to the canal. 
Additionally, Israel would allow a symbolic presence of Egyptian police forces on the 
eastern bank. In return, Egypt would end its state of belligerence and agree to leave 
the final borders to be determined in negotiations between the sides.
55 Meir was 
furious when she found out that Dayan had presented the US with a different position 
to that of the government, and rejected his ideas. According to Aloni, Dayan sent 
General Yariv, one of Meir’s favourite generals, to convince her. Yariv brought along 
maps and spent several hours trying to convince Meir; but to no avail. Meir claimed 
that ‘nothing would come out of this initiative and the public would not understand 
the need for an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai’.
56 Eban suggested, to Dayan that he 
would bring his proposal to the government for a vote, claiming that there might be 
enough votes to approve it. Dayan replied that if ‘Golda does not support my position, 
than I do not support my position’!
57  
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  169The Kitchenette 
 
Israel’s territorial approach and its short-term policies appeared contradictory. On the 
one hand, Israel was engaged in the creation of settlements in the Rafah Plains, the 
Gaza Strip and Sharm El-Sheikh, stating that these areas would remain under Israel’s 
control; Israel’s approach regarding these areas was based on its fear of international 
security arrangements and its desire to unilaterally define its own secure borders. On 
the other hand, Israel refused to either define the future status of these areas or put 
forward long-term plans for them and continued to state its willingness to engage in 
direct negotiations without preconditions. The majority of Israel’s decisions regarding 
the Occupied Territories were dictated, to a large extent, by the Kitchenette. 
Therefore, in order to understand Israel’s approach towards the territories, during the 
Meir period, it is important to understand the way in which the main members of the 
Kitchenette, i.e. Meir, Galili and Dayan, viewed the long-term future of the Occupied 
Territories and the settlement issue. 
 
In the midst of the Jarring Mission, and the interim agreement negotiations, the 
Labour Party held its annual convention. During the convention Meir, Galili and 
Dayan put forward their views on the territories and Israel’s diplomatic approach. 
Meir described the Arab states as consisting of one united front which opposed Israel 
and that still harboured some desire to destroy Israel.
58 She accused the Jarring 
mission of attempting to return Israel to the pre-Six Day War situation and questioned 
the need to risk Israeli lives by accepting this idea.
59 Meir made it clear that Israel 
would not accept an imposed solution or be dictated to about the parameters of its 
future borders. Furthermore, she explained that Israel would never agree to rely on 
others to provide for its security needs, claiming that only secure borders would 
provide that.
60 Meir claimed that Sadat did not enter into negotiations with Israel in a 
sincere attempt to reach peace. Because of her distrust of Sadat, she refused to 
consider a withdrawal from the Suez Canal, viewing it as a prelude to an Israeli 
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  170withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. According to Meir, Israel 
should not be made to pay merely because Sadat wanted to reopen the Suez Canal.
61 
 
Dayan criticised Ben-Gurion’s claim that Israel should withdraw from all the 
territories, with the exception of East Jerusalem and the Golan heights. According to 
Dayan, Israel could not afford to withdraw from the West Bank. Dayan challenged the 
view that Jordan was a credible peace partner, stating that Hussein had not changed 
and that dealing with Jordan also meant dealing with the likes of Yasser Arafat (the 
leader of the PLO) and George Habash (the leader of the Popular Liberation Front of 
Palestine, PFLP).  Dayan questioned the logic behind giving Jordan areas, such as 
Qalqilya, Ramallah, Hebron and Gush-Etzion. He raised the question of who would 
control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank once Israel has left, ‘Egypt, Jordan or the 
PFLP’.
62 For Dayan, only the continued presence of the IDF along Israel’s strategic 
lines would ensure long-term security and force the Arab world to accept Israel’s 
presence and the new borders.
63  
 
Regarding the Palestinians, and true to his Functional Solution, Dayan explained that 
they understood that Israel was aiming for a ‘mutual and beneficial lives together’. He 
argued that the Palestinians were more willing to find ways to accommodate Israel, 
than they were to ‘settle with the terrorist organisations’.
64 Dayan concluded his 
remarks by stating that, ‘despite Resolution 242, the Rogers Plan, the Allon Plan and 
other plans’, the strongest guarantees for Israel’s long-term security, and the most 
important aspects of this conflict, were ‘the return of the nation of Israel to its 
homeland and the presence of the IDF along the Jordan River’.
65 
 
Galili claimed that the Labour Party was not entrusted with the right to relinquish the 
historic right of the ‘Jewish people to the land of Israel’: ‘Our party was established in 
order to realise our historical aspirations and rights’. Galili remarked that during the 
party’s first convention it had agreed to establish settlements ‘not in Uganda or some 
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  171undefined state, but in the historic land of Israel’.
66 According to Galili, the Labour 
Party had won the trust of the nation because of its commitments to the realisation of 
the Jewish aspirations of settling the land of Israel, as well as its sincere desire to 
pursue peace.
67 Galili explained that he was happy the party did not draw any maps, 
‘When the time comes and there is a real chance for peace we will submit our map’. 
Galili, in his usual verbose style, claimed that Israel wanted ‘secure and recognised 
borders’ corresponding to its ‘geographical, topographical, strategic, security, 
historical and political considerations’ and in accordance to Israel’s ‘Zionist and 
security’ needs as well as ‘the political realities’.
68 
 
These remarks, by Meir, Dayan and Galili, raise several important issues. First, it is 
clear that members of the Kitchenette attached a great deal of importance to Israel’s 
security considerations and viewed the territories mainly through a military-strategic 
prism. Second, despite the importance attached to the strategic-military 
considerations, it is clear that Meir, Dayan and Galili grappled with the Normative-
Instrumental dichotomy. Their views regarding Israel’s strategic imperatives were 
thus modified by their cultural and identity images, i.e. their views on Zionism, its 
realisation and the historic relationship between the Jewish people and the land of 
Israel. Furthermore, it is apparent that these views were modified by the resurgence of 
New Zionism ideology; this is particularly noticeable in the language used by Galili. 
Third, their willingness to accept territorial concessions reflected the degree of trust 
they attributed to the Arab leaders and their proposals. Lastly, it is apparent from their 
stated views that Meir and Galili did not attach a great deal of importance to 
formulating a long-term territorial policy and therefore did not have an end-game in 
mind. This was in contrast to Dayan, who was pushing for Israel to adopt a Functional 
Solution.  
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  172Israel’s Contradictory Approach 
 
There were several reasons for the failure of the interim agreement and, to a lesser 
extent, the Jarring Talks, one of which was Israel’s lack of a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term territorial policy. Throughout the negotiations, Israel was 
unable or unwilling to put forward a clear long-term policy in regards to the Sinai 
Peninsula. This lack of policy meant that Israeli decision makers were not working 
together towards the achievement of a particular outcome; Israel’s contradictory 
security approach and Meir’s reaction to Dayan’s new initiative attest to the lack of 
policy coordination. Meir stated Israel’s willingness to negotiate with Egypt in order 
to achieve a peace agreement on the basis of secure and recognised borders. 
According to Meir, secure and recognised borders meant the retention of the Rafah 
Plains by Israel and a contiguous strip of land stretching from Eilat to Sharm El-
Sheikh by Israel; these areas were within the parameters of the Oral Law and were 
deemed essential for Israel’s national security. However, despite agreeing, in 
principle, to withdraw from the majority of the Sinai Peninsula, in practice, the Meir 
government argued with the American mediators over every inch, while constantly 
adding new ‘strategically important’ areas from which Israel could not withdraw. 
Furthermore, and as shown, Israel’s settlement activities in the Sinai Peninsula were 
not directly related to its professed security needs; Israel’s development of the Sharm 
El-Sheikh-Eilat area clearly did not match its stated significance.  
 
On the one hand, the government, in its attempts to negotiate a peace agreement with 
Egypt, viewed the Sinai Peninsula as a bargaining chip. On the other hand, it viewed 
the territory, particularly after the War of Attrition, as a strategic asset to its national-
security – one which provided Israel with strategic depth and maritime freedom. In 
addition to this already complex dichotomy, Israeli politicians could not agree on the 
nature of Israel’s security needs in its pursuit of secure borders. Moreover, and despite 
stating its desire to retain these areas, Israel was unable, or unwilling, to define their 
future status. In fact, in his diary, Weitz questioned whether it would be feasible to 
annex the territories Israel deemed strategically important.
69 It is not exactly clear 
what Israel’s long-term objectives in regards to the Sinai Peninsula were. Israel’s 
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  173professed strategic aims, i.e. retaining control over the Rafah Plains and Sharm El-
Sheikh, could have only been realised with American diplomatic support. Israel’s 
stated reasons for demanding these territories were purely strategic-military. 
However, when the American administration addressed Israel’s security concerns, 
Israel refused to change its stance. Not only was Israel unwilling to change its stance, 
but it was also unwilling to define its future relationship with these territories.  
 
Israel’s contradictory security approach towards the Sinai Peninsula and the Occupied 
Territories was made amply apparent during a series of meeting with Sisco, and 
Yevgeny Primakov (the Deputy Director of the USSR’s Academy of Sciences’ 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations). Sisco explained to Meir that 
the US was willing to look at its long-term financial and military commitments to 
Israel in order to ensure its security, after it withdrew, as part of an interim 
agreement.
70 Sisco reaffirmed that in the final agreement Sharm El-Sheikh would 
remain under Israel’s control, as stipulated in Rogers A, adding that the US did not 
accept Jarring’s interpretation of Resolution 242. Replying to a question from Meir, 
Sisco informed her that the US position had not changed and that it remained fully 
committed to Rogers A.
71 Nevertheless, even though the US was willing to address 
Israel’s security concerns and ensure that Sharm El-Sheikh remained in Israeli hands, 
Israel refused to budge. Meir informed Sisco, that Egypt was unwilling to enter into 
negotiations without preconditions and that, in her opinion, Sadat was not ready to 
sign a peace agreement with Israel. Israel, according to Meir, did not want the 
resumption of hostilities and was therefore willing to work towards an interim 
agreement, as long as this was consistent with its national security.
72  
 
Following Sisco’s visit, Primakov came to Israel, at the behest of the Soviet 
leadership, for a series of secret meetings with Meir, Dayan and Eban. Primakov 
informed Eban that the USSR was willing to discuss all of Israel’s security concerns, 
although to Primakov, Israel’s policies appeared to have little to do with security 
concerns and more to do with the acquisition of territories.
73 Primakov stated that 
Arab recognition of Israel, and its territorial integrity, was more important to security 
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  174than territorial changes, reaffirming the USSR’s willingness to address Israel’s 
security concerns. According to Primakov, Resolution 242 provided Israel with the 
territorial recognition it desired, as long as this was ‘not a question of territorial 
acquisition’.
74 Sadat, he claimed, was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel - 
an opportunity Israel should take. Furthermore, he added that Israel’s demand for 
direct negotiations without preconditions was not consistent with its stated desire to 
retain the Golan Heights, Sharm El-Sheikh, parts of Sinai and Jerusalem.
75 Eban 
replied that Israel’s main concern was security and not territories, but that some 
territories were essential for its national security.
76 Primakov explained that in his 
view the Arabs had shown a great deal of diplomatic flexibility and Israel should now 
dispel the notion that it was happy with the status-quo and was bent on territorial 
acquisition. He reassured Israel that the Arabs were no longer interested in destroying 
it and that the USSR was willing to provide help and assurances to ensure the success 
of the negotiations.
77 Dayan inquired about the Soviet position regarding the 
territories.
78 Primakov asserted that the USSR agreed with Sadat’s demand for a 
complete Israeli withdrawal to the international border, but was willing to consider 
different scenarios for the Gaza Strip, none of which would involve an Israeli 
presence there.
79  
 
There are several reasons behind Israel’s lack of a clear long-term policy and its 
failure to produce such a policy during this period, (e.g. the interim agreement 
negotiations and the Jarring Talks) but probably the most important reason was the 
unwillingness of the American administration to either impose a solution or apply 
sustained pressure on Israel. Throughout the interim agreement negotiations and the 
Jarring Talks, Israel’s position regarding the Occupied Territories was influenced by 
the (fluctuating) levels of pressure it was under from the Americans (which can be 
seen in the example of Israel’s secret peace plan of 1970). Additionally, and as stated 
by Dayan, as long as the US did not impose a solution on Israel, the Israeli 
government could continue promoting the status-quo. There is no doubt that the US 
could have applied pressure on Israel, had it wanted to do so; Kissinger once asked 
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  175Rabin how would Israel react if the US decided to cut the aid. This is not the place to 
examine the reasons behind the American reluctance to apply pressure on Israel, but 
there is nevertheless two important points that needs to be mentioned: Kissinger was 
not supportive of Rogers’ Middle East initiatives and the ‘bureaucratic turf struggle’ 
between the two affected US diplomatic efforts and, as a consequence, Israel’s 
territorial policy (or rather the lack of it).  
 
Another important reason for Israel’s lack of clear long-term policy was Meir’s 
preference for a non-committing territorial approach that allowed her to avoid dealing 
with the controversial issues. Meir, the quintessential ‘Jewish mother’, was the most 
dominant figure in the government and, as such, gave the tone on the most important 
issues, with most ministers reluctant to confront her.
80 According to Meir, Israel did 
not have suitable peace partners, while the interim agreement and the Jarring Talks 
were the start of a process that would culminate in Israel’s full withdrawal from the 
Sinai Peninsula. Furthermore, Meir’s distrust of Rogers, whom she accused of treating 
Israel unfairly,
81 and Jarring, whom she considered a dishonest person who had sold 
himself to the Arabs and the Soviets,
82 led her to believe that no meaningful 
negotiations were possible. Arguably, this perception, in addition to her general 
distrust of Sadat and her belief that the Arabs would eventually accept Israel’s terms, 
led her to conclude that time was on Israel’s side. She was, therefore, in no rush to 
take controversial decisions and define Israel’s long-term territorial policy.  
 
Meir apologists, such as Mordechai Gazit and Meron Medzini, argue that Sadat was 
not ready to sign a peace agreement with Israel and therefore Meir was correct in the 
way she handled the negotiations. While their analysis may raise some valid 
arguments, Gazit and Medzini are unable to articulate exactly what were Meir’s 
policies for the Sinai Peninsula.
83 The fact of the matter is that Meir insisted on 
maintaining the territorial status-quo, she did not put forward a clear long-term policy 
and avoided making any controversial decisions regarding the Sinai Peninsula.  
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  176The Rafah Plains 
 
In January 1972, several Bedouin tribes petitioned to the Israeli Supreme Court, 
claiming that the army had expelled them from their homes in the Rafah Plains.
84 The 
petition was supported by members of Hashomer Hatz’air,
85 who helped uncover the 
incident. Chief of Staff David El’azar claimed the orders did not emanate from him, 
and established a fact-finding commission to investigate the incident. 
 
On the 15
th of March 1972, members of Hashomer Hatz’air presented Mapam’s 
central committee with the findings from their report into the treatment of the 
Bedouin in the Rafah Plains. They claimed that Israel was creating an Arab-free area, 
south of the Gaza Strip, in order to separate the Strip from the Sinai Peninsula. This, 
they suggested, was part of a plan to clear certain areas before settling them with 
Jews, and linking or annexing them to Israel. They remonstrated with the faction’s 
leaders, reminding them that in a ‘proper state’ the government must act in a 
transparent manner.
86 Health Minister Victor Shem-Tov professed to have had no 
prior knowledge of the incident and claimed that no decision regarding the Bedouin 
had ever been taken by the government.
87 
 
Hashomer Hatz’air provided the Mapam Central Committee with a detailed report of 
the geographical area in which lands had been appropriated and the number of 
Bedouins dispossessed (around 5,000). The report included maps showing existing 
and planned settlements, and outposts, in the Rafah Plains and the Gaza Strip, most of 
which were on appropriated lands. The areas cited by Hashomer Hatz’air were Abu-
Midan (Gaza Strip) and Samiri (Rafah Plains), the same areas in which Allon and 
Dayan had previously proposed establishing security outposts.
88 The report also 
uncovered details of a possible planned city in the Rafah Plains. Referring to the 
existing settlements in the Gaza Strip, members of Hashomer Hatz’air asked the 
committee ‘how was it possible that a transitory outpost established by the army, for 
security purposes, could transform into a civilian settlement’. The report alleged that 
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  177the majority of the settlements created in the Rafah Plains and the Gaza Strip were not 
of a military nature. The report advised the party to examine whether this method of 
operation was evident in other regions as well.
89 In fact, unknown to Hashomer 
Hatz’air, Galili, citing important political reasons, proposed establishing an industrial 
area in the Gaza Strip that would supply the army and the four settlements already 
established there.
90 
 
In his defence, Shem-Tov claimed that he was unaware of any government decision 
regarding the local population of the Rafah Plains. He added that from a conversation 
he had recently (after the case was brought to light) he concluded that neither Dayan 
nor El’azar were involved. Some members of Mapam inquired how it was possible 
that, despite being part of the Labour Party, and the ruling coalition, they were kept in 
the dark on this matter. Shem-Tov replied, ‘How could I know of something I only 
read a few hours ago in the Press?’.
91  
 
The Rafah Plains were seen as vital for Israel’s national security, as a way of 
separating the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula while at the same time providing it 
with strategic depth.
92 The first proposal to establish settlements in the area came 
from Allon. On the 10
th of December 1968 he proposed creating a series of 
settlements in the triangular area of Abu-Agheila, El-Arish and the city of Rafah.
93 
Allon based his proposal on a survey done in the area, by the Settlement Department, 
which included a detailed plan for four settlements.
94 Nevertheless, the Settlement 
Department clearly stated in its proposal that parts of the area were inhabited and 
cultivated by Bedouins.
95 On the same day, Israel, in its response to Jarring, 
proclaimed that it would not withdraw from the Gaza Strip and that it would retain a 
strip of land linking Sharm El-Sheikh with Eilat. This decision opened the door for 
the establishment of settlements in the area,
96 and prompted the Settlement 
Department to present a revised plan for the creation of six to seven settlements in the 
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  178Rafah Plains.
97 This was followed, on the 26
th of January 1969, by a different 
proposal to establish two settlements in the area.
98 During a government meeting on 
the issue, Dayan explained that they would need to relocate the Bedouins who lived 
there. He added that the project should be defined as a military one, and that Israel 
should strive initially to establish Nahal outposts in the area. Dayan claimed the area 
was one from which Israel would not withdraw as it was vital for its national 
security.
99  
 
Arguably, the government’s inability to find a long-term solution to the Gaza Strip 
was behind its decision to establish settlements in the Rafah Plains.
100 The Gaza Strip 
presented the government with several challenges, chief among them the need to 
contain and pacify the population of the territory, in particular the ‘terrorist’ threat 
emanating from it.
101 Israel’s policies in the Rafah Plains were an attempt to 
compensate for its lack of a clear long-term policy approach towards the Gaza Strip 
and to provide an answer to the strategic and demographic problems posed by the 
territory. On the one hand, Israel could not afford to annex the Gaza Strip, because of 
the demographic implications. On the other hand, it feared its withdrawal would lead 
to the use of the area as a base by a foreign army.
102 In other words, Israel’s strategic-
military needs, regarding the Gaza Strip, dictated, to a large extent, its settlement 
activity in the Rafah Plains.
103  
 
The idea to settle the Gaza Strip was first suggested by Allon in 1967. In the Allon 
Plan the Gaza Strip was to be an integral part of Israel, while its refugees were to be 
resettled.
104 Nevertheless, the decision to establish settlements in the area would only 
be taken on the 13
th of September 1970. It is important to note that the idea of settling 
the Gaza Strip received broad political support, including from Mapam.
105 This 
decision came as a result of Galili’s proposal to establish two Nahal outposts in the 
Gaza Strip (Kfar Darom and Netzarim), in order to assert Israel’s claims to the area, 
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  179in the aftermath of the War of Attrition.
106 In January 1970 Galili became Israel’s 
settlement Tsar, replacing Allon as head of the Ministerial Settlements Committee 
(MSC). In a discussion in the MSC, prior to the government’s decision, general Gazit 
claimed the settlements were necessary for ‘political-psychological’ reasons ‘to give 
an electric shock to the residents of the strip’, even though he acknowledged they 
served no ‘tactical point’.
107 General Ariel Sharon (Head of Israel’s Southern 
Command) went even further arguing that the settlements would ‘wean the Arabs of 
the Gaza Strip from the illusion that we will eventually get out of there’.
108  
 
The decision by the government to settle the Gaza Strip and the Rafah Plains had been 
taken before the long-term future of these areas was decided upon. The Eshkol 
government had avoided taking a decision over the long-term future of the Gaza Strip 
until it could find a solution to the demographic problem it posed. Several ideas were 
discussed, among them exchanging the Gaza Strip for parts of the West Bank in order 
to conclude a deal with Hussein. The decision to settle the Gaza Strip by the Meir 
government, not only hampered negotiations with Hussein, but also plunged Israel 
into a demographic conundrum. In fact, a proposal by Dayan, to provide the residents 
of the Gaza Strip with Jordanian passports, in order to strengthen Jordan’s ties with 
Gaza, was rebuffed by Meir and Galili, who expressed fears the move would provide 
Jordan with a foothold in the territory.
109 On the 11
th of November 1971, Meir 
informed Hussein that the hand-over of the Gaza Strip was no longer an option.
110 
 
As mentioned earlier, the decision to settle the Rafah Plains was clearly in opposition 
to Israel’s professed desire to negotiate with Egypt without preconditions. Israel was 
creating facts on the ground that would hinder such negotiations. Furthermore, the 
appropriation of lands in order to create a new reality by reshaping the landscape 
discredited Israel’s democratic and legal traditions. However, despite these problems, 
the idea that the Rafah Plains would remain under Israel’s control after any agreement 
became central to Israel’s territorial position.
111 This idea was strengthened, in May 
1973, when Israel’s Supreme Court rejected the Bedouin tribes’ petition regarding the 
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  180appropriation of lands on the Rafah Plains. The court accepted the army’s argument 
that the area was essential to Israel’s security needs and that the decision to 
appropriate lands and resettle the Bedouin population was taken out of ‘military 
necessity’.
112 However, during the court case several of Israel’s daily newspapers 
published accounts of a secret plan by the Ministry of Defence for the establishment 
of a large, deep-sea port, city in the Rafah Plains named Yamit.
113 These detailed 
plans were drawn up by Dayan and Galili with the assistance of the Settlement 
Department long before the court case began.
114  
 
Gazit wrote that the case of the Rafah plains illustrated the perverse dichotomy 
inherent in Dayan’s concept of ‘enlightened occupation’.
115 On the one hand, Dayan 
envisioned a long-term Israeli-Arab coexistence, under Israel’s rule while, on the 
other hand, he supported the expansion of Israel’s settlement activity, which included, 
among others, land appropriation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Dayan was 
well aware of the economic, political and social problems that existed in the Occupied 
Territories, and had urged both the government and the Knesset to do more for the 
welfare of the Palestinian population.
116 One of the reasons the government was not 
investing more was that, according to Israeli analysts, socio-economic and security 
conditions in the Occupied Territories were improving dramatically.
117 Moreover, the 
fact that the security and political situations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were 
under control (from Israel’s perspective), while Palestinian living standards were 
improving, meant that the government was in no hurry to re-assess its territorial 
approach.  
 
The fact-finding commission established by the army found extensive irregularities in 
the conduct of Sharon.
118 It concluded that Sharon acted on his own accord, and in 
contravention of procedures, and that neither the government nor the army command 
was involved. Nevertheless, the committee recognised that the new situation in the 
Rafah Plains was advantageous from the army’s perspective and therefore advised 
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  181El’azar not to take any further action, other than to officially reprimand Sharon.
119 
Arguably, Sharon understood the importance that the government, and the army, 
attributed to the area and the difficulty they had in making such a decision. He 
therefore decided to support their efforts, and made that decision for them; Sharon 
later claimed that Dayan ‘had been fully aware of what was going on’.
120 Indeed, in a 
letter to Meir, during the court case, Galili proposed establishing a regional centre in 
the area, explaining that it was now relatively empty. Galili added that the proposal 
was done in consultation with Dayan and Gvati.
121  
 
 
Hussein’s Federal Plan  
 
Israel’s incoherent policies were not limited to the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and 
the Rafah Plains; in fact, it was the West Bank which proved to be the epitome of 
Israel’s confused and muddled territorial approach. Instead of agreeing on a 
comprehensive long-term approach, decision-makers appeared content with the 
implementation of both the Allon Plan and Dayan’s Functional Solution.  
 
The Israeli government chose to leave the question of defining its long-term 
relationship with the Occupied Territories open, even though the establishment of 
settlements and outposts continued unabated. With the exception of the Jerusalem 
municipal area, the Occupied Territories existed in a legal limbo, with Israel unwilling 
to extend its jurisdiction, even to areas it declared would remain under its control.
122 
Arguably, the government preferred the status of the territories to be determined 
through negotiations and did not wish to jeopardise those by taking unilateral action. 
However, with the Israeli occupation of the territories entering its fifth year, the 
undefined status of the territories, in particular of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
created numerous problems for Israel, not least that of legitimacy.  
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  182The idea that Israel would be required to remain in the territories for a long period of 
time was not new. Back in 1967, Dayan put forward a proposal that would have seen 
the territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) remain under Israeli control 
indefinitely, i.e. the so-called Functional Solution.
123 Subsequently, during his time in 
the Defence Ministry, Dayan worked towards the realisation of this solution with the 
apparent backing of the government. As noted by Shem-Tov, when it came to the 
implementation of political, social and economic decisions regarding the Occupied 
Territories, Dayan was ‘completely and exclusively’ in control.
124 In fact, the 
Directors-General Committee, which was nominally in charge of coordinating the 
government’s activities in the Occupied Territories, made budgetary proposals for the 
financial year 1970-1971 that appeared to be in line with Dayan’s vision.
125  
 
This included a drive towards Palestinian ‘self-rule’ by which Israel recognised and 
supported local-elected officials. Dayan’s and, consequently Israel’s, actions 
empowered local officials, particularly the mayors, and enhanced their position. 
Subsequently, the relative financial weakness of the Palestinian municipalities, and 
their dependence on the military administration for public services and investment in 
infrastructure provided Israel with a great deal of control over them.
126 
  
Israel’s need to legitimise and empower local officials necessitated holding fresh 
elections in the West Bank (later followed by elections in the Gaza Strip); the 
previous local elections were held in 1963. The elections were seen by Dayan as a 
way of empowering local officials in order to strengthen the case for Palestinian self-
rule and his idea of a Functional Solution, even if they represented an action against 
the interest of Jordan - with whom Israel appeared to want a deal. It is worth noting 
that Dayan’s belief in the Functional Solution appeared to be justified by the positive 
economic and social statistics emanating from the military administration.
127 The 
relative ease by which Israel administered the territories, and the apparent success of 
Dayan’s occupation model, contributed to the government’s lack of urgency in 
adopting a long-term approach. 
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  183 
In 1972, elections were held in the West Bank, with the process run and supervised by 
local officials without Israeli interference. From an Israeli perspective, the elections 
proved to be a great success (participation levels were above 80%),
128 despite vocal 
resistance by the PLO and unhappiness expressed by Jordan.
129 The elections did not 
bring about an immediate change to life in the territories.  They did represent, 
however, the first instance in which Palestinians were able to determine their political 
future, with several prominent members of the old Palestinian establishment losing 
their seats to up-and-coming young independent runners. Consequently, the political 
leadership of the West Bank resembled a three-headed hydra, caught up between 
Jordan, the PLO and local independent groups.
130 This situation (i.e. the 
fragmentation of the Palestinian political leadership) undermined both Dayan’s 
Functional Solution and Israel’s Jordanian Approach.  
 
On the 15
th of March 1972, King Hussein unveiled a new diplomatic initiative ‘The 
Federal Plan’, through which he hoped to reaffirm his claim to the West Bank. The 
plan was timed to coincide with the mayoral elections in the West Bank. It was meant 
to restore Hussein’s credentials and support - damaged in the aftermath of Black 
September - among Palestinians. Hussein proposed linking the West Bank, and 
possibly the Gaza Strip, with Jordan in a federal agreement, creating an autonomous 
Palestinian region under Jordanian control with Jerusalem as its capital.
131 The plan 
was immediately dismissed by the Arab world, with Hussein accused of trying to sign 
a separate peace deal with Israel. Among Palestinians, the mood - not surprisingly 
considering the events of Black September - was sour. The PLO issued a statement 
condemning and rejecting the plan, claiming that the Palestinians should be accorded 
the right to determine their own future, and accusing Hussein of being an accomplice 
of America and of Zionism. The plan did not receive much approval in the West Bank 
either, with only a minority of elected officials welcoming it.
132 
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  184The rejection of the plan by the Arab states was followed by a formal Israeli rejection. 
The plan prompted a vote in the Knesset, recognising Israel’s historic rights to the 
West Bank. The government, while not rejecting the federal solution outright, did not 
accept the territorial aspects of Hussein’s plan. Meir called the plan a pretentious and 
one-sided statement that failed to recognise Israel’s claims in the West Bank.
133 One 
of the few to welcome the plan was Allon, who claimed the federal solution was 
compatible with his plan, even if he rejected its territorial aspects.
134 Allon claimed 
that there was no reason to dismiss Hussein’s federal plan. Allon believed there was a 
‘real possibility’ of reaching a solution based on it and the Allon Plan, adding that the 
federal plan offered a good solution to the Palestinian problem. Nevertheless, Allon 
argued that in order to bring about a solution based on these plans, Israel should 
continue to create facts on the ground. He called for the establishment of a new city 
on the Jerusalem-Jericho road (Ma’ale Adumim), and stated that additional 
settlements were needed in those areas that would remain under Israeli control after a 
peace agreement was signed.
135 
 
Despite rejecting Hussein’s plan, the Israeli government, with the exception of Dayan 
who operated in accordance with his vision, continued to view the Jordanian 
Approach as the most suitable for the West Bank. Indeed, on the 11
th of November 
1971, during a meeting with Hussein, Meir stated that Israel had no desire to keep the 
Palestinians under its jurisdiction: ‘They belong to you, they are your people’.
136  
Meir proposed a solution based on ‘substantial changes to the border’ along the lines 
of the Allon Plan,
137 with Jerusalem remaining under Israel’s control but, with 
Jordanian administration over the Muslim holy sites.
138 Hussein informed Meir that 
he had no problems discussing border changes, but that these should be based on 
reciprocity and be based on a desire for long-lasting peace between the two states.
139 
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  185On the 21
st of March, Meir met with Hussein and his Prime Minister Zaid Rifai to 
discuss the Jordanian federal plan. Meir started the meeting by complaining that Israel 
was not notified prior to the unveiling of the plan. She informed him that his plan 
disregarded Israel’s historic claims to the West Bank, and that any future agreement 
on the West Bank must be based on substantial changes to the pre-war borders. These, 
she proceeded to explain, would be similar in substance to those proposed in the 
Allon Plan. With regards to Jerusalem, Meir stated that she was willing to discuss 
administrative solutions to the Muslim and Christian holy places but that the city 
would remain under Israel’s control.
140 In response, Hussein stated that he was 
willing to sign a separate peace deal with Israel but that this depended on Israel’s 
position. He proceeded to explain how his federal plan would work. The West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, which would form the Palestinian part of the federation, would 
remain demilitarised, and under Jordanian control. Jordan would be willing to accept 
some minor border changes and a unified Jerusalem- as long as it was also the capital 
of the Palestinian autonomous region. On the matter of Jerusalem, Hussein asked 
Meir to desist from changing the status-quo in Jerusalem irreversibly.
141 Furthermore, 
Rifai informed Meir that, while it was willing to pursue a separate peace with Israel, 
Jordan could not agree to an Israeli plan that envisioned major border modifications. 
He went on to explain that any future peace agreement must be ‘acceptable, workable, 
durable, something we can be proud of, something that his Majesty can present to the 
Arab nations and to the world’.
142  
                                                
 
Meir dismissed the federal idea outright, informing Hussein that if this was his 
position, then they should stop negotiating. In reply, Hussein told Meir not to be 
despondent and that they should both try, for their next meeting, to find constructive 
ways to bridge their differences. Meir said that this would not be necessary as the 
differences between them were too big. She explained that Hussein was basically 
offering Israel a revised version of the Rogers Plan which Israel had already 
rejected.
143  
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  186 
One of the main problems faced by the Israeli government, regarding its negotiations 
with Jordan, was its lack of an agreed position. Caught between two contrasting plans 
(the Allon Plan and Dayan’s Functional Solution) Israel could not articulate to 
Hussein its vision of a Jordanian-Israeli peace plan. In a meeting, on the 18
th of June 
1972, with Allon and Galili, to discuss Dayan’s planned meeting with Hussein, Meir 
said that the government ministers needed to decide what it was that they wanted. She 
inquired whether either of them knew what Dayan was going to offer Hussein and 
asked what they thought he should offer.
144 Allon suggested that Dayan limit himself 
to security and military issues and that he should not bring up his plan (the Functional 
Solution) in the meeting with Hussein. Galili informed Meir that Dayan had 
previously raised the idea of allowing Hussein some administrative powers in the 
West Bank, as part of an interim agreement (which would have fitted well with 
Dayan’s plan). He suggested that Dayan stick with the offers already made by Meir 
and limit himself to listening and reporting back to the government.
145 As it turned 
out, Dayan did not deviate from the government’s position. The only new idea he 
brought with him was a suggestion for a defence pact between the two states. In the 
meeting, he urged Hussein - who was disappointed that Israel did not come up with 
any new proposals - not to miss the opportunity and to reach an agreement with 
Meir.
146 The meeting exposed Israel’s inability to put forward a clear plan; Dayan 
explained, to Hussein, Israel’s philosophy as ‘a formula … not an expression of exact 
territory, although it carries territory with it, naturally’.
147 
 
According to the Israeli Press, Hussein had proposed (possibly to Dayan) a revised 
version of his federal plan.
148 On the 23
rd of August, Dayan allegedly said in a close 
meeting of Labour ministers, that there was a real chance for peace with Jordan. He 
explained that Jordan was willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel, 
based on: minor border modifications; Israeli military presence in the Jordan valley; 
and Jordanian control over the Gaza Strip. Dayan explained that Hussein was willing 
to consider different solutions regarding Jerusalem as well as leaving the final status 
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  187of Jerusalem for future negotiations.
149 This appears to be in line with Hussein’s 
remarks in a meeting with Meir on the 3
rd of February 1972, regarding border 
modifications: 
 
  ‘…we realised that changes [to the border] must occur. But the point is how 
significant, and how drastic? When we spoke of a reciprocal basis, it was reciprocal in 
terms of land, in terms of something that really be accepted by people. And we have a 
very open mind.’
150  
 
Nevertheless, Dayan did not accept Hussein’s terms and, arguably, neither would the 
majority of Labour MKs. Dayan explained that because Hussein would not accept the 
Allon Plan, or any plan that would satisfy Israel’s demands, Israel should examine its 
policies in the West Bank, taking into account that it would probably remain there for 
many years.
151  
 
During the talks, Hussein had presented a clear and consistent position while showing 
a great deal of diplomatic flexibility to ensure the talks were successful. Hussein went 
as far as discussing different administrative solutions to resolve the diplomatic 
impasse over Jerusalem and offered several concessions with regards to Israel’s 
security needs in the West Bank. While rejecting Hussein’s proposals, the Israeli 
government did not clearly express what it was that it wanted other than major border 
modifications. The only plans presented to Hussein, by both the Eshkol and the Meir 
governments, were variations of the Allon Plan - a plan that was never approved by 
either government. It is important to remember that the Kitchenette had previously 
rejected Allon’s interim plan, which was based on the Allon Plan.  
 
Had Hussein agreed to any of Meir’s suggestions, there would have been no guarantee 
these would have been approved by either the government or the Knesset. If the 
details reported, by the Israeli Press, regarding Hussein’s offer to Dayan, are to be 
believed, then there would have been no reason for it to be rejected by the 
government. According to the Press, Hussein had expressed his willingness to address 
all of Israel’s security concerns, including a provision for an Israeli military presence 
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in the Jordan Valley.
152 According to Rifai, Israel was acting in a way that defeated its 
declared purposes.
153 An examination of Israel’s approach during the negotiations 
with Hussein leaves the impression that Israel was moving in two opposing directions. 
On the one hand, Israel made it clear that it did not want to control the heavily 
populated areas of the West Bank, while, at the same time, it provided Dayan with the 
opportunity to implement his Functional Solution. On the other hand, Israel stated that 
its preferred option with regards to the West Bank was the Jordanian one, while it 
offered Hussein a plan it knew he would never accept. Israel’s government had been 
informed on numerous occasions, by various committees and reports, that Hussein 
would not accept the Allon Plan. In conclusion, the Meir government adopted an 
incoherent and contradictory approach towards the West Bank, which was based on 
the partial implementation of two different plans, while actively undermining these 
plans and weakening its own negotiating position vis-à-vis Jordan. It is worth 
reiterating again that the Allon plan and the Functional Solution, while differing in 
their long-term aims, shared many short-term objectives. 
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6. Chapter Three 
 
The Grand Debate 
 
Between September 1972 and April 1973, the Labour Party held a lengthy debate - 
known as the Grand Debate - on the future of the Occupied Territories. The debate - 
the brainchild of Party Chairman Aharon Yadlin
1 - was held in response to ‘mounting 
pressure’ to resolve the party’s internal disagreements,
2 and was meant to reconcile 
the differences amongst party members prior to the elections (October 1973); instead, 
it exacerbated them.
3 The debate exposed the growing rift between the leading figures 
in the party, with Allon, Sapir and Eban on the one side and Galili, Dayan and Meir 
on the other.
4  
 
The debate within the party was not so much between factions as between two main 
groups: those advocating a Functionalist Approach and those advocating a 
Territorialist Approach (i.e. the Allon Plan). But there were also two smaller groups, 
the first of which included the supporters of The Land of Israel Movement (i.e. those 
associated with New Zionism ideology), while the other was associated with a 
Reconciliationist Approach (i.e. a withdrawal from the majority of the territories). The 
latter raised, for the first time, the possibility of a Palestinian state; these included 
Arie Lova Eliav (the former Secretary General of the party) and Yitzhak Ben-Aharon 
(Secretary General of the Histadrut). Eliav called on the party to support an Israeli 
withdraw from the majority of the territories and adopt a two-state solution; Eliav was 
one of the first in the party to publicly acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian 
nation.
5 Amongst the party elites, only Allon recognised the importance of finding a 
solution to the Palestinian problem. Even so, Allon argued that only a territorial 
compromise based on a Jordanian Approach held the keys to the Palestinian 
problem.
6  
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  190Ben-Aharon was particularly concerned about the demographic problem, and asked 
what did party members want, a Jewish state or a bi-national state?
7 He, therefore, 
called for a unilateral withdrawal from the majority of the territories:  
 
I am not sure that we need to wait for a peace agreement to decide upon the future of 
the territories. I feel that one day we may realise that it would be better if a particular 
area and population was outside of our area jurisdiction without the need of a 
signature.  
 
Ben-Aharon was concerned that, because of adverse political developments in the 
Arab world, Israel might be left in control of territories and population centres it did 
not intend to keep, and that this would become a burden on it.
8 However, despite his 
demographic concerns, Ben-Aharon was firmly in favour of an Israeli retention of the 
Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip and against any division of Jerusalem.
9 In addition, 
Ben-Aharon did not rule out a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank in 
accordance with the Allon Plan.
10  
 
Opening the debate, Yadlin reminded members that they were required to discuss and 
determine the party’s policies towards the Occupied Territories. However, he added 
that ‘…whilst doing so [i.e. determining the party’s policies], we forget our 
disagreements regarding the exact strategic borders, which in my opinion, can be left 
until we enter into meaningful negotiations with the Arab states.’
11 Yadlin added that 
the debate was not solely about Israel’s future borders, but also about its future 
political and economic relationship with the Occupied Territories.
12  
 
Sapir acknowledged that the debate within the party was intensifying and getting 
louder. He claimed that, in the aftermath of the Six Day War, and unlike other 
ministers, he had reached certain conclusions in regard to the territories; Sapir added 
that recent events only helped to strengthen his convictions.
13 He maintained that, 
before entering into meaningful negotiations, Israel should first decide what kind of 
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  191solution it desired and refrain from engaging in activities that would hinder the future 
of these negotiations.
14 He provided the example of Yamit to illustrate types of 
activities that would hinder future negotiations. Sapir questioned the logic behind the 
investment of large sums of money in Yamit, ‘over the next 25 years’, and asked 
whether ‘this is what Israel needs at the moment’. He ridiculed party members who 
argued that the investment in Yamit would not come at the expense of Israel’s 
development towns (‘Ayarot Pituah). Sapir asserted that the territories were a 
financial burden - one that would only increase with time.
15 
 
For Sapir there was ‘no difference between a formal decision on annexation - as those 
who believe in greater Israel advocated - and annexation that was not decided upon 
but creeps up on us [i.e. the Functional Solution].’ In regard to the Functional 
Solution, he said ‘I find it strange that senior political figures, some of whom will 
enter the history pages, succumb, even if for a short while, to this delusion.’
16  Israel, 
according to Sapir, could ill afford to control the territories without providing - at 
some point in the future - full legal and economic rights to the population, in addition 
to raising their living standards to be on par with Israel’s. Sapir asserted that treating 
the population as second class citizens would not work in the long run: ‘The world 
will not agree to it, the Arab population will not agree to it … and we, under no 
circumstances, will agree to it.’ Referring to the Israel’s inevitable demographic 
problem, Sapir commented that ‘the demographic projections are so simple that even 
a child could calculate them’.
17 
 
Sapir agreed that it was counter-productive to start drawing up maps and taking 
unilateral actions in the territories as this would hinder future peace talks. 
Nonetheless, Sapir warned that if Israel maintained the status quo it might not be able 
to extirpate itself from the territories in the future; he provided an allegory about ‘a 
boy who ties himself to a tree and then shouts that the tree will not leave him’.
18  
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  192Allon, agreeing with Sapir, claimed that Israel did not need to agree on a final map, 
but needed to know - at least in general terms - its parameters, within which it was 
necessary or possible to establish and expand settlements. However, fearing a 
demographic problem, he argued that it was necessary to avoid settling in heavily-
populated areas as well as in those areas from which Israel was planning to withdraw. 
For Allon, only the Territorialist Approach guaranteed Israel’s security and preserved 
its Jewish nature.  
 
The discussion should be focused on Israel’s strategic long-term peace policy and the 
correct approach by which to administer the territories until peace arrives.
19 If I am in 
favour of a territorial compromise, it is from the viewpoint of political-realism and a 
humanist viewing of Zionism, which requires that we adhere to, and strive for, 
peace.
20  
 
Allon argued that what went on in the territories was temporary and could not last, 
and it was, therefore, in the interest of Israel that the situation did not become 
permanent. He confessed that assertions made by Dayan, that the local population 
could live indefinitely under Israeli rule, ‘made me wonder’.
21 Allon contended that a 
Functional Solution would deny political rights from the Palestinian population. He 
argued that the Jewish people ‘of all people’ should not be those to deliver an unjust 
and deplorable political system ‘Israel should not deny the elementary political 
aspirations of the local population’.
22 Responding to snipes from attending party 
members, Allon declared that a Palestinian entity existed, whether or not it was 
defined as a nation. In his view, Israel should work towards a solution that addressed 
its security and political needs as well as providing a solution to the Palestinian 
political problem: ‘If Israel does not ignore the Palestinian element, it might prove to 
be an important element in the march for peace.’ He suggested that Hussein’s Federal 
Plan might be the right approach to achieve such a solution, whilst revealing that he 
personally rejected its territorial component.
23  
 
Allon claimed that, for the past five years, Israel’s economic relationship with the 
territories had not been properly scrutinised and that there was a need to redefine this 
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  193relationship in a manner that would leave Israel with flexibility in terms of its 
diplomatic options. He asserted that there was a need for two separate economic 
entities that would cooperate, but not integrate. Allon emphasised that the economic 
cooperation between the two entities should not lead to the creation of a single 
economic structure.
24  
 
The peace Israel requires, the peace for which Israel should strive and that which can 
be attained, cannot be any other than a peace based on compromise. No one should be 
under the illusion that Israel can achieve peace while holding on to all the territories 
while, at the same time, no one should delude himself that Israel can achieve security 
while withdrawing from all the territories.
25 
 
Speaking several weeks after Allon and Sapir, and in an attempt to heal the growing 
rift, Eban argued that the time to resolve the differences and disagreements within the 
party had not yet arrived. Eban suggested that Israel would be ready to make the 
necessary territorial compromises according to its security needs, when the time 
arrived.
26 This, he acknowledged, was inherent in the Allon Plan but, like Meir, he 
too claimed that this was not the only plan available. He proceeded to propose that the 
party maintain its current policies, as stated in the Oral Law and the party’s 
manifesto.
27 Israel, according to Eban, should maintain the current ‘temporary’ 
situation because that would leave all of the diplomatic options open. Eban argued 
that, when Israel came to sign a peace agreement, the accord should be based on the 
establishment of proper relations between Israel and its neighbours, and on substantial 
territorial changes that would guarantee Israel’s long-term security needs.
28   
 
In contrast to Eban, Dayan remarked that, after six years of controlling the territories, 
it was time for the party to decide ‘what we should and should not do’. Dayan argued 
that there was no ‘objective need’ to tie Israel’s policies in the territories with the 
issue of Israel’s future borders.
29 On the matter of settlements, Dayan stated that 
Israel would not withdraw from areas it was now settling, even though he conceded 
that none of the settlements served any security purpose. Furthermore, Dayan asserted 
that there was a difference between borders or areas that served a ‘military-security’ 
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  194purpose and those that served a ‘diplomatic-security’ purpose. He elaborated that the 
latter was more desirable and if Israel was in a position to achieve real peace then it 
would most probably have to relinquish some of the areas it was currently holding.
30  
  
He disagreed with the assertions that Israel should only establish settlements for 
security purposes (Mapam’s position) or only in areas it planned to keep (the Allon 
Plan). Israel, according to Dayan, should expand and strengthen its settlement activity 
in the territories; he proposed establishing industrial centres as well as new 
agricultural, urban and civilian settlements. Furthermore, he proposed regulating the 
Israeli Land Authority (ILA) to allow corporate entities and private individuals to 
purchase land in the territories.
31  
 
Dayan scoffed at Sapir’s claim that ‘there is no difference between a formal decision 
on annexation and annexation that was not decided upon, but creeps upon us.’ Dayan 
claimed that Israel was not engaged in a slow and gradual annexation of the 
territories. Moreover, he made it clear that he was against annexation, claiming he 
would rather withdraw from the territories than accept the Palestinian population as 
Israeli citizens. However, he admitted to be uncertain with regards to the Golan 
Heights; he spoke about providing the Druze population with Israeli citizenship if it 
requested it.
32 
 
Dayan agreed that no formal decision was needed over the issue of the final borders 
but, taking into account the amount of time that had already passed, the party needed 
to define its future relationship with the territories. He contended that Israelis and 
Palestinians could live together under the military administration and that Ben-Aharon 
and Eliav were wrong to suggest that ‘what is west of the Green Line is Israel and 
what is east of it is Palestine’.
33 Dayan was basing his statement, to an extent, on the 
IDF’s assessments regarding the Occupied Territories. The IDF’s coordinator of 
activities in the Occupied Territories General Shlomo Gazit described Israel’s 
relationship with the occupied population in the economic, social and political spheres 
as ‘outstanding’; he attributed the situation to the trust-building measures and 
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  195activities to restore confidence by the military administration and to the lack of 
foreign pressure on Israel.
34 Arguably, it was this lack of foreign pressure and the 
relative ease by which Israel administered the territories, which provided Israel with 
little incentive to adopt controversial long-term policies.  
 
Taking the middle ground between Allon and Dayan, Galili explained that the party 
had a ‘pragmatic and practical’ policy but that it had not yet defined its long-term 
strategic-territorial aims nor did it agree on ‘our final map’.
35 Galili rejected the call 
for a Palestinian state, arguing that the ‘Palestinians’ right to self determinate is a ploy 
for the real diplomatic purpose of establishing a Palestinian state over the ruins of 
Israel.’
36 The future of the West Bank, according to Galili, was within a Jordanian 
framework based on significant changes to the pre-war borders. However, ‘in the 
absence of peace, we do not withdraw nor do we leave a void; instead, we create 
settlements.’ Galili maintained that Israel’s policy in the West Bank should be defined 
by what ‘is good and necessary for Israel’, taking into account the needs of the local 
population. He defined the main points of this approach: ‘continuation of the 
settlement activities in the territories’, ‘continuation of the Open Bridges policy’, the 
establishment of an ‘enlightened administration’ in the territories, the need to 
‘regulate the employment of workers from the territories in Israel’ and for the local 
population ‘to live their lives without foreign intervention’. Referring to the 
demographic problem, Galili asked ‘what would be a bigger threat, the population 
living under an enemy Arab leader or under Israel’s control’?
37 Galili’s comments 
must be understood in relation to the relative ease by which Israel controlled the 
Occupied Territories. 
 
Galili expanded on how he saw the final settlement. He proposed that Israel should 
take over the Gaza Strip and that the large population areas of the West Bank be 
handed over to Jordan ‘similarly to what was suggested in the Allon Plan’. Galili 
called for the continuation and expansion of the settlement activities in those areas 
that Israel intended to retain after a peace agreement. Galili made it clear that the 
West Bank would be demilitarised and that its population would enjoy ‘some of their 
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  196rights from Jordan and some from Israel’.
38 On the one hand, Galili called on the 
party not to make unilateral decisions that would block the chances for peace, while, 
on the other hand, he called for the continuation of the settlements activity and the 
‘enlightened occupation’.
39 The proposed solution, as suggested by Galili, appeared to 
be an amalgamation of the Allon Plan with parts of Dayan’s Functional Solution. 
Galili maintained that there was no need to revise the party’s chapters regarding the 
territories; nothing had happened that would justify that. For Galili, the time for peace 
had not yet arrived and there was no need to make any decisions: ‘This was not the 
hour to decide’.
40 
 
The last speaker, in the Grand Debate, was Prime Minister Meir. Meir tried to diffuse 
the argument by stating that, as there was no sign of a ‘real chance for peace’, there 
was no need to make firm decisions at that moment.
41 ‘When the time comes’ she 
claimed, the party would need to either reject or support the proposals that would be 
put in front of it. She admitted that she had a map of her own which, she claimed, 
would provide Israel with secure borders, and that there were territories from which 
she would not withdraw, but that at that moment it was nothing more than an 
academic exercise.
42 Meir made clear her opinion that the territories were neither an 
obstacle for peace nor a recipe for war. She reminded party members that in 1957 
Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, and from the Sinai Peninsula, ‘an act that did not 
lead to peace’, while in 1967 Israel did not hold any territories and yet war broke out: 
‘We want to be here while they [the Arabs] do not want us to be here’.
43  
 
Meir claimed (untruthfully) to have never met with Hussein, although she expressed 
her desire to do so; she stated ‘I would have loved to meet him’ but ‘unfortunately, he 
did not want to meet’. She clarified that it was not for her to determine whether the 
Palestinians were a nation or not, but that between Israel and Jordan there was place 
for only two states, ‘not three’. She added that Israel would never enter into 
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  197negotiations with the heads of the terrorist organisations that aimed ‘to destroy 
Israel’.
44 
 
Striving to preserve party unity, Meir questioned the need to make difficult and far-
reaching decisions: ‘If I am allowed to voice my opinion, there is no need to make 
decisions or reach conclusions’.
45 Unsurprisingly, the Grand Debate ended without 
any decisions being taken, conclusions being reached or resolutions voted on. Despite 
the debate lasting for over 80 hours, being held over eight sessions and showcasing 80 
speakers, the party could not even agree on a concluding statement. Unable to heal the 
growing rift between its elites, the party, rather than risk a possible split in its ranks, 
preferred not to decide.  
 
 
The Galili Document  
 
On the 8th of April 1973, and in preparation for the upcoming elections, Dayan, 
unhappy with the indecisiveness shown by the Labour Party and the government, on 
the territorial issue, presented Meir with a ten-point plan titled ‘The policy in the 
territories in the next four years’. In his plan, Dayan called for: 
 
1.  An increase in resources for development and infrastructure in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank. 
2.  The expansion of Jerusalem’s urban and industrial areas to the north, south 
and east, beyond the Green Line. 
3.  The development of Yamit as a regional-industrial centre for the Rafah Plains, 
and the construction of a deep-sea port south of Gaza. 
4.  The establishment of an industrial centre in the Qalqilya-Tulkarm area. 
5.  The creation of an urban-industrial centre in the Golan Heights. 
6.  The establishment of new settlements in accordance with proposals made by 
the Settlement Department. 
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  1987.  Israel’s priorities in the territories to be re-examined with the aim of 
‘strengthening urban population, village settlements, and establishing 
industrial enterprises in them’. 
8.  Private Jewish businessmen to establish industrial enterprises in the territories. 
9.  Israel’s Lands Authority (ILA) to acquire lands in the territories with the aim 
of making them available for settlements, public and private enterprises and 
‘land exchanges’.  
10. The regulation of the ILA to allow for the acquisition of land by companies 
and individuals within the political and security concepts.
 46 
 
Dayan’s radical ideas generated controversy and hostility among government 
ministers and his plan was rejected by a small majority. Ministers rejected Dayan’s 
proposals because, for the first time, he put forward elements of his Functional 
Solution which clearly contrasted with the Allon Plan. The majority of ministers 
(including Meir) were deeply concerned that these proposals would close the door on 
the possibility of achieving a territorial settlement. It is important to note that several 
of Dayan’s proposals, such as the establishment of a regional centre in the Golan 
Heights, were ‘within the government’s consensus’.
47 Despite the rejection of his 
proposals by the government, Dayan did not relinquish his drive to influence Israel’s 
territorial policy. On the 23
rd of July, he declared that, due to the Labour Party’s 
present territorial policy, he will have to reconsider his position within it,
48 especially 
after the party mirrored the government’s decision and rejected his proposals.
49 
Dayan requested that the party reconsider his ten-point plan as the basis for its 
electoral platform. He made it clear that his participation in the elections, as part of 
the Labour Party, was conditional on the adoption of his document.
50 Unwilling to 
risk a defection by the Rafi faction to the opposition, so close to the elections, and 
taking into account Dayan’s electoral appeal, Meir entrusted Galili with the 
responsibility for drafting a compromise document that would be accepted by Dayan 
and the party.
51 The Galili Document, as it became known, eroded most of Dayan’s 
proposals but did not reject them out of hand. In fact, Galili, with a clever use of 
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  199elaborate phrasing, managed to produce a document that met most of Dayan’s 
demands while being in accordance with the government’s and the party’s existing 
decisions i.e. the Allon Plan and the Oral Law.
52  
                                                
 
Party Chairman Yadlin opened the party’s secretariat debate on the Galili Document, 
by commenting that there was no need for the party to talk about ‘winners and losers’, 
since, on this particular occasion, ‘the party as a whole won by adopting the 
document’.
53 After a brief introduction by Yadlin, Galili proceeded to explain the 
document’s main points. Galili made it clear that the document, if agreed upon, would 
represent the party’s territorial policies ‘for the next four years’. Galili contradicted 
himself when he explained that the document did not correspond to any real change in 
the government’s policies, while arguing that it was a more comprehensive and 
substantial plan. He claimed that the document guaranteed Israel’s security needs and 
it addressed the core issues.
54  
 
On the matter of settlements, Galili explained that all new settlements were to be 
established according to government decisions: ‘We have a system according to 
which we shall operate in the future’. The Galili Document referred to the idea of 
strengthening and expanding the existing settlements programme within the 
parameters already established by the government. Galili went on to say that, within 
those parameters, and subject to government regulations, there will be some scope for 
non-governmental bodies as well as private individuals to take part in the 
establishment and developing of new settlements. This last point was an attempt to 
address one of Dayan’s core demands without rejecting it.
55 With regards to Dayan’s 
proposal to establish a regional centre in the Rafah Plains (Yamit), Galili claimed 
‘there could be no mistake when it comes to the government’s position with regards to 
the settlement and development of the Rafah Plains.’ According to him, the 
government intended to expand the existing settlements and establish an urban centre 
by 1977. Galili clarified that the government had agreed in principle to establish a 
deep-sea port in the area for economic as well as political-military reasons. However, 
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  200he claimed that the final decision on the matter may take two to three years.
56 Galili 
stated that ‘Israel’s Land Authority will be directed by the government to purchase 
every land necessary for settlement, development, housing and industrial purposes.’ 
However, this will be undertaken only in areas identified by the government and in 
accordance with its policies. Galili declared that the party was united on the issue of 
settlements and that even Mapam (as part of the Alignment) agreed with the 
settlement programme in certain areas such as the Golan Heights, Sharm El-Sheikh 
and Gush-Etzion.
57  
 
The Galili Document gained a near-unanimous approval, with only Aliev refusing to 
vote for it. Aliev declared that the document ‘stood against all that I understand to be 
the values of the Labour movement’ and that it gave credence ‘to the strangulation of 
Zionism’! Aliev made it clear that he ‘would never, under any circumstances and in 
any forum vote for such a document’.
58 In contrast, Allon, and many other prominent 
Labour leaders, claimed the document did not fundamentally change the party’s 
existing policies. As part of the Alignment but not the Labour Party, Mapam did not 
partake in the debate. Nonetheless, Mapam stated that it did not agree with the Labour 
Party on this matter, and that it ‘regretted’ the adoption of the Galili Document. 
Furthermore, Mapam claimed its members would vote against the adoption of the 
document as the electoral platform of the ‘Alignment’.
59 The near-unanimous 
approval of the document proved that Dayan and his supporters, despite being a 
minority in the party, yielded ‘greater actual power’ and were able to influence the 
party’s policies in their favour. Dayan, through ‘implicit threats’ and intimidation, 
was able to ‘constrain’ the power of the moderates and overcome their ‘numerical 
superiority’ in the party.
60  
 
The Galili Document was a patched up solution approved by the party in order to 
avoid adopting the more radical proposals of Dayan.
61 Nevertheless, some of the 
proposals in the Galili Document did represent a clear change to the party’s position. 
While not containing Dayan’s proposal to expand the urban and industrial 
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  201development of Jerusalem to the north (into Samaria), the document did propose 
expanding it to the south and east, beyond its municipal boundaries. Additionally, the 
document adopted Dayan’s proposal for developing an industrial area in the Qalqilya-
Tulkarm area
62  - extending, in this regard, the scope of the Allon Plan. Indeed, 
Lochery points out that the document ‘satisfied most of Dayan’s demands and was 
considered extremely hawkish as well as accelerating the settlement programme.’
63 
Nonetheless, he states that ‘The Galili Document, although endorsed by the party 
institutions, was never binding on members of the Labour Party.’
64  
 
On the 5
th of October, Kissinger asked Eban, during their meeting, ‘why was this 
document necessary?’ Kissinger claimed it only affirmed, in the eyes of the Arabs, 
that Israel was content with the current status quo in the territories. Eban explained 
that the Galili Document did not represent a change in the Labour Party’s or the 
government’s policies, to which Kissinger replied – ironically - that he was certain 
that ‘with your great intellectual prowess you would be able to prove what you say’.
65   
 
 
The Yom Kippur War 
 
The Galili Document was based on a scenario in which war was an unlikely event and 
Sadat’s actions (such as ordering the departure of all Soviet military personnel out of 
Egypt in the summer of 1972) gave no immediate indication of an impending war. 
But, by not providing Sadat with a diplomatic recourse, Israel had made the war a 
certainty. It is not the purpose of this research to deal directly with the narrative of the 
Yom Kippur War. This research will, however, focus on those aspects of the war that 
relate to Israel’s territorial policy: the ‘Concept’; Israel’s tactical decisions during the 
war regarding the territories; and the changes that occurred in Israel’s relationship 
with the US as a result of this war.  
 
The ‘Concept’ is the term used to describe AMAN’s, and the political leadership’s, 
guiding assumption about Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours in the pre-war 
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  202period. It was assumed that Israel’s military might, in conjunction with the military 
and political support it received from the US, was sufficient to deter any Arab attack 
against it. The Arab states, it was assumed, would have to come to terms with Israel’s 
demands for new borders.
66 The assumptions and predictions made by the AMAN 
and the political echelons were based, to a large extent, on this ‘Concept’. As 
mentioned earlier, matters of national security and foreign policy were dealt with 
mainly by a small and informal group of ministers (the Kitchenette) which included 
Meir, Dayan and Galili as well as (depending on the occasion) Allon, Haim Bar-Lev 
(the Industry Minister and former Chief of Staff) and Ya’akov Shimshon Shapira 
(Justice Minister). This group of decision-makers, in particular Meir, Dayan and 
Galili, operated in relative isolation and exhibited qualities such as ‘self-righteousness 
and self-assurance’ (in taking the right course of action), in short they engaged in 
what is referred to as ‘group think’.
67 This is why Israel’s leaders, trapped in their 
own ‘Concept’, were in no rush to conclude negotiations with either Egypt or Jordan 
and, more pertinent to this thesis, were in no rush to define Israel’s long-term 
territorial policy. The belief that time was on their side, and that the Arab states would 
eventually come around to accept Israel’s position,
68 proved to be mistaken. Israel’s 
leaders were well aware of the possibility of signing a peace agreement- or at least an 
interim agreement- with Egypt, based on full withdrawal to the pre-war borders. 
However, held captive by their own convictions, they chose to overlook these 
possibilities. On the 3
rd of April 1973, Eban briefed the Knesset Foreign Affairs & 
Security Committee that Egypt had reiterated its call for an interim agreement. 
Moreover, he acknowledged that Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement based 
on an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders.
69  
 
Israel’s wrong assumptions and predictions, which were based on the ‘Concept’, led 
to the rejection of several potential Arab proposals regarding the Occupied Territories 
(such as Sadat’s Interim Agreement Proposal and Hussein’s Federal Plan), but also to 
a situation in which its leaders were able to avoid taking decisions on the Allon Plan 
and the Functional Solution. It is clear that the Kitchenette in general and Meir in 
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  203particular adopted ‘objectionist’ and ‘obstructionist’ attitudes towards these and other 
suggestions regarding the Occupied Territories.
70 Meir’s dominance was such, that 
even in those instances where members of the Kitchenette were in favour of a 
particular Arab proposal (e.g. Dayan and the interim agreement) they were unwilling 
to challenge her. This attitude would come back to haunt the government; in the 
aftermath of the ‘Yom Kippur War’ Meir admitted that, at the time, she did not 
understand the logic behind Dayan’s interim agreement proposal.
71 Blinded by their 
‘Concept’, Israel’s leaders were in no hurry to find a long-term solution to the 
Occupied Territories, believing that Egypt and Jordan would eventually come to 
accept Israel’s need for secure borders. 
 
The majority of assumptions held by Israel’s decision-makers regarding the territories 
were proved wrong. They assumed that, in the unlikely event that the Egyptian army 
tried to cross the canal, the Bar-Lev line would be sufficient to hold it back long 
enough for Israeli forces “to move up and destroy it”.
72 In reality, the Bar-Lev line - 
from which Meir refused to withdraw during the negotiations for the ‘interim 
agreement’ - proved not to be an obstacle for the crossing army. It was widely 
believed that it was essential for Israel to control Sharm El-Sheikh,
73 in order to 
ensure free passage through the Straits of Tiran.
74 This, however, did not prevent the 
Egyptian forces from blocking the straits further south at Bab El-Mandab.
75 This last 
point was put to Dayan in a closed Labour Party meeting after the war.
76 
Additionally, the perceived wisdom that settlements contributed to Israel’s national 
security proved to be misplaced. Israel was required to evacuate its settlements in the 
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula during the war, dispelling the notion that they 
served a security purpose. Interestingly, the claim that settlements did not contribute 
to Israel’s security had been one of the main criticisms against the Allon Plan.  
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  204It can be argued that only with regard to the notion of strategic depth were Israel’s 
military concepts correct. This, of course, is based on the assumption that Egypt’s and 
Syria’s war efforts were not based exclusively on retrieving those territories that 
supposedly contributed to Israel’s strategic depth. Sadat’s limited war plan and his 
army’s limited capability of fighting outside the range of its SAM-3 anti-aircraft-
missile batteries are a testimony to that. It is also questionable whether the Syrian 
forces would have invaded the Upper Galilee region had they managed to secure the 
Golan Heights.  This is not to say that both armies would not have expanded the 
fighting theatre had their initial successes been left unchecked. 
 
Militarily, Israel had managed to secure a resounding victory despite being caught off 
guard. In addition, the decision to counter-attack in the Golan Heights and advance 
into Syria, in order to balance the possible loss of territories in the Sinai Peninsula and 
bring about the rapid collapse of the Syrian army,
77 left Israel in possession of 
additional territories. On the Sinai front, the Egyptian forces managed to secure 
several bridgeheads on the first days of the war and transport considerable amount of 
forces to the eastern side. Sadat was adamant on holding parts of the eastern bank at 
all costs. The war thus became one of attrition along the canal until Israel managed to 
cross it and surround the Egyptian forces. By the time the ceasefire was negotiated, on 
the 23
rd of October, Israel’s forces not only encircled the main Egyptian force along 
the canal, but they were also on the outskirts of Suez City and on their way towards 
Cairo. The outcome of the war was a resounding military victory for Israel, while 
providing Sadat with a much needed diplomatic coup - his forces were on the east part 
of the canal. 
 
More than anything else, the war and its aftermath exposed the degree to which Israel 
became reliant on American financial and military support. During the war, the US 
provided Israel with 22,000 tons of military equipment, one-and-a-half times the 
combined Soviet military aid to Egypt and Syria.
78 In the aftermath of the war Israel’s 
military and financial dependence on the US only increased. To illustrate this last 
point, the military support provided to Israel by the American administration, in the 
period leading up to the war averaged $400 million a year; this sum grew to $1.5 
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  205billion a year during the years 1974-1975 - ‘fully 42% of Israel’s defence spending’.
79 
This unhealthy state of dependency was not lost on the American administration. It 
became apparent to the Americans, in particular to Kissinger, that they could turn this 
situation to their advantage by bringing Egypt, as well as Jordan, to the negotiating 
table in the full knowledge that they could secure Israeli territorial concessions.
80 
 
 
The Fourteen-Point Document  
 
The Yom Kippur War had a ‘traumatic effect on the Labour Party and throughout 
Israeli society, leading to a crisis of confidence in both the leadership and the party as 
a whole.’
81 The months following the war were characterised by ‘shock and 
recrimination’;
82 the deep sense of public anger and frustration were channelled 
through protest movements, which were initially composed of army reservists 
returning from the battlefield. The public, which seemed to want an outlet to sound its 
disappointment and frustration with the leadership, accused the politicians of letting 
down the entire nation and demanded their resignation. Dayan - more than any other 
leader - was held directly responsible for the failures of the war.
83 The protest 
movements’ demands that those responsible for the ‘Mehdal’ (the blunder) be brought 
to justice led to the establishment of an investigative committee headed by Shimon 
Agranat (the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court). The committee, established in 
November 1973, would publish its first report in April 1974- four months after the 
elections took place.    
 
The growing public resentment at its leadership was not the only obstacle faced by the 
Labour Party in the run up to the 1973 elections. The war had provided discontented 
members of the party with an opportunity to speak out against policies, in particular 
those relating to the Occupied Territories, with which they did not agree and a 
leadership they no longer supported. Dayan and the Galili Document were held as 
symbols of a party that had lost its way. For the first time since the Lavon Affair, 
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  206senior party members were openly challenged and asked to resign. On the 25
th of 
October, Ya’akov Shapira called for the resignation of Dayan, blaming him for 
Israel’s ‘lack of preparedness’ at the outbreak of the war; Shapira later resigned 
following Meir’s decision to support Dayan.
84 Shapira expressed his frustration at the 
hard-line policies adopted towards the Occupied Territories. He blamed the party’s 
leadership for making promises to promote territorial concessions while, in practice, 
hoping that the territories, ‘if not all of them, than at least a large portion of them’ 
would be ‘annexed, or integrated, or united with the state of Israel’.
85 A group 
comprising former army officers, and headed by the mayor of Hertzelia Joseph Nevo, 
spoke for many in the party, in particular its grass roots, when they called for the 
party’s political and military policies to be revised. Nevo referred to the Galili 
Document as ‘irrelevant’, and asked whether it was possible ‘to go to elections with 
the present leadership and policy’.
86   
 
The simmering feeling of discontent in the party finally erupted, on the 5
th of 
December, during the Central Committee’s vote on a new electoral platform - referred 
to as the ‘Fourteen-Point Document’. One after another, senior members of Mapai, as 
well as several from Ahdut-Ha’avoda, expressed their support for the new document 
while retracting their support from the Galili Document, claiming they had voted for it 
only to prevent a split in the party. Haim Tzadok (Chairman of the KFDC), claimed 
that the Yom Kippur War made it clear that the Galili Document was based on 
political misconceptions.
87 Allon reminded party members that the Galili document 
was adopted in order to ‘save’ the party from a more radical document ‘which party 
member Moshe Dayan tried to force upon it’. Allon asserted that the document was 
not relevant to Israel’s needs at the time it was voted on, and is ‘probably irrelevant to 
our current situation’.
88 Some party members, however, presented a different 
viewpoint. Rahel Yanait Ben-Tzvi, the widow of former Israeli President Yitzhak 
Ben-Tzvi and prominent Mapai member - who was associated with New Zionism and 
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  207the Land of Israel Movement - criticised the party for its willingness to give away the 
territories.
89  
 
The new platform, which was drafted by Eban, was an attempt to ‘negate the 
concessions made to Dayan in the Galili Document’ and to redress the balance of 
power within the party, in the aftermath of the war.
90 In this respect, the new 
document represented a clear shift away from Dayan’s policies towards the Occupied 
Territories, as advocated in the Galili Document. The Fourteen-Point Document did 
not - with the exception of Jerusalem - mention any particular area as being 
‘indispensable to Israel’.
91 Additionally, it refrained from mentioning any of the urban 
and industrial centres, which had been planned to be built in the territories, and which 
had been agreed in the Galili Document. For the first time, a document drafted by 
Israeli decision makers discussed the rights of the Palestinians, and in that sense, 
broke new ground.
92 Moreover, the document clearly indicated that Israel was ready 
to offer territorial concessions, though not a return to the 1967 borders, in exchange 
for peace. Additionally, and as mentioned by Allon, the new document at least 
mentioned the Palestinian problem and tried to address it.
93 Nevertheless, the new 
document did not define Israel’s long-term territorial policy.  
 
The Fourteen-Point Document stated, among other things, that: 
 
  Israel would strive towards peace agreements based on territorial compromises 
that would provide it with secure borders.  
  Israel would not return to the pre-war borders. 
  ‘The Jewish nature of the state of Israel’ must be protected, in any future 
peace agreement, ‘in order for it to fulfil its Zionist destiny’. 
  Israel would strive to achieve a peace agreement with Jordan based on the 
concept of two independent states.  
  Israel rejected the notion of a Palestinian state separate from Jordan in the 
West Bank. 
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  208  The rights of the Palestinians to self-determination could only occur within a 
Jordanian-Palestinian state.  
  With regards to the settlements: Israel would continue to establish and expand 
settlements, according to the decisions that would be made by the government 
‘from time to time’, with particular emphasis on Israel’s security needs.
94  
 
At the end of a particularly fiery session, calls were made - most notably by Aliev - 
for the party to revoke the Galili Document. Sapir, fearing the rejection of the 
document would create a terminal schism within the party, and unwilling to challenge 
Meir, claimed there was no need to revoke the document. Instead, he decided to leave 
the party with two contradictory documents, and requested Aliev not to call for a vote 
on the Galili document.
95 Dayan interpreted the move as neither the sanctioning of the 
new document nor the revoking of the Galili Document.
96 Meir demanded a vote and 
accused Sapir of not solving the party’s problems with his actions, but making things 
worse. Yadlin, instructed by Sapir to find a bureaucratic loophole, stated that a vote 
was unnecessary, as the party’s secretariat decision (the Galili Document) could not 
be changed by the Central Committee (the Fourteen-Point Document).
97 Meir, 
desperate to cement her position within the party, and clearly upset with Sapir’s 
decision, requested a vote of confidence in her candidacy. Despite requests for a 
secret ballot, Yadlin decided to have a vote by a show of hands; in the end, 291 voted 
in favour, 33 opposed and 17 abstained.
98 However, the vote was anything but a vote 
of confidence as half of the 615 members left the meeting before the vote was taken, 
arguably because of the late hour.
99 The party had once again reluctantly decided not 
to decide, choosing unity over policy. 
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  209The 1973 Elections 
 
The 1973 elections were held on the 31
st of December, which was later than for 
scheduled because of the Yom Kippur War. The elections were unique in there being 
two electoral campaigns: a pre-war campaign in which domestic issues dominated the 
agenda, and a post-war campaign that focused on peace and security.
100 The 
participation rate - the second-lowest in Israeli history (75.1%)
101 - reflected the fact 
that the elections were held with the public being in a state of shock, and with many 
reservists still on duty. The Labour Party, despite the fact that it was headed by Meir 
and Dayan, managed to retain its status as Israel’s dominant party, albeit with its 
lowest ever share of the votes. 
 
On the political Right, through a series of unifying processes, a new force emerged: 
the Likud. The party comprised of Begin’s Gahal, the State List (Ben-Gurion’s former 
party), the Free Centre and the Land Of Israel Movement (which included former 
Labour Party members associated with New Zionism). The Likud won 39 seats, while 
the Labour Party gained 51 - losing 10 seats over the previous two elections. These 
results reflected a general shift to the right and indicated a change in Israel’s political 
system from a dominant-party system to a two-party system.
102 Labour’s loss of seats 
forced the party to form a government with a nominal majority of two seats - the 
smallest majority it had ever held.  
 
In addition to its weak parliamentarian base, the new government was further 
constrained in its ability to formulate policies in regard to the Occupied Territories by 
two important developments: the effect of generational and ideological change within 
the National Religious Party on the dynamics of the Coalition, and Israel’s growing 
military and diplomatic dependency on the US. The NRP had been Mapai’s, and 
subsequently the Labour Party’s, preferred coalition partner due to its size and polity, 
i.e. a medium-size moderate religious party with middle-of-the-road views on foreign 
affairs and security matters. As a result of the changes the NRP underwent, and 
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  210influenced by New Zionism, its new leadership demanded, as a minimum requirement 
for joining a Labour-led Coalition a firm commitment from the Labour Party that 
there would be no withdrawal from the West Bank.
103 Meir, after a lengthy 
negotiation period, and in order to secure a working majority, made a specific pledge 
to the NRP that the government would put any agreement with Jordan, which was 
based on a territorial compromise in the West Bank, to new general elections.
104 In 
reality, this pledge and the additional ministerial seats procured by the NRP 
represented a clear change in the balance of power within the ruling coalition and in 
the government’s approach towards the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, this 
represented the first incident in which the Labour Party’s territorial policy was, 
indirectly, constrained by the rise of New Zionism.  
 
The elections were held against a backdrop of ‘unprecedented’ American involvement 
in the region in an effort to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
105 Kissinger, 
who had taken over as Secretary of State brought with him new diplomatic methods, 
i.e. the step-by-step and shuttle diplomacy. Moreover, Kissinger, with the full backing 
of Nixon, chose not to link ‘diplomatic steps’ with the final outcome of the 
negotiations - leaving this to the parties. The American involvement and Kissinger’s 
new approach yielded early dividends. Kissinger, under the cover of an international 
peace conference, set the stage for direct talks between Israel and Egypt. These talks 
culminated in a disengagement agreement signed on the 18
th of January 1974. The 
agreement proved to be similar in nature to Dayan’s interim agreement proposal, with 
its success highlighting Kissinger’s new approach and the magnitude of the American 
administration’s previous diplomatic failures.  
 
 
Meir’s Meetings with Hussein 
 
Throughout 1972 and 1973, and in particular after Hussein unveiled his Federal Plan, 
Israel and Jordan held frequent meetings, which did not bring the sides any closer to 
signing a peace agreement. Jordan had hoped, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur 
War to be rewarded for its neutrality and diplomatic stance: King Hussein had 
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  211personally warned Israel of the impending surprise attack. Yet, lingering doubts 
persisted in the Jordanian side regarding Israel’s willingness to negotiate and the real 
purpose of the international peace conference organised by the Americans. The 
conference, they believed, was a cover for ongoing American efforts to reach a 
separate agreement between Egypt and Israel.
106 In order not to be left out of the 
diplomatic process and keen to reach an agreement with Israel, Hussein and his Prime 
Minister Zaid Rifai met with Meir and Dayan. The meeting (held on the 26
th of 
January 1974) revolved around Jordan’s proposal for a parallel disengagement 
process - similar to the one advocated by Kissinger between Israel and Egypt - and the 
return of Jordanian civil administration to those areas vacated by Israel.
107  
 
Hussein warned Meir that Israel would be left to negotiate with the PLO, if it failed to 
reach an agreement with Jordan. Rifai explained that Jordan was taking a risk by 
trying to secure a peace agreement with Israel. Instead, it could just ‘disassociate’ 
itself from the process and support the PLO, which had received the backing of most 
Arab states as the sole representative of the Palestinian people;
108 this, he added, 
would ‘please the Arabs and get everyone off our backs’.
109 Meir challenged the 
Jordanian assertion that the Palestinians would come to view the PLO as their 
representatives. Hussein replied that they might not do so at present, but if Jordan 
disengaged from the West Bank ‘it will not be Israel that they will look to’. Meir 
agreed that they must ‘use our imagination’ to find ways to allow for closer 
engagement between Jordan and the West Bank.
110  
 
Rifai proposed a step-by-step disengagement, or a partial withdrawal process, that 
would be negotiated ‘as we went along’. The Jordanian proposal called on Israel to 
withdraw parallel to the Jordan River; this, according to Rifai, would include the 
dismantling of Israel’s settlements and military positions along the river and the 
repositioning of Jordanian civil administration in the area. According to Rifai, this 
plan would ‘put an end to any possibility of the theory of a Palestinian state’.
111 
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  212Dayan, after questioning Rifai’s plan, inquired ‘if we asked for the proposal for the 
real and sincere and final peace settlement, what would it be?’
112 Rifai suggested two 
kinds of agreements: a contractual peace agreement based on the pre-war borders with 
some ‘rectifications’ and including Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem ‘but with a 
new status to it’; or another agreement based on phases, where the line ‘can vary from 
month to month’ without a need for contractual agreement and based on a de-facto 
peace. Meir questioned whether the second suggestion would eventually lead to ‘the 
reestablishment of the 4
th-of-June Line’, to which Rifai answered: yes!
113  
 
Unhappy with Rifai’s suggestions, Meir proposed the Allon Plan as a framework for 
the disengagement process - one that would be implemented initially only at the 
Jericho area. She explained that even this would be difficult for her to implement, as 
she was in the midst of coalition negotiations, which might lead to new elections. 
Dayan, expounding on the idea, suggested that ‘the Allon Plan or something like that’ 
would be the maximum the Labour Party could agree to, if it hoped to win a new 
election.
114 The plan suggested by Meir and Dayan was similar to an earlier plan 
proposed by Allon (in October 1970) which they rejected. However, it is reasonable 
to believe that, even if Hussein had accepted the basic tenets of the Allon Plan, the 
government - because of the NRP, the internal division within the Labour Party and 
its weak parliamentary base - would not have been able to approve the agreement. 
 
Dayan - questioning the need to evacuate settlements and army strongholds along the 
Jordan River - asked whether Jordan could envision a situation in which Israel 
maintained its military positions in the West Bank. Meir quickly added that Israel 
would be willing to lease the land for the military bases. Rifai tried to convince the 
Israeli duo that, with its forces situated along the mountain ranges, Israel would, even 
after a partial disengagement, still dominate the West Bank militarily. He suggested 
that Jordan might be able to agree to some limited military presence, but what was 
important was the purpose behind Israel’s need for it.
115 Hussein added that he could 
live with an Israeli radar position, or something of that sort, on some hill tops: ‘In a 
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  213state of peace, this is something we can live with’.
116 Rifai articulated Jordan’s 
position: ‘If Israel wants territory, expansion, corridor here and corridor there and 
positions and settlements, and take the meat and get rid of the bones …’ then ‘it are 
impossible for His Majesty and for us to accept any settlement on those lines’. He 
explained that if Israel did not withdraw, it would eventually be stuck with Arafat.
117 
 
Dayan suggested that Israel withdraw from the Jericho area, which would provide 
Jordan with a corridor into the West Bank, to which Rifai asked, ‘What is your hang-
up on the river itself. It isn’t much of a barrier, you know’. Rifai proceeded to explain 
that he did not see ‘any great cost to Israel if it withdraws 5 or 10 or 15km from the 
Jordan Valley’.
118 Hussein, unable to understand Dayan’s fixation with the river, 
asked whether Israel had in fact any military bases there to which Dayan replied, 
‘Very, very close to it’.
119 In fact, Israel had established its military bases in 
accordance with Dayan’s plan on the mountain ranges. Meir suggested allowing 
Jordanian civil administration to be exercised over some of the West Bank population 
centres. Hussein and Rifai agreed, provided that it was linked to the first stage of the 
disengagement process. Both refused to ‘be sucked’ into a plan that had all the 
hallmarks of the Allon Plan. Meir tried to explain that she could not go to the 
government or the Knesset and suggest a disengagement plan, when both sides were 
not engaged in any fighting: ‘People would laugh at me’. Rifai, in a jovial manner, 
asked Meir, ‘Must we go to war in order to be taken seriously? Do you want us to 
fight so that you can withdraw’?
120 Towards the end of the meeting Dayan once again 
brought up the Allon Plan, explaining that it was the least to which Israel could agree. 
Rifai explained that Jordan would not consider the Allon Plan:  
 
…if we are going to start playing with the West Bank and we give you one part of the 
valley and we keep this here and this here, and fortifications and you have a corridor. 
We would much rather, honestly, have you keep the whole lot. And there won’t be 
any peace, there won’t be any settlement.
121 
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  214The meeting with Hussein summed up Meir’s approach towards the Occupied 
Territories in general, and the West Bank in particular. After five years in power, 
Meir was unable to articulate Israel’s preferred long-term approach towards the 
Occupied Territories. While Hussein appeared to acknowledge and address Israeli 
concerns, Meir and Dayan were fixated on a plan which they had never approved and 
which they knew Hussein could not accept. In fact, throughout his period in office, 
Dayan, with Meir’s knowledge, worked towards the establishment of a Functional 
Solution. It is interesting to note that, during a KFDC briefing, Meir once claimed to 
favour a Functional Solution over a territorial solution with Jordan.
122 On the one 
hand, Meir and the Kitchenette pursued a Jordanian Approach based on the Allon 
Plan, while, on the other hand, they allowed Dayan to implement his Functional 
Solution, thus undermining Jordan’s position in the West Bank. The Israeli 
government under Meir did not only take a decision not to decide, but it was - by 
design or by default - undermining its own initiatives and plans.  
 
On the 2
nd of April 1974, the Agranat Committee published its provisional report. In 
its report, the committee criticised the conduct of AMAN and called for the dismissal 
of its senior rank. More importantly, the committee held Chief of Staff El’azar 
directly responsible for the Mehdal. However, in a move that provoked widespread 
condemnation, the committee absolved Meir and Dayan of responsibility.
123 On the 
10
th of April, Meir - standing in front of party members, and in response to growing 
criticism and condemnation -
124 announced her resignation, ‘I cannot bear this yoke 
any longer…I have reached the end of the road’.
125 Arguably, the Meir period will 
forever be remembered for the Yom Kippur War. 
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Golda Meir was, with the exception of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s most dominant 
Prime Minister, with her position within the government unparalleled.
126 Meir did not 
only dominate the government, but also the foreign affairs and national security 
decision-making process. Policies were formulated and approved by her and a small 
group of ministers (the Kitchenette) who, on most occasions, either shared her point 
of view or chose not to challenge her. Meir believed that time was on Israel’s side and 
as a consequence felt no pressure to define Israel’s long-term territorial policy. In fact, 
at every juncture, she worked either to postpone or to undermine attempts, by the 
government and the Labour Party, to define Israel’s territorial policy. 
 
Under Meir, the slogans ‘secure and recognised borders’ and ‘negotiations without 
preconditions’ came to epitomise Israel’s diplomatic stance; the government would 
repeat these like a mantra at every opportunity. As argued by Shapira, these empty 
slogans served only to delay and obstruct negotiations and decisions regarding the 
territories. Israel, under Meir, was caught in a predicament. It created facts on the 
ground that corresponded with its perceived ‘secure and recognised borders’, while 
refusing to define its long-term relationship with the territories, out of desire to 
maintain unity and out of fear of closing the door on its diplomatic options.  
 
However, the failure to define Israel’s long-term territorial policy cannot be the sole 
responsibility of Meir. Ministers cannot be absolved of the responsibility they shared; 
time and again, ministers refused to challenge or criticise Meir. Senior ministers, in 
particular Sapir, Eban, Allon and Dayan, deferred to Meir instead of challenging her 
on matters upon which they believed she and the government as a whole were 
wrong.
127 On numerous occasions, they criticised the lack of policy and called on the 
government and the Labour Party to reach a decision. But, when push came to shove, 
they ultimately toed the government’s line, as demonstrated by Dayan’s approach of 
‘If Golda does not support my position, than I do not support my position’. In fact, 
Galili, criticising dissenting party members, stated that decisions relating to the 
territories, ‘even Hebron’, were authorised by the government and backed by the 
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  216Labour Party. He questioned why those who were against those decisions never 
voiced their opinions.
128 
 
At no time did the government, or for that matter the Labour Party, under the 
leadership of Meir, put forward a clear and comprehensive long-term vision of 
Israel’s relationship with the territories. Israel established settlements and industrial 
centres in the Rafah Plains, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights 
without ever agreeing on the political future of these areas. The Oral Law and the 
Galili Document, upon which the government and the Ministerial Settlement 
Committee based many of their decisions, were not blueprints for the government’s 
long-term territorial policy. These documents were born out of ‘haste and 
intimidation’ and owed more to Dayan’s threats of resignation,
129 than to any serious 
attempt at forming a coherent policy. Moreover, within the Labour Party, unity 
became the main political goal and, as such, served as a source of diplomatic and 
political immobilisation.
130 Labour Party officials and government ministers preferred 
not to deal with the long-term strategic questions,
131 choosing instead to adopt a non-
decision in order to maintain party unity. 
 
The sole exception to Israel’s rigid diplomatic stance was its acceptance of Rogers B, 
which came as a result of sustained American pressure. Israel based its diplomatic and 
security stance towards the Occupied Territories on the understanding that the US, or 
for that matter the UN (through Resolution 242), would not require it to withdraw to 
the pre-war borders. However, Israel was made aware, on numerous occasions, that 
the American position, as articulated in Rogers A, was based on only minor changes 
to the pre-war borders. Both sides were well aware of the discrepancies between their 
positions. Kissinger once commented that Israel’s diplomatic approach, in particular 
in regard to its relationship with the US, ‘reflected a basic misunderstanding’.
132 
However, with the exception of Rogers B, the American administration did not apply 
substantial pressure on Israel during the entire Meir period. One could only guess 
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what would have happened had the US put its full weight behind the Israeli-Egyptian 
interim agreement or the Jordanian track.  
 
In conclusion, the government did not have a coherent and comprehensive long-term 
territorial policy during the Meir period; its insistence on ‘secure and recognised 
borders’ was nothing more than a hypothetical exercise at prevaricating. Arguably, it 
was Israel’s rigid diplomatic stance, its exaggerated self-confidence, which was based 
on the ‘Concept’, as well as its unwillingness to define its territorial policy, that led to 
the Yom Kippur War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Rabin Period 
 
Introduction 
 
Israel does not have a foreign policy only a domestic policy.
1 
 
The resignation of Meir was the culmination of a generational transition that had 
started over a decade earlier. The majority of Labour Party veterans that had led the 
state for over a decade, and who were considered as pillars of the political system, 
were gone: Meir, Haim Gvati, Abba Eban, Pinhas Sapir, Ya’akov Shapira and Moshe 
Dayan. Replacing them was a new generation of politicians - Israeli born technocrats 
and military men. In this state of generational flux a new government was established 
headed by Yitzhak Rabin - the youngest and least experienced Prime Minister in 
Israel’s history. This new and relatively inexperienced government faced many 
challenges: maintaining a stable coalition, conducting extensive negotiations with 
Israel’s neighbours, i.e. Syria, Egypt and Jordan, confronting the rise of Palestinian 
nationalism and the PLO as well as dealing with the challenges to the rule of law 
brought about by Gush-Emunim. The need to provide solutions to the ongoing and 
evolving challenges, in particular in regard to the Occupied Territories, required long-
term strategic planning. The Rabin government, however, did not stand up to these 
challenges. It allowed Gush-Emunim to dictate and influence its settlement policies 
and missed an opportunity to distance itself from the vague and failed approaches of 
its predecessor. The government failed to decide upon Israel’s long-term relations 
with the Occupied Territories. Instead, it provided a platform for the expansion of 
settlement activity into areas previously outside of the consensus, i.e. the Allon Plan.  
 
The next two chapters will detail and examine the choices available to and the 
decisions taken by Israel in regard to the Occupied Territories through several case 
studies: Israel’s interim agreements with Egypt and Syria; the Jericho First episode 
and the establishment of Ma’ale Adumim, Ofra and Kadom. It will demonstrate that 
the government, under the weak leadership of Rabin, and constrained by domestic 
factors, in particular the rise of the NRP and Gush-Emunim, as well as by Israel’s 
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  219economic and military needs (supplied by the US), was unable to put forward clear 
and comprehensive policies for the Occupied Territories. Unable to define its long-
term strategic imperatives, it employed an ad-hoc short-term incremental approach to 
decision-making. In short, the government chose, because of its inherent weakness 
and for reasons of self-preservation, not to deal with the strategic long-term 
implications of Israel’s relationship with the territories. 
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The Rabin Government 
 
The collapse of the Meir government left the Labour Party in a difficult situation. Its 
popularity had diminished considerably as a result of the Mehdal and the reputation of 
its veteran politicians was tarnished. In order to fill the leadership vacuum, and 
fearing new elections and a renewed succession battle, the party needed to find a 
compromise candidate behind which it could unite.
2 The party’s main candidate 
Finance Minister Sapir had made it clear that he would not accept the nomination. 
Due to Sapir’s unwillingness, several names were mentioned: Allon, Foreign Minister 
Eban and Transport Minister Shimon Peres - who had the backing of Rafi. Both Eban 
and Allon were informed by Sapir that the party would not support their nomination: 
Eban had no party backing and nominating Allon could have caused Rafi to withdraw 
from the Labour Party. In the absence of a unifying figure, Sapir and Mapai turned to 
Rabin - whom Allon and Ahdut-Ha’avoda agreed to support.
3 Rabin appeared to be 
the perfect candidate - from Sapir and Mapai’s perspective. The reputation of the 
former Chief of Staff, and Ambassador to the US, who had managed to maintain his 
national hero status for his role in the Six Day War, was not tainted by the Mehdal. 
Moreover, Rabin had previously received wide support among the electorate and was 
seen as one of Labour’s most promising politicians. Additionally, Rabin’s lack of a 
party base would force him to rely on Mapai for support. 
 
For the first time in its history, the Labour Party’s central committee put forward two 
candidates: Peres and Rabin. Both had known each other for many years and did not 
share much respect for one another. Peres, during his time as Deputy Defence 
Minister, successfully blocked Rabin’s appointment to become Chief of Staff. He 
viewed Rabin as an unsuitable future Prime Minister because he lacked any political 
experience.
4 Rabin’s attitude towards Peres did not differ by much; he suspected that 
Peres was behind Ben-Gurion’s early decision not to promote him to Chief of Staff. 
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  221Additionally, he resented the fact that Peres was not a military man and, according to 
Rabin, someone who did not serve in the military was not suitable to lead.
5 The 
central committee convened on the 22
nd of April to vote for its new party leader and 
future Prime Minister by a secret ballot. The primary contest was marred by 
allegations, emanating from both camps, regarding both candidates’ character. The 
primaries were won by Rabin, albeit by a small majority of 298 to 254; Rabin’s 
narrow victory put him in a difficult situation within the party. Peres’ strong showing 
in the primaries made him a leading candidate for the Defence Ministry - the second 
most important position in the government. In fact, Rafi threatened to withdraw its 
support for the new government if Peres was not chosen for the coveted position; 
Rabin had initially nominated Allon,
6 and he would later claim that he only 
reluctantly accepted Peres as the new defence minister.
7 In order to placate Allon and 
Ahdut-Ha’avoda, Rabin made him the foreign minister, while deposing Eban, with 
whom Rabin did not have a good working relationship during his term as ambassador 
to the US.
8 This may explain why some of Mapai’s veterans, most notably Eban, 
supported Peres in his battles with Rabin. 
  
Rabin’s first task was to form a coalition government. The NRP - influenced by its 
young guard - decided against joining the government. Thus, the Alignment (the 
Labour Party and Mapam) was forced to settle on a minority government, which 
included the Independent Liberal party (headed by Tourism Minister Moshe Kol) and 
the new Citizen’s Rights Movement (headed by former Labour Party member 
Shulamit Aloni). Holding only 58 seats (in a 120-seat parliament), and needing to rely 
on support from the Arab parties in the Opposition, Rabin’s government was the 
weakest in Israel’s history. In order to address his weak parliamentarian base Rabin 
announced that, at some point in the future, the NRP would be invited to join the 
government.  
 
The Rabin government, with its relatively inexperienced government and a neophyte 
for Prime Minister, was at a disadvantage from day one. It lacked veteran political 
heavyweights, with the exception of Allon and Minister without Portfolio Israel 
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  222Galili, as most of the Labour Party’s founding generation withdrew. Additionally, 
Rabin was not a member of a party faction and therefore suffered from the lack of a 
solid party base.
9 This lack of support meant that Rabin could not count on any of the 
factions and had to operate on the basis of consensual politics.
10 Furthermore, the 
government’s decision-making process was destined to be fragmented because of the 
uneasy working relationship between Rabin, Peres, and, to a lesser degree, Allon.
11 
The relationship amongst the triumvirate (Rabin, Peres and Allon) threatened to return 
the government to the decision-making immobilisation that reigned under Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol.
12 The ability of this new government to agree or decide on the 
future of the Occupied Territories was thus severely hampered from the start.  
 
 
Syria and the Golan Heights 
 
On the 31
st of May 1974, Israel and Syria signed a separation-of-forces agreement, in 
what was to be the last act of the outgoing Meir government, and the first important 
decision of the new Rabin government. The agreement included an Israeli withdrawal 
from Syrian territories it had conquered during the Yom Kippur War and several 
smaller areas it had held since the Six Day War, including the city of Quneitra.
13 
Israel’s acceptance of the separation-of-forces agreement created a precedent in 
regard to the issue of the Golan Heights. Until that moment, Israeli politicians, of all 
political persuasions, as a by-product of Syrian belligerency and Israel’s perceived 
security needs, accepted the notion that Israel would remain indefinitely in the Golan 
Heights.  
 
The driving force behind Israel’s acceptance of the separation-of-forces agreement 
with Syria was the application of US pressure. It is true that Israel’s acceptance of the 
separation-of-forces agreement was also due to its desire to stop the war of attrition 
that had broke out on its northern border in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and 
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  223its desire to conclude a P.O.W exchange deal with Syria
14 - Syrian President Hafez 
Al-Assad tied the exchange of prisoners with the agreement. However, in order to 
conclude the agreement, Israel required the assistance of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger and American assurances and guarantees.
15 Furthermore, Israel only agreed 
to sign the agreement once it was told by Kissinger that Assad had sent him a secret 
letter agreeing to prevent attacks from Syrian territory into Israel.
16 Allon commented 
that the agreement had more to do with Israeli relations with the US than with Syria.
17  
 
From Israel’s perspective, it became apparent that Assad would not sign a peace 
agreement for less than a full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 
1967 and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.
18 This was a price Israel was 
not willing to pay. Kissinger made it clear that the US did not view the new line (the 
separation-of-forces agreement line) as the final border between the sides.
19 However, 
Israel concluded that it could not afford to withdraw from large parts of the Golan 
Heights without risking Israel’s national security. Because of the belligerent and 
radical nature of the Syrian regime and the strategic implications of withdrawal, 
ministers were advised to put the idea of negotiating with Syria on hold, and shift 
their attention to negotiations with Egypt and Jordan instead.
20   
                                                                                                                                                                         
Since the War of Independence, Israel had viewed Syria as its most vociferous and 
belligerent enemy. Leading up to the Yom Kippur War, Syria had refused to negotiate 
with Israel either directly or through mediation. Therefore, the future status of the 
Golan Heights did not come up during either the Jarring mission or the Israeli-
American discussions. Israel was initially inclined to view the Golan as a bargaining 
chip, which can clearly be seen in its 19
th of June Decisions, while its reluctance to 
withdraw from the Golan Heights can be attributed to both Syrian intransigence and 
its perceived strategic imperatives. It was widely believed that Israel’s position, on top 
of the Golan mountain ranges, 60 km from Damascus, provided a constant deterrent 
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  224and ensured that Israel enjoyed strategic depth.
21 In addition, remaining on the Golan 
Heights provided Israel with the ability to protect its main water sources and its 
northern region from Syrian and Palestinian attacks.
22 Syria’s refusal to negotiate and 
its belligerent activities against Israeli interests, coupled with the significance of 
Israel’s strategic imperatives, meant that public and political opinion in Israel was 
steadfast in its determination not to make any concessions in the Golan.
23     
 
The agreement among political parties, of the need to keep the Golan Heights, 
influenced Israel’s settlement and development policy. Indeed, early (1969) 
development plans for the Golan set very ambitious targets, as they presupposed the 
area would remain under Israel’s control. The plans estimated a Jewish population of 
about 45-50,000 in urban centres and agricultural villages within ten years, in addition 
to the development of industrial and tourist centres across the Golan Heights.
24 
However, these plans never materialised. By 1973 the total population of the Golan 
Heights was only 1300, including several hundred Nahal soldiers, concentrated in 
three main settlement clusters in the southern region of the Golan. These were small, 
self-sufficient, agricultural-based settlements, in an area rich in resources and close to 
the settlers’ base of the Upper Galilee region. Outside of the southern region Israel 
had only six settlements, of which only one was in the crucial central region - the 
most important area strategically for Israel.
25 Furthermore, the settlements suffered 
from a lack of adequate funding; this problem was brought up by the settlers
26 and by 
members of the Knesset who visited the settlements.
27 The fact that Israel’s settlement 
activities in the Golan Heights neither matched its rhetoric (its desire to remain in the 
territory indefinitely) nor its strategic needs (i.e. settlements in the central region) 
clearly indicates that Israel did not have a clear long-term policy. 
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  225There are two main reasons why the development and settlement of the Golan 
Heights, prior to the Yom Kippur War, did not match the political will. First, 
settlement activity in the region was beset by many logistical and technical problems, 
e.g. lack of water supply, cost of land reclamation, scarcity of suitable agricultural 
land, harsh topographical conditions and lack of infrastructure.
28 The Second and 
most important factor concerning Israel’s attitude towards the Golan Heights was the 
American diplomatic stance towards Syria. Israel could neither annex the Golan nor 
heavily develop the region without drawing the ire of the US. An example of US 
influence on Israel, in this matter, can be found in Meir’s secret peace plan of 1970. 
As a consequence of US pressure during the Rogers talks, Israel was willing to agree, 
in principle, to withdraw from up to a third of the territory.
29 
 
In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the government came to the conclusion that 
it had to anchor its presence in the Golan Heights. It was widely believed that it was 
Syrian intransigence and its refusal to negotiate with Israel which was at the heart of 
the conflict and not Israel’s presence in the Golan. It was, therefore, concluded that 
Israel must increase the number of settlements and allocate more resources to the 
development of the region.
30 In addition, Israel feared that the US would use the fact 
that the central region of the Golan was largely empty to demand concessions there.
31 
The fact that Israel remained on the Golan Heights, prompted new development plans 
which aimed to settle the central region and increase investment.
32 In its first few 
weeks in office, the Rabin government agreed to expand and strengthen Israel’s 
presence in the Golan by constructing an urban centre (Katzrin), an industrial area and 
an additional agricultural settlement in the central region.
33 Yet, despite these efforts, 
the government had to scale down its plans for the region because of its geographical 
features and the logistic problems these created, the on-going negotiations with the 
Arab states and its desire to avoid antagonising the US. Additionally, most politicians 
assumed that the Golan would remain under Israel’s control and therefore saw no 
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  226need to hasten settlement activity there, ‘there was no need to create facts on the 
ground’.
34 Moreover, Israel’s housing minister at the time, Avraham Ofer, was known 
as a moderate and as one who was against large-scale works that would harm peace 
negotiations.
35 Another important factor inhibiting Israel’s policy towards the Golan 
Heights was the local Druze population. The precedent created by the disengagement 
agreement with both Syria and Egypt changed irrevocably the attitude of the Druze 
population towards Israel. Once seen as natural allies of Israel, and at one stage its 
leaders even appeared to support the idea of an Israeli annexation,
36 the Druze 
community became vocal, though non-violent, opponents of Israel’s occupation.
37 It 
is therefore not a surprise that, despite the government’s plans and intentions, the 
population of the Golan Heights did not increase much under Rabin. Only in the later 
stages of the Rabin government did the area witness a steady rise in development and 
infrastructure, but even then it was only done on a small scale.  
 
Israel’s desire to hold on to the Golan Heights was a by-product of Syrian 
belligerency and diplomatic inflexibility, as well as the recognition of the region’s 
value in meeting Israel’s strategic needs. However, despite its continued presence on 
the Golan Heights, Israel was unable to implement its stated settlement and 
development aims for the region. This was mainly because of technical and logistical 
problems associated with the area’s geography, and external political constraints 
placed on Israel by the US. Moreover, because of the geographical problems Israel’s 
settlement and development plans did not match its stated strategic needs (i.e. the 
settlement and development of the central region). Nevertheless, despite refusing to 
annex the territory and vowing to keep its diplomatic options open, the incremental 
decisions taken by successive governments - in particular the increased development 
of the central region by the Rabin government - were moving Israel towards a de-
facto annexation of the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Interview with Hillel. 
35 Interview with Aloni, interview with Yadlin.  
36 ISA/YAOH/Meeting 4/Page 18. 
37 Interview with Hillel. 
  227Jericho First  
 
On the 3
rd of June 1974, the new government stated its foreign policy approach: it 
declared its willingness to hold direct negotiations without preconditions with its Arab 
neighbours in order to bring about peace agreements. These agreements would be 
based on territorial compromises that would provide Israel with secure and recognised 
borders. Until such agreements were reached, Israel would continue to remain on the 
cease-fire lines.
38 On the 21
st of June, the government made clear its intentions with 
regard to Jordan; it concluded that an agreement with Jordan was the only viable 
solution for the West Bank.  The government stated that an agreement with Jordan 
would be based on an Israeli state, with Jerusalem as its capital, and a Jordanian-
Palestinian state, where the political aspirations of the Palestinians would be fulfilled. 
Furthermore, it decided not to negotiate with ‘terrorist organisations whose sole 
purpose is the destruction of the state of Israel’, i.e. the PLO.
39 
 
In reality, Israel’s intentions towards Jordan were slightly different. It sought to 
normalise relations with Jordan in order to reach a de-facto peace, which would 
include a nominal Jordanian presence in the West Bank (as long as it did not infringe 
upon Israel’s security) in order to limit the influence of the PLO. Israel believed that, 
if this objective was met, the possibility of peace between the two states, whether 
based on a Functional Solution or a territorial compromise, would be enhanced in the 
long run.
 40 The resumption of the debate within the government on Israel’s intentions 
for the Occupied Territories within the government (which had been nullified under 
Meir) exposed stark differences among ministers - particularly among the triumvirate 
- regarding to Jordan and the West Bank, and illustrated the problems it faced 
formulating a clear long-term policy: Allon favoured an agreement based on his plan; 
Peres pressed for a Functional Solution; and Rabin favoured some form of the 
Territorialist Approach, combined with security elements taken from the Functionalist 
Approach.
41 In light of this, it is not a surprise that the government adopted a tentative 
approach towards Jordan. 
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  228Allon believed that the best way to advance relations between the two states would be 
through an interim agreement based on his plan. This, he thought, would lead to a 
permanent peace between the two states and would cement the political future of the 
West Bank with Jordan.
42 This idea is referred to as the Jericho First plan, because 
Allon envisioned that this interim agreement would be initially implemented in the 
Jericho area.
43 The idea was supported by Kissinger who, in turn, pressed both Jordan 
and Israel to accept it. According to Kissinger Israel had two choices in regard to the 
West Bank: either negotiate with the Jordanians or deal with the Palestinians; he 
favoured the former.
44 
 
In a meting on the 28
th of August, King Hussein, accompanied by his Prime Minister 
Ziad Rifai, proposed to the Israeli triumvirate a disengagement plan along the Jordan 
River - similar to what he had proposed to Meir in February; Rabin and Peres rejected 
this. Peres proceeded to propose an agreement along the lines of a Functional 
Solution. Hussein expressed surprise that, after conducting so many meetings, Israel 
would come up with an offer ‘like that’.
45 Allon, in an attempt to rescue the talks, 
suggested an Israeli withdrawal from the Jericho area as an interim agreement and the 
establishment of a Jordanian civilian administration there. Hussein was against that 
idea; Rifai explained that Hussein would settle for either for a disengagement-of-
forces agreement along the Jordan River or a complete Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank.
46  
 
On the 19
th of October, a second meeting between Hussein and the Israeli triumvirate 
took place. There is some controversy over what exactly occurred during this meeting, 
as its content has not yet been made public. It is unclear whether Hussein, growing 
anxious because of the upcoming Arab League summit in Rabat, was willing to 
consider the Jericho First plan. According to Allon, Hussein was inclined to settle for 
the Jericho First plan but, because of the proximity of the meeting to the Rabat 
Summit, chose not to. Allon claimed to have told Hussein that, he would only advise 
the government to support the Jericho First plan if Hussein agreed to commit to the 
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  229plan, regardless of the summit’s outcome.
47 According to Aloni, however, Hussein 
agreed to the plan because he wanted to prove, before going to the summit, that he 
was still the rightful representative of the Palestinian people.
48 The merits of the 
‘Jericho First’ plan were debated in the government, with some uncertainty as to what 
actually happened during this debate. According to Aloni, ministers debated the plan 
and then voted to reject it: only Aloni, Transportation Minister Gad Ya’akobi and 
Information Minister Aharon Yariv voted in favour.
49 This has been denied by Police 
Minister Shlomo Hillel and Education Minister Aharon Yadlin, who stated that the 
government did not hold a formal vote on the plan and that the debate never reached 
the stage where a decision had to be made.
50  
 
However, there is an agreement over the fact that the main reason the plan was not 
accepted by the government was due to Rabin’s desire to include the NRP in his 
coalition.
51 Aloni asked Rabin why the plan was rejected; Rabin replied that a 
promise had been made to the NRP that any territorial concessions in the West Bank 
would necessitate either new elections or a referendum. Aloni expressed her 
amazement that ‘a promise made by Meir [who had since resigned] during coalition 
negotiations [as part of a government that had since resigned] to the NRP [who were 
not part of the current coalition] should be honoured.’
52 There is some evidence to 
support Aloni’s version of events. Rabin, in a meeting with Mapam members, 
expressed hope that Hussein would be accepted as the representative of the 
Palestinians in Rabat, but that he would not call for elections over Jericho. Rabin 
stated that an agreement with Jordan was not feasible at the time, and stressed the 
importance of focusing on reaching an agreement with Egypt, believing that doing so 
would lead to a breakthrough on the Jordanian front.
53  
                                                
 
In the ensuing summit in Rabat, the Arab League passed a unanimous resolution 
declaring the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The resolution 
was passed unanimously - even Hussein was resigned to support it - despite 
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  230considerable American pressure on several Arab states to support Jordan’s position.
54 
The summit completely changed the nature of the debate within Israel and highlighted 
the Palestinian question.
55 Kimchi described the summit as ‘one of the most 
significant turning points of this period’.
56 
 
It is unclear whether or not Hussein pursued an interim agreement based on the 
Jericho First plan. It is also unclear whether procuring an agreement from Israel 
would have changed the outcome of the summit in Rabat. However, it is clear that 
Rabin had decided to pursue an interim agreement with Egypt first and deferred 
negotiations with Jordan to a later stage. This decision was taken with a desire to 
broaden his parliamentarian base in mind, and was possibly due to the lack of 
American pressure for an interim agreement with Jordan. It could be argued that 
Kissinger could have applied pressure on Hussein to lower his expectations and on 
Israel to show more flexibility, but Kissinger was more interested in the Egyptian 
track.  
 
The government was also deeply divided on the subject of territorial compromises in 
the West Bank. The doves were in favour of territorial compromises beyond the Allon 
Plan, the majority of the ministers favoured a territorial compromise along the lines of 
the plan, while others - most notably Peres - were arguing for a Functional Solution. 
The inability of the government to reach a common position on the matter, regardless 
of whether it would have been accepted by Hussein, attests to its lack of a 
comprehensive and coherent clear long-term policy towards the West Bank. As if to 
confirm this, Allon claimed that Rabin’s promise to the NRP was not as big a problem 
as Rabin imagined it to be, and could have been easily overcome.
57 Additionally, the 
missed opportunity highlighted the continual failure among dovish politicians to have 
any influence on Israel’s territorial policies. 
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  231The NRP  
 
One of the main reasons behind Rabin’s rejection of the Jericho First Plan, and his 
government’s lack of a clear long-term policy towards the West Bank, was his desire 
to include the NRP in the Coalition. On the 30
th of October 1974, and on the heels of 
the Rabat Summit, the NRP joined the government, which prompted the resignation 
of Aloni’s Citizen’s Rights Movement. Rabin’s decision to include the NRP in order 
to broaden his parliamentarian base followed months of negotiations with the NRP 
and the other coalition members, to which Aloni was not invited.
58 This explains why 
Mapam and the Independent Liberal Party - which both favoured the Jordanian track - 
did not push the government on the Jericho First plan, even though Mapam’s leaders 
stated that a settlement with Jordan was necessary.
59 Negotiations between the Labour 
Party and Mapam regarding the NRP shed light on the relationship between the 
government’s handling of the territorial policy and its inner politics. In a series of 
meetings that took place during August, Rabin explained that he had reached an 
agreement with the NRP about joining the coalition and, as a result, could not make 
any substantial decisions in regard to the Occupied Territories. Rabin added that, in 
regard to the West Bank, he did not foresee any serious developments taking place 
before the next general elections.
60 Rabin promised the NRP that the government 
would allow settlements in all the land of Israel, while assuring Mapam and the 
Independent Liberal Party that they could abstain or vote against any resolution 
regarding the settlements.
61  
 
The coalition negotiation process revealed deep anxieties within the Alignment 
regarding the NRP. The NRP was presented as a ‘Trojan horse’ that would sideline 
Mapam and the peace process while serving the interests of the Likud.
62 However, 
others within the Alignment called for the inclusion of the NRP in order to block a 
potential link with the Likud and heal a growing national rift over religious matters. 
This was expressed as a fear over the possible future collaboration between radical 
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  232nationalism and a radical religious movement.
63 The fears expressed regarding the 
inclusion of the NRP - perennial coalition partner of the Labour Party, known for its 
diplomatic and religious pragmatism - were a result of the changes that occurred 
within the NRP during the previous decade. 
 
In the aftermath of the Six Day War, Israel witnessed a period of religious revivalism. 
This manifested itself in the growing importance attached to religion and its inclusion 
in the political life. However, these changes were not a direct result of the war, but 
built upon demographic and institutional changes that had been brewing for many 
years, e.g. the growth of religious education, high birth-rates among the religious 
communities and the influx of ‘low-status oriental immigrants’ with a religious 
attachment.
64 On the back of this religious phenomenon, a new power base emerged 
within the NRP. The party - already preoccupied with faction-based politics - 
witnessed the inclusion of another faction, based on the emergence of several young 
leaders led by Zevulon Hammer and dominated by New Zionism ideology. Within 
this competitive system the emergence of the young guard proved to be a deciding 
factor.
65 The young guard demanded to have a more active role in the management of 
the party and a change to the party’s traditional policies of alliance with Mapai, 
religious status-quo within the state and neutrality in foreign affairs. In addition, the 
growth of religious nationalism and a general shift to the right amongst the electorate 
forced the NRP to secure its electoral base, against the incursion of the Likud, which, 
in turn, strengthened the young guard.
66 
 
The generational debate within the NRP took on a new dimension with the acquisition 
of the Occupied Territories, in particular the West Bank.
67 The territorial issue thus 
became entangled within an evolving religious debate.
68 The young guard refused to 
associate itself with a Labour Party that was willing to withdraw from the holy places 
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  233in the West Bank.
69 Therefore, in order to avoid alienating the young guard and 
wishing to preserve unity, the old guard avoided making decisions on the territorial 
issue.
70 Party leader Haim-Moshe Shapira went even further by associating himself 
with Dayan in an attempt to brandish his hawkish credentials.
71 Although not a major 
factor, the unwillingness of the NRP to make controversial decisions on the long-term 
future of the Occupied Territories contributed to Israel’s lack of clear policy under 
both Eshkol and Meir. 
 
The Yom Kippur War strengthened the religious sentiment among the young guard of 
the NRP that it was necessary to retain the Occupied Territories.
72 As a result, in the 
1973 elections, the NRP tied its participation in the coalition with the government’s 
territorial policies. Interestingly, this represented the first time in which New Zionism 
or for that matter nationalist or religious sentiments played an integral part in Israel’s 
territorial policy. Moreover, the decision to join the Rabin government was only 
approved by the party’s central committee by a narrow margin of 57% to 43%. The 
decision was severely criticised by the young guard, who decided to remain in the 
Opposition, and by many of Israel’s leading Rabbis despite Rabin’s promises to the 
NRP regarding the West Bank.
73 The young guard’s identification with the concept of 
greater Israel and with the settlers’ movement was most apparent in the formation and 
activities of Gush-Emunim - ‘the Bloc of the Faithful’. 
 
 
Gush-Emunim 
 
When referring to the Gush-Emunim phenomenon, Ehud Shprinzak used the analogy 
of the ‘tip of the iceberg’: a small radical, ideologically motivated, group that arose 
out of a larger social context and therefore enjoyed broader public support than was 
initially apparent.
74 It is not the intention of this thesis to either explain or define New 
Zionism, or to rationalise the resurgence of nationalist and religious fervour during 
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  234the period researched; what is of interest is the effect that individuals and groups 
associated with New Zionism had on Israel’s territorial policy. 
 
The outcome of the Six Day War was a predictable one for Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Cook, 
the son of Israel’s first Rabbi and leader of the religious Zionist movement. His father 
had compared the establishment of the state of Israel to the beginning of the time of 
redemption. The Six Day War was seen as a direct validation of this process.
75 For 
Cook, it was the beginning of the messianic age, the return of the Jewish people to the 
land of Israel: ‘We have just returned to the elevations of holiness and our holy city. 
We shall never move out of here’.
76 The immediate manifestation of this revelation 
was most apparent to a small group encompassing the young guard of the NRP and 
the students of Cook’s ‘Merkaz Harav’ yeshiva - from which most of the Hebron and 
Gush-Etzion settlers came. They believed that the government was not fulfilling its 
role in this era of redemption and took it upon themselves to do so, first in Gush-
Etzion and Hebron and later in Kiryat Arba. They found that the government - torn 
apart internally - was standing in their way. The group perceived Zionism as being 
associated with the creation of settlements on the land of Israel, as did early Labour 
Party members. However, for them the notion of settling the land of Israel was not 
only a Zionist mission but also a religious imperative; by settling the land of Israel 
they were redeeming their souls.
77 Thus, they attributed the Yom Kippur War to the 
government’s insufficient settlement drive, which led them to found the Gush-
Emunim movement.
78 
 
Gush-Emunim considered the territories, in particular the West Bank, as part of the 
land of Israel. This view attributed neither a strategic nor a bargaining value to the 
Occupied Territories.
79 For Gush-Emunim there was no reason to negotiate with an 
Arab world bent on destroying Israel. This fear of annihilation by the Arab world, 
combined with a sense of religious justification, resulted in a rejection of the politics 
of the ‘gentile world’.
80 The group rejected the internal Israeli political system as a 
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  235force for a change, arguing instead for a bottom-up grass-root approach. They were 
supported in their endeavours by many politicians from the Opposition, including 
Begin and Sharon. In addition, they were supported by followers of Tabenkin, who 
admired them for being the pioneers of a new generation and shared much of their 
Zionist zeal.
81 Moreover, even prominent left-wing politicians such as Mapam’s 
leader Ya’akov Hazan admired their zeal, which reminded him of the early Zionist 
pioneers.
82 
 
Gush-Emunim initially tried to lobby the government for more settlements across the 
West Bank - particularly in Samaria - but with little success.
83 The government 
refused to grant them permission to settle; Rabin stated that settlement projects would 
only correspond to government policies. Several Attempts by Gush-Emunim to settle 
independently on several sites across the West Bank, and once on the Golan Heights, 
were unsuccessful. The government’s refusal to allow the group to settle, and their 
forced eviction from sites, caused the group to view the government as illegitimate 
and immoral. For them, the actions of a government that deprived its own people of 
their ‘God given right’ to settle were akin to that of the British mandate’s ‘White 
Book’ policies. Therefore, they perceived their opposition to the government’s 
settlement policies as both right and moral.
84 For the first time since the Hebron 
incident, the government faced a group that was bent on influencing its settlement 
policies. Gush-Emunim did not only offer an alternative to the government’s policy, 
they actively implemented one.
85 The government was thus faced with a determined 
and growing movement, which opposed its settlement policy and which was 
encouraged and supported by a broad section of society, opposition politicians and 
even members of the Labour Party. By influencing the government’s settlement 
policies, Gush-Emunim was also influencing the future relations between Israel and 
the Occupied Territories.  
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  236The group took upon itself the task of expanding settlement activities to areas outside 
of the mandate of the Allon Plan. Outside the publicised settlement attempts by Gush-
Emunim, several low key attempts were made; two of them proved highly successful 
and signalled the end of the Allon Plan as the government’s settlement concept. These 
two successes also proved, once and for all, that the Labour government did not have 
a clear and comprehensive territorial policy and had not agreed upon its preferred 
future relations between Israel and the Occupied Territories. 
 
 
Ma’ale Adumim 
 
Ma’ale Adumim represented the first clear example of Gush-Emunim’s impact on the 
government’s settlement plans. The idea of establishing a settlement in the area of 
Ma’ale Adumim had first been raised by Allon in 1968, while the exact location of the 
project remained obscure and was described as being in the vicinity of Jericho.
86 
Allon later proposed that the exact location of the settlement be decided by the MSC. 
Although Allon had described the project as one which would help fulfil Israel’s 
diplomatic and security objectives,
87 it was still rejected by the Eshkol government. 
One of the main issues regarding Ma’ale Adumim was that establishing a settlement 
in the area would help to divide the West Bank, by narrowing the strip of land in the 
Jerusalem-Jericho corridor connecting Samaria and Judea. Therefore, the decision 
over whether to establish a settlement in the area was not taken lightly by either the 
Eshkol or the Meir governments. As part of a discussion regarding the expansion of 
Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries under Meir, an ad-hoc committee had been 
established to look at future industrial sites for Jerusalem. The committee advised the 
government to appropriate lands to the east and north of the city, because these 
represented suitable sites for future industrial areas.
88 The committee decided to start 
development in one of those areas - a site to the east of the city named Ma’ale 
Adumim. In addition, Galili advised the government to allow the Israeli Land 
Authority to support the effort by purchasing additional lands in the area.
89 Allon, 
being the head of the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem and in charge of land 
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  237appropriation, wrote that most ministers had already gathered that the area would 
eventually become an urban settlement.
90 He went on to say that this was the reason 
why several ministers were against the project, but supported the government’s 
decision to establish an industrial area nonetheless.
 91  
 
On the 28
th of August 1974, during an MSC meeting, Galili raised the idea of settling 
in the Ma’ale Adumim area. Galili notified the committee that the government had 
already appropriated an area of 70,000 square km east of Jerusalem. He explained that 
the government had not yet decided what to do with the area, but was considering 
using it as an industrial area for Jerusalem. Galili explained that the area would 
initially serve as a storage facility for the army, but would be later transformed into an 
urban settlement. He told the committee that several private investors were willing to 
invest money in the project at a minimum cost to the tax payer.
92 The discussion in 
the MSC followed some earlier discussions regarding Ma’ale Adumim at a ministerial 
level.
93  
 
The idea of creating an industrial area in Ma’ale Adumim infuriated Yehiel Admoni, 
the head of the Settlement Department. From Admoni’s perspective the project was 
outside the scope of, and therefore breached, the Allon Plan. However, because the 
exact parameters of the plan were never agreed upon and therefore remained vague,
94 
Allon interpreted the project as being within the scope of his plan. Benvenisti argues 
that because the Allon Plan was vague, it allowed for the inclusion of areas that were 
not originally part of the plan, in particular in the Jerusalem region.
95 The fact that the 
head of the Settlement Department was unsure about the exact parameters of the plan 
implies that the Allon Plan was more of a rough guideline or concept than a detailed 
plan or policy.  
 
One of the most important facts behind the creation of Ma’ale Adumim was the level 
of collaboration between Galili and Gush-Emunim. Demant argues - and this is 
backed by reports in the Israeli press - that Galili and the head of Israel’s Land 
                                                 
90 ISA/YAOH/Meeting 9/Page 16. 
91 Ibid Page 17. 
92 Admoni, Decade of Discretion Page 102. 
93 YTA/15Galili/4/10/2/Memo from Galili to Rabin/8.8.1974. 
94 Demant Ploughshares into Swords Pages 148-149. 
95 Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Handbook (Jerusalem, Kana, 1987) (Hebrew), Page 148. 
  238Authority Meir Zore’a (a supporter of the Land of Israel Movement) had extensive 
dealing with Gush-Emunim. It is important to note that Galili did not always disclose 
this fact.
96 Arguably, these dealings between Galili, Zore’a, the NRP and Gush-
Emonim attest to the growing impact individuals and groups associated with New 
Zionism ideology were having on Israel’s territorial policies. Demant goes on to argue 
that the decision to establish an industrial site in the area, and the subsequent decision 
to allow members of Gush-Emunim to settle there, were the products of deals struck 
with the NRP and Gush-Emunim.
97 It is also alleged that the project was promised to 
the NRP by Rabin as part of the coalition bargaining process.
98 
 
On the 24
th of November, the government agreed to develop Ma’ale Adumim as an 
industrial area for the city of Jerusalem. Hillel explains that the decision was taken in 
light of the need to create facts on the ground in response to the Rabat Summit 
resolution.
99 It was decided that the site would not be used as a civilian settlement and 
that only those employed in the construction could reside there.
100 This was followed, 
on the 9
th of December, by a decision of the MSC, in consultation with Peres, to 
establish a work camp in Ma’ale Adumim as well as two new Nahal outposts in 
Kokhav Hashahar and Tko’a; these two outposts were only marginally inside the 
scope of the Allon Plan. The committee agreed that, within six months, a decision on 
whether these should become civilian settlements would be made.
101  
 
The Ma’ale Adumim project was beset by problems from the start. The most pressing 
problem was the lack of funds or budgetary capacity for it.
102 In addition, several 
prominent figures were either against the project or were actively undermining it. 
Housing Minister Ofer was doing his best to delay the project while Labour MK 
Yossi Sarid was publicly stating that the government, by investing in the project, was 
neglecting Israel’s developing towns. On top of that, the government was forced to 
restrict the Settlement Department’s involvement in the project after it became 
                                                 
96 YTA/15Galili/4/10/3/Memo from Galili to Rabin/20.10.1974. 
97 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords Pages 358-359. 
98 Demant, Page 358. 
99 Interview with Hillel. 
100 ISA/7032/14-a/Memo from Galili to Rabin/15.12.1974. 
101 ISA/7032/14-a/Memo from Galili to Rabin/9.12.1974. 
102 YTA/15Galili/4/10/13/Memo from Galili to Rabin/7.1.1974. 
  239apparent that Admoni was acting against it;
103 this all came after Galili had initially 
intended for the Settlement Department to play an important role in the project.
104 
Admoni’s reluctance to show more support for the project may have been due to the 
project’s location or to the involvement of Gush-Emunim.
105  
 
In order to address some of the problematic issues raised by the Ma’ale Adumim 
project, a special ad-hoc ministerial committee was established. In its first meeting on 
the 8
th of January, Finance Minister Yehushu’a Rabinowitz asked how the 
government could have authorised a project, and made financial commitments, when 
no budget had been allocated or agreed upon. He went on to say that, despite the 
government’s decision on the matter, it was virtually impossible to monitor the 
progress, since the project lacked clear plans. Ofer claimed that, although the 
committee was discussing the possibility of creating an industrial zone at the site, 
there was always a suspicion that this was intended to be a civilian settlement.
106 It is 
unclear whether Ofer was aware of the fact that Galili had met with representatives of 
Gush-Emunim and allowed them to reside in the area while helping with the 
construction.
107 Galili explained to the committee that if the government did not 
develop the area the far right would. Galili claimed that developing Ma’ale Adumim 
was an ‘ingenious’ move, on his part, to quell some dangerous domestic 
developments. Rabin backed Galili by stating that although Sarid was making a fuss, 
he would only be able to bring tens of people to protest, while Yehuda Ben-Meir 
(NRP) would bring hundreds to support it.
108 This statement by Galili raises questions 
regarding the exact purpose and necessity of the project. Additionally, it further 
demonstrates that prominent decision makers, in this case Galili and Rabin, were 
influenced not only by political considerations, but also by individuals and groups 
associated with New Zionist ideology. Furthermore, it would appear that the project 
was a result of political deals and was not done in response to the needs of the city of 
Jerusalem. If true, this would not be the first time that decisions regarding 
developments and settlements in the Jerusalem area were taken without consulting 
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  240with the Jerusalem municipality.
109 Furthermore, this clearly shows that the Ma’ale 
Adumim project was not part of a comprehensive long-term settlement policy. 
 
In a subsequent meeting on the 10
th of January, ministers continued to debate the 
project’s budget and appeared genuinely unsure as to who was responsible for it. 
Rabin informed the committee that the Finance Ministry would ‘by hook or by crook’ 
find the appropriate funds for the project. Rabinowitz insisted that the main problem 
with the settlement was political, and that is why there was a great deal of confusion. 
Nonetheless, he added, that as the decision had been taken by the government, he 
would comply with it.
110 In the end, the committee decided to establish 25 residential 
units for 100 settlers/workers at the site.
111 The political and economic problems that 
marred the project attest to the fact that it was not part of the government’s long-term 
strategic planning. In one particularly revealing episode, Galili - struggling to find 
money for the project - urged Rabinowitz to allocate funds for the project.
112 Mapam 
alleged that Galili and Zore’a had allocated money to the project without receiving the 
government approval for the budget. Leaks of revolts within the government on this 
issue exposed the complexity of decision-making within a fragmented government.
113  
 
On the one hand, several ministers, in particular Mapam’s, were working to 
undermine the project.
114 On the other hand, Rabin and Galili were working hard to 
satisfy the NRP’s demands for the project. While Galili claimed that ministers 
supported the decision to include Ma’ale Adumim in the future boundaries of the state 
of Israel, the decision to build residential units on the site only passed by a slim 
majority (11 to 8).
115  The decision - to build a small number of units and to limit their 
availability to site workers - appeared to be an attempt to satisfy both the NRP’s 
demand for a civilian settlement and Mapam’s opposition to one.
116 The 
government’s inability to agree on a comprehensive settlement policy, and the need to 
reach a consensus within a divided coalition, forced the government to revert to an 
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  241incremental mode of decision-making. Thus, the weakness of the dovish ministers and 
the growing influence of Gush-Emunim and the NRP contributed to the fact that this 
far-reaching decision was taken as a political compromise. 
 
 
Ofra 
 
The growing threat from Gush-Emunim was a source for concern within the 
government. On the 26
th of January, Rabin, Peres, Galili and Hillel met to discuss the 
illegal activities of Gush-Emunim. They agreed to use all means necessary to restrict 
the movement of its members within the Occupied Territories in order to hamper any 
attempts by them to create facts on the ground without a government decision. Rabin 
acknowledged that the political reality in Israel had changed as a result of Gush-
Emunim. He stated that it was a political movement that would not be placated by 
giving in to their demands, in places such as Ba’al-Hatzor and Ma’ale Adumim. 
Rabin expressed the fear that the government might be unable to deter Gush-Emunim 
from future actions.
117 His words provide an indication that the government, or at 
least some ministers, were negotiating with Gush-Emunim. Additionally, it represents 
the second occasion on which an official document mentioned the concessions made 
to Gush-Emunim in Ba’al-Hatzor. This fact was first revealed during the ministerial 
meeting regarding Ma’ale Adumim, where Peres informed the committee of 700 
would-be settlers waiting to settle on the site. Rabin sarcastically replied that he could 
settle them in the Galilee as opposed to Ba’al-Hatzor.
118 
 
Ba’al-Hatzor is the highest peak of the Samaria mountain range and was designated as 
a new army base (based on the concept of ‘Mobile Defences’ and in accordance with 
the Dayan Plan). Under orders from the Defence Ministry, lands were appropriated in 
the area and construction began in late 1974. Several members of Gush-Emunim 
contacted Moshe Netzer (Peres’ settlement advisor and former head of the Nahal) and 
requested permission to establish a working camp on the site in order to help with the 
construction. Netzer, acting under the direction of Peres, authorised the request.
119 
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  242Peres authorised the move despite the fact that Ba’al-Hatzor was in the midst of a 
heavily populated area in the centre of Samaria and clearly outside of the prescribed 
parameters of the Allon Plan. 
 
By April 1975 the settlers had established themselves next to the army base and were 
effectively living on the site; they named their camp/settlement Ofra. According to 
Netzer, Peres authorised the settlers to remain at the site as a way of cooling Gush-
Emunim’s settlement fervour.
120 Rabin, who was rumoured to have been upset by the 
incident, authorised Galili to find a solution to the problem. Galili’s solution appeared 
to have been a compromise by which the settlers could remain at the site as long as 
they supported themselves and their numbers did not exceed 24.
121 This compromise 
was taken without consulting the government and in full knowledge that most 
ministers would vote against it.
122 Rabin’s actions did not make much sense, unless he 
shared Peres’ assertion that the move would help dampen the settlement zeal of Gush-
Emunim. As it turned out, Rabin whether by design or by default, authorised the 
establishment of the first settlement outside the scope of the Allon Plan. 
 
In June, due to inquiries made by Sarid, knowledge of the settlement became public. 
Sarid asked how a settlement could be established without a government decision and 
without anyone knowing anything about it.
123 The truth of the matter is that the 
decision to allow the settlers to remain in Ofra was taken by Peres
124 - who also 
ordered the Defence Ministry to support the settlers’ effort.
125 Peres had previously 
met with members of Gush-Emunim and had expressed some support for their 
ideals.
126 Additionally, Peres believed in a Functional Solution and thus saw no 
problem with Jews settling in the Occupied Territories. Moreover, Peres believed that 
by supporting Gush-Emunim he was acquiring potential political support for the 
future.
127 Peres’s decision was partly based on his continued rivalry with Rabin, but, 
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his flirtation with Gush-Emunim was also a testament to the impact New Zionism 
ideology had on his views.  
 
Peres’ decision to allow Gush-Emunim to establish a working camp in Ofra proved to 
be a turning point for Gush-Emunim and for the government. It signalled the first time 
in which a settlement was created without the government’s approval or knowledge. 
In addition, it was the first settlement established outside of the government’s 
designated area, in a heavily populated region of Samaria. Peres’ decision shattered 
the concept that the government had a comprehensive settlement or territorial policy 
based on the Allon Plan. According to an assessment by the US Embassy, ‘the 
rational decision-making process, in regard to settlement creation, operates creakingly 
if at all’. This ‘policy vacuum’ provided Peres with the opportunity of ‘keeping one 
foot within official guidelines and one in the pro-settlement camp on the right’.
128 The 
cases of Ofra and Ma’ale Adumim clearly indicate that the Rabin government did not 
have a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy regarding the Occupied 
Territories, in general, and the West Bank, in particular. 
 
128 NARA/D750215-0635/Cable from the Tel Aviv Embassy to the State Department/20.6.1975. 
 Chapter Two 
 
Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula 
 
The Rabin government’s lack of long-term planning in regard to the Occupied 
Territories did not inhibit it from pursuing a second interim agreement with Egypt. 
The idea of a second interim agreement was supported by most ministers, including 
Allon, Peres and Rabin.
1 However, despite broad ministerial support, and before 
being asked to do so by Kissinger, the government was unable to take a firm decision 
on the matter. In a secret memo, Galili pointed out that an interim agreement with 
Egypt was both feasible and desirable. He explained that such an agreement would 
usher in a period of de-facto peace and ensure that psychological and political 
conditions which are essential for peace were attained. Only after a sustained period 
of stability was achieved could Israel examine the possibility of pursuing a permanent 
peace agreement. Until such an agreement was signed, Galili advised the government 
to hold on to as much of Sinai as possible in order to provide Egypt with an incentive 
to strive for peace.
2 Ministers raised concerns regarding a second interim agreement. 
They wanted to ensure that the agreement would include an end to the state of war 
between the sides and act as a prelude to peace agreements.
3 Additionally, they feared 
that Israel might be required to withdraw from the strategically important Sinai passes 
and from Abu-Rhodis - the main oil field in Sinai.
4 Lastly, some were sceptical about 
the real value of the American and international security guarantees.
5  
 
Israel’s main objectives were to ensure an end to the state of war, to secure free naval 
passage and a non-belligerency agreement. In return, Israel was willing to withdraw to 
a strip of land 30-50 km wide along the 1948 international border, i.e. not including 
the Gaza Strip. In addition, Israel would continue to hold a continuous strip of land 
from Sharm El-Sheikh to Eilat.
6 The negotiations with Egypt proved harder than 
expected as Sadat was unwilling to sign a non-belligerency agreement. As a result, 
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  245Israel refused to pursue an interim agreement based on an Israeli withdrawal from the 
Sinai passes and Abu-Rhodis without achieving any of its objectives.
7 Kissinger, 
acknowledging that Rabin was in a difficult position internationally, domestically and 
within his government, offered extensive American guarantees.
8 Kissinger warned 
Israel that its refusal to sign an agreement would result in delays to its military and 
financial aid.
9 
 
The US agreed to provide Israel with military assistance, economic aid, oil supplies 
and diplomatic assurances. These assurances included: a US agreement not to 
recognise or negotiate with the PLO, an assurance not to press Israel for an interim 
agreement with Jordan and an assurance that it had not adopted a position regarding 
the final border between Israel and Syria.
10 Additionally, Kissinger elicited an 
agreement from Sadat to provide Israel with free non-military naval passage through 
the Suez Canal. Only after the US agreed to provide Israel with extensive guarantees 
and assurances did the government agree to sign a second interim agreement. Some 
members of the Coalition, however, remained sceptical; in the Knesset vote on the 
agreement several Rafi members, including Dayan, and the young guard of the NRP, 
voted against.  
 
The second interim agreement with Egypt revealed the extent to which America’s 
Middle East policies affected Israel’s territorial decision-making process. The 
agreement proved how important American guarantees and assurances were to Israel. 
Arguably, the main driving force behind the diplomatic effort was the American 
administration. According to Maoz, the interim agreements with Egypt and Syria 
shared similar characteristics: the agreements were in line with American Middle East 
policy and Israel only signed them in response to US incentives and under American 
diplomatic pressure.
11 In other words, despite the importance of the agreement to 
Israel, the government was unable to work towards its own objectives without direct 
US involvement. Furthermore, due to its fragmented decision-making process, 
domestic constraints, and weak leadership, the government was unable to take the 
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  246necessary decisions in regard to the Sinai Peninsula without being pressured, provided 
with incentives and rewarded with guarantees and assurances by the American 
administration. In fact, Rabin managed to reach a consensual decision on the matter 
only in response to American prodding. 
 
The interim agreement was in line with Israeli interests, as it did not require it to 
withdraw from areas it regarded as essential for its national security. Despite agreeing 
to negotiate with Egypt without preconditions, successive Israeli governments had, 
since the Oral Law, agreed to hold certain areas in Sinai indefinitely.
12 This stemmed 
from Israel’s desire to maintain strategic depth and ensure free naval passage through 
the straights of Tiran.
13 Therefore, successive Israeli governments concluded that they 
could ill afford to withdraw from the Rafah plains and Sharm El-Sheikh. Instead, they 
chose to invest in settling and developing these areas in anticipation that they would 
remain under Israel’s control.
14 Under Rabin, Israel strengthened its presence in the 
Rafah plains by creating a dense and continuous line of settlements from Yamit to the 
Eshkol region east of the Gaza Strip.
15 This helped Israel to control the Gaza Strip by 
surrounding it with Jewish settlements. It is important to note that the idea of 
controlling the Gaza Strip was linked to Israel’s presence in the Rafah plains. 
Arguably, Israel had no intention of holding the former without the latter.
16 The Gaza 
Strip was the price Israel was willing to pay in order to secure strategic depth in the 
Sinai Peninsula. However, it is important to note that, as with other regions, there was 
some disagreement over where the future border with Egypt should be and, in the 
absence of a clear decision, the line kept shifting.
17 A clear example of this was the 
settlement of Nahal Sinai and the government’s decision to establish an additional 
outpost near Abu-Agheila.  
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  247Interim Agreements 
 
In the run-up to the second interim agreement with Egypt, the Rabin government 
appeared to be willing to consider further territorial compromises with Syria and 
Jordan. This was partly the result of a change in public perception. After the initial 
interim agreement with Egypt and Syria, and according to the polls, the majority of 
Israelis were in favour of territorial compromises, though not a return to the 1967 
borders.
18 The government envisioned further interim agreement, with Jordan and 
Syria, based on an end to the state of war and further Israeli withdrawals. With 
regards to Jordan, the interim agreement would have been based on Israel’s continued 
presence in the Jordan Valley and on the West Bank mountain ranges. On the matter 
of Jerusalem, Israel was only willing to discuss religious and administrative 
arrangements. Additionally, any agreement with Jordan would have necessitated 
either new elections or a referendum, as promised to the NRP. In regard to Syria, 
Israel was willing to withdraw from an area encompassing up to a third of the Golan 
Heights. Further Israeli withdrawals from the Golan Heights would have depended on 
an extended period of calm of 10-15 years, and would have been based on the signing 
of peace agreements.
19 In March 1976, the government voted to accept the idea of 
interim agreements with Jordan and Syria based on a territorial compromise.
20 This 
followed several months of intense political debates in which the government 
appeared reluctant to vote on further territorial withdrawals. However, although the 
government decided in favour of interim agreements, it did not specify the exact 
nature of the territorial compromise it was proposing or its future relationship with the 
territories it planned to hold,
21 so as not to create a schism within the Coalition, i.e. 
with the NRP.  
 
According to Allon, Syria was unwilling to pursue an interim agreement with Israel. 
Israel offered an agreement that included an end to the state of war, transparency over 
the intentions of both states for Lebanon, and an additional Israeli withdrawal, albeit a 
small one.
22 According to Yadlin, the government discussed different approaches, 
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  248including leaving Israeli settlements under Syrian control as long as the Golan 
Heights remained demilitarised. However, he confirms that Syria was not interested in 
an interim agreement with Israel.
23 Israel pursued an interim agreement because it 
knew Syria would not agree to a peace agreement for less than a full Israeli 
withdrawal from all the Occupied Territories and a solution to the Palestinian 
problem.
24 According to Kissinger, there was no progress on the diplomatic front 
because of: internal Arab divisions; the Lebanese civil war; reservations about what 
Israel could actually deliver; and the fact that nothing could happened until after the 
American elections of 1976.
25 In addition, the Labour government was unable to push 
for far-reaching and extensive interim agreements without risking its narrow 
parliamentarian base. Israel was thus left with territories - parts of the Golan Heights 
and the areas in the West Bank not included in the Allon Plan - which it did not plan 
on holding and from which it was willing to withdraw. This provided Gush-Emunim 
with an opportunity to hijack the government’s territorial policies.  
 
 
Sebastia  
 
The international stature of the PLO increased dramatically after the Rabat Summit. It 
was invited to join the discussions in the UN on the future of Palestine and was 
offered to become a permanent observer. In the UN, the PLO supported efforts to 
denounce Israel and banish it from the organisation.
26 On the 10
th of November, the 
attempts by the PLO and the Arab states to de-legitimise Israel reached their pinnacle 
with a General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with Racism. In the MSC, 
Galili called for the establishment of 30 new settlements in 18 months as a response to 
this resolution.
27 Nevertheless, it was Gush-Emunim who took the opportunity to 
protest against the resolution by settling in the central region of Samaria, in a heavily 
populated area outside of the national consensus. 
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  249Back in October 1974, Gush-Emunim presented Galili and Rabin with their settlement 
plans. They requested that the government allow them to settle in the central region of 
Samaria, in the vicinity of Nablus. After being refused permission, the group 
attempted several times to settle illegally in the area, only to be forcibly removed by 
the army.
28 On the 29
th of November 1975, Gush-Emunim members, along with 
hundreds of supporters, arrived at the old railway station in Sebastia - the location of 
the capital of the biblical kingdom of Israel - about 10km from Nablus. According to 
Gush-Emunim, their settlement attempt was in response to, and influenced by, the 
Rabat Summit and the resolution equating Zionism with Racism.
29 The government 
voted unanimously to remove the settlers, but ministers decided to wait until after the 
conclusion of a meeting of the leaders of the Jewish faith. The meeting, a show of 
solidarity with the Zionist cause, by leaders of the world Jewry, opened in Jerusalem 
on the 3
rd of December.
30  
 
On the 3
rd of December, in a meeting of Mapam’s political committee, members 
argued that by not removing the settlers immediately the government was effectively 
legitimising their attempt. There were calls for an ultimatum to be given to Rabin, 
regarding Mapam’s participation in the government. In the end the committee decided 
to provide the government with more time to deal with the situation.
 31 
 
The government’s pause was exploited by thousands of Gush-Emunim supporters 
who joined the settlement attempt; amongst them were members of the NRP, MKs 
from the Opposition, leading Rabbis and even Rabin’s special security advisor Ariel 
Sharon. Sharon appeared to be supporting the project while advising Rabin on how to 
deal with it.
32 Because of the large number of supporters, and the delicate nature of 
the situation, concerns were raised by ministers, and by the Chief of Staff, regarding 
the possibility of bloodshed.
33 This prompted ministers to search for a solution that 
would remove the settlers without violence.
34 Additionally, the NRP exerted intense 
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  250pressure on Rabin to find a compromise.
35 While ministers debated the matter, Peres 
took it upon himself to negotiate a compromise, without consulting the government.
36 
Peres’ compromise was later approved because it was assumed that once the 
demonstration subsided, the government would gradually remove the settlers.
37 The 
compromise reached with Gush-Emunim allowed for 30 men - this later became 30 
families - to relocate temporarily to the Kadom army base nearby, and be employed 
by the army, until the government decided on their fate.
38  
 
On the 10
th of December, Mapam’s Political Committee agreed on a resolution 
describing the Sebastia incident as an attempt to create facts on the ground in order to 
realise the dream of greater Israel and hinder peace. It called the compromise with the 
settlers a dangerous precedent of yielding to illegal acts. Mapam’s committee 
criticised the government’s lame attempt to remove the settlers and concluded that the 
whole incident had hurt its credibility and authority.
39 Nevertheless, Mapam chose to 
remain in the Coalition.
40 
 
It took the government almost six months to decide not to establish a settlement in the 
Sebastia area. The decision called for the relocation of the settlers to a suitable site in 
accordance with government decisions. Furthermore, it decided that no action should 
be taken in the area to imply the transformation of the temporary camp into a 
permanent one.
41 This decision was promoted by the fact that the settlers were doing 
just that. In an official report, the Defence Ministry listed 23 families, 30-40 single 
people, and 45 children living in the camp. The report stated that the Defence 
Ministry was willing to establish several small factories, in order to employ the 
settlers, in jobs related to the defence industry.
42  
 
On the 1
st of June, Rabin requested that all of the settlers’ activities in the Kadom 
camp be in accordance with the government’s decision.
43 Earlier that day, Galili 
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  251notified Rabin that some of the activities in the camp ‘might be’ contravening the 
government’s decision.
44 In response, Peres claimed that the activities alluded to, e.g. 
new structures being built, employment by the army, building of a synagogue, were 
all done in the period before the government’s decision and therefore did not 
contradict the government’s decision.
45 Despite Peres’ response, Galili informed 
Rabin that activities contravening the government’s decision were still being carried 
out.
46 Galili authorised Yehiel Admoni to offer the settlers alternative settlement sites, 
among them Mescha: a site not yet approved on the western edge of the West Bank.
47 
The settlers, however, refused to relocate; they explained that there were other 
members of Gush-Emunim who would be glad to settle there. Admoni wrote back to 
Galili informing him of the settlers’ negative response and claimed that there was 
nothing more he could do.
48  
 
On the 20
th of July, Shem-Tov wrote to the government’s secretary demanding to 
know whether the government had invested any money in the camp. Furthermore, he 
asked whether or not a factory was established there and whether or not it employed 
the settlers. Additionally, he inquired whether any of these actions contradicted the 
government’s decision.
49 On the 27
th of July, Netzer replied to Shem-Tov detailing 
what had happened in Kadom. The settlers were initially moved into a prescribed area 
in the camp and several tents and sheds were provided for them. At the request of the 
Defence Minister, and the Prime Minister, 30 caravans were borrowed from the 
Jewish Agency to provide for temporary accommodation. An area within the 
perimeter of the camp was allocated to the caravans and for several additional 
‘temporary structures’ to serve as study rooms and toilets. These structures were 
connected to running water, sewage and electricity. The entire operation was done by 
the army, and the settlers, and was paid for by the Defence Ministry. Additionally, the 
settlers requested permission to establish several additional ‘temporary structures’, 
e.g. a mess hall, a synagogue, a mikvah and a small factory. The settlers were given 
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  252permission to establish these, on the condition that it was done at their own expense. 
The Defence Ministry did not provide any funds for these additional structures.
50  
 
On the 9
th of August, Tourism Minister Moshe Kol wrote to Rabin to inquire when 
the government was planning to implement its decision.
51 This was followed by a 
letter from Aharon Barak (the government’s Attorney General), who wrote in 
response to the settlers’ demand for access to state education. Barak argued that the 
government should provide education for the settlers’ children. However, because 
Israel’s law did not apply to the Occupied Territories and as there was no legal 
settlement in the area, the government was not obliged to provide for education there, 
since doing so might have implied the transformation of the settlement into a 
permanent one. Israel, therefore, should provide access to state education outside of 
the Occupied Territories. In this way the government could fulfil its obligation to the 
settlers’ children without changing its stance on Kadom.
52  
 
Unable to resolve the problem and unwilling to confront the settlers or risk the 
dissolution of the coalition, the government decided to leave the matter of Kadom 
until after the elections.
53 The story of Kadom illustrated the difficulty of operating on 
the basis of consensual politics, within a broad coalition, on matters of national 
importance and controversy. It also indicated the level of support received by Gush-
Emunim from elements within the Coalition. According to Yadlin, ‘Sebastia was the 
government’s submission to Gush-Emunim’.
54  
 
The episode also provided clear indication of the hostile relations between Peres and 
Rabin, which helped to fragment the government’s decision-making process. On the 
one hand, Rabin could not afford to dismiss Peres, because of factional politics, even 
though the latter was undermining the government. On the other hand, Peres’ 
behaviour was partly in response to the disrespect shown to him by Rabin, in 
particular Rabin’s decision to bypass Peres by appointing Sharon as a special advisor 
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  253on security matters.
55 The Kadom episode was followed by mutual recriminations. 
Rabin blamed the UN resolution, the fear of bloodshed and Peres;
56 he went as far as 
hinting that Peres served as a Trojan horse for Gush-Emunim.
57 In fact, Peres’s 
actions cannot be fully understood without taking into account his relationship with 
Gush-Emunim and the ideological similarities they shared. There is no doubt that 
Peres’s actions were influenced by his association with individuals and groups linked 
to New Zionism. 
 
Most ministers, with the exception of the NRP, also blamed Peres for the 
government’s capitulation.
58 Peres, however, blamed Rabin for undermining him - 
Rabin was apparently negotiating with the settlers through Sharon at the same time
59 - 
and the Chief of Staff for not wanting to remove the settlers; the army in-turn blamed 
the police.
60 More than anything else, Kadom exposed the inability or unwillingness 
of the dovish ministers - Mapam’s in particular - to hold the government to account.
61 
Shem-Tov described his experience during the affair as a ‘lone voice in the 
wildernesses’.
62 Yet, according to Hillel, during government meetings, Shem-Tov 
would deliver his condemnatory speeches, ministers would pretend to listen, and then 
the meeting would proceed as normal.
63  
 
 
Settlement Policy under Rabin 
 
Israel’s early settlement approach was loosely based on a military-strategic concept. 
The government perceived the Occupied Territories, with the exception of Jerusalem, 
as serving either a strategic or a bargaining function, i.e. an Instrumental view. 
Therefore, territories were designated either as dispensable or indispensable; the 
Allon Plan served to distinguish the latter from the former. The indispensable 
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  254territories included the Jordan Valley, the Rafah Plains, the Golan Heights and Sharm 
El-Sheikh. This Instrumental view of the territories changed with the establishment of 
Gush-Etzion, and later Hebron and Kiryat Arba, and their inclusion in the Allon Plan, 
as these settlements did not serve any strategic purpose. This change (from an 
Instrumental to a Normative view) was further enhanced with the arrival of Gush-
Emunim and the growing ideological importance, i.e. New Zionism, attached to the 
territories by the NRP and the Likud. However, the blame for deviating from the 
Allon Plan, and from the Instrumental view, was also due to the government’s own 
actions, and the work of Galili as head of the MSC.
64  
 
The Israeli settlements and army bases in the Jordan Valley provide us with a clear 
example. The Jordan valley was perceived as a strategically important area and as 
integral to the Allon Plan. During negotiations with Jordan, successive governments 
refused to compromise over this area. According to Netzer, the clearest indication of 
the Israel’s settlement approach was in regards to the Jordan Valley.
65 In reality, 
however, the settlements established in the Jordan Valley were not as extensive or 
developed as intended; these were small agricultural settlements with 44 residents 
each on average.
66 It is unlikely that Israel based its security concept on these 
settlements. Even on a strategic level, the main army bases, and troop concentrations, 
were not in the area but, on the mountain ranges, in accordance with Dayan’s ‘Mobile 
Defence’ concept. Additionally, Rabin made it clear that Israel would not relinquish 
its military control over those mountain ranges.
67 In essence, Israel was holding on to 
both the Jordan Valley and the mountain ranges even though, it stated that, from a 
military-strategic perspective, it needed only one of these. In short, it seems that the 
government was not operating according to the Allon Plan and was not acting purely 
on the basis of its strategic requirements. This lack of a clear and comprehensive 
long-term plan was acknowledged by Galili. On the 8
th of June 1976, Galili informed 
the MSC that he did not intend to present a comprehensive settlement plan. Instead, 
he proposed that the committee discuss and decide on settlement issues in an 
incremental manner, in response to government decisions, as and when required.
68 
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  255This lack of long-term planning, however, provided an opportunity for new ideas and 
plans to be tested. 
 
In January 1976, the government was presented with Avraham Wahman’s Double 
Column plan. Wahman claimed that Israel’s decision not to decide was a mistake and 
was a result of ‘Israel not knowing what it wanted’.
69 The plan was an attempt to 
build on, and expand, the Allon Plan. The plan called for two columns of continuous 
settlements: a western one along Israel’s coastal area to the Rafah plains (and from 
there to Eilat) and an eastern one from the Golan Heights to Sharm El-Sheikh. 
According to the plan the two columns would be connected by a series of roads that 
would intersect the West Bank. The plan called for the settlement of the Jordan 
Valley, the Sinai Desert and the Dead Sea region, not for security reasons, but as ‘a 
necessary physical part of the state’.
70 The Palestinian population would be cast aside 
to live in autonomous areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip enveloped by 
Israel.
71 The Labour Party decided to adopt some of the settlement ideas in the plan, 
but did not accept it as an expansion to the Allon Plan. The idea of expanding and 
strengthening the settlements in the Jordan Valley and the Rafah plains were clearly 
within the government’s consensus, less so the settlement of the Sinai Desert. 
However, the idea of closing the Jericho corridor was not acceptable as it would have 
closed the door on the Jordanian option.
72 
 
The second important plan to be considered was Peres’ idea of thickening Israel’s 
settlements on both sides of the green line, in order to ‘enlarge Israel’s tight hips’.
73 
The areas along the green line were mostly uninhabited and marginal, and it was 
agreed that these were areas Israel should continue holding on to indefinitely.
74 
Several new Nahal outposts were created towards the end of 1976 and the beginning 
of 1977 in accordance with this new approach: Sal’it, Reihan, Elkana and Ariel. It 
was widely understood that these would be transformed at a later stage into civilian 
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  256ones.
75 Additionally, by controlling these areas, Israel controlled the region’s main 
water aquifers, which affected the water resources of both Israel and the West Bank.
76 
This also added a new dimension to Israel’s territorial policy.
77 
 
The idea of settling along the green line was raised by Gush-Emunim and was 
supported by the NRP. A group associated with Gush-Emunim had lobbied the 
government and the NRP for the right to settle in Mescha for several years.
78 
Additionally, the area was identified by Galili and Admoni, after they were 
approached by the group, as suitable for settling, as part of Israel’s efforts to thicken 
the green line. Galili explained to the group that, once a decision has been taken by 
the government, and the logistical problems had been overcome, they would be 
allowed to settle there.
79 Under pressure from Gush-Emunim and from the NRP to 
authorise this settlement, Galili wrote to Hammer explaining that attempts to forcibly 
settle in the area were unnecessary as the delay in settling the area was due to 
technical and logistical problems. Galili asked Hammer not to publicise the 
arrangement as this would hinder the project.
80 The Mescha outpost was established 
two weeks before the elections and settled by the group; the new settlement was 
called Elkana.  
 
Elkana was not the only place in which the government either gave in to or 
cooperated with Gush-Emunim. In late 1976, following a request by Peres, and 
supported by Allon and Galili, the government approved the creation of a working 
camp in Ofra, a move reminiscent of the early settlement period of the Golan Heights. 
Furthermore, Galili informed the government of a proposal to transform Ma’ale 
Adumim into a permanent settlement.
81 The Allon Plan was clearly no longer the 
driving force behind Israel’s settlement activities and even Allon was supporting 
projects outside of its scope. Israel’s settlement activities under Rabin demonstrated 
the gradual shift that had occurred in Israel’s territorial policy from an Instrumental 
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  257into a Normative approach; this can be attributed to, among others, the impact of New 
Zionism.  
 
The settlement activity of the Rabin government during its final year resulted from 
three developing trends. First, due to the lack of meaningful negotiations and 
international pressure, areas that were previously outside of the national consensus 
were labelled ‘vacant’. Some of these were incorporated into the national consensus 
because of political pressure from the NRP and Gush-Emunim - in accordance with 
their vision of Greater Israel - as well as the growing ministerial appetite for 
redefining Israel’s future borders unilaterally.
82 Secondly, dovish ministers - in 
particular Mapam’s - appeared unable to influence the territorial decision-making 
process. This stemmed from the lack of a dovish faction in the Labour Party and from 
Mapam’s unwillingness to further weaken the government. Thus, in an effort to 
bolster Rabin’s government, Mapam was allowing it to act with impunity. Lastly, it 
became clear that the US would not put undue pressure on the government regarding 
the creation of settlements. This was despite the fact that the American administration 
was fully aware of Israel’s settlement activities,
83 and that it viewed these activities as 
illegal under international law.
84  
 
 
The Palestinian Option 
 
Despite the Rabat Summit resolution, Israel continued to view the Jordanian option as 
the most desirable one for the West Bank. However, Jordan’s weakness in the 
diplomatic arena, and the growing international clout of the PLO, prompted the 
government to re-examine its approach towards the West Bank. The solution favoured 
by officials was the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule (administrative 
rule), that would be in line with the Allon Plan, while not endangering the viability of 
the Jordanian Option.
85 This limited self-rule would be implemented by expanding 
the role of the mayors and by creating additional administrative roles for the locals in 
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  258the West Bank, and to a lesser degree, in the Gaza Strip.
86 The move towards 
Palestinian self-rule was also influenced by international pressure and growing calls 
from within the American administration for Israel to pursue a Palestinian-based 
approach. A prime example was a report which was presented to the US Congress, 
regarding the centrality of the Palestinian problem to the Arab-Israeli conflict, by the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders,
87 which was followed by 
another report from the Brookings Institute along the same lines. These reports were 
taken very seriously in Israel as it was feared they might entail a change in US 
policy.
88 Israel’s concern was not misplaced; these reports were later adopted by the 
Carter administration.  
                                                
 
According to Shlomo Gazit, Israel’s decision in late 1975 to move towards Palestinian 
self-rule, was a move too little to late due to a number of social changes that had 
occurred in the territories.
89 These were reflected in the changing attitude of the 
Palestinian population towards Israel. The new Israeli-Palestinian relations were 
directly linked to the prolonged occupation, the worsening economic situation in the 
territories, as a result of Israel’s recession and high inflation in the aftermath of the 
Yom Kippur War, and Israel’s settlement policies.
90 
 
Israel’s officials believed that the most effective way to promote limited self-rule 
would be through new local elections. It was hoped that these would promote a new 
leadership amongst Palestinians. This was despite growing fears among the 
Intelligence services that the new elections would be used by the PLO to strengthen 
its grip on the West Bank and remove pro-Jordanian notables. Indeed, the Intelligence 
services predicated accurately the outcome of the 1976 elections; it was a resounding 
victory for the PLO. Long-serving pro-Jordanian mayors, e.g. Al-Jabri in Hebron, 
were replaced by younger pro-PLO nationalists.
91 The elections caused great distress 
in Israel and Rabin was quick to lay the blame at Peres’s door.
92 On the 28
th of 
December 1976, a report by, the former head of AMAN, Yehoshafat Harkabi stated 
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  259that it was very unlikely that a new Palestinian leadership acceptable to Israel would 
arise.
93 Despite the election result, the government was unwilling to consider a 
Palestinian option, based on the PLO. The government went as far as making it an 
offence for Israeli citizens to contact members of Palestinian terrorist organizations, 
i.e. the PLO.
94 Additionally, attempts, by Mapam and the Independent Liberal Party, 
to leave all diplomatic options open by promoting dialogue with any Palestinian group 
that was willing to recognise Israel’s right to exist and renounce terrorism were not 
successful.
95 
 
Approaching the 1977 general elections, the government was left in a difficult 
situation. Violent incidents and civil disobedience in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip were on the rise, and Israel’s settlement policies were only worsening the 
situation; in other words (and in contrast to Dayan’s principles of non-intervention 
and non-visibility), a visible occupation and increased Israeli intervention in 
Palestinian economic, social and political life. This, in addition to Israel’s lack of a 
long-term diplomatic solution, made the job of maintaining a stable and ‘benevolent’ 
occupation extremely difficult.
96 Israel supported a limited Palestinian self-rule in the 
hope that a new leadership might emerge. However, this was undermining Jordan’s 
position in the West Bank and, as a result, complicated Israel’s negotiations with 
Jordan. Nevertheless, negotiations with Jordan continued on the premise of a 
territorial compromise based on a variant of the Allon Plan. This in turn was in 
complete contradiction to the activities of Peres in the Occupied Territories. While 
Israel debated the merits of the Palestinian and Jordanian options, Peres was busy 
implementing Dayan’s Functional Solution. Thus, in the absence of a guiding policy, 
Israel was advancing simultaneously in three different directions. 
 
 
The 1977 Elections  
 
On the eve of the 1977 elections, the Labour Party’s political committee held a series 
of discussions in order to decide on the new electoral platform. Party Chairman 
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  260Danny Rosolio called for a meaningful debate on the merits of the Fourteen-Point 
document as the basis for the new platform. However, party members rarely discussed 
the document; instead they used the occasion to debate Israel’s policies and long-term 
approach towards the Occupied Territories. Several issues were discussed and debated 
in the committee: interim agreements, future borders, the preferred West Bank 
approach, coalition promises made to the NRP and the party’s platform. According to 
Rabinowitz, the main issue facing the party was what to offer in return for an interim 
agreement and whether this should be included in the platform.
97 There was a 
realisation within the party that further territorial compromises would be required. 
Ofer called on the party to face-up to the fact that it needed to take very hard 
decisions regarding the territorial issue.
98 Rabin declared that the party was willing to 
accept territorial compromises, but would not agree to return to the 1967 borders. He 
went on to say that the main reason peace had not been achieved was due to ‘the other 
side’ not being ready.
99 The reason behind the party’s reluctance to return to those 
borders was, according to Yariv, based on the perception that the Arab world wanted 
a return to the situation that prevailed before the Six Day War, with the addition of a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
100 Dayan proposed that the 
party inform the electorate that the Arab states were offering peace agreements in 
return for a full Israeli withdrawal; a price the Labour Party was refusing to pay. 
Dayan, therefore, proposed asking the electorate directly whether they approved of 
this approach.
101  
 
The main areas of disagreement were the political future of the Golan Heights, the 
Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank. There was hardly any reference to the future 
status of Jerusalem or the Gaza Strip, even though the party never adopted a clear 
approach towards the latter. While the party was moving towards accepting a 
territorial compromise in the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, albeit without 
agreeing on its scope, it remained deeply divided over the political future of the West 
Bank, so much so that it could not even define its preferred approach. Therefore, there 
was a fear, according to Galili, that, because of factional politics and the controversial 
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  261nature of the territories, the final platform would not be accepted by the entire 
party.
102 
 
The Sinai Peninsula 
 
Some members appeared unconvinced by Sadat’s drive for peace and the need for 
substantial territorial compromises. Meir referred sarcastically to Sadat as a moderate: 
‘We give him the oil fields - he takes, we move beyond the passes - he takes, what a 
man of peace!’
103 However, it was apparent that a majority within the party supported 
a third interim agreement with Egypt based on further Israeli withdrawals. The main 
question was the scale of these withdrawals and whether or not Israel intended to hold 
on to certain areas. Hillel complained that he did not know the party’s position on 
Sinai. He added that the party was afraid of saying what it is that it wanted: ‘We must 
say that there are areas [in Sinai] from which we will not withdraw, in which we plan 
to continue settling and developing.’
104 Rabin stated that Israel would be required to 
withdraw from a large portion of Sinai in order to achieve peace, but would not agree 
to return to the 1967 border. According to Rabin, the new borders would be in line 
with the Oral Law, i.e. Israel would continue to hold the Rafah plains and a 
continuous strip of land from Sharm El-Sheikh to Eilat. However, Rabin caused some 
confusion when he stated that Israel ‘could leave open for interpretation what exactly 
is meant by territorial continuity’.
105 The idea that Israel might accept less than was 
stipulated in the Oral Law and the Allon Plan was raised by Yitzhak Navon. Navon 
surprised many when he explained that controlling Sharm El-Sheikh did not guarantee 
free naval passage, as the Egyptians could block naval access further south in Bab El-
Mandab.
106 
 
It is clear from the debate that the views expressed in the party were based mainly on 
the strategic value of the Sinai Peninsula and were consistent with the idea of further 
withdrawals. In addition, disagreements over the extent of future Israeli withdrawals 
were directly linked to the level of confidence members had in Sadat’s commitment to 
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  262peace. According to Yadlin, the second interim agreement proved to most ministers 
that Sadat was bent on peace.
107 It was apparent that, after the second interim 
agreement, more party members were willing to consider territorial withdrawals 
beyond the scope of the Allon Plan.  
 
The Golan Heights 
 
There seemed to be a realisation amongst party members that further withdrawals 
would be necessary in the Golan Heights. Bar-Lev, speaking for many, did not see an 
opportunity for reaching peace agreements with Syria, but did not rule out the 
possibility of an interim agreement, which would include territorial concessions in 
return for a non-belligerency agreement.
108 Allon argued that Israel should advance 
talks of an interim agreement, since waiting for peace agreements and full 
normalisation was tantamount to ending diplomatic negotiations.
109 The consensus 
within the party, as outlined by Rabin, was that Israel ‘will not withdraw from the 
Golan Heights, but this does not necessarily mean sticking to the current line’.
110 The 
party was able to reach a consensus on the necessity of pursuing an additional interim 
agreement, but not on the extent of the territorial compromise. The different approach 
from the Sinai Peninsula reflected a greater level of suspicion towards Syria. 
Nevertheless, and as with the Sinai Peninsula, the party did not outline the future 
status of these territories. 
 
The West Bank 
 
More than anything else, the subject of the West Bank exposed the widespread 
differences within the party, with different ministers and factions pulling in different 
directions. The ideas expressed and the solutions offered cannot simply be categorised 
as being based on either a Territorialist Approach, e.g. the Allon Plan, or a Functional 
Solution. Within the party and even within the different factions, these terms acquired 
different interpretations. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Ahdut-Ha’avoda. 
On the one hand, the resolution of Hakibbutz Hameuhad affirmed Ahdut-Ha’avoda’s 
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  263support for the Allon Plan and for the continuation of the settlement activities, as the 
only method of realising the socialist-Zionist ethos. On the other hand, the resolution 
called for negotiations without preconditions with all Arab states on the basis of 
territorial compromises.
111 Additionally, and for the first time, prominent dovish 
members (Sarid, Eban, Moshe Carmel, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and Yariv), representing 
all of the party’s factions, joined forces to propose a peace plan.
112 This plan reflected 
a growing movement within the party of breaking up the old factions and replacing 
them with new ones which were based on political orientation. 
 
In contrast to the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, the debate regarding the 
West Bank did not relate purely to strategic and military considerations; the debate 
was complicated by the invocation of ideological, psychological and religious images. 
The debate related to members’ perceptions of the land of Israel, the Jewish state, 
Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. Peres - the main proponent of the Functionalist 
Approach - stated that, while Israel required secure and defensible borders, neither 
international guarantees nor ‘a 14 km wide strip of land’ would be able to provide 
these.
113 Peres explained that the Arabs would never agree to a territorial compromise 
that did not include Jerusalem.  Because Israel would never accept this, he claimed ‘I 
do not believe there is a territorial compromise that will be acceptable to the Arabs’; 
‘In my view, it is better to pursue a functional and political compromise than a 
territorial compromise’. Peres asked why it was acceptable to build settlements in 
Hebron but not elsewhere in the territories.
114 The need to elaborate on what was 
meant by the term Functional Solution, prompted Meir to request a draft that would 
define ‘what we mean when we say a Functional Solution’,
115 and that such a draft be 
circulated among members.
116 Peres’ concerns over the security merits of the 
Territorialist Approach were also raised by Hillel. According to Hillel, territorial 
compromises were necessary in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights but, not in 
the West Bank: ‘There is not enough strategic depth … any withdrawal from the 
Jericho region will allow hostile elements into the area’. He argued that the party 
should stop stuttering on the issue of territorial compromises in the West Bank which, 
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  264according to him, were unnecessary; the solution to the Palestinian problem ‘was not 
east of the Jordan River but west of it’.
117  
 
Nonetheless, concerns were raised regarding the Functional Solution. Carmel stated 
that ‘Israel has no desire to rule over the population centres, as this might jeopardise 
its internal security and its sense of morality’.
118 Allon maintained that a Greater 
Israel solution would necessitate providing full rights to the Palestinian population, 
which would turn Israel into a bi-national state. However, if Israel decided to annex 
the territories without providing Palestinians with full rights it would cease to be a 
democratic state. Allon added that some members of the party were trying to advance 
a Functional Solution: ‘In my opinion, this kind of solution is a new edition or version 
of the South African approach’ and ‘the worst of all possible solutions’. According to 
Allon, the solution to the West Bank had to be based on a negotiated settlement with 
Jordan.
119 Allon asked how it was possible that the party was talking about territorial 
compromises with Syria but not with Jordan.
120 By agreeing on the need for a 
territorial compromise with Jordan ‘we are freeing ourselves of a great burden’.
121 
Allon stated that Israel did not want a third state between itself and Jordan and 
therefore, had to agree to a territorial compromise.
122  
 
Allon’s derision of the Functional Solution was shared by Galili. ‘The main reason we 
favour a territorial compromise in the West Bank’ is because ‘we do not want to force 
the population to live under our control’.
123 Galili asked Peres whether he would 
consider putting the idea of a Functional Solution to a vote, in order to clarify the 
party’s policies and position.
124 He questioned why the party would not publicly state 
its willingness to strive for peace with Jordan based on a territorial compromise.
125 
These and other comments, prompted Ya’akobi to ask whether the party had rejected 
the possibility of negotiating with Jordan on the basis of a Functional Solution.
126 
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  265However, the need to placate Peres, and his large group of supporters, meant that the 
party could not afford to reject the Functional Solution altogether. Bar-Lev 
acknowledged that there were two options, and that, although he did not believe a 
Functional Solution was a realistic one, he argued that discounting it completely was 
unnecessary. He added that it would be good if Israel could reach an agreement with 
Jordan based on a territorial compromise. However, ‘if we can reach an agreement 
based on a Functional Solution, which, I think, is unlikely, that would be even 
better’.
127 
 
This desire to avoid precise definitions and policies appeared preferable. Rabin stated 
that there was no reason to define the scope of any territorial compromise, ‘it is 
unnecessary in my opinion to draw maps’.
128 Zadok concluded the meeting by 
reminding the party that there was no need to include specific plans or proposals in 
the electoral platform. He stated that the decision on whether or not to accept a 
particular plan or not should be left to the government.
129 The proposed platform 
reiterated the party’s commitment to pursuing peace agreement based on territorial 
compromises. The main difference between the new platform and the Fourteen-Point 
document was in nuance. The new platform added that Israel was committed to 
territorial compromises with each of its neighbours,
130 but the paper was approved by 
only a small margin. Last minute amendments proposed by Dayan, including one that 
would have allowed for the creation of Jewish settlements across the West Bank, were 
narrowly defeated. Entering the 1977 elections, the Labour Party, unable to clearly 
define its long-term policies in regards to the Occupied Territories and unwilling to 
risk party disunity, decided in affect not to decide. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In the wake of Meir’s resignation, Rabin was hand-picked by Sapir to lead the Labour 
Party. As the head of a minority government, lacking a solid party base and without 
much political experience, he was at a disadvantage from day one. It is, therefore, not 
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long-term policy approach towards the Occupied Territories.  
 
In its three years in power the Rabin government based its approach loosely on a 
strategic-military concept, i.e. the Allon Plan. Nevertheless, at no time was it able to 
define or agree on the exact parameters of the territories it regarded as essential for its 
national security. Moreover, the establishment of army bases, and the investment in 
infrastructure and settlement, in the Occupied Territories, did not correspond directly 
to the Allon Plan, or, for that matter, to any particular plan or concept. The clearest 
indication of this muddled approach was the West Bank. On the one hand, the 
government half-heartedly pursued a settlement with Jordan based on the Allon Plan. 
On the other hand, it was undermining Jordan’s position in the West Bank by 
promoting Palestinian self-rule. The government’s uncertain approach provided Peres 
with a blank cheque to implement a Functional Solution in the West Bank. In short, 
the government was arbitrarily pursuing and implementing three different policies. 
 
The reasons for this lack of clear and comprehensive policies are rooted in Israel’s 
domestic sphere. Rabin was a novice Prime Minister, constrained by the factional 
politics of the Labour Party, undermined by Peres and forced to include the NRP in 
the Coalition in order to broaden his narrow parliamentarian base. The need to operate 
on the basis of consensual politics forced him to resort to an incremental and ad-hoc 
strategy of decision-making based on improvisation. The government’s political 
weakness and lack of clear policies were effortlessly exposed by Gush-Emunim. An 
examination of the Rabin period also reveals the extent of the transformation the 
Jewish state had undergone - characterised by the demographic changes, the rise of 
New Zionism, the growing importance of religion, and the change of political power 
from the founding generation to the 1948 generation - and the impact it had on the 
government’s ability to formulate clear long-term policies. The sole exception to the 
government’s lack of long-term planning was its second interim agreement with 
Egypt. This, however, had more to do with American diplomatic pressure and the 
commitment to extensive military and financial aid.  
 
It can be argued that, had the Labour Party won the 1977 elections, it would have 
been pressurised by the Carter administration to commit to further interim agreements 
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with Syria and Egypt, and possibly Jordan or the PLO. Additionally, by winning the 
elections it would have received a public mandate to pursue these agreements. These 
would have been based on Israel’s willingness to withdraw from most of the Sinai 
Peninsula, up to a third, but possibly more, of the Golan Heights, and from the 
populated areas of the West Bank with an option of turning the Gaza Strip into either 
a Jordanian or a Palestinian demilitarised area. However, the lack of clear policies 
was the party’s downfall and one of the reasons it lost the elections.
131 
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This thesis proposed to deal with the new and complex reality that dawned on the 
Middle East in the aftermath of the Six Day War. This reality was shaped principally 
by the capture of Arab territories by Israel during six days of fighting in June 1967, a 
summer which forever changed the landscape of the region. While a detailed account 
of the efforts to try and tackle some of the challenges faced by the Israeli decision 
makers included an extensive examination of Israel’s political system, it also focused 
on the Jewish state’s security, demographic and economic concerns. When 
considering the various approaches adopted by politicians and the different solutions 
proposed by the numerous committees, the research raised the question of whether 
successive Israeli governments, under the leadership of the Labour Party, had a 
coherent and comprehensive long-term policy with regard to the Occupied Territories; 
a policy that would take into account the challenges posed by the occupation of Arab 
land. 
 
It is the central argument of this thesis that successive Israeli governments did not 
have, with the exception of East Jerusalem, such a policy towards the Occupied 
Territories. This is not to say that no decisions were ever taken or that the process of 
formulation, approval and implementation of short-term policies was completely non-
existent. Indeed, actions taken by successive governments included establishing 
settlements and army bases, occasionally in contravention of their own laws and 
regulations, annexing areas unilaterally, integrating - to an extent - the economy of the 
territories with that of Israel, negotiating with Arab states over the territories as well 
as establishing a military administration in the Occupied Territories. However, at no 
time during the period researched did the government reach a formal, or for that 
matter an informal, decision on the long-term future of the Occupied Territories. 
Successive Israeli governments made decisions based on comprehensive long-term 
plans and approaches, such as the idea of annexation, the Allon Plan and the 
Functional Solution. However, these decisions, when put into context and viewed as a 
whole, did not amount to any coherent and comprehensive long-term policy - one that 
provided an answer to the challenges posed by the occupation of the territories. The 
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on a specific basis. 
 
It can be argued that with regards to specific areas, i.e. the Golan Heights, Sharm El-
Sheikh, the Rafah Plains, the Gaza Strip, the Jordan Valley and Gush Etzion, the 
government had made a clear decision to annex, or to continue to hold these areas 
indefinitely. However, having meticulously examined Israel’s decisions regarding 
these areas, the suggestion that a clear decision had been taken does not seem to be 
valid. Despite domestic pressure, from within the Coalition, the Labour Party and the 
electorate, at no time did the government formulate or implement a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term policy for these areas. Moreover, during this research it 
became quite clear that the government’s decisions regarding these areas did not 
usually correspond to its military, economic, demographic, political and diplomatic 
aims and objectives. There is therefore no basis for the claim that the government ever 
had a coherent and comprehensive policy for these areas.  
 
More specifically, there is hardly any documented evidence to support the claims that 
successive Israeli governments had a comprehensive long-term policy, a specific 
long-term approach, a long-term economic plan, a settlement plan or a settlement map 
for the Occupied Territories. It is true that the Allon Plan was widely supported and 
promoted by ministers. However, at no time did it become an official policy, and it 
was only implemented in conjunction with other plans, e.g. the Functional Solution, 
or only partially implemented, e.g. in the case of the Jordan Valley. Furthermore, 
there were many instances in which the government, and even Allon, acted in ways 
that contradicted the plan, e.g. the establishment of Kiryat Arba, Kadom, Ofra and 
Elkana. In fact, successive governments employed a variety of different, and at times 
contradictory, approaches towards the territories. 
 
The Golan Heights 
 
The fact that Israel aspired to hold on to the Golan Heights indefinitely is 
indisputable, as seen in the actions taken by successive Israeli governments, which 
effectively demonstrated their intent to informally annex the territory. This was 
supported by the majority of the political parties (including Mapam) and by the 
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advantages it did not wish to relinquish: protection of its main water sources, 
provision of strategic depth, security for the Upper Galilee Region, an elevated 
military position and a constant deterrence against Syrian aggression. Israel’s stated 
position was against any agreement that would require it to withdraw from the Golan 
Heights. In practice, however, successive Israeli governments indicated their 
willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, or at least from parts of the territory, 
on numerous occasions, e.g. the 19
th of June Decisions, Allon’s secret peace plan, or 
the government’s decision of March 1976. In fact, it had become part of the prevailing 
wisdom that Israel could withdraw from up to a third of the Golan Heights without 
losing any of its strategic advantages. However, Israel’s settlement and economic 
decisions in regard to the Golan Heights appeared not to be linked to its stated 
strategic objectives. Its settlement activities and its investment in infrastructure did 
not correspond to the areas it required strategically, i.e. the central region of the 
Golan; Israel’s development of the Golan Heights lagged far behind its stated 
objectives and its annexationist rhetoric. The thesis does acknowledge that this was 
partly the result of the territory’s geographical and logistical features, which were 
significantly constraining elements; however, this was not as important as other 
factors. 
 
Israel’s policy approach towards the Golan Heights was governed not only by its 
strategic imperatives, but also by two important interlinking factors: the US’ foreign 
policy and the pressure it exerted on Israel, and Syria’s diplomatic stance. Syria’s 
reluctance - prior to the Yom Kippur War - to negotiate with Israel, either directly or 
indirectly, and its refusal to adopt any resolution that conferred recognition of Israel, 
e.g. the Khartoum Summit and Resolution 242, resulted in it being treated as an 
international pariah. Consequently, the position adopted by the Israeli government 
that ‘there was no one to talk to’ on the Syrian front, reflected the diplomatic reality. 
As a result of Syria’s diplomatic stance and its association with the USSR, no 
substantial American pressure was put on Israel to give up the Golan Heights; Israel’s 
actions in the Golan continued with little American scrutiny. Nevertheless, American 
political pressure was enough to moderate Israel’s position regarding the Golan 
Heights and to deter it from annexing the territory. In the aftermath of the Yom 
Kippur War, Syria seemed to relax its position towards Israel which, consequently, 
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Heights. Unable to resist American pressure, and perceiving Syria to be less of a 
military threat, Israel moved to adjust its own position accordingly. Arguably, had 
Syria accepted an additional interim agreement, or had the Labour Party won the 1977 
general elections, it would be right to assume that Israel would have made further 
concessions in the Golan. 
 
The Sinai Peninsula 
 
In its 19
th of June Decisions, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula to the 
international border, excluding the Gaza Strip. However, Nasser’s perceived 
belligerency caused the Israeli government to rescind its decision. It became clear that 
Israel’s attitude towards the territory was linked, for most parts, to its strategic 
imperatives - secure naval passage, strategic depth and secure borders - and its 
relationship with Egypt. In other words, the more bellicose Nasser became, and the 
longer the War of Attrition dragged on, the less likely Israel was to withdraw to the 
international border and the stronger the voices in Israel demanding changes to the 
border grew. This correlation, between Israel’s position regarding the Sinai Peninsula 
and its relationship with Egypt, became more obvious with the coming to power of 
Sadat. The more Egypt became open and willing to negotiate, the more open Israeli 
governments became towards the idea of withdrawing from Sinai; it is important to 
note that this approach was only adopted in earnest under Rabin. Meir, despite 
objections from within the government, and against Israel’s stated strategic and 
military objectives, stood steadfast against any territorial concessions in the Sinai 
Peninsula, viewing such acts as a prelude to an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. 
 
Throughout the period researched, Israel’s stated aims regarding the Sinai Peninsula 
were of a military-strategic nature. At no time did the government express any desire 
to hold on to parts of the Sinai Peninsula for other reasons than military-strategic. 
Israel’s settlement activity in Sinai, in particular under Meir and Rabin, corresponded 
almost entirely to its perceived military-strategic needs. However, it is important to 
remember that Israel had established several settlements that did not correspond to its 
strategic aims and that were outside of the Rafah Plains and the Sharm El-Sheikh-
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to note that the government never established clear settlement guidelines and 
parameters for Sinai. 
 
In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, and as Israeli leaders became convinced of 
Sadat’s intentions, they were more willing to accommodate Egypt and moderate their 
demands regarding the Sinai Peninsula. This was evident during the Labour Party’s 
conference in January 1977, where Rabin suggested that Israel might not require (and 
therefore would not insist on) having presence along the Sharm El-Sheikh-Eilat strip. 
Arguably, given the time, Israel’s position regarding the Rafah Plains might have also 
changed. In short, Israel did not have a clear long-term policy in regard to the Sinai 
Peninsula. Its flexible and short-term decisions regarding the region were, with some 
exceptions - most notably the Rafah Plains and Nahal Sinai - in response to the 
perceived threat emanating from Egypt.  
 
The Gaza Strip and the Rafah Plains 
 
Successive Israeli government were unable to produce either a coherent short-term or 
long-term policy towards the Gaza Strip; it is apparent from their actions that Gaza 
was like a thorn in Israel’s plans. When asked about it, Hillel, Shem-Tov and Yadlin 
were unable to explain what was Israel’s policy regarding the Gaza Strip.
1 Successive 
Israeli governments, unable to annex Gaza because of the demographic problem and 
unwilling to withdraw because of military-strategic considerations, appeared clueless 
as to what to do with the Gaza Strip. Initially, the government planned to relocate the 
Arab population and annex the territory. Once it became convinced that this was not 
feasible, the government sought to reach an understanding with Jordan in exchange 
for concessions in the West Bank; this idea was dropped under Meir. Nonetheless, the 
strategic-military concern from the possible consequences of allowing a foreign army 
into the territory was so prevalent, that the government decided to hold on to the 
territory, despite not having a viable long-term plan for it.  
 
In this respect, Israel’s decision to establish settlements in the Gaza Strip, and later in 
                                                 
1 Interview with Hillel, interview with Shem-Tov, interview with Yadlin. 
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was thought that the settlement activity in the Gaza Strip would ease the burden of 
controlling the territory.
2 Nevertheless, the marginal settlement activity was a 
testament to the fact that successive Israeli governments were unwilling to invest 
heavily in this endeavour. However, Israel’s desire to control the Gaza Strip led to the 
establishment of a strong military and civilian presence in the Rafah Plains. In fact, of 
all the Occupied Territories, Israel’s proposed military and civilian plans for the 
Rafah Plains were its most ambitious. Israel had established settlements in the Rafah 
Plains and around the Gaza Strip in order to control Gaza. Yet, at no time did it 
provide an account of its intentions for the future status of the Gaza Strip and its 
population, and the Rafah Plains. Moreover, Israel’s approach regarding the Rafah 
Plains was dependent on its continued presence in the Gaza Strip. Additionally, 
Israel’s settlement and military activities in the Rafah Plains undermined its 
negotiations with Egypt. To use a Hebrew metaphor, the Gaza Strip had become a 
bone in Israel’s throat, one that Israel could neither swallow nor cough out.  
 
The West Bank 
 
The story of the West Bank provides the clearest example that Israel did not have a 
coherent and comprehensive long-term policy. From the onset of the territorial debate, 
the government was unable to reach a consensus over the future of the West Bank; the 
government was unable to either define its main objectives or reach an agreement 
over its preferred approach - Palestinian or Jordanian. In the absence of a guiding 
policy, Israeli governments decided not to decide over the long-term future of the 
West Bank. The need to reach a consensus on such a controversial issue proved to be 
a difficult task within the confines of the National Unity Government. The main 
problem faced by decision makers was their inability to define their approach, 
debating on whether it should be Instrumental or Normative. On the one hand, they 
felt a historic-religious attachment towards the West Bank, as part of the biblical 
Jewish homeland; this is particularly true in regard to Hebron. On the other hand, 
decision-makers viewed certain areas of the West Bank as strategically important, e.g. 
the Jordan River and the Jerusalem Passage. 
                                                 
2 See Page 173. 
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The debate on what was required from a strategic-military perspective and what was 
desirable from an ideological-religious perspective was further clouded by the 
demographic problem posed by the West Bank. Israel’s approach towards the West 
Bank was based on the realisation that it could ill afford to annex the heavily 
populated Palestinian urban centres. In fact, the two main plans proposed by 
ministers, i.e. the Functional Solution and the Allon Plan, were designed to provide a 
solution to this very problem. These plans, while acknowledging both a Palestinian 
and a Jordanian element, depended on two distinct approaches. The Allon Plan was 
based on the principle of static defences, control over strategic areas, agricultural 
settlements and withdrawal from the heavily populated areas, while the Functional 
Solution advocated mobile defences, urban settlements, economic integration and an 
administrative solution; it is important to note that both plans shared similar short-
term goals. Unfortunately, despite the fact that neither of these plans was officially 
adopted, significant parts of both were still executed. The implementation of the Allon 
Plan and the Functional Solution simultaneously undermined both plans, as well as 
the Palestinian and Jordanian approaches, and left the demographic problem 
unresolved. 
 
Israel’s settlement activities in the West Bank compounded the problem by deviating 
from both these plans. It is true that the majority of Israel’s settlements in the West 
Bank were established in accordance with the Allon Plan. However, especially during 
the Rabin period, settlements were established in areas outside the scope of the plan. 
The establishment of settlements outside the scope of the Allon Plan, e.g. in Hebron 
and Kiryat Arba as well as in the heavily populated region of Samaria, was in 
contradiction to Israel’s stated strategic and demographic objectives. Moreover, 
Israel’s settlement activities contradicted its professed aim of reaching a negotiated 
settlement with Jordan over the future of the West Bank. Arguably, Israel’s 
unwillingness to withdraw completely from the West Bank, the annexation of East 
Jerusalem, the lack of a suitable Palestinian partner and the lack of any meaningful 
American diplomatic pressure, contributed to Israel’s lack of clear and comprehensive 
settlement policy regarding the West Bank.  
 
It was not only Israel’s settlement policy that made little sense. Israel’s political and 
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objectives; this was also true in regard to the Gaza Strip. Israel sought, in accordance 
with the Functional Solution, to empower local officials and implement Palestinian 
self-rule in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. This went hand-in-hand with 
Dayan’s objectives of raising living standards and integrating the economies of the 
Occupied Territories with Israel’s.  However, Dayan’s, and later Peres’ political and 
economic decisions stood in contrast to the Labour Party’s desire to avoid economic 
integration and de-facto annexation. Additionally, the economic integration and 
empowerment of local officials undermined Jordan’s position and was in contrast to 
Israel’s professed aim of reaching a negotiated settlement with Jordan over the West 
Bank, and potentially over the Gaza Strip. In other words, successive governments 
appeared to act against Israel’s perceived aims and objectives regarding the West 
Bank.  
 
 
The Lack of a Clear and Comprehensive Long-Term Policy 
 
There are many factors that govern and affect the decision-making process and 
Israel’s territorial decision-making process was no exception. Arguably, it is an 
almost impossible task to chart the exact events, and pinpoint the precise factors, 
which lead to Israel’s lack of a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy. 
Moreover, to provide an accurate analysis that would encapsulate all of the factors 
behind this phenomenon experienced by successive governments is an even bigger 
task. In trying to explain why successive governments failed to put forward a coherent 
and comprehensive long-term policy, four major contributing factors have been 
identified: the faction-based politics of the Labour Party; the US position vis-à-vis 
Israel; New Zionism (i.e. the resurgence of nationalist and religious fervour); and the 
intention of successive Prime Ministers to avoid formulating a clear long-term policy. 
The thesis acknowledges that there were many other factors involved, and that these 
might have played an important role in regard to a particular government but do not 
apply to all three governments. These factors include the lack of suitable peace 
partners; the relative ease by which Israel’s administered the territories, the weakness 
of the dovish elements in the government; the lack of international pressure; the role 
played by the IDF; the actions of individual ministers; the fragmentation of the 
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The Faction-Based Politics of the Labour Party 
 
The unification of the Israeli Labour parties (Mapai, Rafi, Ahdut-Ha’avoda and 
Mapam) was the lifelong ambition of many Labour leaders. The Labour parties, with 
the exception of Mapam, did not exhibit major political differences in terms of their 
economic and social platforms. The main points of contention between them 
surrounded the role of Ben-Gurion, and the young guard (tze’irim), as well as Mapai’s 
nomination system and its abuse of political patronage. There were major differences 
between the parties, and between party members, in regard to the territorial issue and 
on the nature of Israel’s polity. It is important to note that the territorial issue was of 
little importance prior to the Six Day War. The acquisition of the territories brought to 
the fore a political debate, which focused on the future borders of Israel and the nature 
of its polity, and which had been left dormant since the War of Independence. This 
debate crossed party and faction lines and threatened to derail the success of the 
unification process.
3 
 
Successive Labour governments failed to produce a substantive and coherent 
territorial policy; they postponed making crucial decisions regarding the future of the 
territories and decided ‘not to decide’ because of the improbability of reaching a 
consensus within governments which were divided by party and factional loyalties. 
Politicians regularly displayed their inability, or unwillingness to overcome factional 
differences and inter-factional competition for power and influence. Beilin attributes 
the party’s, and subsequently the governments’, policy immobilisation to the ‘price of 
unity’.
4 The need to maintain party unity, and avoid a split amongst the factions, 
ensured that the unified party was unable and unwilling to take a clear and 
unequivocal stand on the issue of the Occupied Territories. The examples of the Oral 
Law and the Galili Document clearly illustrate this point. In response to Dayan’s 
demands for clear policies, the party tried to find a formula that would fulfil most of 
Dayan’s demands, while not committing the party or alienating its dovish members. 
In fact, the Oral Law was described as a non-binding ‘optional-unwritten 
                                                 
3 See Pages 15-19 and 87-90. 
4 Interview with Beilin.  
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5 while the 
Galili Document was a patched-up compromise that was never binding on party 
members - Mapam members were allowed, as part of the Alignment, to vote against 
the document.
6 In other words, the party’s need to formulate a coherent and 
comprehensive territorial policy became secondary to the need to maintain unity. 
 
The US Position. 
 
The Israeli government was certain, in the aftermath of the Six Day War, that it would 
be required to relinquish control over most of the territories it occupied. It is therefore 
not a surprise that the government had agreed, in its 19
th of June Decisions, to 
withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights to the international border 
in exchange for peace. However, and as explained earlier, this decision was taken, 
first and foremost, for the purpose of pacifying the American administration.
7 Early 
on, decision makers understood the prominent role played by the American 
administration and the need to co-ordinate its actions with Israel’s. The American 
administration became, in the aftermath of the Six Day War, Israel’s most important 
diplomatic, financial and military supporter. Subsequently, its influence on the Israeli 
decision-making process was such that Israel could ill afford to take a decision that 
went against US interests without some trepidation. However, the US, in its own 
interests and for its own reasons, chose, for most of the period, not to put pressure on 
Israel on the matter of settlements and the territorial concessions.  
 
The lack of a clear long-term territorial policy did not come directly as a result of the 
lack of US pressure; nevertheless, the lack of US pressure exacerbated the problem. 
On the one hand, the ability of Israeli decision makers to formulate a long-term policy 
was restricted by the stated position of the American administration, i.e. the Rogers 
Plan and Johnson’s Five Principles. On the other hand, Israeli indecisiveness was 
compounded by the mixed messages it received from the US; this was true in regards 
to both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. 
 
                                                 
5 See Pages 138-139.  
6 See Pages 194-195. 
7 See Pages 44-45. 
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policies was the position of the American administration. There are many examples 
for this behaviour, e.g. Israel’s decision against annexing and implementing a 
vigorous settlement plan in the Golan Heights; Israel’s timid settlement activities 
during the Eshkol and Meir governments; as well as the governments’ insistence, 
even if it meant only as lip-service, that it had accepted the notion of a territorial 
compromise. Furthermore, the extent of Israel’s settlement activities and territorial 
ambitions were directly linked to the limits set out by the Rogers Plan and Johnson’s 
Five Principles, i.e. the recognition that Israel could annex certain areas in order to 
fulfil its military-strategic needs. It is true that Israel continuously tried to push these 
boundaries, but had the American administration rebuked Israel publicly, the Israeli 
government would have probably come into line with the US position. Israeli 
decision-makers remarked on many occasions that, as long as the US had not put its 
foot down on the matter of the Occupied Territories, Israel was free to continue with 
its actions. In short, the US position, i.e. constraining decision-makers, sending mixed 
messages, counter-balancing the hawkish elements and not putting pressure on Israel, 
helped to exacerbate existing divisions, while strengthening the hands of those who 
argued in favour of avoiding taking clear decisions on the Occupied Territories. 
 
 
New Zionism 
 
The rise of New Zionism and the growing importance attached to religious matters 
did not contribute directly to Israel’s lack of a clear and long-term policy. The main 
impact was on the activities of individuals, Tabenkin’s followers, the NRP, Gush-
Emunim and the Land of Israel Movement, and it was the activities of these 
individuals and groups that contributed indirectly to the government’s policy 
immobilisation. Additionally, it can be argued that the views of several prominent 
decision makers were modified by New Zionism ideology, i.e. a gradual shift from an 
Instrumental towards a Normative approach (examples of these include, among 
others, the views of Galili and Peres, which may help to explain their flirtations with 
Gush-Emonim).  
 
The early attempts by groups associated with Tabenkin and the Land of Israel 
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Hebron, exposed and weakened the fragile National Unity Government. The wall-to-
wall Coalition was unable to take a firm stand against these settlement attempts, 
precisely because certain factions and individuals within the Labour Party, as well as 
Gahal and the NRP, supported these attempts. These parties and individuals identified 
with and espoused the Normative motives and objectives associated with New 
Zionism. More importantly, because of the rise of its young guard, which was 
associated with New Zionism, the NRP was unable to provide its traditional support 
to the Coalition led by the Labour Party. In fact, because of its faction-based politics, 
the NRP was unable, until the 1973 elections, to clearly articulate its own position 
regarding the Occupied Territories. In other words, the rise of New Zionism and the 
growing importance attached to religious matters changed the dynamics of the Israeli 
political system in a way that weakened Mapai’s, and later the Labour Party’s, 
parliamentary base and ability to dictate policy. 
 
The effect of the internal changes within the NRP came to a head in the 1973 general 
elections. Buoyed by its relative success in the elections, the NRP made several 
specific demands during the Coalition negotiation process. The NRP made it clear 
that it would not join the government unless it agreed to either hold a referendum, or 
call for new elections before any decision regarding the future status of the West Bank 
was taken. This demand, in addition to the Labour’s weak parliamentary base, 
ensured that the Rabin-led government was constrained in its ability to form a clear 
long-term policy regarding the West Bank. Rabin, subsequently, preferred to 
concentrate on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, leaving the negotiations on the future 
of the West Bank for a later date.  
 
Lastly, Gush-Emunim obstructed and hindered the government’s decisions and 
actions in regard to the Occupied Territories, in particular the West Bank. Gush-
Emunim - supported by the young guard of the NRP, by Tabenkin’s followers, by 
members of the Opposition and by Peres - directly challenged the government’s 
territorial approach, thus contributing to the government’s inability to formulate a 
clear long-term policy.  
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There is no doubt that Eshkol, Meir and Rabin led very different governments in their 
time in office. These governments were led by prime ministers who brought with 
them different sets of experiences, skills and images. For instance, Eshkol and Rabin 
were seen as weak prime ministers, who struggled to control their party and were 
undermined by their respective defence ministers. In contrast, Meir was regarded as a 
dominant prime minister who influenced and dictated Israel’s foreign affairs and 
security decision-making processes. Moreover, these three governments faced 
different sets of international and domestic circumstances. Nevertheless, it is very 
clear that each prime minister, for his or her own reasons, favoured a non-committing 
approach towards the Occupied Territories, while all three Prime Ministers made a 
clear choice of advocating against the formulation of a coherent and comprehensive 
long-term policy; this choice was made, at times, against the advice of ministers and 
advisory committees. There are, of course, many mitigating circumstances but, 
ultimately, it was the responsibility and imperative of each prime minister to rise up to 
the challenges that faced him/her. Unfortunately, successive prime ministers chose, 
for reasons of self-preservation and political convenience, not to pursue a coherent 
and comprehensive long-term policy. 
 
The Eshkol-led National Unity Government had a wall-to-wall Coalition that 
contained the Right, the Left and the NRP. The government was under no 
international pressure and, with the exception of Hussein - who, it was thought, could 
not act without Nasser - had no suitable peace partners with whom to negotiate. Under 
these circumstances, the government, exhibiting a fragmented decision-making 
process, undermined by ministers, unable to define its main objectives and unable to 
find common ground, chose not to pursue a comprehensive long-term policy. In other 
words, any attempt by Eshkol to pursue such a policy had the potential to cause a split 
in the Labour Party and bring down the Coalition.  
 
Eshkol’s position within the Labour Party and within the National Unity Coalition 
was severely weakened in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Eshkol was actively 
undermined by Dayan and his margins for political manoeuvring were constrained by 
the National Unity Coalition and the Labour Party’s unification process. Eshkol 
  281initially favoured a practical approach towards the Occupied Territories, one that took 
into account Israel’s strategic-military and demographic needs. However, due to the 
lack of suitable peace partners, Eshkol’s stance changed and he voted in favour of 
establishing settlements, even though he did not put a clear long-term policy in place. 
Owing to his weakened political standing and his dithering and indecisive character, 
combined with domestic and international factors, Eshkol opted for a muddled and 
ad-hoc approach.  
 
In contrast to Eshkol, Meir monopolised and dominated the decision-making process 
through her kitchenette. Unlike Eshkol, Meir, especially after Gahal left the Coalition 
in 1970, enjoyed an unprecedented strong parliamentary base. With Meir, it was not 
the ministers or Coalition partners that undermined her; on the contrary, it was Meir 
herself who undermined efforts to reach a clear long-term policy, either by interfering 
with the formulation process or by avoiding taking important decisions. Meir’s 
distrust of the Arab side, her belief that time was on Israel’s side and her 
determination to maintain party unity, led her to favour a non-committing approach to 
the Occupied Territories. Meir appeared to be more preoccupied with maintaining 
Labour Party unity than with defining Israel’s long-term approach towards the 
territories. 
 
Meir, who aligned herself with Galili, Dayan and the hawkish elements in the Labour 
Party and the Coalition, chose to overlook the demographic and social costs of the 
ongoing occupation in pursuit of ‘secure and recognised borders’- a term she never 
tried to define. Meir refused to consider Israel’s long-term relationship with the 
Occupied Territories and the Palestinian people. In fact, under Meir, Israel established 
settlements in the Rafah Plains and the Gaza Strip without ever taking into account 
the long-term implications of such acts.  
 
Of the three prime ministers, Rabin’s political situation was the most precarious; he 
did not have the unqualified support of the Labour Party, or for that matter of any of 
its factions. Rabin’s position was further weakened by the Labour Party’s weak 
parliamentary base and its increase reliance on the NRP in the aftermath of the Yom 
Kippur War. Similarly to Eshkol, Rabin was actively undermined by his Defence 
Minister. Peres’ support within the Labour Party was such that Rabin could not afford 
  282to dismiss him. Rabin’s position and his government’s political base were further 
weakened by the actions of Gush-Emunim and the Coalition promises made to the 
NRP. Furthermore, the active role taken by the US, in the post-war negotiations, 
ensured that the Rabin government was under pressure from both domestic and 
international sources. Rabin could have pursued a coherent and comprehensive long-
term policy but, partly because of his weak position, the political risks were greater 
than his chances for success.  
 
 
Summary 
 
In conclusion, in the ten years following the Six Day War, successive Israeli 
governments, under the leadership of the Labour Party, did not have a coherent and 
comprehensive long-term policy in regard to the Occupied Territories. There were 
many factors that contributed to this lack of clear long-term policy. The Occupied 
Territories posed demographic, military, economic, diplomatic and political problems 
for the state of Israel. They also brought to the fore an unresolved Normative debate 
regarding the nature of Israel’s polity. This was epitomised by the inability of 
successive governments to define whether the problems required an Instrumental or 
Normative approach. Moreover, the Occupied Territories became entangled in a 
growing debate regarding the role of religion within the Israeli society.
8 The 
increasing religious awareness had a direct impact on the Israeli political system, i.e. 
on the NRP, and its approach towards the Occupied Territories. The Labour Party 
undermined internally by its faction-based politics, grappled with the issue and was 
ultimately unable to provide a long-term solution to the problem. The failure to find a 
solution, either by the party or by the government, was further complicated by the 
lack of American pressure on Israel. Under no substantial American pressure, being 
distrustful of the Arab world and unable to clearly define the nature of the problem 
and its solutions, decision makers were in no hurry to pursue a long-term policy. This 
situation was welcomed by several ministers, in particular Dayan, Allon and, to a 
lesser extent, Galili. These ministers publicly stated their demands for clear long-term 
policies, while using the policy vacuum to implement their own designs for the 
                                                 
8 See Pages 225-226. 
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Occupied Territories.  
 
Successive Israeli governments, unable to navigate the treacherous diplomatic and 
political waters, were against the adoption of a clear long-term policy. Nevertheless, 
while advocating a non-committing approach, so as to leave all the options open, they 
acted in an incoherent manner that undermined their own interests and efforts to 
achieve peace in the region. Israel’s actions, in particular, in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip were in direct contradiction to its stated strategic and demographic 
objectives. These actions threatened to put Israel on a trajectory towards a one-state 
solution without providing Palestinians with equal rights; a solution all political 
parties were against. The establishment of settlements outside the parameters of the 
Allon Plan did not only undermine the position of Jordan but, more importantly, it 
contradicted Israel’s stated desire to avoid a de-facto annexation of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. By its own actions, Israel was bringing itself closer to a one-state 
solution.  
 
This was a period of time in which Israel was gifted a unique opportunity to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through the various committees it had established, the 
government was well aware of the need to find a long-term solution for the Occupied 
Territories; a solution that encompassed the many challenges posed by the territories. 
Instead, by acting against their declared aims and stated objectives, successive Israeli 
governments squandered this opportunity.  
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